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ABSTRACT
In this thesis attention is focussed on the antithetical and 
complementary roles played by T.S. Eliot and D.H. Lawrence in the 
criticism of F.R# Leavis. They figure both as subjects for and 
as influences upon that criticism, end are seen by Leavis as 
conç>lementary forces from an early stage in his career as a critic.
An attempt is made to explain Leavis* s shifting valuations of these 
authors by reference to the work of four philosophers for whom he 
has expressed admiration.
Santayana* s ideas are seen to favour the influence of both Eliot 
and Lawrence. Particular attention is paid to the concepts of 
tradition and impersonality in relation to Eliot, and to the way in 
which Santayana* B version of * impersonality* is congruous with Lawrence’s 
view of the artist as a man for whom there is no distinction between the 
living (and suffering) individual and *the mind Wiich creates*.
Wiitehead*8 philosophy of organism, and the overriding importance 
attached to the human individual by Collingwood and Polanyi are seen 
as further reinforcements of Leavis*s high valuation of Lawrence.
Because Whitehead and Polanyi are both philosophers with a grounding 
in the natural sciences they are seen to be aptly invoked by Leavis in 
his controversy with Lord Snow on the nature of culture, and this 
controversy in its turn is seen to reflect part of Leavis* s concern ' 
with Lawrence.
This study is not a comprehensive view of influences upon Leavis 
as a critic. But it is hoped that, by concentrating attention upon 
the major figures of Eliot and Lawrence and the possible influence 
of four philosophers, some light has been cast valuably on Leavis* s 
critical premisses and in particular on his view of the relation of 
literature to life.
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Introduction
Tracing influences on the critical practice of Leavis is a 
difficult undertaking. Leavis is still not just alive, but actively 
engaged in the teaching and criticism of literature. However, as 
Leavis himself recognises, the fact remains that in the formation 
of his critical ideas he was impressed by certain writers.
This thesis is not intended to deal e^ diaustively with all the 
formative influences on the criticism of Leavis. its principle 
concern is vritii T.S. Eliot and D.H. Lawrmce who have both profoundly 
Influenced Leavis as a literary critic, and who have also been the 
occasion of some of his own most influen;^ tial criticism. In recent 
years, Leavis has referred more than once to philosophers whom he has 
found valuable for particular insights, and it will be argued that a 
better understanding of the nature of Leavis*s criticism, and in 
particular of his dealings with Eliot and Lawrence, can be arrived 
at if we look also at -vjhat has certainly or possibly interested him 
in the work of four philosophers vdiose names appear in his writings: 
George Santayana, A.N. bhitehead, E.G. Collingwood and Michael Polanyi.
Here an objection has to be forestalled. It may be argued that 
Leavis is well knox-jn for his distrust of abstract and philosophical 
thinking; how can it be then that he is influenced by such 
philosophers? The ansxfer is that Leavis makes use only of those of 
their ideas that pertain to literary criticism proper and enforce 
his claims fortthe human world* relegating the abstract philosophical 
argument to the specialist.
Santayana* s ideas, it will be seen, move in the direction of 
both Eliot and Lawrence. Tradition, impersonality and the expediency 
of a dispassionate approach to works of literature are prominent in 
Santayana* s ^ jritings, and are recurrent in both Eliot and Lawrence,
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and are dr aim upon by Leavis* But Eliot* s initial view of 
impersonality as implying a complete separation between the man 
who suffers and the mind which creates has not been found felicitous 
by Leavis (though he worked under its spell for some time). Keamdiile 
it is at variance with the notion of vitalism expounded by Lawrence, 
the philosophy of organism outlined by Vliitahead, and the doctrine of 
* personal loiowledge* inlierent in the writings of Collingt-rood and 
Polanyi. EHot's classicism, which Lax-rence describes as * bunkum* 
in a phrase to which Leavis frequently returns, is associated in 
Leavis* s mind with a dry Intellectual tone largely arising from 
prolific reading of books but not from experience of life. In 
Leavis* s mind it is related to Fle^ oert* s aestheticisn, the doctrine 
of *art for art*s sake’ and the 'Bloomsbury Group* with their one­
sided axid exclusive interest in the autonomy and aestheticism of art.
This classicism, Leavis discovered, would debar the critic from 
appreciating the whole of the ’Romantic Movement* in which the cult 
of personality looms large, and which in Leaxris’s view, * enriched 
the human heritage* *
With^EHofs classicism Leavis could not appreciate Blalce, 
Dickens, VJordsxmrth and Lawrence who form the axis of Leavis*s 
critical beux/rei  ^The ni sus, intuition, and spontaneity 
discernible in the writings of these authors are diametrically 
opposed to the notion of’technique* favoured by Eliot.
Added to this is the restrictive tone that dominates Eliot’s 
criticism from his entry into the Church of England. Eliot’s 
consequent identification of tradition >dth Christianity not only 
narrows down the range of the literary tradition but also rules out 
writers who are not professedly Christian-'writers like La-^ rence 
for whom Leavis* s admiration is intense.
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All these factors have contributed to Leavis*s disenchantment 
with Eliot. Eliot's restrictive view of Cliristianity is replaced in 
Leavis* s spectrum by the notion of human and moral relativity, a 
notion that he found available in the x-jritings of Santayana, Lawrence, 
Uiitehead, Collingwood and Polanyi. The notion has temporal and 
spatial qualities that maEce it Imperative to see the work of art not 
just in relation to the age, but also to the society in which it is 
produced. It is in terms of that moral relativity that he rates so 
highly Dickens, Blake, and Lai-rence, and even Eliot himself; but Eliot 
the poet whose Four Quartets transcends any doctrin.al frame and is at 
the same time a strong and pertinent protest against our *technologico- 
Benthamite i’ige*.
Leavis's relation to Collingviood and Polanyi is somexdiat 
'ticklish* if one can use that word, in the sense that they are 
referred to only in recent work, and in the context of Leavis's 
attack on C.P. Biiow's Two Cultures. Their ii7Ç)ortance is that they 
not only illustrate Leavis*© view of the oneness of the human 
tradition, but also the potency of the human element in an age of 
a massive teclmological and computational -drift. Hence they take 
Laxrence* s notion of life as inherent in the individual a step further 
to assert the inalienable creativity of man in an age in which computers 
and machines seem to render human beings redundant and unnecessary.
The line of argument adopted in the thesis is not linear but 
circular in the sense that it does not take up a ceitain point, and 
develop it to a logical conclusion, but rather tackles certain themes 
that are seen to represent Leavis*s major points of emphasis. These 
points recur, in varying degrees, in every chapter, and by virtue of 
their recurrence, it is hoped, the influence of the authors singled 
out for discussion on Leavis is clarified.
» «#
The chapters are ordered in such a way as to lead to Leavis* s
most recent criticism and for this reason the addition of a formal
conclusion seemed unnecessary*
Matthew Arnold and I.A* Richards are two names often associated
with that of Leavis. It might be as xfell to indicate the extent of
Leavis*s indebtedness to these tw critics, however cursorily.
Richards does not appear to be a major influence; Matthew Arnold,
however, has influenced Leavis not only in terms of ideas, but also
in his very vocabulary. Looking at Richardè*s contribution to the
formation of Leavis* s ideas we find that it manifests itself mainly
in the notion of tradition and in the practical analysis of wx>rks .
of literature. Leavis quotes the following passage from Richards' s
Practical Criticism;
From the beginning civilization has been dependent 
upon speech, for >;ords are our chief link with the 
past, and with one another, and the channel of our 
spiritual inlieritance. As the other vehicles of 
tradition, the family and the community, for example, 
are dissolved, we are forced more and more to rely 
upon language. 1
Reliance on language has been seized upon by Leavis as a means of
maintaining the continuity of tradition* In English Literature in our
Time and the University Leavis sees Richards's chapters on 'Rhybiim
and Metre*, and on 'Poetry for Poetry's saice* in The Principles of
Literanr Criticism, as his most liiportant contribution to criticism,
as they released criticism from the fallacy of form, and 'pure 
2
sound value *.
1. F.R. Leavis k Denys Thompson, Culture and Environment, London, 
Chatto and Windus, 1933, reprint 196L. p.61
2. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and The University 
London, Chatto and Windus, 19^ 7, p.17
Leavis feels, however, that Richards's increasing pre-occupation 
with questions of e^asiology, logic end psychology has not very much 
advanced the concrete analysis of works of literature.^
Mhat about Arnold?
Leavis has often been described as the heir of Arnold, and the
description has a substantial element of truth, Leavis acknowledges
Arnold as one of the major formative influences on him.^
As- early as 1930 Leavis takes his cue from a quotation from
Arnold's Culture and Anarchy, a quotation with which he opens his
Mass Civilization and Minority Culture;
And this function is particularly important in our 
modern world, of which the whole civilization is, to 
a much greater degree than the civilization of Greece 
and Rome, mechanical and external, and tends 
constantly to become more so. It
Arnold's conception of 'mechanical* and 'external*
civilization, accompanied by * spiritual philistinism* evolved,
in Leavis* s hands, into that of the technologico-Benthamite
civilization, a phrase that sums up Leavis* a reaction against
the overwhelming advance of technology and obsession with material
well-being. In his introductory essay to English Literature in our
Time and The University, Leavis saysi
1. ibid, pp 1 -17
2. John Gross, The Rise & Fall of the Kan of Letters, London, 
R-eidenfeld and Hicolson, 19^ 9, p.2o9 and Philip Rahv, 
Literature end the Sixth Sense, London, Faber and Faber, 1970 
p. 290
3. LxnztaxÿXËx F.R. Leavis, Imna Karenina and other Fssays, London, 
Chatto and Mindus, 1907, p.177
U* F.R. Leavis, Education and The University, London, Chatto and 
Lindus, 19^ 1, reprint, 19up, p.113
VJaat we face in iinmediate view is a nightmare 
intensification of what Arnold feared. He saw 
this country in danger of becoming a greater 
Holland; we see it unmistakably turning with 
rapid acceleration into a little America. By 
'greater* Arnold meant bigger; what he feared 
was the relative loss of that which had made 
England great^as distinguished from rich, 
materially prosperous and powerful, bliat we 
see now in the rapid assimilation of this 
country to America is the jettisoning of all 
that made it no more paradoxical that England 
should have produced English literature than 
that America should be producing the American 
literature that American wealth is bestowing 
on the world and American prestige recommending, 1
The distinction between England and America, as Leavis
sees it, lies in the sense of rootedness, tradition, and organic
community from which English literature springs. This rootedness
is associated in Leavis *s mind with the rural England of
Shakespeare and Bunyan where "society was in the fullest measure
permeated by thought, sensible to beauty, intelligent and alive** ^
to put it in Arnold!an terms.
That is xdiy Leavis is keen to indicate that the distinction
he draws between England and America, far from being a matter for
praise or dispraise, is a determined attempt to return to origins,
to tradition and to communal life. In a letter to The Times
Literary Supplement he says:
I had hoped I had made i^ plain that I didn't 
regard America's strength^ with its conditions 
and concomitants, as a matter for simple attitudes 
of ^proval or disapproval, pleasure or displeasure.
Such simple attitudes - and that was an insistence 
of mine - are out of place in the world of 
complexities and ambiguities in which we have to 
determine what stance our sense of personal 
responsibility dictates. 3
1. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and The University, p. 33
2. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, Cambridge University Press,
1918, p. 69
3. F.R. Leavis, Letters in Criticism, (ed) John Tasker, London,
Chatto and Windus, 197b, p. 133
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Arnold's definition of culture as 'the study of perfection'
and perfection as 'an inward condition of the mind and spirit at
variance xdth the mechanical and material civilization in esteem 
1
with US' was later adumbrated in Leavis*s insistence on 'the
autonomy of the human spirit». Leavis says:
I was merely insisting that there is an intrinsic 
huiiian nature, with needs and latent potentialities 
the most brilliant scientist may very well be blank 
about^ and the technologically directed planner may 
ignore^with (it doesn't need arguing) disastrous 
consequences. 2
To put an end to the adverse consequences of this accelerating
teclmological advance Leavis proposes the notion of an educated
public capable of appreciating literature and the University as a
centre of that appreciation. In making this proposition he was
insiDired by Arnold's leading ideas. Leavis himself recognizes
tliis saying:
I have perhaps made it plain by now that my 
associated insistences-on the University and on 
English literature-are txfo enchases in the 
e^ qpression of the same basic concern. It is the 
concern that it was Arnold* s distinction to have 
given expression to and that makes the conception 
of the function of criticism he stands for - he 
made it part of the English speaking cultural 
heritage - a significant development. 3
Leavis* s insistence on the notion of tradition that malces 
for continuity had been heralded by Arnold. Arnold finds it a 
matter for regret that Englishmen have lost their sense of identity 
vjith the national past: In "on The Study of Celtic Literature**,
for example, Arnold says:
1. Matthew Arnold, op.cit. p. 1+9
2. F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall My Sword, London, Chatto and windus, 
1972, p.9U
3. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and the University, 
p.U2
•  ô -
on tills side - Wales,- Wales, where the past still 
lives, where every place has its tradition; every 
name its poetry; and where the people, the genuine 
people, still knows this past, this tradition, this 
poetry and lives with it and clings to it; while, 
alas, the prosperous Saxon on the other side, the 
invader from Liverpool and Birkenhead has long ago 
forgotten his. 1
Arnold's insistence on the Hellenic, Hebraic, and Bliz^ethsn 
periods as sources of vitality in Culture and Anarchy, is also 
illustrative of his concern with the notion of tradition.
Like Arnold, Leavis attaches paramount Importance to
literature and to the moral character inlierent in works of
literature. But this statement needs qualifying, for the
imriortance attached by Arnold to poetry has a materialistic,
pragmatic tinge. In "The btudy of Poetry" Arnold says:
The best poetry is what we want; the best poetry 
will be found to have a poirer of forming, sustaining, 
and delighting us as nothing else can. A clearer, 
deeper sense of the best in poetry, and of the 
strength and joy to be dr aim from it, is the most 
precious benefit which we can gather from a poetical 
collection such as the present. 2
(the Collection is Ward's English Poets). Before that he has
already stated
... in poetry as a criticism of life, under the 
conditions fixed for such a criticism by the laws 
of poetic truth and poetic beauty the spirit of 
our race will find, we have said, as time goes on,- 
and as other helps fail, its consolation and stay.
1. Matthew Arnold, Lectures and Essays in Criticism (ed)
R.H. Super, Ann /irbcr, The University of Michigan Press,
1?o2, p. 291
2. Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism, first and second series, 
London, Everyman's Library, p.237
3. ibid, p.23d
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Although Vincent Buckley interprets the phrase 'criticism of
life' to meen 'interpretation, evaluation, feeling for, sympathetic
shoring in'; it does not mean carping at, or even rational analysis.
The immediate function of poetry is a quasi-religious, not a social 
1
one" , and although Leavis vindicates Arnold's phrase "as e:5>ressing
an intention counter to the tendency that finds its consummation in
'Art for Art's salce'I still feel that the phrase is an infelicitous
one because the phrasing suggests a narrovdng dovm of the vast range
poetry is presuraed to embody^ namely the e>-perience of the human race
at large. To hold poetry as a substitute for religion - as Arnold
does - is to blur the distinction between ti^  recognizably different
disciplines. Leavis himself states this view saying:
'The element that dates' in the worst sense is that 
represented by the famous opening in idiich Arnold 
suggests that religion is going to be replaced by 
poetry. 3
Arnold's views of poetry as 'a criticism of life' and as 
' a substitute for religion' are coloured by his pre-occupation t-dth 
Victorian material civilization and his loss of faith in religion.
Follovdng Arnold's lead, Leavis assigns this great importance 
to literature without committing himself to any reductive statanent. 
He sees in the poetic e}g)erience a process that strilces deep roots 
that are comraon to human beings - these deep roots he designates 
as ïTioral and religious:
1. Vincent Buckley, Poetry end Morality, London, Chatto and Windus, 
19o8, pp.36-37
2. F.R. Leavis,'Arnold as Critic' Scrutiny, vol.Vll, No.3.
December 1938, p. 321+
3. ibid, p. 322
- l o ­
in coming to terras with great literature we discover 
what at bottom we really believe. What for - what 
ultimately for ? What do men live by - the questions 
vjork and tell at what I can only call a religious 
depth of thought and feeling. 1
Leavis*s view of the function of criticism shows another
aspect of Arnold's influence # Leavis*s life- long dedication
to criticism as a discipline and to the vindication of the
critical activity is essentially Arnoldian in spirit. Arnold's
definition of criticism as 'a free play of the mind on all
2subjects which it touches', strikes a sensitive chord in Leavis. 
Arnold also identifies * the free play of the mind* with 'the life
3
of intelligence'. Leavis speaics of the function of the critic
in terms of 'critical intelligence', ^ and as in Arnold, the vrord
'intelligence' is crucial to his critical vocabulary.
Like Arnold, Leavis recommends critics to concentrate on the 
concrete analysis of specific works of literature without busying 
themselves with abstract formulations. In 'The Study of Poetry' 
Arnold says:
Critics give themselves great labour to draw out
\jîiat in the abstract constitutes the characters of
a higlv quality of poetry. It is much better to 
have recourse to concrete examples; to take specimens 
of poetry of the high, the very highest quality, and 
to say: The characters of the highest quality of
poetry are what is e3q)ressed here. ^
1. F.R. Leavis, Two Cultures ? The Significance of O.P. Snow,
London, Chatto and Windus, 19^ 2, p. 23
2* Matthew Arnold, Lectures and Essays in Criticism (ed) R.H. Super, p#270
3. ibid, p.268
K
i+. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p.225
5. Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism, pp. 21+3*2W+
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This repudiation of the abstract in favour of the concrete has
become one of Leavis* s leading critical principles; censuring Eliot
for falling to induce the contributors to The Criterion to stick to
the concrete, Leavis, in "Under which King, ... Bezonian"? says:
The relevance of the point may be enforced by 
remaridjig the particular weakness of The Criterion, 
for the dead, academic kind of abstract tl:iinking 
especially when the 'thinker* (incapable of literary 
criticism) stands in a general abstract way, for 
'order' intelligence, and the other counters all of 
J) which 6 0  worthless than nothing if not related 
scrupulously to the concrete. 1
In another context Leavis once again says:
You can't profitably discuss the standards apart 
from the purposes and the methods, or apart from 
the actual functioning of criticism in the 
contemporary world. And apart from the ability 
to arrive at intelligent and sensitive judgments in 
the concrete e^xcept, that is, as informed by 
critical experience - understanding of the nature 
of critical judgment in the abstract can amount 
to little. 2
In The Function of Criticism at the Present Time Arnold sums
3
up the function of the critic in one word 'disinterestedness'.
Leavis makes ample use of the word in his critical discourses.
Clarifying Hopkins's sense of humour, for example, Leavis says:
Hopkins's humour is the humour of a disinterested, 
mature, perfectly poised and completely serious 
mind, and has in it nothing of defensiveness, 
superiority or donnishness. h
1. Scrutiny, vol.l, no.3, Decmber 1932, p.211^
2. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and The University 
p. 1+6
3. Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism, p.20 
i+. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p.
- 12 -
He also describes Lawrence saying:
... he was, in fact, intelligent, as only the 
completely serious and disinterested can be, 1
Later on he saj’-s:
••• For disinterested intelligence and the 
creative impulse that goes with it, the urgency 
of the human crisis is both a challenge and an 
opportunity, 2
Eut this disinterestedness is qualified wiien the critic 
comes to pass a judgment on the work of literature. This 
judgment becomes Inevitably personal and in that sense creative. 
That is why Arnold arrogates to criticism *a joyful sense of 
creative activity',^  Leavis’s view of criticism as ’creative’^  
and not objective as Eliot maintains, is Arnoldian.
Arnold’s critical writings provide Leavis with a number of 
critical teras that he harnesses to serve his cm purposes. 
Pointing to Chaucer’s superiority over the romance poets, Arnold 
says:
Chaucer had not their helplessness, he has gained 
tlie power to survey the world from a central, a 
truly human point of view. o
7
Leavis capitalizes on this'notion of ’hujnan centrality', 
and makes it one of his operative critical criteria. Describing 
Laurence's achievement in The Horse Dealer's D->ughter Leavis says:
1. ibid, p.238
2. F.R, Leavis, Lor bhall my Sword, p.215
3. Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism, p. 285
U, F.R. Leavis, Lor Shall my Sword, p.97
5. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, London, Faber and Faber, p.25
6. Matthew Arnold, op.cit, p.2l+7
7. The word 'centrality' 'as the soul of all good criticism'
occurs in 'The Literary Influence of Academies' p.55
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Vjhen we come to The Horse Dealer's Daughter it is 
not so difficult to suggest, in description, the 
kind of thing it offers. And yet, the classical 
perfection of the tale in its simple human centrality 
is bound up with its remoteness from anything in the 
nature of a cliche, 1
And in his article on 'Johnson as Critic' he again says;
Johnson's critical writings erliibit very notably 
the characteristic wisdom, force and human 
centrality of the great moralist, 2
The tjord 'movement' is another illustration of Arnold's 
influence on Leavis. Exprès sing his enthusiasm for Chaucer's 
poetic skill, Arnold says:
Of his style and manner, if we thinlc first of 
the romance poetry and then of Chaucer's divine 
liquidness of diction, his divine fluidity of 
movement, it is difficult to speak temperately. 3
And in the same article he again says;
A nation may have versifiers T-dth smooth numbers, 
and easy rhymes and yet may have no real poetry 
at all. Chaucer is the father of our splendid 
English poetry, he is our 'well of English 
undefiled', because by the lovely charm of his 
diction, the lovely charm of his movement, he 
makes sn epoch and founds a tradition. In 
Spenser, Shakespeare and ï-llton, Keats, we can 
follow the tradition of the liquid diction 
the fluid movement of Chaucer. i+
In one of his famous essays titled 'Imagery and Movement' 
Leavis seems to draw on Arnold's term, and though Leavis tends 
to equate 'movemmt' with his favourite terms ' enacWent ' and
1, F.R, Leavis, D.H. Lairence; Novelist, London, Penguin Books, 
1955, reprint 1970, p. 259
2. F.R, Leavis, Anna Karenina and other Essays, p. 197 
3* Matthew Arnold, op.cit, p. 21+7
i+. Matthew Arnold, Fssays in Criticism p. 21+7* The word 
'movement* makes further appearance in 'On Translating 
Homer*, Matthew Arnold, Fssays Literary and Critical,
London, J.K. Dent, pp. 210-22
— li+ —
'imagery* yet the Arnoldian connotation manifests itself idien he 
compares XJordsT-jorth's two poems 'Surprised by Joy' and 'Calais 
Beach' end reports;
^Sniprd^d_by_Joyÿ demands a constant and most 
sensitive vigilance in the reader, and even if he 
know-5 the poem well^he is imlikely to satisfy 
himself at the firèt attei:npt, such and so many 
are the shifts of tone, emphasis, modulation, 
tempo, and so on, that the voice is required to 
register ('movement* here, it will be seen, is 
the way the voice is made to move, or feel that 
it is moving, in a sensitive reading-out). 1
In The function of Criticism at the Present Time jlrnold says;
" ... the touch of truth is the touch of life", and then says
... every one can see that a poet, for instance, 
ought to know life end the world before dealing 
• with then in poetry, and life and the world being 
in modern times very comple:: things, the creation 
of a modern poet, to be worth much, implies a great 
deal of critical efiott behind it. 2
3Leavis quotes these vjords in his essay on 'Eliot and Milton*,
end later on we find that he mdces use of them in his critical
discussion. He, for instance, says
the judgments the literary critic is concerned 
with are judgments about life. i+
1. gcrrutiny, vol. 10.11, no,2, September 19i+5, p.
2. Matthew Arnold, Lectures' and Essays in Criticism, (ed) R.H, Super, p.261
3. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p.29
!+. F.R, Leavis,. Nor Shall Ey SVord, p.97
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Santayana and Leavis
Santayana's critical writings can be described as lending 
themselves to the opposed views of Eliot and Lawrence. In tracing 
Santayana's influence on Eliot this chapter will suggest the notion 
of tradition, the 'objective correlative' formula, and partlyDthe
doctrine of impersonality as points of reference. i The doctrine, of
i ■. /'
impersonality raises an issue involving two of the, authors to be
X  / y  ■
discussed in this thesis. Sant^ana and Eliot are bbtbr-agreed on 
the need for rendering the artistic emotion in an adequate iapersonal 
form; but they do not show accord on the nature of this impersonalization.
1. George Santayana (1861-1952) is a philosopher, poet, literary 
critic, novelist (he wrote a semi-autobiographical novel titled 
The Last Puritan) and even a dramatist (he wrote a tragedy called 
Lucifer largely modelled on Goethe's Faust). Of a Spanish father
and a Catalan mother he was bom in Madrid on December 16, 1863. 
After a "friendly if not altogether pleasant separation" his 
mother returned with her three children by the first American 
husband (Nathaniel Russell Sturgis) to the United States. In 
July 1872 Santayana joined them; he was nearly nine years old.
He went through grammar school, high school, and Harvard College, 
graduating from Harvard in 1886, He secured a Harvard College 
fellowship grant for two years to the University of Berlin. He 
worked on Lotze for his thesis and in I889 he was awarded his 
doctorate and appointed to the staff of the Harvard department 
of Philosophy. He was sent as an advanced graduate student to 
King's College, Cambridge in 1896-I897. He went on sabbatical 
in 190U-I905 to Italy and the East, and in 1905-1906 he was an 
exchange professor at the Sorbonne. In 1907 he was sppointed 
full Harvard professor. In 1912 his mother died and he resigned 
his Harvard professorship, spending the rest of his life in 
Europe (cf. 1 - George Santayana "A general confession", Paul 
Arthur Schilpp (ed) The Philosophy of George Santayana, New York, 
Tudor Publishing Company, 1951, PP- 3-30. 2 - Norman Henfrey (ed)
Selected Critical "Writings of George Santayana, vol.l, Cambridge 
University Press, 1969, PP- 1-37- 3 - Encyclopaedia Britannica
vol. 19, pp- 10U3-1014+).
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Eliot insista that there is a separation between the man vJao 
suffers and the mind which creates, but Santayana views the 
creative individual as an indivisible ;Aole. Eliot* 3 profession 
of classicism and belief in original sin predispose him to be 
dubious about the possible integrity of the individual; and his 
assault on the 'inner voice' is a quick reminder of this distrust.
From the social angle we notice that Eliot ^eaks of the
individual not as an independent entity entitled to particular
consideration, but rather in relation to the family, class and 
1society.
Santayana, like Lawrence, thinks that the individual is the
centre of any social life. In sn interesting essay significantly
titled "The Indomitable Individual" he says;
The individual is the only seat and focus of social 
forces. If society and government are to be justified 
at all, they must be justified in his eye and by his 
instinct ... Man is constrained to be more or less 
social by his mode of propagation but this constraint, 
so to speak, is peripheral, the core of his being has 
a closed, private and indomitable life* Every man 
has a soul of his oi-m. 2
In his essay on 'John Galsworthy' Lawrence similarly insists 
that life is primarily individual and laments the over-.emphasis 
on the social being, "But the fatal change today is the collapse 
from the psychology of the free human Individual into the '• 
psychology of the social being". 3
1. T.S. Eliot, Notas Torfards the Dfinition of Culture, London, 
Faber and Faber, lÿi+B, ppV 36-66*
2. George Santayana, Obiter Script a; London, Gonst^le and Company 
1936, p. 66 (first published in The New Republic y Hay
3# D.H, Larjrence, Phoenix I,London, Heinemann, reprint I9 6I, p.51+0.
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Furthermore Santayana's interest in the 'immediacy' and sincerity
of the artistic experience, and the Romantic movement as a -whole
is in line with the vital tone of Lawrence. These points will be
given more attention in the next two chapters on Eliot and Lawrence.
The immediate concern of this chapter is with the influence of
Santayana on Leavis.
Though Leavis in 'Tragedy and The Medium'  ^dissents from
2
the views expressed by Santayana in 'Tragic Philosophy*, he does
K
not fail to recognize that he made use of the essay in his 
discussion of literary criticism with his undergraduate-students. 
What is more revealing as 'Tragedy and The Medium' testifies, 
is that Leavis holds Santayana in a very high esteem, and in 
Leavis's ambit this esteem is accorded only to a few. It is quite 
rare for Leavis to describe a critic as brilliant, witty, and 
sharply intelligent as Santayana is qualified in this essay.
This esteem is further consolidated by Mrs Leavis ' s 
favourable review of Santayana's critical writings in Scrutiny.^
In this review she concentrates on some of Santayana's critical 
works, and recommends them for study by students of English 
literature. The essay brings out a number of points of 
significance related to Santayana's characteristic critical 
approach. First, she argues that Santayana's criticism is not 
philosophical in the abstract sense of the word, because he 
concentrates on a textual analysis of a given work, and if he 
points to a certain philosophy, the reference is based on the 
total experience of the work. (She cites his essay on Browning 
and Whitman as illustrative of this view). Secondly, his Latin
1. F.R. Leavis, Scrutiny, vol.12, Autumn 19U1+, PP- 21+9-260.
2. Scrutiny, March 1936, pp. 365-378.
3. Scrutiny, vol.IV, No.3, December 1935, PP- 278-295-
background afforded him that impartial tone that characterizes 
his criticism of English literature. Comparing Santayana's 
essay, in Three Philosophical Poets, to Eliot's on Dante she says:
it (Santayana's essay) illustrates the superior 
sophistication and detachment of the disillusioned 
• catholic. It is perhaps not impertinent to say that 
the Anglo-Catholic attitude to Dante is there felt 
to be reverential to the point of prostration and to 
the exclusion of a critical attitude. The cool 
approach of Santayana^ equally serious and equally 
sensitive to Dante's genius but free also to register 
critical dis satisfaction^  comes out in refreshing 
contrast and is justified by the use he makes of 
his criticisms for comparative study. 1
Adopting the same procedure, but on a different plane, she
compares Santayana's criticism of Dickens with Chesterton's saying:
Chesterton, while desiring to be immeasurably 
laudatorydoes not succeed in isolating or pointing 
to the peculiar virtues of Dickens's writings; all that 
his book does is to project on to a fictitious 
Dickens the highly coloured and boisterous literary 
personality of G.K. Chesterton. It is a Teutonic and 
insular piece of work, and in the end, does neither 
Dickens nor his readers any good. Santayana's essay 
is perfectly impersonal (one's consciousness of an 
un-English force at work behind it does not conflict 
mth this statement); while making all the radical 
criticisms of Dickens he also distinguishes his 
unique merits and values them as highly as possible. 2.
This analysis is supplemented by the equally relevant 
examination of the social background of the artist. Lîrs Leavis 
dwells -frdth satisfaction on Santayana's association of the work 
of art with the social environment (a strategy that was 
subsequently developed by Mr and I'lrs Leavis in their literary 
criticism). She endorses Santayana's cynical attitude to the 
academic life at Harvard University - an attitude that was later
1. ibid, p. 282
2. ibid, pp.282-283.
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echoed in her attack on academics at Cambridge - as this chapter 
will show later on. In the most enthusiastic and panegyrical terms 
she concludes her essay on Santayana by ^ plying to him one of 
his own favourite dicta 'Intelligence is the highest form of 
vitality'. ^
In the course of her criticiaa of the 'good taste» of
Oxford "dons" like George Gordon, whose main preoccupation in
literary studies, she feels, was to show their egotism and their
strong zeal for second and third rate writers and to reduce
genuine literary appreciation to the mere editing of books, she
points out that for such a group^%he most genuinely witty, urbane
2and brilliant critic, Santayana, will make no impression.
leavis's interest in Santayana dates back to the early
twenties, and judging by documentary evidence, the influence of
Santayana is seen at work in Leavis's writings since 192!+, when
Leavis in his Ph.D. thesis, draws on Santayana's description of
the poet, in the course of his distinction between the poet and
the journalist I
But the sense of the distinction is clear if we think
of the poet who (as Santayana describes him) tspokesman
of his full soul at a given moment cannot consider
eventualities or think of anything but the message he
is sent to deliver, whether the world can then hear
him or not'. A journalist must consider eventualities. 3
1* ibid, p ,295
2. Scrutiny, vol.Xll, No.l, Winter 19k3, p,l8
3. F.R. Leavis "The Relationship of Journalism to Literature" 
an unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of 
Cambridge in 1921+, p.L, and quoted from Reason ^  Art, London, 
Archibald and Constable 1905, and reprinted 192!+, p.370.
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In New Bearings in English Poetry Leavis makes use of 
Santayana's Interpretations of Poetry and Religion in drawing 
the analogy between Eliot's Ash-¥ednesday and Dante's Divine Comedy. ^
I^  revaluation Leavis capitalizes on Santayana's views in his 
2
essay on Shelley.
In Education and the University, Leavis refers twice with
approval to Santayana's Three Philosophical Poets. Elaborating
Pound's list of works to be read by the aspirant to literary
training Leavis says "... there is Dante, whom one hasn't merely
read as one has Goethe and Lucretius (for one has, of course, read
Santayana's Three Philosophical Poets". ^ The second reference is
made in the course of Leavis's recommendation of reading classic
works, at least in translation, if they are not written in one's
native language or in the languages he knows, a view Wiich runs
counter to that expounded by Pound "one can read Dante, and helped,
say, by Mr Eliot's remarkable essay, and by Mr Santayana's Three
Philosophical Poets, which Mr Pound seems to despise, form something
more than an academic notion of Dante's place in the European
tradition". ^ But Leavis's acknowledgment of indebtedness to
Santayana is frankly stated in the opening sentences in his essay
a
on "Eliot as Critic". In those early years - says Leavis - after 
the great hiatus, as in a dazed and retarded way I struggled to 
achieve the beginnings of the power of articulate thought about
1. F.R. Leavis, New Bearings, p.106.
2. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, pp. 208-222-227.
3. F.R. Leavis, Education and The University, p.106.
i+. ibid, p.13U
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literature, it was Santayana. I picked up Logan Pearsall Smith's 
Idttle Essays from the W itings of George Santayana, when it came 
outn.’ If Leavis does not feel entirely h^py with the essays, 
this may be due to the fact that, in Smith* s edition the essays 
are excised, fragmentary and abstracted from the meaningful context 
in which they should be seen.
Furthermore Santayana stayed in England from Iplk to 1918, 
mostly at Oxford and frequented Cambridge. At that time Leavis* s 
critical ideas were fermenting and it is possible that Santayana 
helped to form them. This is at least -jdiat this study ai£is to show.
To trace the influence of Santayana on Leavis I will deal with 
three main topics: The Work of Art., The Function of the Critic,
and The Relativity of Human Values. These topics overlap, and in 
doing so they will help to show the relationship between the two 
critics. In this connection chronology, I think, is not essential 
as Santayana had virtually finished as a critic before Leavis began.
But if Santayana influenced Leavis, he certainly also exerted 
an influence on Eliot; and since Eliot himself is a formative 
influence on Leavis, it would be advisable to deal with Santayana* s 
influence on Eliot here because this process, as I hope to show, 
will clarify much of idiat is in common between Santayana and Leavis.
Santayana and Eliot
The idea of tradition underlies Santayana* s literary 
criticism. This idea is also a cornerstone in Eliot's critical
-1. F.R. Leavis, Anna Karenina and other Essays, London, Chatto 
Windus, 1967, p. 177.
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practice. It is not surprising to learn that Santayana was Eliot* s
professor at Harvard; the student probably assimilated, much of the
critical ideas of his professor, Herbert Howarth assures us that
Eliot attended Santayana* s courses both as an undergraduate and a 
1
postgraduate.
The impact of Santayana*s concept of tradition on Eliot's can 
be demonstrated by quoting from the two:
It is this continual digestion of the substance supplied 
by the past - says Santayana - that alone renders the 
insights of tne past still potent in the present and for 
the future. Living criticism, genuine appreciation is 
the interest we draw from year to year on the 
unrecoverable capital of human genius. 2
Eliot, in turn, defines tradition as 'the vitality of the 
past that enriches the life of the present*. ^
VJhat is worth emphasizing is that in the quotation from 
Santayana we have a glimpse of Eliot's notion of the historical 
sense which does not simply mean knowledge of something outdated 
and irrelevant, but rather a potent force co-present and co­
effective id.th contemporary works of art. The historical sense has 
a very subtle connotation as it refers to a work of art produced in 
the present and this is the temporal aspect of the historical sense, 
but this work, to be properly appreciated, should be simultaneously 
related to past works of art of idiich it forms a part, and in this 
act of judgment and appreciation the presentness of the present
1. Herbert Howarth, Notes on Some Figures behind T.S. Eliot, London, 
Chatto and Windus, 19bp, p. bij.. ~
2. George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, London, Oxford 
University Press, I960, p.1
3. T.S. Eliot, After Strange Gods, London, Faber and Faber 193U, p.30
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work of art and the pastness of previous works are fused so that 
both become contemporaneous. In his elaboration of the concept 
of tradition Eliot has emphasized the substantially effective 
potency of the present over the past. In other words present 
works of art affect past works (or at least our sense of them), 
in as much as they are affected by them. »»Wnat happens t-jhen 
a new work of art is created is something that happens to all 
works of art which preceded it. The existing monuments form 
an ideal order among themselves which is modified by the intro­
duction of the new (the really new work of art among them^’ ^
In his essay on Eliot, Hurray, Homer, and the Idea of 
Tradition", David Hard attributes Eliot* s concept of tradition 
largely to the influence of Gilbert Murray. He contends that 
Murray's lectures on the "Rise of the Greek epic»* delivered at 
Harvard and attended by Eliot, must have constituted the source
p
of Eliot's notion of tradition.  ^ To this contention the . 
following counter-propositions can be advanced. Of all the 
figures to whom Eliot acknowledges indebtedness, Murray is the 
least recognized; Eliot refers to him in the most derogatory 
terms in his essay "Euripides and Professor Î-Sirray". "... it is 
because professor Murray has no creative instinct that he leaves 
Euripides quite dead". Eliot attributes the success of the play.
1. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood, London, Methuen Co. Ltd. 
reprint 1969, p. ÿû.
2. Essays in Criticism , vol. 18, January 1968, pp. i|.7-59-
It should be observed that David Hard later modified -
rather mollified this emphasis in his book
T.S. Eliot - Between Two Worlds London, Routledge and 
Keg'an Paul, 1973, pp. i^ b-Sl.
3. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred Hood, p. 77.
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not to Hurray* s translation which is imperfect and lifeless, but 
to the lively performance of the actors. Ward's essay specifies 
Homer (and Homer's lUad in particular because it Vas the subject 
of Mirray's lectures) as the source of the concept, but Homer 
seems not to have had particular importance for Eliot. Eliot 
confesses that it was Virgil rather than Homer, and Virgil's 
snd not Homer's Iliad that attracted him to the study 
of classical literature. ^
Furthermore if Hurray in "The Iliad as a Great Poem»»,^
refers to the idea of tradition, he does so with reference to
Hi ad; in other words, his reference is occasional and
n6t insistently made as it is in Santayana. To consolidate
these counter statements I would put beside the lengthy
quotation David Ward takes from Murray, another one from
Santayana. Ward's quotation is:
But now comes a curious observation. We who are 
accustomed to modern literature always associate 
this sort of imaginative intensity with something 
personal. We connect it with an artist* s ' 
individualit^ o^r x-ith originality in the sense of 
'nexmess*. It seans as though, under modern 
conditions^ an artist usually did not feel or 
imagine intensely unless he xvas producing some 
wrk xdiich was definitely his own, and not 
another's xfork, xdiich must bear his personal
name and be marked by his personal character...
I do not specially wnsh to attack this mo-iern 
prejudice, if it is one. I largely share in it; 
and its excesses X'zill very likely disappear. But 
I do very greatly wish to point out that artistic 
feeling, in this matter, has not always been the 
same. Artists have not always wished to stamp 
their vjork with their personal characteristics or
1. T.S. Eliot, On Poetry and Poets, London, Faber and Faber,
pp. I23-I2U.
2. Gilbert Murray, The Rise of The Greek Epic, London,
Oxford University Press, 1907, reprint 193U, pp. 238-260
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even their personal names* Artists have sometimes 
been, as it were, Protestant or Iconoclast, unable 
to worship without asserting themselves against the 
established ritual of their religion^  sometimes^ in ’ 
happier circumstances, they have accepted and loved 
the ritual as part of the religion, and >jrought out 
their nexv wrks of poetry, not as protests, not as 
personal outbursts, but as glad and nameless offerings,, 
made in prescribed form to enhance the glory of the 
spirit whom they served ... Each successive poet did 
not assert himself against the tradition^ut gave 
himself up to the tradition, and added to its 
greatness and beauty all that was in him. The intensity 
of imagination which makes the Iliad alive is not, it 
seems to me, the imagination of any one man. It means 
not that one man of genius created a wonder and passed 
sway. It means that generations of poets, trained in 
the same schools and a more or less continuous and 
similar life, steeped themselves to the Ups in the 
spirit of this great poetry. 1
Santayana's passage runs as follows:
... life is an art not to be learned by observation 
and the most minute and comprehensive studies do not 
teach us what the spirit of man should have learned 
by its long living. He study the past as a dead 
object, as a ruin, not as an authority, and as an 
experiment. One reason why history xfas less interesting 
to former ages was that they were less conscious of 
separation from the past. The perspective of time 
was less clear, because the synthesis of experience 
was more complete. The mind does not easily 
discriminate the successive phases of an action in 
which it is still engaged, it does not arrange in a 
temporal series the elements of a single perception, 
but posits thera all together as constituting a 
permanent and real object. They thought of all 
reality as in a sense conteïîç>orary. 2.
Hith the fundamental realization that Santayana's quotation 
is taken from Interpretations of Poetry and Religion published in 
1900, and >jhich Eliot must have read or heard in the form of
1. Essays in Criticism, vol I8, January, I968, p. 3l
2. George Santayana, Interpretations of poetry and Religion 
London, Adam and Chailes Black, 1900, pp.170-171.
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lectures, I will attempt to sketch the main ideas in the ttjo 
quotations, and their bearing on the point under discussion. 
Murray* s quotation bears a relation to the concept of tradition 
in so far as it emphasizes the notion of anonymity and 
depersonalization. In the concluding section of the quotation 
there is a reference to the interaction and collaborative inter— 
p3-sy between the past and the present, but the major emphasis 
falls on the notion of depersonalization.
In the passage from Santayana, however, we are struck by 
the marked emphasis on the inseparability of the past from the 
present, the dissolution of all barriers and the contemporaneity 
of the past.
Murray* s passage, I think, pertains more to the creative 
activity, whereas Santayana* s is concentrated on the unbroken 
link relating the past to the present. Hith full awareness of 
the integrity of the concept of tradition I would say that 
Santayana's passage strikes the central note; that is, the 
original conception, but Murray's stresses a major component of it; 
that is impersonality. To clarify this one would refer to the 
threefold character of the concept of tradition; the relation of 
the work of art to other works (the simultaneous existence of 
past and present works of art)j this relation is the one with' 
which the present argument is concerned. The relation of the 
work of art to the artist (the impersonality implicit in the
1. The title of Santayana* s course "Ideals of Society, Religion,
Art and Science in their historical Development", which, as 
Herbert Howarth states, Eliot elected in 1909, bears close 
analogies to Santayana* s Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, 
VTherein the relationship between poetry, religion and science 
furnishes the substance of the book. See preface, p.7.
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creative process) ^impersonality will follow soon. And finally
the relation of the work of art to the reader or the critic -
a relation that entails objectivity of approach - (this point
will be taken up later). These three elements are discernible
in Santayana’s critical vjritings. •
Herbert Howarth tends to think that E.K, Rand’s lectures
on Virgil and the classics must have contributed to Eliot’s
idea of tradition.
I imagine that Eliot must have been prepared for his 
doctrines of tradition and the creative assimilation 
of the past by lectures in which Hand showed how 
Virgil studiedf assimilated and transformed his 
poetic forerunners. 1
In other vrords Rand might have dr aim Eliot’s attention to the
significance of the classics and in this general sense they
might have their share in forming his idea of tradition.
Undoubtedly it is difficult, especially in connection
X'jith Eliot, to point to definite influences and look upon them
as conclusive, because he was an omnivorous reader. VJhat I
x-jould like to emphasize is that Santayana has claims, at least
as gooc^ as a possible influence on the formation of Eliot’s
notion of tradition.
Impersonality and Tradition
The sense of tradition implies impersonality, but before 
discussing this concept in both Santayana and Eliot I would
I t
like to put in a historical perspective. In English literary
jX
criticism the idea of impersonality is adumbrated by Coleridge:
1. Herbert How-arth, op.cit, p. 70.
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"A second promise of genius is the choice of subjects very
remote from, the private interests and circumstances of the i-jriter
himself" ; in the same context he makes impersonality synonymous
with"the alienation, the utter aloofness of the poetfs own
feelings from those of x-jhich he is at once the painter and 
2
analyst".
Flaubert in French literature expresses similar views
"I believe that great art is scientific and impersonal"^  and
in another context he states "Egoism gives the measure of .
inferiority; a perfect being would no longer be egotistical"
and again he reports; "the man is nothing, the TTork is all".^
But Flaubert’s xvorking out of this concept is not consistently
developed. He contradicts himself, for example^ vmen he describes
d
poetry as being purely subjective,
James Joyce, too, is one of the early British exponents of
the concept of impersonality. 3h A Portrait of The Artist as a
Young Man he says:
The personality of the artist, at first a cry or a 
cadence or a mood and then a fluid and lambent 
narrative, finally refines itself out of existence, 
impersonalises itself so to speak. The mystery of 
aesthetic like that of the material creation is ac­
complished, The artist, like the God of Creation 
remains within or behind or beyond or above his 
handix-jork, invisible, refined out of existence, 
indifferent, paring his fingernails. 6
1. S.T. Coleridge, Biographia Liter aria, Vol.1 (ed) J.Sha^ Tcross, 
London, Oxford University Press, reprint 1963, p.lU*
2. ibid, p. 16.
3. Quoted in T.Sturge Moore, Art and Life, London, Methuen 
Co. Ltd. 1910, p.79.
h» ibid, p.81;
3. ibid, p. 82
6. James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, London, 
Penguin Books, pp. 2 i4-213^
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But before Joyce, Santayana’s influence was looming large
on the American and even continental scene, and above all on
Eliot’s academic life at Harvard. The terra ’impersonality*
occurs significantly, for example, in the course of Santayana’s
commentary on Dante whose Divine Comedy came to be lavishly
admired by Eliot as an ideal of impersonal emotion;
 "^be tendency to impersonality, xve see, is
essential to the ideal. It could not fulfil its 
junctions 1% it retained too many of the traits 
of any individual. 1
In another context he says:
The painter does not look at a spring of water • 
with the eyes of a thirsty man, nor at a beautiful 
w m ^  with those of a saty. The difference lies, 
it is urged, in the impersonality of the enjoyment. 2
In point of fact the idea of impersonality is most elegantly 
expressed in Santayana’s discussion of Lucretius’s genius as a 
poet. "The greatest thing about this genius is its power of 
losing itself in its object, its impersonality.
It should be obvious that the conception of irpersonality 
varies in the hands of Santayana. It either means that the 
artist might blend the real with the ideal through the agency 
of imagination that drapersonalizes the experience (as Dante 
did wd-th Beatrice) or the dissolution, so to speak, of the 
personal character of the artist into the character and 
details he creates (as happened with Lucretius).^  And in both
1. George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, 
London, Adam and Ckarls Black, 1900, p. 130.
2. George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty, London, Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1696, p.37.
3. George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, London, 
Oxford University Press, 191Ô, p.3Ü.
U. George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion 
London, Adam and Charles Black, 1910, p. 129.
3. George Santayana, op.cit, p.3U*
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cases the imagination which welds such divergent elements is 
nothing but the sum-total of the poet’s views and experiences 
which in turn colour the artistic product as Dante’s Christian 
doctrine colours his attitude to the Divine Com edy.
Santayana’s concept of impersonality suggests that the 
personal life of the artist is irrelevant to our appreciation of
the work of art, and should not deter us from direct access to the
work;
But -sdiere intelligence is attained, the rest of the
man, like the scaffolding to a finished building,
becomes irrelevant. We do not wish it to 
intercept our view of the solid structure, which 
alone was intended by the artist, if he was 
building for others and not a coxcomb. 1
Eliot seems to have adopted this view when he says;
It is not in his personal emotions, the emotions
provoked by particular events in his life that
the poet is in any way remarkable or interesting. 2
And again he says;
To divert interest from the poet to the poetry 
is a laudable aim, for it would conduce 
to a jus ter estimation of actual poetry, good and 
bad. 3
To indulge in purely p^sonal emotions, to fail to keep 
away from the emotions represented in the work of art, is, to 
Santayana, a sign of barbarism. It is this charge which he 
levels against both Whitman and Browning ;
1. George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, London, 
Oxford University Press, 1910, p.20.
2. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood, London, Methuen Co. Ltd., 
1920, reprint 1969, P- 37
3. ibid, p. 39
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His (Browning’s) art was still in the service of 
the will. He had not attained in studying the 
beauty of things, that love of the form for its 
own sake, which is the secret of contemplative 
satisfaction. 1
Santayana's ’barbarism’ was later identified by Eliot with 
the lack of ’technical excellence’
There are many people who appreciate the 
expression of sincere emotion in verse, and 
there is a smaller number of people idio can 
appreciate technical excellence. But very 
few know when there is expression of significant, 
emotion, emotion which has its life in the poem
and not in the history of the poet. 2
Here it must be admitted that when Eliot adopted the concept
of impersonality at the beginning of his career, he was
possessed by an excessive sense of protest against the Romantics,
and so he worked out the concept of impersonality in a way which
is slightly different from that of Santayana; and this applies
to his definition of the mind of the artist at the moment of
creation. He goes so far as to deny this mind any active role
in the act of creation. He likens it to a catalyst which effects
changes in the material it handles, but remains intrinsically
neutral and unchanged. This extreme view is the result of his
strong reaction against what he calls the spontaneity of the
Romantics. He separates the personal feelings of the artist
almost exclusively from those which he entertains at the moment
of creativity, and reduces the mind of the artist to a mere
medium that passively attends on the process of transformation.
1. George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, 
p. 19U
2. T.S. Eliot, op.cit, p. 39
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The more perfect the artist, the more 
completely separate in him will be the man 
who suffers and the mind which creates the 
more perfectly will mind digest and transmute 
the passions tdiich are its material. 1
It should be observed that Santayana’s concept of
impersonality does not preclude personal emotions and moral
views from being expressed in the work of art. In this
connection Santayana says;
..... nothing can so well call forth or sustain attention 
as what has a complex structure relating it to many 
complex interests. A work woven out of precious 
threads has a deep pertinence and glory. The artist who 
creates it does not need to surrender his practical 
and moral sense in order to indulge his imagination.
The truth is that mere sensation or mere emotion is 
an indignity to a mature human being. 2
This view of impersonality sounds much more sensible and 
convincing than Eliot’s as it ensures the major goal of 
objectivity without going to extremes. The central aim of the 
French Symbolists and the English Imagists was to counteract 
the sentimental indulgence of the Romantics by exhorting 
artists to express their emotions and ideas indirectly
3
through equivalent symbols and images, and this is precisely 
what Santayana’s quotation suggests. But in his early phase 
Eliot went too far in bani^ tiing personal emotions and ideas 
almost altogether from the work of art. As he matured as a 
critic, however, Eliot gave up this extreme view in favour of
1. T.S. Eliot, ibid, p. Sh
2. George Santayana, Reason in Art, London, Archibald and 
Constable 1903. p. 211
3. Wallace Martin, The New Age Under Orage , London, 
Manchester University Press, 1967. ’The origins of 
Imagism’ pp 1^ 3-181
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Santayana’s sounder interpretation.^  In his essay on Teats he says;
I have, in early essays, extolled what I called 
impersonality in art, and it may seem that «in giving 
a reason for tne superiority of Teats's later work the 
greater expression of personality in it *I am 
contradicting myself ... the truth of the matter is as 
xollows. There are two forms of iiîipersonality^  that 
which is more and more achieved by the maturing artist, 
the first is that of what I have called the anthology 
piece^ of a lyric by Lovelace or Suckling or Campion.
The second impersonality is that of the poet, who out 
of intense and personal e:<perience, is able to express 
a general truth* retaining all the particularity of 
his experience to make of it a general symbol, m 2
Santayana conceives of the creative activity as a process of
objectification; that is to say, it is an attempt to conjure up the
images and details that evoke the impression the artist wants to
leave upon us.
The poet's art is to^a great extent, the art of 
intensifying emotions by assembling the scattered 
objects that naturally arouse them. By this union 
of disparate things, having a common overtone of 
feeling, the feeling is itself evoked, in all its 
strength, nay it is often created for the first time.
In another context he says
... emotions are essentially capable of ,
objectification as well as impressions of sense.
1. There are early indications, hotfever, that Eliot is going to
move in the direction of Santayana. In his essay on
Ben Jonson, 1919, he says 'The creation of a vrork of art, we
Tfill say, the creation of a character in drama, consists in the 
process of transfusion of the personality, or in a deeper sense, 
the life of the author into the character’ The Sacred Wood, p.118
2. T.S. Eliot, on Poetry and Poets, London, Faber & Faber, p.233
3. George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p.263
U. George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty, p.i;7
He again states
convenience and econongr of thou^t alone determine 
vdiat combination of our sensation we shall continue 
to objectify, and treat as the cause of the rest.
The right and tendency to be objective is equal 
in all. 1
The idea of objectification is exquisitely brought home in
Santayana's words
We can convey a delicate emotion by delicately 
describing the situation -vdiich brings it on, 2
Santayana uses the term 'objectification* with regard to
Dante in a way Wiich reminds the reader of a similar tone in
3
Eliot's essay on Dante. Santayana says
Dante's objectification of morality, his art of 
giving visible forms and local habitations to 
ideal virtues and vices, was for him a thoroughly 
serious and philosophical exercise, J4.
This conception with the general desirability of objectification
it implies has become a guiding principle in modern literary
criticism and has exercised a far reaching effect on almost the
whole galaxy of modern critics. It has its repercussions, not
just in Eliot's idea of objectivity, but in his formulation of
the notion of the 'objective Correlative*. Santayana's words
in this connection are*
1. ibid, p,l|6
2. George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p.277
3. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p.2k3
li. George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, p.l08
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The thrilling adventures vMch he (the child) 
craves donand an ^ propriété theatre; the 
glorious emotions with which he bubbles over, 
must at all hazards, find or feign their 
correlative objects, 1
Eliot's words are
The only way of expressing emotion in the 
form of art, is by finding an objective 
correlative; in other words a set of objects, 
a situation, a chain of events that shall be
the formula of that particular. gRotion. such
that when the external facts which must 
terminate in sensory experience are given, the 
emotion is immediately evoked, 2
Matthiessen rules out Hulme as a possible source of this concept,^
This point of view was later asserted by Frank Kermode,^  Sean
Lucy's ^proach to the subject is rather ambiguous and self.
contradictory.
1. George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion. p,277
2, T.S, Eliot, The Sacred Wood, London, Methuen Co. Ltd., 1920, 
reprint 1969. p.lOü
3* In his notes on Eliot's 'objective correlative* Mat thi es sen 
argues that Hulme was killéd in action in 1917, and his essays 
on 'Modern Art and Philosophy*, 'Humanisam and The Religious 
attitude*, 'Romanticism and Classicism* were not published 
until 192b, in his book Speculations. Eliot heard about him 
from Pound but never read his essays before their publication 
in ^ peculations, that is when his views on the 'objective 
correlative* had already taken shape, P.O. Matthiessen,
The Achievement of T.S. Eliot, London, Oxford University Press, 
pp.70-71.
1;. Kermode says "Eliot was not much affected by him (Hulme) 
until his posthumous period of influence began with the 
publication of Speculations^ in 1924", Romantic Image. 
London, Routledge and Regan Paul, 1961, p. 120
5* Sean Lucy first sssys "Eliot had been associated with Hulme 
in The Imagist Movement, and since Hulme was known as a 
brilliant talker, must have been familiar with his ideas",
T.S, Eliot and The Idea of Tradition, London, Cohen & West, 
19o0, p.33, but later on he contradicts himself saying "In 
fact, apart from the evident debt to Arnold, it is very 
difficult to trace in Eliot's criticism the direct influence 
of any predecessor or contemporary", ibid, p.38
*  36 *
Tvor Winters ascribes Eliot's 'objective correlative' to
Edgar Allan Poe.^  In an essay titled 'Criticism in ^ isis'
Harry Levin attributes the phrase to Washington Allston.
"Anti-romantic reaction, turning from the image of the artist
to the sphere of his artistry has attempted to scrutinize the
latter with a technician's impersonality. The focal point of
the scrutiny has been - in a phrase formulated by a half-forgotten
classicist^ Washington Allston, and promulgated by Eliot -
2The objective correlative.
In "The criticism of T.S .Eliot", Rene Wellefc comes to the
same conclusion*
Eliot wants to think of this world (the world of 
art) primarily as one of objectifying, of patterning 
emotions 'Not our feelings, but the pattern Wiich we 
make of our feelings^ i^s the centre of value' amounts 
to saying that the strongest writers make their 
feelings into an articulate external world. Both 
these passages are variants of the most famous 
phrase 'the objective correlative' a term Eliot 
^parently picked up in Washington Allston's 
hardly known 'Lectures on Art'. 3
A review of Washington Allston's Lectures on Art will 
immediately reveal that as early as 1830, the phrase was used by that 
writer. Speaking of external phenomena as a manifestation of inward 
mental activities he says
1, Tvor Vdnters, In Defense of Reason, London, Routledge and 
Regan Paul, I960, pp.467-468,
2, Harry Levin "Criticism in Crisis", Comparative Literature
Vol.m, 1935, p.149
3, Rene Wellek "The Criticism of T.S, Eliot", Sewanee Review ^1/ ^
1956, p.416
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So too is the external world to the mind; which 
needs also as the condition of its manifestation 
its objective correlative. Hence the presence of 
some outward object predetermined to correspond 
to the pre-existing idea in its living power is 
essential to the evolution of its proper end - 
the pleasurable emotion* 1
One may even go further and argue that Allston's view of the
correspondence between 'the outward object' and the pre-existing
idea gives the cue to Eliot's insistence on the 'complete adequacy
of the external to the emotion». It should also be noted that
embodiment of ideas and emotions in visible forms - a theme which
is favourite to Eliot - is the dominant subject of Allston's
Lectures on Art, In his Introductory discourse he asyss
Were it possible to embody the present complicated 
scheme of society, so as to bring it before us as 
a visible object, there is perhaps nothing in the 
world of sense that would so fill us with wonder. 2
Talking about Paganini's need for his fiddle, his Cremona^ he
again says*
,,, he needed the most delicate Cronona - some 
instrument as it were articulated into humanity - 
to have inhaled and respired those attenuated 
strains, Wiich those who heard them, think it 
hardly extravagant to say, seemed almost to 
embody silence.
Now this one classical instrument by means 
of which such marvels were wrought, is but one 
of the many visible symbols of that more subtle 
Instrument through which the mind acts when it 
would manifest itself. 3
1# Washington Allston; lectures on Art and Poems (1830) 
and Mbnaldi (l84l) Facsimile reproductions by 
' Nathalie VAright, Gainsville Florida, 196?, p.16
2, ibid, p. 9
3. ibid, p.13
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Mario Praz asserts that Eliot has derived the idea of
the 'objective correlative' from Ezra Pound, He says*
Pound's idea of poetry as a 'sort of inspired 
mathematics which gives us equations not for 
abstract figures, triangles, spheres and the 
like, but equations for the human emotions' 
may be said to be the starting point of Eliot's 
theory of the objective correlative, 1
Judging by verbal analogy Santayana's words 'Correlative 
objects' appear to be closer to Eliot's 'objective correlative' 
than Pound's words, Frank Kermode, in another context^ confirms 
this impression saying*
The objective correlative^ a term probably ^
developed from the object correlative of 
Santayana 2
though he reverses the order of Santayana's phrase.
Indeed this point has been made by B,R, McElderry in an
article titled 'Santayana and Eliot's objective correlative'
1
where he inclines to think that 'Santayana's correlative objects' 
might be a possible source of Eliot's*objective correlative* and 
in pursuance of Eliseo Vivas' s argument that
the emotion expressed through the objective correlative 
is not that which the poet felt before the poem was 
written. The emotion as well as the correlative are 
found through the process of creation. But if the term - 
'creation* is taken seriously the consequences for Eliot's 
critical approach are devastating. For it means that one! 
finished, no one can go behind the poem, not even the 
artist himself. 3
1, Mario Praz, The Flaming Heart, New York. Double Day Anchor Books, 
1958, p. 351
2, Frank Kermode, Modem Essays, Fontana 1971* P» 307
3, Eliseo Vivas "Objective Correlative of T.S. Eliot" (A,
R.W. Stallman (ed) Critiques and Essays in Crtticism,
New York, The Roland Press Gonpany, 1949, p.400
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McElderry concludes that if the creative process really inheres
in creation not in expression, then Santayana's 'correlative
objects appears to be a more accurate phrase than Eliot's,^  and
he supports this judgment by quoting Santayana's statement that
expression is a misleading term tdiich suggests that 
something previously known is rendered or imitated; 
whereas the expression itself is an original fact. 2
That is to say that the objects, images are not stored up in the
mind as Eliot contends but rather created 'for the first time' as
Santayana argues.
Mario Praz terms Eliot's 'objective correlative' a theory 
thereby indicating that it has a being quite separate from the 
corpus of Eliot's criticism. In doing so he shows a radical 
misconception of Eliot's notion of the 'objective correlative', 
because Eliot's objective correlative is in sparable from his 
doctrine of impersonality. The main drive behind Eliot's cult 
of impersonality is to preclude the artist from Indulging in 
direct self-expression and this can be achieved by creating a 
host of images, objects and situations standing for,, and 
equivalent to the personal emotions of the artist, hence 'the 
notion of the objective correlative'. The only new element -vjhich 
Eliot brought into the term was the insistence on the "complete 
adequacy of the external to the emotion”,^  which his discussion 
of Hamlet necessitate!.
1. B.R. McElderry, "Santayana and Eliot's objective correlative" 
Boston University Studies in English, vol.Ill, 1957, p.l80
2. ibid, p.180
3. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood, p. 101
* 4o •*
To reinforce his contention that Eliot*5 'objective
correlative' derives from Pound, Marid Praz advances a number
of quotations from Pound's The Spirit of Romanoe. which he
imagines to "have the chief elements of Eliot's theory of the
objective correlative as well as his interpretation of Dante's
vision". But these quotations do not strongly suggest the
notion of the 'objective correlative', at least not as strongly
as Santayana's • Here are some of the extracts he gives:
The cult of provence had been a cult of the emotions; 
and with it there had been some, hardly conscious, 
study of emotional psychology. In Tuscany the cult 
is a cult of the harmonies of the mind. If one is in 
synpathy with this form of objective Imagination and 
this quality of vision, there is no poetry which has 
such enduring, such, if I may say so, indestructible 
charm.
Apropos of Guinizelli's sonnet 'Vedunt la lucente stella
diana', Pound writes*
Here the preciseness of the description denotes, I think, 
a clarity of imaginative vision. In more sophisticated 
poetry an epithet would suffice, the picture would be 
suggested. The dawn wuld be 'rosy-fingered' or in 
russet clad' • The Tuscan poetry is, however, of a time 
when the seeing of visions was considered respectable, 
and the poet takes delight in definite portrayal of his 
vision. The use of epithet is an advance on this method 
only when it suggests a vision not less clear, and its 
danger is obvious. In Hilton or Swinburne, for example, 
it is too often merely a high-sounding word, and not a 
svjift sjTffibol of vanished beauty, 2
Praz also gives this passage*
There is little doubt that Dante conceived the real 
HeU, Purgatory end Paradiso as states, and not places, 
Richard of St.Victor, had some while before, voiced 
this belief, and it is, moreover, a part of the esoteric 
end mystic dogma. For the purpose of art and popular 
religion, it is more convenient to deal with such matters 
objectively, this also was most natural in an age v!ierein 
it was the poetic convention to personify abstractions, 
thoughts and the spirits of the eyes and senses and indeed 
everything that could be regarded as an object, an essence
1. Mario Praz, op.cit. p.351
2. Mario Praz, op.cit. p.352
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or quality. It is therefore expedient in reading 
the CoiTimedia to regard Dante's descriptions of men's 
mental states in life, in which they are^ after, death, 
compelled to continue. That is to say, men's inner 
selves stand visibly before the eyes of Dante's intellect.
I have quoted these extracts at length because they have their
equivalents in Santayana, but in a finer, and much more lucid form.
In his essay on Dante Santayana argues that in the age of Dante
people had a sharp distinction between, good and evil. He says
,,, so earnestly and exclusively did they peculate 
about moral distinctions, that they saw them in almost 
visible sh^es, as Plato had seen his ideas. They 
materialised the terms of their moral philosophy into 
existing objects and powers, 2
Defining poetry in terms of Dante's concrete realization of
experience Santayana says
Poetry is an attenuation, a rehandling, an echo 
of crude experience, it is itself vision of things 
at arm's length, 3
In the course of his description of Dante's manipulation of
moral values Santayana again says
Dante's objectification of morality, his art of 
giving visible forms and local habitation to ideal 
virtues was for him a thoroughly serious and 
philosophical exercise, 4
He designates Dante's Divine Comedy as 'a dramatic view of human
passions in life',^  In his essay on Dante Eliot makes use of
this view and echoes it:
1. Mario Praz, The Flaming Heart, pp.354-355
2. George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, p.77
3. ibid, p.124
4. ibid, p.108 
5* ibid, p.106
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Dante's is a visual imagination. It is visual 
imagination in a different sense from that of a 
modem painter of still life; it is visual in 
the saise that he lived in an age in wiiich men 
still saw visions. It was a psychological habit, 
the trick of which we have forgotten, but as good 
as any of our own, 1
Furthermore a review of the remaining part of Eliot's 
essay on Dante will show that apart from his discussion of the 
idea of poetry and belief, Eliot is pre-occupied with drawing 
a comparison between Dante and Shakei^ eare as regards their 
manipulation of religious thones, a comparison which eventually 
culminates in Eliot's preference of Dante to Shake^eare. This 
preference refers us back to Santayana's essay on "The absence 
of Religion in Shakespeare"^  idierein the same view is voiced and 
later drawn upon in Eliot's critique.
It is true that EHot, in his preface to the essay on Dante,
acknowledges his indebtedness to both Pound and Santayana,^  but
in vievT of what has already been pointed out Santayana's influence
should receive a greater attention than^ has so far been "
Yet if we realize that Praz set out to write his book with a
pre-conceived bias in favour of Pound's influence we may
discern #y his view was defective and one-sided. Suffice it to
mention that the title of his book 'The Flaming Heart' itself
derives from Pound's The Spirit of Romance, idlerein he says
The vision of love, and the flaming heart, of 
love in the guise of a pilgrim, and of the little 
cloud cannot be separated from the whole. 4
1. T.S, Eliot, Selected Essays, p.243
2. George Santayana, Interpretation of Poetry and Religion, p.156
3. T.S. Eliot, Dante, London, Faber and F^er, 1929. pp 12-13
4. Ezra Pound, The Spirit of Romance , London, Peter Owen Limited, 
1910, reprint 1952, p. 122
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A glance at Pound's 'As for Imagisme',  ^will reveal that
Pound is more concerned with the part played by the mind in the
act of creation than with the notion of objective equivalence.
He classified images into two categories, subjective and objective.
The subjective image is that which undergoes change in its original
form as a result of the operation of the mind upon it. The
objective image retains its 'external original'. In other words
in the objective image the mind of the artist does not noticeably
interfere. In this way Pound prepares the reader for his concept
of the mind as "machinery Wi^e the voltage is so high that it
fuses the machinery, one has merely the ' emotional man' not the
artist. The best artist is the man whose machinery can stand the
highest voltage. The better the machinery, the more precise,
the stronger, the more exact will be the record of the voltage,
2and the various currents which have passed through it." In 
this passage we certainly have anticipations of Eliot's concept 
of the artist as a catalyst, a shred of platinum, and a medium, 
as well as 'the separation between the man who suffers and the 
mind Wiich creates*, but not of objective equivalence.
On the basis of Pound's critical writings in The Spirit of 
Romance and in Literary Essays ^ one might say that Pound cannot 
take up a subject, work it out and follow it up to a definite and 
logical conclusion. I am more inclined to endorse Sean Lucy's 
view in this respect that;
1. Ezra Pound, 'As for Imagisme», The New Age, January 1928, 
pp. 349-350
2. ibid, p. 350
3. T.S. Eliot (ed) Literary Essays of Ezra Pound, London,
Faber and Faber.
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Perhaps the Tjord 'stimulus* is better then the word 
'influence* in describing the possible in'^ erplay of 
their (Pound* s and Eliot* s) ideas. It has been said 
of Pound that he has a genius for bringing to life in 
the people with idiom he comes into contact, the 
personal gifts of these people rather than any 
reflected impression of his own character. 1
This means that, when he met Pound, Eliot had already some
dormant ideasof impersonality and its in^ ilications, ideas
generated by Santayana in the class-room probably and by the
French symbolists vdiom Eliot knew through his one-year stay in
France. Pound's role was to develop, through his discussion,
Eliot's interest in the French symbolists, and probably Santayana,
because Eliot's critical ideas obviously enough reflect the influence
of both Santayana and the French symbolists.
To my mind Santayana's critical writings embody the major values
/
for T-jhich Eliot stands. If Eliot has been acclaimed as a chan^ ion of
objectivity and classicism, this view is most articulately and
elegantly brought home in Santayana's doctrine of beauty.
Sentimentalism in the observer, and romanticism in 
the artist are exanples of aesthetic incapacity,
Ijienever beauty is really seen and loved, it has 
a definite embodiment, the eye has precision, the 
work has style, and the object has perfection. 2
The achievement of the artist does not inhere in his stark
personality or distasteful egocentricity, but rather in abiding
by a body of literary works that preceded him, and which by virtue
of their precedence, determine the line of his creativity. They
do so because they have formed the taste of readers, and it is in
relation to this formed taste that his work will be judged. In
1, Sean Lucy, op.dit, p.58
2. George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty, p.l50
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their totality they constitute a rich heritage on which the 
contmporary artist can draw for his artistic creation. In this 
connection Santayana points out that the ancients were far 
superior to us in understanding. They concentrated on the 
definite, precise aspects of nature that gave adequate 
objectification to human sensations and motions.^
The value of past works of art for the contemporary artist 
is that they enable him to acquire technique. «The pacific 
values of art", says Santayana, "ere technical values, more 
permanent and definite than the adventitious analogies on which 
a stray observer usually bases his views. Only a technical 
education can raise judgments on musical compositions above 
Impertinent autobiography. The Japanese know the beauty of 
flowers, and tailors and dresmakers have the best sense for 
the fashions, We ask them for suggestions and if we do not 
always take their advice, it is not because the fine effects 
they love are not genuine, but because they may not be effects
which we care to produce." ^
To cut oneself off from these teclmical accomplishments is 
to be in dag danger of asserting pedantry, chaos and disgusting 
sentimentality. To maintain the literary tradition does not 
mean to repeat or reproduce #at was done in the past, since 
tradition is, by nature, elastic, adaptable and susceptible to 
change and development. Santayana's words in this context are 
suggestive:
1. George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty, p. 150
2. George Santayana, Reason'in Art, p. 369
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The only kind of reform, usually possible, is reform 
within a more intimate study, and a more intelligent 
use of traditional forms. Disaster follows rebellion 
against tradition (or against utility) idiich are the 
basis and root of our taste and progress. But within 
the given school, and as exponents of its spirit, we 
can adapt and perfect our works, if haply we are better 
inspired than our predecessors. For the better we 
know a given thing, and the more we perceive its strong - 
and weak points the more capable we are of idealizing it.
Thus tradition denotes that the writer should be traditional 
and original simultaneously^  traditional in the sense that he 
adheres to a corpus of works of art that give him an Insight into 
the nature of artistic excellence, and original in the sense that 
he has to contribute something new to the sum-total of previous 
works, otherwise his work will be valueless.
In working out his critical theory Eliot seems to have 
exploited to the full the implications of Santayana's view. 
'Tradition and the Individual Talent» gives ample evidence of 
this assuiaption. It is in a sense a remoulding of the original 
ideas of Santayana.
For Santayana the creative process entails a great deal of 
concentration.
Focus a little experience, give some scope and depth 
to your feeling and it grows ijnatinative, give it more 
scope and more depth, focus all experience within it, 
make it a philosopher's vision of the world, and it 
tdll grow imaginative in a superlative degree, and be 
supremely poetical. 2
Eliot Bffibraces this view in his approach to works of art. Eliot's 
insistence that the creative process involves a great deal of 
pressure is stated when he says:
1. ibid. p. 167
2. George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, London, 
Oxford University Press, 1910, JP*' In
• 1^7
For It is not the 'greatness', the intensity of 
the motions, the con^ onents, but the intensity 
of the artistic process, the pressure, so to 
speak, under which the fusion takes place that 
counts. 1
In order to be achieved, this intensification must be subserved 
by a climate of thought, a literary milieu, wliich should on the 
idiole be congenial to its creation. On this subject Santayana 
is quite clear and articulate:
A monstrous ideal devours and dissolves itself, 
but even a rational one does not find an immortal 
mbodiment simply for being inwardly possible, and 
free from contradiction, it needs a material basis, 
a soil and situation propitious to its growth. This 
basis as it varies, malces the ideal vary, which is 
sing)ly its expression. 2
Voicing the same idea in his criticism of Blake, Eliot says:
The (jiestion about Blake the man is the question 
of the circumstances that concurred to permit this 
honesty in his work ... the favouring conditions. 3
This point leads logically to consideration of a principle 
in common between Santayana and Eliot - a principle in the 
formulation of vhich, Santayana undoubtedly had the precedence; 
namely that aesthetic and moral experiences are closely intertwined. 
In point of fact this is a ruling principle running throughout 
Santayanafs works, and the inportant point is that, for Santayana 
the beautiful and the moral are identified and inseparable. This 
inextricable bond between aesthetic and moral experiences is 
largely due to Santayana's central conception that poetry and 
religion are identical, are expressions of the human imagination 
and have their source in cyth. Santayana says:
1. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood, London, Methuen Co.Ltd., 1920 
reprint 1969, p.5^
2. George Santayana, Reason in Art, London, Archibald Constable 
Co.Ltd,, 1903, p. 192
3. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, London, Faber and Faber 1932, 
reprint 19^# P» 31
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in one way or another, 
mim&ters to all human good, Is to make the aesthetic 
sphere contemptible. 1
And in another context he says:
To separate the aesthetic element, abstract and 
dependent as it often is, is an artifice lahich 
is more misleading than helpful, for neither in
5^4 & rational estimate
of its value can the aesthetic function be divorced 
from the moral and practical. 2
Eliot takes up this idea and words it in a similar order, placing
particular emphasis on the need for a*unified sensibility*.
He sayst
The artistic sensibility is ln^ overished by its 
divorce from the religious sensibility, and the 
religious by its separation from the artistic. 3
To Santayana the creative process is an act of discovery in
>diich diverse and different elements are skilfully interwoven.
It is an activity in wiiich the artist explores new combinations
hitherto unknom to him.
By this union of disparate things having a common 
overtone, the feeling is Itself evoked in all its 
strength, nay it is often created for the first 
time ... poets can thus arouse sentiments finer 
than any they have know and in the act of composition 
become discoverers of new realms of delightfulness 
and grief. U
Echoing this idea Eliot says that the creative mind
is a receptacle in which fecial or veiy varied ^
feelings are at liberty to enter into new combinations^
1. George Santayana 'What is Aesthetics' Philosophical Review 
May I90U, and later in Obiter Scripta. p.29
2. George Santayana, Reason in Art. p.l3
3# T.S. Eliot, Notes Towards The Definition of Culture, p.21
hf George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion .pp. 263-26L
3$ T.S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood , p.31;
but it should be noted that Santayana attributes this uniqueness 
of the creative moment to the sense of intuition which the 
artist has whereas Eliot ascribes it to the passivity of the 
mind at the moment of creation.
Santayana argues that the achievement of the artist does
not manifest itself in hankering after novel experiences or
new Ideas, but rather in concentrating on familiar experiences
and manipulating them in a significant and illuminating way.
Poetry is not at its best wien it depicts a 
furth^ possible e3q)erience, but when it initiates 
Us, by feigning something, which as an experience 
is impossible, into the meaning of the experience 
which we have actually had. 1
Reflecting this notion Eliot says
The business of the poet is not to find new 
emotions, but to use the ordinary ones, and In 
working them up into poetry, to e^ gress feelings 
tdiioh are not in actual emotions at all. 2
(To clarify Eliot's distinction between aaotion and feeling, a
distinction which he borrowed from F.H, Bradley^  ^ I would
roughly say that emotion is the central theme or rathar experience
embodied in the work, whereas feeling is the detail, the object or
the image that contributes to the illumination or perspicuity of that
emotion).
The Function of The Critic
If we move on to the second aspect; that is the function 
of the critic, we find that Santayana maintains that the critic's
1. George Santayana, op.cit. p.26b
2. T.S. Eliot, op.cit. p.38
3. Vide J.H. Miller, P^ets of Reality. London, Oxfoid University 
Press, 1966, p. 131
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judgment or taste is a personal one. This criterion - says
Santayana • will be natural, personal and autonomous.^  The
view is echoed by Eliot as he says;
For the development of genuine taste, founded on 
genuine feeling, is inextricable from the development 
of the personality and character,««and the man whose 
taste in poetry does not bear the stamp of his 
particular personality, so that there are differences in 
what he likes from what we like, as well as resemblances, 
and differences in the way of liking the same things, is 
apt to be a very uninteresting person with whom to 
discuss poetry. 2
But this personal taste is not simply a matter of bluntly or
naively expressing one's impressions and views. It entails -
according to Santayana - a great deal of analysing, 'questioning
and purging of his feelings*^  to achieve the requisite degree
of refinement and maturity in artistic appreciation. This view
finds expression in Eliot's belief that the critical effort
carries with it a considerable measure of 'sifting, combining,
I
constructing, expunging, correcting and testing,'
This maturity manifests itself in a coherent pattern which 
the critic discerns in the work. 'The critic's function - says 
Santayana - is precisely to feel and to confront all values, 
bringing them into relation, and if possible into harmony. ' ^
1. George Santayana, Reason in Art, p. 192
2. T.S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and The Use of Criticism, 
London, Faber and Faber, 1933, reprint 1970, pp. 35-3o
3. George Santayana, op.cit, p. 192 
b. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p.30
5. G. Santayana, Obiter Scripta, p.30
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If Santayana expresses the function of the critic in terms of the 
sense of harmony he creates among works of art Eliot has conceptually 
the same view but renders it in terms of 'order*. To him works of 
art must 'form an ideal order among themselves'^  and 'the function of 
criticism seems to be essentially a problem of o r d e r T h i s  function, 
to be adequately discharged necessitates that the critic should be 
impartial and objective. 'An intelligent critic*, says Santayana,
' should look impartially to beauty, propriety, difficulty, originality, 
truth and moral significance in the work he judges'.^
Attacking what he terms the 'inner voice* Eliot says that the
critic ' should endeavour to discipline his personal prejudices and 
cranks'^  with the object of reaching something outside himself 
'which may provisionally be called truth*.
This pursuit of truth can ideally be attained by putting the 
reader in possession of the work of art instead of diverting his 
attention into historical, autobiographical, or even biographical 
information. 'We might say to the criti^ * says Santayana, 'that 
sinks^ -into--the_-arcli®ologist, show us the work and let the date alone*. 
This v"iew has its reverberation in Eliot's assault on those critics 
who supply information on the work instead of enabling the reader to 
have a first-hand experience of it. This information creates a
1. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred .Wood, p.30
2. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p.23
3. George Santayana, Obiter Scripta, p. 28 
b. T.S. Eliot, Selected EsSays, p.23
3. ibid, p. 3b
6. George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty, p.20.
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'vicious taste for reading about works of art instead of reading 
the works themselves', to use Eliot's words in this connection.
Reference has been made to Santayana's central belief that 
moral and aesthetic values are indivisible* In his characteristic 
philosophical reasoning Santayana maintains that a thing is beautiful 
if it is essentially moral, and by analogy is simultaneously ugly if 
it is lacking in moral perfection
... if a thing were ugly it would thereby not be wholly 
good, and if it were altogether good, it vrould perforce 
be beautiful. 2
Reference has also been made to Santayana’s concept of the 
function of the critic as consisting in the exposition of the moral 
significance of the work of art. Eliot's earlier critical writings 
do not come out strongly in favour of including moral and social 
considerations in the evaluation of works of art. In 'Tradition and 
The Individual Talent* published in 1919, he emphasizes that 'any
3
serai-ethical criterion misses the mark', but later on in his essay
on Dante, that is in 1929 he modifies this arbitrary judgment saying
It would appear that Uiterary ^predation' is an 
abstraction and pure poetry a phantom, and that both 
in creation and enjoyment much always enters, which 
from the point of view of 'art* is irrelevant, b
Yet Eliot's confession that literary criticism should be supplemented
by moral standards is frankly stated in his essay in 1933 on 'Religion
and literature'^ 'literary criticism', he ssys, 'should be completed
by criticism from a definite ethical and theological standpoint •••
literature has been and probably always will be judged by some moral
standards'. If we proceed to his essay on 'Johnson as critic and Poet',
1. T.S. Eliot, op.cit. p.33
2. George Santayana, Reason in Art. p. 177
3. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood, p.33 
b. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p. 271
3. ibid, p. 368 ___________
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that Is in im, ve find that Eliot falters and fluctuates, 
regressing to hie 'pure literary' theory.
of UtOTature to life. But from another point of
considerations. 1 
And in 'The Social Function of Poetry» Eliot evades the whole 
issue and concentrates on the role of language and the unified 
sensibility it creates among the different strata of society.
It is only in his last work To Criticize The Critic that 
he ultimately and unswervingly settles down to a moral view of 
literature. Eliot says:
I have suggested also that it is impossible to 
fence off literary criticism from criticism on 
other grounds, and that moral, religious and 
social judgments cannot be wholly excluded.
That they can, and that literary merit can be 
estimated in complete isolation is the illusion 
of those iiho believe that literary merit alone 
can justify the publication of a book which could 
otherwise be condemned on moral grounds. 2.
But it diould be observed that Bliot's sense of morality
or rather his conception of tradition is identified with
Christianity and he narrows the scope still further by interpreting
Christianity in terms of orthodoxy.
I believe that a right tradition for us must be 
a Christian tradition, and that orthodoxy in 
general implies Christian orthodoxy. 3
1. T.S. Eliot, On Poetry and Poets, London, Faber and Faber,
1937, p. 191
2. T.S. Eliot, To Criticize The Critics, London, Faber and Faber, 
1963, pp. 23-20
3. T.S. Eliot, lifter Strange Gods, London, Faber and Faber,
193b, p.21
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and in the same context he sayss
Tradition by Itself is not enough, it must be
perpetually criticized and brought up to date
under the supervision of what I call orthodoxy.
Eliot goes so far as to denounce people's adaptability to moral
changes looking upon it as a deviation from the right path.
■ This adaptability to change of moral standards is 
sometimes greeted with satisfaction as- an evidence 
of human perfectibility, idiereas it is only 
evidence of vhat unsubstantial foundations people’s 
moral judgments have. 2
Discussing the 'Aims of Education' and under the heading
'The Issue of Religion', Eliot insists on the necessity of having
a definite, and if possible, uniform Christian religious education.^
But Eliot's most explicit ideas on the subject occur in a pamphlet
which he exclusively devotes to this topic; that is. The Idea of
a Christian Society, vjiierein he says:
... the only hopeful course for a society which 
would tlirive and continue its creative activity , 
in the arts of civilization is to become Christian.
Revieidng these statements in the light of what we have seen
already of Eliot's view of tradition we siiall be struck by a sense
of inconsistency and self-contradiction, as he insisted that the
5
sense of tradition extends from Homer down to the present day.
1. ibid.
2. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p.369
3. T.S. Eliot, To Criticize the Critic, London, Faber and Faber, 
19vS pp. 1CB-Ï2Ü
U. T.S. Eliot, The Idea of a Christian Society, London, .
Faber and Faber, 1939, P»2b
5. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred IJood, London, Methuen Co. Ltd. 1920, 
reprint 19697 P#b9
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If we remember that Homer and with him the \diole of Greek 
literature is essentially pagan and unchristian, ^
Eliot's theory collapses because the organic link between the past
and the present which is of the essence of the notion of tradition
is lost* Two diametrically opposed doctrines arc apparentj Paganism
and Christianity* The contemporary artist and critic will not draw
on past or more specifically Greek works of art because they belong
to a different religious category. Similarly the historical sense
which comprehends in Eliot's view as expounded in 'Tradition and The
Individual Talent' the timeless and the temporal will be reduced only
to the temporal or more exactly to the period that marks the beginning
of Christianity* By this I mean that Eliot's identification of
tradition with Christianity vjill not only exclude Greek literature, but
Hebrmf literature too, if we consider the question frcm the point of
view of historical development, and contemporaneously it ■^jill rule out
any other literature belonging to a non-Christian tradition.
Santayana, contrary to what Eliot holds, recognizes and belives 
in the relativity of human and moral values. In a letter to Henry 
Ward Abbot, Santayana points out that man's standard of morality is 
'relative to everything else in the world*. And in another context 
he praises the philosophy of eminent poets like Homer and Dante - poets 
with whom Shakespeare is contrasted and compared, on the score of their 
ability to see man in his relations, surrounded by a kindred universe
3
in which he fills his allotted place. »
1. This point will be dealt with in more detail in the next 
chapter on Eliot.
2. Daniel Cory (ed) The Letters of George Sant^wa, London, 
Constable, 1933, p. 16
3. G. Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p.l3U
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Santayana speaks in the most favourable terms of Aristotle's 
religion, as it combines all the relevant elements that practically 
conduce to its efficacy and integration. In other words this 
religion is based on a proper and realistic understanding of the 
moral and material nature of man. It is an 'embodiment of thou^ h^t's 
perfect fulfilraent'to use one of Santayana's favourite terms 
in this regard, Santayana's concept of religion is a comprehensive 
view of all the relevant moral doctrines that meet and crystallize 
men's ideals. Thus his vision is viider in the sense that it affords 
each generation and each society the right to adopt the kind of 
moral ideals most suited for its human purposes. This again implies 
that religion should not be literally or narrowly interpreted, but 
should represent a response to 'personal experience and human life',^  
that is, to visualize religion as a kind of poetry, depending on 
the imagination of the people, end corresponding to human ideals and 
aspirations, 'each man*says Santayana, 'has an immortal soul, each 
life has the potentiality of an eternal meaning'.^
Santayana and Leavis
Santayana lays great stress on the significance of tradition; 
Leavis also uses this concept with marked emphasis, Leavis says:
1. ibid, p.70
2. ibid, p. 71
3. ibid, p.9b 
b, ibid, p,9 j
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• •• it is of so great importance to keep the literary 
tradition alive. 1
and if L) ant «ay ana defines tradition as the 'unrecoverable capital 
of human genius'leavis proposes a similar view when he identifies 
tradition with the 'picked experience of ages'.^  In another 
context he approvingly quotes Eliot's definition of tradition as 
'the vitality of the past that enriches the life of the present' 
Leavis bitterly laments the loss of the communal rural life and the 
organic relations binding the English agricultural society - 
relations that were shattered in the face of an overwhelming 
industrial development, creating a society that is insular and 
mechanical by nature. He thus turns to literature, and to 
language as an ei^ gression and crystallization of that literature 
as a means of maintaining the continuity of tradition or 'the
inherited wisdom of the folk'.
IJhen we come to the idea of impersonality we find that Leavis
uses the term for the first time in the context of his analysis of
Eliot's poetry and with regard to Gerontion in particular.
6'Gerontion', says Leavis, 'has the impersonality of great art*.
He singles out Gerontion for this designation because this poem 
marks for the first time Eliot's detachment from his hero and tMs 
lends the poem a dramatic quality enhancing its effect. The tenor
1. F.R. Leavis, Denys Thompson, Culture and Faivironment,
London, Chatto k yindus, 196b, p.62
2. G. Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets^  p.l
3. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p.82
U. F.E. LeavlB, Scrutiny, Toi.Ill, No.2, September 193U, p.l8U
S. F.E. Leavis, op.cit, p.80
were first used in 'Thou#it and Emotional Quality (19b5).
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of Leavis*s criticism here smacks more of Eliot's than of Santayana's
conception of impersonality# I mean that Leavis*s tone here
suggests that he is under the spell of Eliot's initial view of
impersonality as implying a separation between 'the man who suffers
and the mind which creates'* Lhen he, later on, uses the term in
his criticism of Wordsvjorth*s poetry,^  we find that the tone shifts
from Eliot to Santayana. Impersonality in Wordsworth means that
the personal emotions and experiences of the artist should be
transmuted into an objective pattern that impersonalizes them or
gives them an impersonal dimension. There is obviously no
separation here between the personal emotions and his creative
mentality as this quotation may show.
The absence of ary sign of repression serves to 
emphasize this significance. The significance of» 
this achieved naturalness, spontaneous, and yet the 
expression of an order and the product of an 
emotional and moral training* 2
When Leavis talces up the idea again in 'Thought and Emotional
Quality* he uses it in the same sense. He says*
Vhen we look at 'Heraclitus' we see that the 
directly emotional and personal insistence 
distinguishing it is associated with an absence 
of core or substance^  Hie poem seems to be all 
emotional comment, the alleged justifying 
situation, the subject of comment being 
represented by loosely evocative generalities, ^  
about which the poet feels vaguely if ^intensely 
(the Intensity of this kind of tiling is conditioned 
by vagueness). Again^ the emotion seems to be out 
there on the page, whereas in reading 'Proud rîaisie* 
we never seem to be offered emotions as such, the 
emotion develops and defines itself as we grasp the
1. F.R. Le: vis. Revaluation , London, Chatto & Windus, 1936, 
reprint 1969, P*1?2
2. ibid, pp. 170-171
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dramatic elements the poem does offer - the 
data it presents (that is the effect) with 
emotional 'disinterestedness* - for 
'disinterestedness* we can substitute 
'impersonality'^ with which term we introduce 
a critical topic of the first importance* 1
For Leavis the artist can have personal emotions, but in
working them out into poetry they are fused in a host of
concrete images, dramatic situations and pregnant complex
details that render them objective and impersonal*
To confirm this point of view Leavis congares two poems*
«A sluiaber did my spirit seal* by Wordsworth, and 'Break, break,
brealc* by Tennyson, The theme in both poems is the irretrievable
loss of the past. The two poems deal with a personal experience,
yet in the case of Wordsworth the experience has been so
sldlfully concretized and objectified that it assumes an
impersonal dimension* Leavis*s commentary on the formal
manipulation of the tvjo poems is illuminating:
Here is a contrast analogous to the last^  (the
contrast between 'Proud Maisie* and 'Heraclitus')
but a contrast in udiich the 'impersonal* poem
unmistakably derives from a seismic personal
experience, wîiile the obviously motional poem
is not suspect, like 'Heraclitus*^  of being a
mere indulgence in the sweets of poignancy* No
one can doubt that Wordsx-rorth wote his poem . /
because of something profoundly and involuntarily
suffered as a personal calamity, but the {/I/
experience has been so impersonalized, that the
effect, as much as that of 'Proud Kaisie^is one
of bare and disinterested presentment. 2
At first sight, it may sound ironical and even paradoxical that
Wordsworth x^dio said that poetry is 'the spontaneous overflow of
powerful feelings' should now be represented byyas an exemplar
1. F.E. Leavis, Scrutiny, vol.XIXI, No.l Spring 19b3, P*33
2. ibid, p.33-3b*
3. E. de SeUncourt (ed) The Poetical Works of w m i aa VfordSHorth, 
Oxford, The Clarendon Press, vol. II, p.Uuu*
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of iBipei’son.ali'ty. But this paradox can. be resolved if we take
into account the fact that Leavis, in his critical practice,
discovered that ^ontaneity does not mean a turning loose of
emotion - as Eliot conceived - but involves a great deal of
organization and self-discipline; spontaneity" - says Leavis,
"that is, as Wordsx;orth seeks it, involves no cult of the
instinctive and primitive at the expense of the rationalized
and civilized, it is a si^ ontaneity engaging an advanced and
delicate organization*""^  Leavis explains Words^ iorth*s conception of
spon taneity as an attempt at both naturalness (whereby the
emotions evoked are rendered genuine and impressive) and
organization (whereby the emotions are ordered according to
intellectual canons serving definite ends in view, and to
Wordsworth they are moral ends). He (Wordsworth) stands for a
distinctively human naturalness, one that is consummating a
2discipline, a discipline moral and other* It should, in 
fairness, be admitted that this re-interpretation supplied by 
Leavis marks a change of attitude towards Wordswotth, mostly 
exculpating him from the vicious connotations of spontaneity 
as interpreted by Eliot*^  When Leavis reverts to the seme theme 
in his later critique of Wordsijorth he brings home the same point 
sayings
1. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p.l70
2. ibid, p.170
3. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood, p.36
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... creativity in Wordsworth is impelled by the 
pressure of deeply and intensely experienced 
pre-occupations ; emotional problems that are at 
once personal and impersonal (that is, moral). 1
Leavis instances Wordsworth* s 'The Ruined. Cottage* as an example
of this personal—Impersonal form. Characterizing the nature of
the poem Leavis reports that
its essential distinction is to have a disturbing 
immediacy that makes it, in its major way, unique.
That distinction, the poignant disturbingness, is 
inseparable from the mode of presentation (which 
he has already qualified as dramatic) from the 
fact that while the tale is told by the Pedlar, the 
poet himself (William Wordsworth) is so insistently 
and effectively a presence for us that the 
sensibility we share is felt as very personally his. 2
Complementary, and in a sense contrary to this form of
iirpersonality, is the other, advanced by Leavis in his discussion
of Santayana's 'Tragic philosophy*. If the Wordsworthian kind of
ingersonality arises from 'a seismic personal experience* rendered
impersonal through literary devices «in tragedy, as Leavis conceives
it, impersonality issues from something that transcends the merely
personal. Leavis describes this impersonality in these words;
... it is an essential part of the definition of 
the tragic that it breaks dovjn, or undermines or 
supersedes, such attitudes (the egotistic attitudes 
stigmatized by Lawrence whom Leavis quotes on the 
Incoimpatibility of both egotism and egoism with the 
tragic experience). It establishes below them a 
kind of profound impersonality in which experience 
matters, not because it is mine, because it is to 
me it belongs or happens, or because it subserves 
or issues in purpose or will, but because it is 
what it is, the 'mine* mattering only in so far as 
the individual sentence is the indispensable 
focus of experiencA 3
1. F.E. Leavis, "Wordsworth; The Creative Conditions" Reuben A.Brower 
(ed) Harvard English Studies II , Harvard University Press, 1971, 
p. 332
2. ibid, p. 333
3. F.R. Leavis, "Tragedy and The Medium", Scrutd^, vol.XII, no.b. 
Autumn 19bb, P» 236
62 •
And later on he sayssmtsw
It is this type of Impersonality that makes for the sense of 
o o « t y s  or rather for ,*at makes for our co»on humanity. 
Commenting on tliis form of impersonality, todor Gomme remarks,
personality, 2
Leavis uses the term impersonality in its EÜotic sense in
the course of his evaluation of George Eliot. Recalling T.o.Lliot's
insistence on the separation of the artistic emotions frcm the
every-day eraotions of the artist, Leavis praises George Eliot’s
attitude to the Transome theme in Felix Holt, because therein end
contrary to what she does in the early phase of her work, she
manages to dissociate herself altogether from the character;
• •• the directly personal vibration^ the directly 
personal engagement of the novelig-^hat we feel in 
Maggie Tulliver’s intensities evei/at their most 
Valid is absent here. ^  The more perfect the artist, 
the more compl^Wy separate in him will be the man 
who suffersthe mind which creates/ it is in the 
part of Felix Holt dealing with Mrs Transome that 
George Eliot becomes one of the great creative artists. ^
Leavis’s evocation of this form of impersonality is the result of
his passion for the occasional sense of aloofness achieved by
George Eliot for the first time in her method of characterization.
1. ibid. p, 258
2. And or Gomme, Attitudes to Criticism, Carbondale and Edward sville, 
Southern Illinois University Press, i960, p. 133
3. F.R, Leavis, Scrutiny, Fol.Illl, no.lt. Spring 19l;6, pp. 262-263
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But the fact that Leavis couples this aloofness with Eliot* g
separation between the man who suffers and the mind idiich creates
shows that he has Eliot* s and not Santayana* s view of impersonality
in mind in his analysis of George iOiot's works. It is In his
criticism of Lawrence that Leavis shoifs himself to be a disciple
not of Eliot (the' Eliot of the early phase) but of Santayana*
This is confirmed by Leavis*s discussion of Lavjrenoe* g method of
characterization in The R;0nbow;
Of the lives dealt tith in The Rainbow, that nearest 
to Lawrence’s own is Ursula’s, and in important ways 
it is very near. The impersonalizing process has its 
overt manifestation in the sex - the she protagonist.
One can iiîiagine cases in iHich such a manifestation, 
the substitution of the other sex for the author’s^  
miglit be the mark of cn impersonality unachieved or 
insecure, a disguise prompted by a sense of danger.
Lut in'Lawrence^  it is clearly not that, it is rather
the mark of creative genius. ^ —-1
and later on Leavis defines this genius as:
the ejrtraordinary power of the impersonslizing 
intelligence to maintain, while the artist, in an 
intensely personal and exploratory way, is actually 
living the experience that goes into the art, the 
conditions that malie creative impersonality possible. 2
But Santayana’s influence becomes obvious in Leavis’s later 
rebuttal and even reversal of Eliot’s dictum in the context of his 
evaluation of Eliot’s critical views. He says:
The relevant truth, the clear essential truth is stated 
when one reverses the dictum and says that between the 
man ibo suffers and the mind which creates there can 
never be a separation. 3
1. F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence: Novelist. Penguin Books, P* 137
2. ibid. p. 1L9
3. F.R. & D» Leavis, Lectures in erica, London, Chatto and aindus.
1?ô9, p. 33
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ïîiis eventual gesture on Leavis*s part confirms us in the 
belief tnat Leavis has inclined the balance once and for all in 
favour of ocntayana* s original conception of inpersonality. This 
point is reinforced if we recall that Leavis maintains that the 
character of the artist is one integral and indivisible ihole, 
idiereas Eliot looks upon the artist at the moment of creation as 
completely different from the same artist in every-day life.
A closer scrutiny of Leavis*s "Thought and Emotional Quality"
will show that it is, in a sense, a recasting of Lantayana’s words:
hhat is very rightly called a sense for fitness 
is a vital experience involving aesthetic satisfactions 
and aesthetic shocks* The more numerous the rational 
harmonies ore, which are present to the mind, the more 
sensible movements x-ill be going on there, to give 
immediate delight.
Accordingly nothing can so i;ell call forth or 
sustain attention as what has a complex structure 
relating it to many complex events. A work woven 
out of precious threads has a deep pertinence and 
glory. The artist who creates it does not need to 
surrender his practical and moral sense in order to 
indulge ids imagination. 1
Iliot's objective correlative exercised some influence on
Leavis*s critical procedure, and it runs through a considerable
part of his appraisal of great novelists. To assess the artistic
acliieveiTieiit of Joseph Conrad in Heart of Darleness Leavis speal::s in
terms of artistic objectification saying
... one might say that Heart of Darkness achieves its 
overpowering evocation (xC atmo sphere by means of 
’objective correlatives.^ 2
He speaivs of George Eliot's inability to master the emotions of 
Dorothea and to embody them in adequate terms, Leavis says:
1. George Santayana, Reason in Art, London, Archibald and Constable, 
1905^ p, 211.
2. F.R. Leavis. Scrutiny, Vol.%, no.l, June 19Ul, p. 23
«• 63 ••
But the emotional 'fulness* represented by 
Dorothea depends for its ex siting potency on an 
aoeyance of intelligence and s^f-knowledge, and 
the situations offered by way of'wbjective correlative 
have the day-dream relation to experience. 1
But a closer examination of Leavis*s critical practice will reveal
that side by side with his use of Eliot's 'objective correlative*
Leavis was already developing the term 'enactment* to replace
loot's formula.
Distinguishing between didactic!an and the artistic
transformation of experience in the case of George Eliot, Leavis say:
• •• one is judging that the intention to communicate 
an attitude hasn’t become sufficiently more than an 
intention^hasn’t, that is, justified itself as art 
in the realized concreteness that speaks for itselfv 
and enacts its moral significance. 2
in the following number of Scrutiny, Leavis quotes a passage from
George Eliot’s liidilemerch, relating to the life cp/^tY Ciisiubon.
On tills passage Leavis says ;
Actually, the pathoa thtt Casaiibon enacts ’below the 
tragic level’ is not quite what this passage by itself 
might suggest. 3
The iTord ’enacts’ is used in the passage ta refer to an
ertemalization of Gasaubon’s sense of failure and frustration.
Leavis again uses the term in his comiiien'Gary on Johnson as critic
Tjhen he maintains tiat Johnson fails to realize that ’works of art
enact their moral valuations.* ^
1. ibid. Vol. XI?, no.l, bummer, 19ho, p. 26
2. ibid, Vol.Xin, no.3, Autumn 19L3, P*17l;
3. ibid, Vol.nn, no.h, p. 2c8
h . The heriyon Review, Toi. Till, no.!*. Autumn 19U6, p. og2.
Later reprinted In The Common Purgu_it, pp. Ho-111
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Loolcing at Laavis's term with Santfdyana in mind, one finds that 
it could derive well from Santayana's critical viritings. Santayana 
says:
... we can convey a delicate emotion only by 
delicately describing the situation which brings 
it on, 1
and in another context he says:
The poet has only to study himself and the art Of 
eagres sing tiis own ideals, to find that he has 
expressed those of other people. He has but _
to enact in himself the peirt of each of his personages.
Yet we must keep reminding oirsdves that Santayana , in 
devising such a term and others, was mostly working out a 
philosophy of art, that is, he was laying down the foundations of 
an aesthetic theory, a theory formulated by a philosophizing and ' _ 
rati on tili zing mind with an underlying passion for beauty. In other 
X'jords Santayana in most cases, speaks of these terms in general and 
abstract terms whereas Leavis adopts them as pointers to certain 
significances he discerns in certain literary teirts. To put it 
briefly one would say that Santayana is a critical theorist, but 
Leavis is a practitioner of criticism.
Leavis's censure of writers who fail to transform their feelings
into vivid objects—;ho "offer emotion insistently explicit, in itself,
for itself, for its own sake, and give nothing but gross sentimentality,
can be detected in Santayana's doctrine of beauty.
Sentimentalism in the observer, and romanticism in the 
artist are examples of aesthetic incapacity. Whenever 
beauty is really seen and loved, it has a definite 
embodiment, the eye has precision, the work has style 
and the object has perfection. I4.
1. George Santayana, Reason in Art, London, Archibald Constable, p. 32
2. George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty, London, Adama and Charles
Black, 1890, p. 169
3. ibid, V0I.XLIX, no.l. Spring 19U3, p. 60
k» G. Santayana, op.cit. p.l30
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He labels both bSiltraan and Browning 'barbaric* on the ground that 
they are ruthlessly sentimental and starPELy personal. Their 
poetry is barbaric in the sense that it is crudely sentimental.
If Santayana holds that the ancients were conspicuously
conversant xfith genuine artistic taste, Leavis repeatedly uses
'the picP^ ed experiences of the ages regarding the finer issues of
life'. Again if the concept of tradition suggests the co-presence
of traditional elements and original touches concurrently Leavis*s
critical practice is an obvious manifestation and application of
the concept. Reva3-Uation has the subtitle 'Tradition and
Development in English Poetry', the subtitle is self-explanatory
and indicative of the nature of tradition. His Hew Bearings in
Englitdi goetr^ ,^ on the other hand, is a critical study of the change
itself
of sensibility that manifested/, after the First lorld Mar, in the
poetry of Eliot and Pound. This change of sensibility and poetic
teclmique was most urgent end timely to save poetry from the state
of sentimentality, stagnation, torpor and superficiality to which
it was reduced at the hands of Browning and Tennyson. Thus to
Leavis, Eliot and Pound offer a new development shoi-jing that they
are alive in their time, and sixuultaneously eiiricl'iing the body of
tradition. The Great Tradition is a critique of the novelists who
form a coherent order and a traditional pattern. These novelists
are few in number but their value resides in their ability to
maintain the traditionZ •
ijid as a recall to a due sense of differences it is 
well to start by distinguishing the few really great, 
the major novelists who count in the same way as the 
major poets, in the sense that they not only change 
the art for the practitioner, and renders, but they 
are significant in terras of the human awareness of 
the possibilities of life. 1.
1. F.R. Leavis, The Great Tradition, London, Chatto and Windus, 19U8 
reprint 1962, p.2.
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In D.H. Lax'^ rence; Novelist, there is a constant and deliberate
atteipt to relate Laxrrence to what Leavis calls 'the tradition
of George Eliot, thereby emphasizing his ' sanity, normality and
health. It should be erghasized that Leavis is consistent in
expressing these views in almost all his "works. Mass Civilization
and Minority Culture is an exposition of the -view that it is only
on the intelligent minority that the huraan and literary tradition
(in the case of Leavis the two adjectives merge and are identified)
depends for continuity and perpetuation. Santayana is a
precursor in this particular respect. His point is so close to
Lea"vls that it inevitably gives rise to the suggestion that Leavis
is influenced by it.
The best men in all ages keep classic traditions alive.
These men have on their side the weight of superior 
intelligence, and though they are few, they might claim 
the weight of numbers. 1
Even Leavis's phrase 'awareness of the possibilities of life' has
its counterpart in Santayana's "vieir on the function of the poet;
... out of that living, but indefinite material (he 
has) to build new structures, fin/.er, fitter to the 
primary tendencies of our nature, truer to the 
ultimate possibilities of the soul. 2
For the ijord 'life* vre can substitute the word 'soul*, since Leavis*s
intention, as I am going to shiow, is also ultimately moral.
Leavis*s prirase *what makes for life and what maizes against
it* finds an echo in Santayana's description of Lucretius's attitude;
This impersonation in the figure of Venus of at ever
makes for life Tzould not be legitimate, it would really contradict 
a mechanical view of nature - if it were not balanced by 
a figure representing the opposite tendency, the no less 
universal tendency towards death. 3
1. George bant ay ana. Reason in Art. p. 20o
2. George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p.- 270
3. George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, p. i|2
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Describing La.v3rence as a novelist Leavis says;
He (LaT-jrence) has unfailingly sure sense of the 
difference between that which maices for life and 
that which makes against it. 1
TaHdng about Louisa* s moral judgments in The Daughters of The Vicir,
Leavis agoins says;
they e:gres8 a moral sense that speaks out of a 
fulness of life and is at the same time a find 
sense of what mail es for that and Wiat irialies 
against it, 2
L ant ay ana uses the term 'insight* frequently as a means of
distancing the artist from the object of his pre-occupation.
He tells us that
In philosophy itself investigation and reasoning 
are only preparatory and servile parts, means to 
end. They terminate in insight or wiiat in 
the noblest sense of the word be cal3.ed theory. 3
Again he talks about Dante saying;
A better science need substract nothing from the 
insight he had into the difference between political 
good and evil. I4.
Using the term 'insight' in the sense of objectifying the
experience Leavis talks about Laxvrence saying;
There is in fact no more impressive mark of his 
genius than what he did r^f.th his misfortune;' he 
turned it into insight. 5
1. h.R. Leavis, D.H. Lm-rence; Kovelist, Penguin Books, London, 
1 9 %  P, 32S
2. ibid, p. 86
3. George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, pp. 10-11 
ij.. ibid, p. 90
3. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, pp. 13ë“13p^
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Opposed to tills kind of experience is the one provided by Swift*
Swift was, ln\various ways, curiously unaware, 
the reverse of 'clairvoyant. He is distinguished 
by the intensity of his feelings, not by insight 
into them* 1
Santayana uses the word ' immediacy* as a critical term
indicating the strong personal urge underlying the experience.
He says "Thus we have just seen that Goethe in his Faust, presents
experience in its immediacy". Again he sayss
To be miscellaneous, to be indefinite, to be 
unfinished is essential to the romantic life* 
licy we not say that it is essential to all life 
in its immediacy? 3
In a similar way Leavis uses the term in relation to Rordsworth;
His success depends upon his conveying the peculiarly 
private value, the intensely personal significance, 
of the concrete Incident, of the experience in 
immediacy* h
The focussing of experience which Santayana entices the artist
to fulfil is mirrored in Leavis* s realization that the creative
process calls for an intensification of feelings.^  Even the term
'intensity* was already used by Santayana in bis Introductory note to
Three Philosophical Poets, wherein he says
Intensity, even momentary intensity, if it can be 
expressed at all, comports fullness and suggestion 
. compressed into that intense moment. 6
1. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p, 8?
2. George Santayana, Three Philosophical Ppets, p. 203
3. ibid, p. 199
it. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, pp. 200-201. ' The term also recurs in 
D.H. Lawrence; Novelist, pp. 110-116, in The Common Pursuit, p. 260 
and in Dickens The Novelist, pp 253-163
3. F.R. Leavis, Scrutiny, Vol.fill, no.l. Spring 19lt3, p. 33 and 
D.H. Lawence: Novelist, pp. IK-123
6* G* Santayana, Three Philosopliical Poets, p.l2
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KeanUiile, If Santayana holds that this .Intensification mist
be coupled vith a favourable climate of thouglit that fosters the
poetîs creativity, Leavls adopts the ssi^ie idea in his exegesis of
Uords>jorth»s poetic technique. Ee says
The poetic process engaged an organization tViat had, 
by his (VIordsworth* s) ovrn account been determined by 
on upbringing in a congenial social environment, %ith 
its rholeoome simple pieties, and the traditional 
sanity oi its moral culture, which to him were nature.
This intensification in tiie act of creation is effected with the
object of bringing the artistic experience into a moment of
illuiiiination or * eigiiificance^  , to use one of Leavis* s favourite
terms in this context, or to "render its native agility practical,
and to attach its volume of feeling to %lat is momentous in human 
2
life" to use the ik^ ords of g antsy ana.
This barings us to another element in comm-sn between Santayana
and leavls that is the indivisibility of moral and aesthetic values.
Analyzing Pope^s *3unciad* Leavis ssys:
Aesthetic is a term the literary critic would do 
well to deny hiaself* Opposed to ’moral* as it is 
it certainly doesn’t generate light. 3
In The Great Tradition, le avis iniicttes that the novelists idio
constitute that tradition are great innovators from'the point of
view of artistic form. But this technical originality is
subservient to an all-embracing moral vision.
1. F.li. le avis, EevaJ-Uation, London, Chat to and b indus, 1936, 
reprint 19o9, p. 171
2. G. Santayana, Reason in .Art, London, Archibald Constable, 1905, 
pp. 61;-85
3. F.Pt. leavls. The Common Pursuit, London, Penguin Books, p. 89
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As a matter of fact vhen we exaraine the formal 
perfection of ’ Erma’, we find that it can be 
appreciated only in terms of the moral pre-occupations 
that characterize the novelist’s peculiar interest 
in life. Those -viho suppose it to be an ’aesthetic 
matter’, a beauty of composition that is combined 
miraculously, with truth to life can give no 
adequate reason for the view that Fima is a great 
novel ... it is in the same way true of other 
English novelists that their interest in their 
art gives them the opposite of their affinity 
with Pater and George lioore, it is brought to 
an intense focus, an unusually developed interest 
in life. 1
In tills connection the affinity between Santayana and leavls is
stronger than it is between Santayana and Eliot. Questioning the
validity of Eliot’s esrlier view of the purely literary values
leavls says:
that are the ’purely literary values’? I 
r,y self am firmly convinced that literature 
must be judged as literature and not as another 
tiling ... but to believe this is not, so far as 
1 can see, to believe in ’purely literary values’.
And the appreciation of good writing for its own 
sake, seems to me, for all its plausibility, a 
phrase that covers a failure of thought. 2
Applying this failure to Eliot’s interpretation of his own plays
leavls says:
The discussion of drama in general suffers from 
the same weakness, the examination of the possibility 
and the practical problem of poetic drama comes from 
a mind in which the tliiniving about matters of form 
and technique hasn’t the life, grapple and force 
that critical thought cannot have apart from the 
habit of full engagement, the habit that manifests 
itself in the kind of pre-occupation with value 
significance and responsibility to life that makes  ^
it impossible to talk about ’purely literary values.
It is interesting to notice in tliis argument that leavls reverses
the critical judgment passed by Eliot on both Dryden and Johnson
and credits the latter with superiority on account of his ability
to combine literary with human values in bis insight into literary works
1. p.E. leavls, The Great Tradition, London, Ghatto and Windus, 19v2,p.8
2. F.E. leavls, Anna Karenina, London, Ghatto and Windus, 196?, p.19^
3. ibid. p. 196_____________________ _____ _____________________
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Johnson’s critical writings e^ ihibit very notably the 
characteristic wisdom, force and human centrality of 
the great moralist, but they have also a value that 
is peculiarly of and for literary criticism - their 
specific interest is in and of that field. Johnson is 
always a moralist, but in criticism he is a classic qua 
critic* 1
Here it sliould be pointed out that leavls’s conception of morality
is of a particular and unique kind. In the first place it is not
a liind of didacticism crudely forced upon the wrk of art with the
object of inculcating a superficial moral lesson as the eighteenth
century practitioners conceived of morality, nor is it the kind of
Victorian moral insistence and lack of concreteness for which leavi:
censured Matthew Arnold. Still less is it a kind of cliche which
leavls blindly attaches to works of art. Commenting on Leavls’s
criticism of Hamry Janes’s novels Harold Osborne says;
Dr leavis does not condemn James because he thinks 
that his influence on morals is bad. He is clear 
that these novels can work change in our moral vietis; 
indeed if they could revolutionize morality. Dr Le avis’s 
sarcastic condemnation would be mitigated. He condemns 
them because they are out of line with the moral views 
which Dr leavls assumes his readers to share, and he 
enunciates a general principle of criticism that any
work of literature which deals with men and women, and
wliich contravenes accepted principles of morality is bad.
Osborne misunderstands the exact nature of leavls’s criticism 
simply because Leavls has strongly refused to pin himself down to 
a fixed principle or to a set of rules, on the sound basis that 
this freedom from ’restrictive codes’ •vd.ll afford him a wider
and a more flexible scope meeting the varying qualities of diverse
1. ibid, p. 197
2. Harold Osborne, Aestetics And Criticism, London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1955, p.^ 7
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artlst-ic achievement-s* Here I T'?ould like to instance only two 
examples confirming this flexibility. Criticizing Eliot’s later 
poetry Leavis indicates that one can enjoy this poetry ifithont 
sharing Eliot’s ’intellectually formulated conclusions, his 
doctrinal v i e w s A g a i n  vindicating Lai-n*ence’s artistic 
technique, he relates him to the tradition of George Eliot, not 
on any doctrinal or dogmatic assumption but on the wider plane 
of the human and moral significance of their works.  ^ Thus where 
morality is concerned, it is taken for granted, I think, that leavis 
has no dogmatic doctrines nor preconceived moral codes.
but if Osborne is accusing Leavis of inrposing some moral codes 
arbitrarily on the work of art, S.L. Bethell, on the other hand
complains that Leavis has no clear-cut and sharply defined
theological doctrine wiiereby to assess works of art.
Dr Leavis has more than once stated that literary 
criticism involves ethical considerations, and it is 
obvious that we cannot discuss a writer’s insight 
without ha''/ing some standard by which to assess it, 
lut Dr Leavis has nowhere said that theological 
considerations are also necessary, indeed he would 
seem to believe the contrary, let, even apart from 
the fact that there are insights wMch are spiritual, 
without being etliical, does not the acceptance of an 
ethical position in itself involve, at least some 
relation to the systems of theology? If the critic 
elects to taxe his stand on ethica without philosophical 
examination of the matter, there will alw*air"s be a chance 
that his ethics may consist of personal predilections, 
or the assumi^ tions of his social group. Lhether this is 
so vdll be apparent to readers of ccni/tiny. 3
1. F.R. Leavis, Education and the University, London, Ghatto and 
Windus, 19o5, p. T 3  ”
2. F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lai-rence; Novelist, Penguin Books, 19^^ pp. 111-112.
3. S.L. Lethell, F'ssrys on Literary Criticism and the English Tradition 
London, Dennis Dobson Ltd., 1948, p.13.
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leavis, as X have already said, does not commit himself critically 
to any theological doctrine because he does not want to be dogmatic on 
the one hand, and because he conceives criticism to be the ’free 
interplay of the mini on all possible subjects*' on the other. It is 
interesting to put on record here that the collaboration invoked by 
Leavis as the function of the critic implies agreement as well as 
dissent. In Education and The Univprsity, Leavis sa^''s; "Collaboration, 
a mutter of differences as well as agreements" Leavis indicates 
that differences in approach and in appreciation of works of art are 
significant and symptomatic of a healthy phenomenon because they 
assert the fact that their advocates ere humanly alive. lioreover 
the Scrutin y writers were not a clique td.th biassed or dogmatic 
opinions, but a group of writers who sometimes agreed and sometimes 
disagreed with each other, which is perfectly permissible and natural 
in any healthy climate of thought,
Morality in Leavis is something that goes deep doim into the very 
essence of our humanity, something that touches the deep recesses of 
our nature, not in its instinctive and primitive sense, but in its 
subtler psychological and human significance. It is sometliing that 
is concerned with ’the deep levels, the springs of life, the
3
illimitable mystery that well up into consciousness’ , to use one 
of Leavis’s suggestive epithets in the course of explicating the nature 
of spontaneity in Wordsworth and associating it wdth Lawrence’s 
characteristic technique. Leavis malies this point clear when he
1. F.il. Leavis, Two Cultures, p.20, hnglish Literature and The University, 
p.C, Lectures in hm^rrca, p.20 *
2. F,R. Leavis, Education and University, London, Ghatto and 
Windus, 1943, reprint 19oh, p.o
3. F.R, Leavis, Rev^uatlon, London, Ghatto and Hindus, 
reprint 1909, p.Two. ,
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sayrî
in coming to terme vith great literature we discover 
what at bottom ve really belLeve. bhat for - what 
ultiiïïatf'lj for? that do men live by - th^ questions 
work and toll at what I can only call a religious 
i'-T.th of the Ugh t and feeling. , 1
1 mry observe in pcr-nthesis thst I,.L. x',nights pursues a leavisian
line of thoughf, in hi a conception of morality, uorr'cring Dryden* s
did act t ci em rend.'«red in ^ irlKti^ n^ terms with Herbert’s Imag o of
reaecnal grovtb, lecay and inlg'.ts i ays :
A religion that csn b e .-pirer- -rl in îuch terms has 
plainly lost connection witrt the deeper sources of 
vitality ana rpiritu.vl health, and for this reason 
it can not enrich humc.n living with a cm re of 
significance in ell its yart:, aa t^ e tradition ^
actrve Herbert »e an i ihake :pe rre’a -d^y
enric} el it, 2
And in t.notier content he idertitle.,, "morel julgment •\vi'Ui the
im a g in a tiv e  apprehension o f l i f e  v o r i.i:  g c.L 11:. b i j i o s t  power” , ' '
ana in a:aotner cont^ v t ref'^ rt to ff.;i.e2AO''re’ a lovelopnent as
m o n iie s t irg  "a  gei.ulri'^ a en re  od' the  my tar ictis dept-a. of l.luonn
erperienct, th e  genuine aenae o a  dsepor r e a l i t y .  Hojecting
the dogmatic approach of Arc - George very Leavis says ’if
vbrictian belied and Christian ettituhei- have really affected the
critic’s sensibility, then.they % ill play thoir due part in his
perceptions mi e, without his summoning his creeds and
doctrines to tne ^co of iiscririinatxr'g and. pronouncing. If, on
the ether Imid, he dues, li-.e fra George Avery, mane a deliberate
1, F.h. leavis, ii.o Cultures London, Chat to and \ Indus, 1>^2, p. 23 
and in 'irageuy ihe memur, gcruciny, vol.ill, no.Ii 1>14 p. 2fS.
2, L,u. nnighiu, I'urt'-er ; xp] or-â : on- , Iona on, bhat o and Aindug 19o5,
p.117.
3. I.e. Lnights, Some Shakespearean Themes, Ghatto and VJ-nius, 1959
p. 144
4. ibid, p. 28
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and determined set at discriminating Christianly^ then the life
of the spirit will suffer damage, more or less severe, in the ways
that Bro George Every*s work merely exemplifies with a peculiarly
rich obviousness* It is fair to add that he represents the most
active and formidable of contenporary gang-movenents# ^
To Leavis’8 mind morality is something that pertains to our
humanity, to idiat makes us genuinely human. Leavis* s morality can be
represented by such a passage from Lawrence’s ’Morality and the Novel’ t
The only morality is to have man true to his manhood, 
and woman true to her womanhood and let the relation 
form of itself, in all honour, for it is to each 
life itself. 2
In confirmation of this principle Leavis condemns the end of
Lawrence’s Rainbow, in spite of ^the fact that it satisfied the moral 
of the readers
expectations/and considers it as a kind of ’Cessation’ arbitrarily 
irtposed by Lawrence himself and not emanating from the previous 
threads of the work. By contrast he endorses the natural ending 
of Women in Love, in spite of its murky and gloomy connotations 
because it ’comes as the inevitable upshot of a drama enacted by 
human individuals as recognizable and as intelligently motivated
3
as any in fiction’. He also condemns Shelley’s moralizing 
because it is too personal and vague, ^ and Milton’s allegorizing ^ 
because it is subjective and disembodied, and finally Arnold’s 
sentimentalizing ^ because it does not offer a concrete object
1. F.H. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, London, Penguin Books, p. 254
2. D.H. Lawrence, A Selection from Phoenix, Penguin Books, p. 180
3. F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrencei Novelist, Penguin Books, 1955, p# 200
4. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p. 214
5. ibid, pp 58-59
6. F.R. Leavis, New Bearings in English Poetry, Penguin Books, pp. 22-23,
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suggesting the emotion. Here it would sound logical to ’identify*
morality with impersonality since Leavis’s moral attitude entails
a comprehensiveness of outlook, a universality of vision -which can
only be matched by his concept of impersonality. This point is
elaborated by Leavis in his essay on *7inna Karenina'. In tliis
essay Leavis seems to define his critical stand and to enlighten
his reader on a number of the crucial terms he uses, bpeaking
about the -wider relation which art bears to life he says:
It is an immensely fuller and profounder involvement 
in life on the part of the artist whose concern for 
significance in his art is the intense and focused 
expression of the questing after significance that 
characterizes him in his daily living.- This, of 
course, amounts to saying that Tolstoy is a different 
kind of man from James - he is the kind of man the 
• greatest artist necessarily is - Tolstoy might very 
well have answered as Lawrence did, -t-rhen asked, not 
long before liis death, what was the drive behind his 
creating ’one writes, out of one’s moral sense, for the 
race, as it were. ’Moral’, of course, is an ambiguous 
word, but Lawrence -was thinlring of that manifestation 
of his own vitality of genius - the distinctive pre­
occupation with ultimate questions - those which 
concern the nature of one’s deepest inner allegiances, 
and determinations, the fundamental significances to 
be read in one’s eigerience of li.fe, the nature ai;d 
the conditions of fulfilment, 1
It shouldin’t be construed that Leavis is suggesting a moral norm or
a definitive attitude. The significance and more specifically, the
moral significance he attributes to the -work of art springs from its
intrinsic structure, and it is the task of the critic, as Leavis
discharges it here, to bring it out. In other words Leavis does
not favour a social or moral idea at the esqpense or to the detriment
of the artistic character of the i-jork of art* On this point Leavls
is most emphatic. He stresses the inalienable principle that Tolstoy’s
dexterous manipulation of Anna harenina solicits Lavjrence’s "view- that:
1. F.R. Leavis, Anna Karenina, London, Ghatto and Windus, 1967, pp. 11-12,
-  -
Art speech Is the only speech and by speech Laurence
means the utterance of thought - thought of the
anti-mathematical order. 1
This notion gives rise to anotlier crucial term frequently used by
Leavis in designating the significance of the work of art - that
is ’sincerity’. The term also recurs in Santayana’s critical
writings and prompts the reader to thinli that Leavis is influenced
by Santayana’s use of it, but before elaborating their respective
use of the term, I would like to put it in some historical
perspective. Lionel Trilling traces the term back to the
sixteenth century;
The word enters the Tnglish language in the first 
third of the si:-rteenth century, considerably later
than its ^pearance in French.
In a footnote Trilling says:
The O.E.D, gives 1549 as the date of the earliest 
French use, but this is contradicted by Paul Robert’s 
Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue 
Française, idilch &ives l4?5 as the date for sincere 
and 1237 as the date for sincérité.
And goes on to says
It derived from the Latin word sincerus and first 
meant what the Latin word means in its literal 
sense - clean or sound or pure. An old and fanciful 
etyaology, sine cera, without wax, had in mind an 
object of virtue which was not patched up and passed 
off as sound, and serves to rer,ind us that ’the -word 
, in its early use referred primarily not to persons 
but to things, both material and ixunaterialU One spoke 
of sincere wine, not in a metaphorical sense in the 
modern fasiiion of describing the taste of a wine by 
attributing a moral quality to it, but simply to mean 
that it had not been adulterated, or as was once said, 
sophisticated* In the language of medicine urine 
might be sincere, and there was sincere fat and sincere 
gall. To speak of the sincere doctrine or the sincere 
religion, or the sincere gospel, was to say that it 
has not been tampered with, or falsified or corrupted.
Dr Jolinsou in his Dictionary gives priority to the 
meaning of the word as j^ plied to things rather than to
1. ibid, p.l5f
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persons. As used in the early sixteenth century in 
respect of persons, it is largely metaphorical - a man» s 
life is sincere in the sense of being sound or pure, or 
whole, or consistent in its virtuousness. But it soon 
came to mean the absence of dissimulation or feigning or 
pretence. Shakespeare uses the word only in this latter 
sense, with no apparent awareness of its ever having been 
used metaphoric ally. 1
Talcing this line of inquiry a step further, we find that
M.H. Abrams detects in Pater’s distinction between science and art
the inalienrdble place of sincerity. He suggests that the
transcriptive function of science means ’accuracy* or truth to the
original, whereas the representational character of art implies
personal’intimacy or sincerity’. In his essays "upon Epitaphs"
Mordsworth set as one of his aims to establish a criterion of
2sincerity by thich a writer may be judged.
Identifying literature vdth morals he quotes Wordsworth as 
saying; .
• •• nothing can please us however well executed in its 
kind, if we are persuaded that the primary virtues of 
sincerity, earnestness,, and a moral interest in the 
m.ain object are wanting. 3
He goes on to show that John Keblc considered poetry in association
with religion and looked upon sincerity as tiieiir connecting linîv.
In religion it means truth to oneself and in poetry it means the
faithful expression of genuine emotions. In Carlyle we can see
the movement of truth as it turns on its heels to 
become equivalent to ’sincerity’, h
1. Lionel Trilling, Sincerity a d Authenticity, London, Oxford 
University Press, 1972, pp 12-13
2. M.H. Abrams, The I-lirror and The Larrrp, London, Oxford University 
Press, I960, p. 318
3. ibid,
4 . ibid.
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Related to this point is the use of ’sincerity* in the sense of
naturalness and spontaneity as opposed to artificiality and
affectation* On this basis Leigh Hunt praises the sincerity of
ancient poets like Homer and Chaucer, in contra-distinction with
the neo-classic craftsmanship, kith Mill’s identification of
poetry with religion, and Arnold’s advocacy of the same concept
a now sensibility set in, hordsworth and Coleridge kept poetry
end religion distinct and apart,
it was only in the early Victorian period when all 
discourse was e:q)licitly or tacitly thrown into the 
two ejdiaustive modes of imaginative and rational, 
expressive and assertive, that religion fell together 
with poetry in opposition to science, end that religion 
as a consequence was converted into poetry, and poetry 
into a kind of religion. 2
In his use of the word ’sincerity’ Fir noli first identifies
it %.jith’truth’, and secondly he tliinivs that it is the main sirring
of * high seriousness*. In The Study of Poetry he censures Burns
for indulging in ’scotch drinJc, scotch religion and scotch manners.*
There is a great deal of that sort of tiling in Burns, 
and it is unsatisfactory, not because it is Eacchalsnion 
poetry, but because it has not the accent of sincerity, 
which Bacchalanian poetry, to do it justice, very often 
has. There is something in it of bravado ^ something/ 
which makes us feel that we have not the man speaking 
to us with his real voicej something^therefore^poetically 
unsound. 3
Arnold terms Burns’s poetry ’poetically unsound’ because it lacks 
one of the tix> major requisites of poetry, that is truth. It is 
not genuine, it is affected and insincere, and therefore untrue.
1. ibid.
2. ibid, p.335
3. Matthew Arnold, Bssays in Criticism, Second Series, 
Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1913, PP* 45-4o.
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The other major requisite of poetry, high seriousness, cornea as 
a by-product of sincerity;
Lut for supreme poetical success more is required than 
the powerful application of ideas to lifej it must be 
an application under the conditions fixed by the laws 
of poetic truth, and poetic beauty. Those laws fix 
an essential condition^ in the poet’s treatment of such matters 
as are here in question, high seriousness; - the high 
seriousness which conies from absolute sincerity. The 
accent of high seriousness, born of absolute sincerity, 
is wiiat gives to such verse as in la sua volontade e 
nostra paceM^ to such criticism of Dante’s, its power.
But the reference to Dante brings us back to Santayana, because
it in in connection mth Dante that he significantly employs the
term: "The most visionary of subjects, life after death, could
be treated with scientific soberness and deep sincerity."^
Roughly speaiing ’sincerity* hcrw is identified with concreteness.
In another context Santayana discriminates between Fnglish poetry
vh ch he designates as largely selective and homogeneous and poetry
of the Latin tradition which he describes as mainly heterogeneous
saying:
In French, Italian and Spanish as in Latin itself, 
elegance and neatness of ’expression’ suffice for 
verse. The reader passes without any sense of 
incongruity or anti-climax, from passion to 
reflection,from sentiment to satire, from flights 
of fancy to homely details, the whole has a certain 
hui>'ian sincerity and intelligibility -odiich weld it 
together. 3
Santayana again commends Jean L all or’s attitude towards the 
complicated problems of our life. He points out that man should boldly 
face the conditions of life insteaii of evading them, because only
1. ibid, p. 48
2. George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p. 131
3. George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p. 131
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through a direct confrontation of the predicaments posed by daily
life can he discover a hope for living,
hith this clarity of thought Santayana invests Jean Lalior
saying "This moral confusion our author avoids by his greater 
1sincerity", and the meaning with which the term is fraught here 
has a direct bearing on our hiuianitv/on what caters for human life 
and hope.
In his essay on ’Arma Karenina* Leavls reminds us that "every
great creative work compels us to reconsider the meaning of that 
2
word," In the light of this remark it wjould be advisable to trace 
Leavis* s use of the terra in seme chronological order.
Commenting on Yeats’s consciousness of the raging conflict between 
’intellectual passion* and ’old age* dominating his later poetry,
Leavis says;
This is the voice of one who knows intellectual passion,=
He does not deceive himself about ihat he has lost, but 
the regret Itself becomes in the poetry something positive.
His irplication3, in short, are very complex; he has 
GCliieved a difficult and delicate sincerity, an extra- 
ordin.-orily subtle pcL^ e. 3
The sincerity here which reflects the genuineness of personal
experience is matched by the concuraraatcness of creative experience
the ’ subtle pose. *
b'hcii Leavis applies the terra to Hliot * s Ash Uednesdai^ , later on,
he suggests that the poetjs teclmlcal accoraplisliraent is a manifestation
of, rather, a plea for sincerity. For the poet ’tecimique* was the
problem of sincerity.^
1. ibid, p.243
2. F.R. Leavis, Anna Karenina and other Essays, London, Ghatto and 
Windus, 1967 ,"p7l3 "
3. F.R. Leavis, New Bearings in Mglldi Poetry , Penguin Books, p.44 
4# ibid, p.99
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Applied to the later poetry of Eliot, the word can be understood 
in terms of leavis’s concept of moral enactment.
The poetry]^ ’Ash Wednesday * onwards doesn’t say, I 
believe, oru know, or frfeve is the truth *lt is positive 
in direction^  but not positive in that \/s^  (the difference 
irom Dante is exbrerae)fj.t is a searching of e:<perience, a 
s^piritua^  discipline, a teclmiqiie for sincerity^for giving 
sincerity a meaning. The preoccupation is with establishing 
from among the illusions, evanescences and unrealities of 
life in tirie, an appreliension of an assured reality. 1 
/
It is obvious that Leavis’s use of the term here is similar to
G ant ay ana’8 application of it to Dante’s Divine Comedy. Dante’s
’visionary subject» has its parallelism in Lliot’s illusions,
evanescences and unrealities. The function of sincerity as elaborated
here by both g ant ay on a and Leavis is to create out of fantasies end
abstractions something concrete and vMLid. Discussing Forster’s
portrayal of human relations Leavis says:
In his treatment of personal relations the bent 
manifests itself in the manner and accent of his 
pre-occupation with sincerity. 2
Sincerity in connection lith Forster reflects his pre-occupation
with viewing human life from a significant angle. This pre-occupation
with our humanity - Leavis suggests - prompts Forster to outstep the
conventional lixi’its of comedy proper, in both ’A Room with a Vierr, and
Mhere Angels Fear to Tread. These limitations to which Jane Austen
:K)Uld have closely adliered, are transgressed in favour of a faithful
and revealing delineation of human life. bitiiin a coiuic frameivork
Forster introduces love and death, and contrasts Italy with Lhgland.^  
Thus Leavis uses sincerity in this context as a faithful indicator of
varying human e^ notions, and this use is in line with Santayana’s
adoption of the term in his distinction between the homogeneous English
1$ F.R. Leavis, Education and University, p.89
2. F.R. Leavis, The Coiimon Pysuit, p. 262
3. ibid
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poetry and the heterogeneous poetry of the Latin tradition.
In respect to Henry James the term is used in a very subtle
and delicate sense:
His intelligence about the need of his time alerted 
and quickened by his Parisian initiation,. he dealt 
firmly with Victorian moral! sm in the way the time - 
the state of British and American culture - required.
On the other hand, strong with his un-British 
inwardness mth France, he yielded no ground to the 
opposed fallacies of Aestheticism, which had so great 
an attraction, for the would-be enlightened and 
unprovincial. He had acMeved a centrality that made 
him strong to deal with all provinciaHsms. He 
expressed vith a fin.e and irresistible sincerity his 
sense of Flaubert’s place in the history of the novel, 
and of the indebtedness to Flaubert that should Lef " 
felt by all practitioners. Eut^ maiving his famous i. 
decision that was a mature conscious realization 6f 
what for hian was fact and necessity 1
The terra points to the fact that James was an adept artist
because he concentrated on provincial American theraes, thereby
securing the element of precision and specificity rdiich simultancously
maxes for universality, as Leavis has indicated in another essay on 
2
the saxae'subject. But Leavis’s handling of the terra in this 
particular argument charges it -vith further implications. Sincerity 
with regard to James suggests the handsome tribute he gives Flaubert 
for the part he played in the development of the novel, but what is more 
important is that it points to James’s adherence to the proper li.terary 
tradition of Gcorgo Eliot wliich has its obvious moral implications.
Thus the term here serves to combine the aesthetic approach of Flxioibert 
with the moral tone of George Eliot.
Ehen Leavis applies the term to ’iuma Karenina’ he coirpels upon us
1. F.R. Leavis’s Preface to Henry Jajnies’s Selected Literary CriticlRTi, 
London, Heinemonn, 19si, p.Hi.
2. F.R. Leavis, The G ommon Pur suit,. pp. 223- 232
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its human and even spiritual connotatioriG, Goiraienting on the
ending of ’Anna Karenina' Leavis argues that Levin’s meditations on
life and death, t ough not strictly pertinent to the central tiieme of
’Anna and Karenin, harmonize with the general panoramic view of the novel#
It is a close in keeping with the creative mode of the 
VTork, vjith the delicate ih-oleness of the ’sincerity* x-ith 
which Tolstoy pursues his aim of inducing life to propose 
and define the ’questions’ a process, that is, at the same 
time a convexring of such ’ansx-xers’ as life may yield# 1
Leavis’s use of ’sincerity’ to transcend the strictly literary'’ 
and to cover ultimate issues essential to our humanity is in full 
keeping with his rejection of the exclusively aesthetic view of 
literature, and x^ ith Santayana’s identification of poetry with 
religion. It serves to bridge or narrow doi-si the gap betxjecn 
literature and morality in the interest of xdiat is central and 
significant in Human life.
Santayana and Leavis on Tho Function of The Critic
Both Santayana and Leaxris are in agreement on the vital need of
2
the critic for e:'p>erience and literary training^ that is a constant 
familiarity xvith good works of art that helps to cultivate xdiat 
Santayana calls taste, and Leavis intelligence or refinement of 
sensibility. To both of them specialization is a pre-requisite for a 
cor^etent literary critic. The subtle sense of appreciation viith 
which the critic is endowed entails a great deal of self-discipline and 
experience of both art and life. This wide experience is intended to 
help the critic realize the underlying vision of the work. If Santayana
1. F.R. Leavis, JUma
2. F.R# Leavis, The
Karenina and other Essays p.l5
Common Pursuit , p.224-225 and George Santayana
The Life of Reason (Reason in Art) pp. 192-193 
3# ibid.
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expresses this function in terms of harmony and coherence, Leavls in
his characteristically practical tone says:
As he (the critic) matures in experience of the new thing 
ho asks, e3q>licitly and implicitly ’where does this come, 
how does it stand in relation to ### ? How relatively 
important does it e&m Î And the organization Into ^ hich 
it settles as a constituent in becoming ’placed* 
organization of similarly placed things, that have found 
their bearing with regard to one another* 1
In other words to Santayana the function of the critic is to create
A kind of harmony and order among works of art, and to leavls it is
a process of establishing relations between them on a basis of
functionalim and relevance, and the similarity betwem ’pl-acing*
and ’harmony* is quite obvious*
Again, Santayana and Leavls agree on the notion that the
judgment passed on the work of art is a personal judgment. "This
2
criterion", says Santayana, "will be natural, personal and auton(%muG" , 
and Leavis* s view that a judgment is personal and cannot be otherwiee 
has become almost comon-place. Once egain Leavis* a conception of 
criticism as a collaborative activity appealing to the readers for 
general consent or -Wiat Leavis prefers to call ’unanimity of consciousness’ 
represented by his famous interrogatory sentence "This is so, isn’t it?" 
has its origin in Santsyana’s concept of criticism as a serious and public 
function, and the critic’s jwlgment will extend its authority over other 
minds also in so far as their constitution is similar to (his). In 
that measure what is a gmuine instance of reason in (him) others will 
recognize as a genuine expression in themselves also. Santayana and 
Leavis accord with each other on the idea that the significance or
X. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, London, Penguin Books, p. 213
2. George Santayana, Cbiter Scripta. London, Constable and Ccmipany, 
1936, p. 30
3* George Santayana, Reason In Art , p. l5l
4. ibid.
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intention elicited by the critic from the work of art may be quite
different from the original intention of the artist, Stating this
idea Santayana says that the critic’s function is to awaken a
certain feeling in the reader,
but even this most aesthetic element in the value of 
art does not borrow its value from the possible fact 
that the artist also shares those habits and emotions# ^
Leavis says something similar:
These tests may veiy well reveal that the deep, 
animating intention (if that is the right i^ ord) 
is something very different from the intention the 
author xjould declare# 2
This is in harmony with Leavis* s original concept that intentions
are nothing but what is realized in the work of art.
Thus if the taste of the critic is personal, yet the ’judgraent
he tries to pass on the vrork of art - tlirough a plea for consent on
the part of the auüence addressed, implies impersonality* Andor
GoîTMe intelligently elaborates this point saying;
Ml at lies behind and gives substance to his (Leavis* s) 
use of the formula (conversational style) is a 
conviction that we do share a fundaiaental human 
sensibility which can properly be a^ ipealed to in 
this way. This, as I understand it, is the 
impersonality referred to by Leavis. 3
This conversational style was later defined by Leavis as
’The Third Realm’ The phrase is designed to identify the new
kind of Intermediate style that is not e:oclusively literary, nor rigidly
scientific, but rather conversational. ' This gesture on the part of
/
1. George Santayana, Reason in dirt, p# 1p1
2. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p. 225
3. Andor G orme. Attitudes to Criticism, Carbondale and Edwards ville 
Southern Illinois University Press, 19oo, p.11?
4. F.R, Leavis, Tt-jo Cultures, London, Ghatto and Windus, 1962, p.28
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Leavls represents a critical ’tactic* having a twofold value. In 
the first place it brings criticism to bear on human and social 
Issues, thereby enhancing its effect, and in so doing it simultaneously 
broadens its scope. The phrase *The third reaiia* says the editor of 
The Hrraan. Tvorld ’is Leavis* s means of malting his step from the great 
particular example, the existence of a poem, to a general truth about 
the nature of language, and this In turn, of widening literary 
criticism into a criticism of life. Life as a comprehensive whole, 
Leavis suggests, is an ideal wliich cannot be attained in the 
fragmentary spirit of scientific specialities, and this is again an 
element in common between bant ay ana and leavis.
To both Santayana and Leavis the judgment passed on the work of
art is a moral one. On this point bant ay ana is quite positive:
Art being a part of life, the criticism of art 
is a part of morals. 2
Leavis reaches a similar position though his wording is someihat
different:
... to insist that literary criticism is or should be 
a specific discipline of intelligence, is not to suggest 
that a serious interest in literature, can confine 
itself to the kind of intensive local anadysis associated 
with practical criticism ... a. real literary interest is 
an interest in man-, society and civilization. 3
Attributing Jormson's 'discriininating taste* and 'sensitive ear* to
a positive tradition that is wider than the merely literary one,
Leavis ssyss
... its positiveness is a matter of its being so much 
more than literary; the very decided conventions of 
idiom and form engage coirprehensive unanimities regarding 
morals, society and civilization. 4
1. The Himan Lor Id, Kay 1971, p.73
2. George Santayana, Reason in Art, p. 178
3» F.R* Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p. 200 
4. F.R. Leavis, Anna Karenina, p. 199
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Leavis* s use of such terns as * relevance* and ’significance* is
an implicit pointer to the moral and humane connotations
involved in th e. work.of literature.
In ills criticism of individual writers Leavis is also influenced
by Santayana’s judgments on those writers. This is Santayana’s vieif
of hbrdsworthî
lUiat he renders, beyond such pictorial touches as 
language is capable of, is the moral inspiration vjhich 
the scene brings to him. Tliis moral inspiration is 
Kh% not drawn at all from the real processes of nature 
udiich every landscape manifests in some aspect and for 
one moinent. ... Uordsi-Torth dwells on adventitious 
iroman matters. He is no poet of genesis, evolution 
and natural force in its myoriad rianifestations, only 
a part of the cosmic process engages his interest or 
touches his soul. 1
Enlarging on this view he says:
V/ordeworth was truly a poet of nature. In so far, 
however, as he was a poet of landscape, he was still 
fundamentally' a poet of human life, or merely of his 
personal experience. uTien he talked of nature he was 
generally moralizing and altogether subject to the 
pathetic fallacy, but when he talked of man or hiraself, 
he was unfolding a part of nature, the upright human 
heart, and studying it in its truth. 2
In a similar way Leavis. says: •
bordsworth* s pre-occupation was with a distinctively 
hmaan naturalness, vith sanity, and his interest in 
mountains was subsidiary. 3
The affinity between Santayana and Leavis on bordsvrorth brings to
the fore the viiole romantic set-up to which Santayana gives so much
credit - and Leavis, probably with Santayana in mind, malces it a
high-water mark of his criticism. Santayana says:
1. George -Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, p. 59
2. ibid, pp. 60-61
3* F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p. 165
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In fact, the great merit of the romantic attitude in 
poetry, and the transcendental method in philosophy, 
is that they put us back at the beginning of our 
experience. They disintegrate convention vihich is 
often curabrous end confused and restore us to ourselves, 
to immediate perception end primordial will, 1
It is possxbly in consequence oi that view that Leavis foimiei 
ills opinion that the Romantic Iiovement added something, that is,
tf p
enriched the human heritage,
Vihen Leavis comes to assess dickens in The Great Tradition,
he brands him as a great* ent ert aimer * and cites Santayana to confirm
this verviic Û. Santa^ rana* s intimation that Dickens cannot be tali en
seriously and can only be enjoyed at the grate in a winter evening
is o-qolicitly adopted by Leavis to indicste a lack of reiponsibility
on the part of Dickens, In his criticism of Dickens Santayana says:
It is remarkable, in spite of his ardent simplicity 
and openness of heart, how insensible Dicnens was to thoK 
greater themes of the huaan imagination, religion, science, 
politics, art. He was a waif him:elf and utterly 
dlsirilierited. For example the terrible heritage of 
contentious religxons wnich fills the world, seems not 
to exist for him. In this matter he was like a 
sensitive cMld, with a most religious disposition, but 
not religious ideas. Perhaps properly spelling he has 
no ideas on any subject at all. 3
Leavis seems to have gone on for a long time under the i p  act of 
thus ’judgment’, and it was probably the severity of tils judgment 
, tliat delayed ils recognition of Dicxens's artistic achievement, it is 
interesting to note that, as Leavis achieved critical maturity, he not 
only rejected, but revoked that verdict. «A waif hiraself */ he was 
totally disinlierited* J Santayana* s observation illuminates noticing 
except the assumptions behind it, it is stultifyingly false*. ^
1. George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets , p. 196
2. F.R. & Q.D. Leavis, Dickens, The hovelist, p. 276, and later
repeated in Leavis* s introduction to The Image of Ghildliood, p.21
3* George Santayana, Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies,
London, Constable and Gcaiipary Llilted, 1922, p.59
4. F.R. h  Q.D* Leavis, Dickens The Novelist, p.214
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The judgment passed by Santayana and Leavls on Browning is
similar in import and effect. Santayana states that Browning’s
poetry is defective on two main points. It is eictremely personal
in the sense that Browning himself is always the centre of the
poetic experience, and this attitude on his part deprives him of
achieving teclinical maturity and convincingness and reduces his
poetry to sentimental discourses* The second major defect is the
lack of a binding moral or ideal tone in this poetry. It is secular,
passionate and crude. It does not ennoxle the sensibility of the
reader, but degrades it. The emotion is pursued crudely for its orn saite.*'
In NewT Bearinr E, Leavis says;
There are kinds of strength a poet is best without. And 
it is plain that Browming wo'old have been less robust, 
if he had been more sensitive and intelligent. He did 
indeed bring his living interests into liis poetry, but 
it is plain too, that they are not the interests of an 
adult sensitive mind. He did not need to withdraw into 
a dream world, because he was able to be a naive romantic 
of love and action on the walling plane. 2
Leavis* s * naive romanticism’, corresponds to Bant ay ana’s ’barbîcrism’
because the designation has more or less the saiae significance of
inexperience and immaturity.
But Leavis disagrees with Santaj'ana in liis appraissl of Shelley 
end by tliis I mean that their evaluation of Lhelley is made from 
tt'jo different standpoints. In his essay on Bhelley, Bantayana tries 
to justify Bhslley’s aaotional outbursts and subversive tendencies 
along iiistoricsl and philosopliical lines. In the first place 
Shelley feels that he does not belong. He has not received a formal 
education, and is not constrained by formal institutions. On the 
contrary he feels that it is his bound on duty to level them dowrn, 
because in his revolutionary and moral spirit, they are symbols of
1. G. Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, pp. 188-21 o
2. F.R. Leavis, Hew Bearings in English Poetry, p.24
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oppression. He shied away from life, because his inner, pure and
uncont-siiDjiated soul was richer; nobler end healthier. He did not
bother to take notice of this world, because it was in his visionary
world that he found embodiment of his ideals. To him this inner
world constituted the realm of beauty, love and eternity.
Shelley’s poetry shows us the perfect, but nalced body 
of human happiness, lihat clothes circumstances may 
compel most of us to add, may be a necessary concession,
to climate, to custom or to shame; they can hardly add
a new vitality and a new beauty comparable to that whd-ch 
they hide. 1
But tills is too much an idealized view which suits Santayana’s
philosopliic cast of mind, but loses sight of the pressing donend
for concreteness that is essential to good poetry. That is why
Leavis rightly rejects it since it is based on mere idealism
2and Platonism.
... but Shelley, we have seen, was, while on the one 
hand conscious of ardent altruicm, on the other 
peculiarly we ale in his hold on objects - peculiarly 
unable to realize them as ezd.sting in their oim 
natures and their own right. Eis need of loving (in 
a sense that was not, perhaps, in the full focus of 
1-Ir Bantaj''ana’s intention) comes out in the erotic 
element, that as already remarked the texture of the 
poetry pervasively exhibits. 3
In on involved and laboured process Bant ay ana tries to impress
upon us the idea that Shelley’s character was self-sufficient.
Shelley, on the contrary, is lil^ e a paha-tree in the desert 
or a star in the sky, he is perfect in the midst of the 
void. His obtuseness to things dynamic - to the material 
order, leaves his whole mind to develop tilings after their 
o m  kind, his abstraction permits purity, liis playfulness 
malies room for creative freedom, his ethereal quality is 
only humanity having its way. 4
1. Norman Eenfrey (ed) Selected Critical britings of George Bentaysna 
Gaftibridge University dress, 19^0, vol.l, p. 173*
2. F.R, Leavis, Revaluation, London, Ghatto and blndus, 1969, p.20o
3. ibid, p.222
4* Norman Eenfrey (ed) op.cit, p. 173
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These statements show how Santayana is so engrossed by Shelley’s 
character and plillosophy that he forgets their impact in a poetic 
conteiit; that is whether they are dramatized or not. In fact he 
has forgotten on© of his own leading principles, naraely that 
eriibodiment or enactment is the metliod of effective poetic coifipoGition. 
Tliis seems to justify Leavis* s vieir that Bhelley offers emotion, in
P 1itself, unattached, in the void, for its own salie, and though 
Bantayana's defence seems to be subtle and philosophical, it does 
not refute Leavis*s charge.
Santayana and Leavis on The Relativity of Human and Horal Values
I have already referred to Santayana* s relativity of moral values.
It wjould be relevant to eiriphasize this notion with regard to Leavis* s
criticism. In one of his illuminating statements Santayana says:
... any reasoned appreciation of life is bound to be 
a religion, even if no conventionally religious elements 
ere irqoorted into the problem. 2
The statement throws a flood of light.on Leavis*s pre-occupation with
other social and educational questions beside his definite practice
as a literary critic, but this point liiill be reverted to later.
In "The Appeal to The Supernatural" Santayana in his sarcastic and
cynical way satirizes the illusory notion of codified or standardized
norms - norms that are fictitiously held to meet diverse human needs
at all times and in ell places saying:
1. F.R. Leavis, op.cit., p.214
2. George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p. 235
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If for Instance the human soul were supernatural and 
had its proper life and perfection in another world, 
then indeed all the variety of human tastes, temperaments 
and customs, would he variety only, in self-ignorance 
and error. There would be an eternal criterion, apart 
from all places, persons and times, by tdiich everything 
sliould be judged. 1
Bp e icing about protest anti sm Santayana says tV.at its ideals
were more allied to those of the Hebrews than to those 
of the early Christians, and that *the typical protestant 
was himself his own church and made the selection and 
interpretation of tradition according to the demands of 
his personal spirit. 2
Again Santayana indicates that Christianity succeeded as a religion
in its e^rly phases, because it then depended for its principles on
the preceding pagan, Hebrew, and imaginative popular traditions:
... it vfas only by virtue of this complement that • 
Clristlanity could claira to approach a humane 
Uüiversality or to achieve an ira.aginative adequacy.
The problem was to compose in the form of a cosmic 
epic, with, metaphysical justifications and effectual 
staTtiixgj-points for moral action, the spiritual 
autobiography of man. 3
This concept' of the relativity of human and moral values Bant ay ana
exliibits in his introduction to Three Fhilosophical Poets, where
he says that "each of these poets (Lucretius, Dante and Goetliej is
typical of an age.^ Lucretius is a naturalist who believes that
the wrld is made up of certairi elements in continual flux - that
it is a machine the constant operation of which entails regular
cycles of death and rebirth -
Into this view of the world he fits a view of human 
life as it ought to be led under such conditions. 5
1. George Bant ay ana. The Genteel Tradition at Pay, The Adelyhi, p#19
2. G. Bant ay ana, op.cit, p.112
3. George Santayana, ibid, p.114
4* George Santayana, Three fhilosop’nicel Poets, London, 0.>i’ori 
University press, lylo, p.4
5* ibid, p.5
- 96.
This is by definition the relativity of human values that characterizes
Santayana* s moral approach. ,
With the passage of time and the consequent need for adaptability
to a new set of values, Dante speared on the scene and a new
' sensibility set in; that is the Christian sensibility manifesting
itself in the doctrine of reward and punishment, and man's life on
earth as a preparation for the life to come. Dante's Divine Comedy
re^nded to that spirit and crystallized such ideals.
As time went on a new doctrine began to take shape, that is
romanticism, or the belief in man's infinite capabilities and his
unrestrained passion for life and adventure. Goethe's Faust
served to set forth this romanticism.
Adopting this relativity of human values in his criticism
Leavis refutes Henry James's irresponsible plastic art saying
Is thye any great novelist whose pre-occupation with 
'form is not a matter of his responsibility tovjards 
rich human interest, or conplexity of interests, ^
profoundly realized?— re^onsibility involving.of 
its very nature, im^inative sÿB5>athy, moral /  9.
discrimination and judgment of relative human value, t
Again in the course of his analysis of Eliot's 'The Love Song of
J.Alfred Prufrock, Leavis says that the poem
represents a consiste break -with the nineteenth 
century tradition and a new start. 2
This new start is meant to represent the modem sensibility.
Reverting to the values embodied by the poet and their correspondence
to the sensibility of the age to Wiich he belongs, Leavis remarks
on the 'Later Poetry of T.S. Hiot' that «it is peculiarly relevant
to the stresses of our time”. ^ In D.H. Lawrence: Novelist. Leavis
1. F.R. Leavis, Scrutiny. Vol.XHl, no.3. Autumn p.172
2. F.R. Leavis, New Bearings in English poetry. London, Penguin Books, p.66
3. F.R. Leavis, Education & The University. London, Chatto and Wlndus
15?U3, reprint, 1965, p. lOU
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, consistently develops this relative morality t^en he bDaode describes
oijm- -
Lavjrence as 'the great writer of ou^phase of civilization».
Once again he describes Lmnrence' s technique saying:
he (Lawrence) is recordinga in his rendering of /
provincial Englandawhat M  the concrete this has 
meant in an actual civilization. 2
It is in relation to tliis contemporary civilization that Lawrence
manages to portray his character, to penetrate into the workings
U
of their heart to bring out what is weighty and momentous in
their life. This exquisite unfolding of the human values they
represent is precisely what Leavis takes to be moral or 'religious'
in Lawrence, and if Lawrence, as Eliot accused him, did not adhere
to a Christian dogma, it is because he wanted to concern himself
practically with the substantial and diverse human values. His
achievement is manifest in his insight into human individuals
related to a given environment.
in interest like hisy^in the deeper life of the psyche 
cannot be an interest in the individual abstracted from 
the society to Wiich he belongs. 3
This gives rise to a wider investigation into other scales of
relativity, because the term cannot be confined to or exhausted
by idle relation between the individual and his age, for there is
the more important consideration that the value advocated by the
individual can or should be supplemmted by other relative values.
I have already referred to Santayana's belief that, on its inception,
Christianity succeeded to im press its teachings upon people by
integrating into it principles derived from pagan, Hebrew and
1. F.R. Leavis, D.H. La>n*ence> Novelist, p.9
2. ibid. p.110
3. ibid. p . 128
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pc^ular traditions* Adopting this concept, in principle, Leavis 
indicates that literary studies should be coinpleted or rather 
perfected by studies in other departments of thought* His 
doctoral thesis is an exploration of the relationship between 
literature and journalism. His Education & the University is a 
reflection of his keen concern for promoting a system of education 
fulfilling the humane values he finds pre-eminently in the study of 
literature. His Tvro Cultures? is a refutation of C.P. Snow's false 
demarcation between -shat he superficially terms a technological 
culture and a literary culture. Leavis's main point in that - 
lecture i^ as to insist on what he rightly considers as one culture, 
combining all that characterizes our humanity. Leavis argues that 
a student with a scientific bent must have some background in literary 
studies, and correspondingly the student of literature must have some 
awareness of technical knowledge. English Literature In Our Time and The 
University, denotes Leavis's focal interest in the university as a 
centre wherein the human tradition, the genuine cultural values can 
be maintained.
Krs Leavis's Fiction And The Reading Public, is a study of the 
gradual change of taste that showed itself in the reading public of 
English fiction from the eighteenth century up to the thirties. She 
terms her study 'anthropological'^ and the adjective is indicative 
of the close relationship, rather the inter-action between literature and 
society. In her essays on 'The Cambridge Tradition' she singles out 
A.C. Eaddon, Leslie Stephen, Henry Sidgwick, and Professor Chadwick for 
particular admiration as they stood for sound and effective human 
values in Cambridge University. But these are pregnant subjects and 
it sounds appropriate to deal with them in some detail.
1. Q.D. Leavis, Fiction And The Reading Public. London, Chatto 
and Hindus, 1932» reprini 1^ 68," p.XV.
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In the preface to Education end The University » Leavis says
V&at I mean, as I explain further on, is that the more 
clearly you see the indispensable value of a real 
literary training, the more it is borne in you that 
such a training cannot occupy by itself two or three 
years of a student’s university life, and that it 
demands of its very nature, to be associated with work 
in other fields. 1
In working out his programme for a liberal education, Leavis is
neither philosophizing nor speaking in abstract terms, but is noticeably
meticulous and specific. He chooses a definite academic institution,
study
that is Cambridge, and a particular branch of igofiEbodge, that is
literature. He concentrates on the university, because it provides,
in his view, a healthy and ideal climate both for the preservation
and continuity of the human tradition. In this context Leavis
clarifies for us almost incontestably the crux of the subject under
review, namely that the human tradition can be studied and maintained
without involving religious dogmas
... it is the pre-occupation with cultural values 
as human and separable from any particular religious 
frame or basis, the offer at a cultural regeneration 
that prompts the description 'humanist*. 2
Leavis's concept of the liberal education,designed to meet the
exigencies of modern life, is that it is free from any religious
'inculcation*. He maintains that Eliot is a representative of
modern sensibility, not on account of his Anglo-Catholicism, though
he professes that, but rather by virtue of embodying the predicaments,
the crises of modem life. He reminds us that our age is no longer
EBbHpodDEiy that of Dante nor of Herbert (the implication is that
religion can no longer adequately represent the crucial, intricate
problems of modern man, as it did in the ages of both Dante and Herbert.
1. FJl. Leavis, Education and The University, pp.8*9
2. ibid, p . 19
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In other words the complexity of modern life solicits a profounder 
and a more comprehensive treatment than the pre-occupation with 
religious dogmas or the limited discussion of religious issues.
This ccRiplexLty calls for a deeper understanding of basic human 
issues and conditions of living.
In Two CulturesTLeavis attacks Snow* e short-sighted and 
reductive attitude towards life. This attitude is deficient and 
inperfect as it reduces life to a mere system of material prosperity 
based on teclmological advance. Snow claims that the * scientific 
Culture* is becoming preponderant in modem life and that the 
scientists have the future in their bones. If one adirés to 
something outside the confines of this material technological mode
f
of living one will be stigmatized by Snow as a luddite.
The upshot is that if you insist on the need for any other 
kind of concern entailing forethought, action and 
provision about the human future, any other kind of 
misgiving, than that which talks in terms of productivity, 
material standards of living, hygienic and technological 
progress, then you are a Luddite. 1
To counteract this diminutive or rather reductionist approach to life,
Leavis resorts to the University wherein literature is studied* The
significance of Leavis*s ençîhasis on literature, in this regard, is
that it involves language* This language furnishes a neutral
ground for both tlie specialist in literature and the people, or
wîiat he has already called *the third realm*. The fact that the
Qîecialiet will talk to people in a language familiar to than, and
elicit the desirable response, will create a coll^orative activity
idiich is essential to the survival of our human heritage. This
language is the common property of all of thorn, and in using it the
critic strikes sensitive chords bringing his auditors back to their
1. F.B. Leavis, Two Cultures? London, Chatto and Hindus, 1962, p.19
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fundamental human character, thlch transcends present conditions 
forms a continuous stream running frcaa the past to the future, 
thereby surmounting the crudities and insensitivities incurred by 
a technologico-Benthamite age.
In English Literature In our Time and The University, Leavis
develops this point in a way that has a direct bearing on the
concept of relativity - a concept that he derived mainly from
Santayana. After paying tribute to Mansfield Forbes for his
efforts in establishing the Cambridge English Tripos - efforts that
evaitually resulted in the consequent experimental work conducted
by I.A. Richards in that school in the field of literary criticism,
Leavis comes to grips with the pivotal question of language and
literary criticiati. The new point he brings to light in this
discussion is the idea of * value* or rather critical standards.
If language furnishes a common ground on vdiich people can mutually
and understandably communicate with each other, the immediate
occasion for this communication is a given poem or novel, because
it is in terms of literature as a manifestation of language that
Leavis speaks. The discussion carried on between the critic and his
public on the nature of that work of art entails judgment or what
Leavis calls 'valuing*• Here Leavis is shrewd enough to identify
value with * significance*, which he interprets as moral significance,
and to indicate that each new work that presents itself to the reader
compels him to modify his judgment and his sense of values
... so far from valuing being a matter of bringing up a 
scale, a set of measures, or an array of fixed and definite 
criteria to the given work, every work that makes itself 
felt as a challenge evokes or generates in the critic a 
fresh realization of the grounds and nature of judgment.
A truly great work is realized to be that because it so 
decidedly modifies, alters the sense of value and 
significance that judges. 2
1. F.R. Leavis, English Literature In Our Time and The University.
London, Chatto and Windus, 19o7, p.5o
2. ibid.
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He Invokes Lawrence In support of this view where he says
The true artist doesn't substitute iramorality for 
morality on the contrary, he always substitutes a 
finer morality for a grosser. As soon as you see 
a finer morality, the grosser becomes relatively 
immoral..
This brings us back in the m ost con$)elling way to the 
Santayana-Leavis theme of the relativity of moral and human values.
Adverting to the same topic in his first lecture, in Lectures 
j-A America. Leavis clears up some misconceptions popularized by the 
English papers and ’Snow's Lecture'. In the first place he rejects 
Dickens's designation as a Luddite and describes him as an 'incomparable 
social historian'.  ^ His achievement is to depict vividly and 
Intensely the shortcomings of his Victorian age. His second object 
is to attack Snow's denomination of two cultures and to insist that 
there is only one human culture. In this lecture he shows himself 
alive to the fact, that however great the achievements of science 
and technology may be in the sphere of our material life, yet they 
are utterly helpless and deficient in respect of our moral and 
spiritual needs. They cannot satisfy the profound cravings of the 
soul. Els claims for the university as a seat of enlightenment and 
intelligence does not depend on the concept of a university as a set 
of epecialized departments, but rather on the assuu^tion that through 
the education of the public, they can respond to the deeper values, the 
finer strains and the more centrally human notations implicit in works 
of literature, and discussed by the literary critic in collaboration 
with them. In the cultivation of this refined sense of human values 
Leavis secures a human basis countering the grossly developing 
technological civilization.^
1. F.E. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and The University  ^p.5l
2. F.R. & Q.D. Leavis, Lectures in America. London, Chatto k Windus, 1969, p.7
3. ibid. pp.3-25
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Leavis* s conccsrn for maintaining the literary tradition is 
consolidated, and in a sense complemented by Q.D. Leavis*s 
interest in anthropological and sociological studies. This 
interest has the effect of broadening the spectrum to embrace studies in 
humanities at large. This interest shows that she is adopting 
something close to Santayana’s view of the relativity of human values. 
Under the heading 'The Cambridge Tradition’ she expresses admiration 
for A.C* Haddon's successful efforts to establish the study of 
anthropology at Cambridge, and is revolted at the university’s 
ingratitude manifested in denying him a professorship. ^
Vindicating Leslie Stephen's critical procedure against the
charge of moralism, Mrs Leavis again recapitulates the central
conception of relative human values; that is, values that are
largely determined by the spirit of the age. She rejects the view
of art for art's sake, arguing that morality in art ^riags from a
keener and profounder realization of man's life. This profounder
understanding of human life is precisely what she calls 'moral
beauty* idiich she attributes to Leslie Stephen. Meanvzhile a
judgment of value will be the right one if itds linked with the
exact generation of people, and the ^ecific period of time to which
it unmistakably belongs.
... In talking of literary changes I shall have first, to take 
note of the main intellectual characteristics of the period, 
and secondly what changes took place in the audience to which 
men of letters addressed themselves; and how the gradual 
extension of the reading class affected the development of 
the literature addressed to them. 2
In discussing Henry Sidgwick*s Cambridge, }%rs Leavis again 
focuses attention on the fundamental question of liberal education.
1. Scrutiny .^ Vol.XL, no.U, Buimer 19U3, pp* 305-310
2. Scrutiny, V0I.VII, no.U, March 1939, p#Wlt
lou
' tracing it back to the initiatives of Henry Sidgwick. In this 
fi^d she puts on record two facts that have become fully established 
as a result of the pioneering work of Sidgwick. The first is the 
creation of the system of co-education in Cambridge, the second is 
the nullification of the principle of religious uniformity as 
applied to university tests in religion, and to the ^pointment of 
university staff-members. This achievenmt idiich establishes the time- 
honoured relative human and moral values, dear to both Santayana and 
Mrs Leavis, is the essential bond that associates Mrs Leavis with 
Cambrj.dge.
A society that places^ a high value on character and 
intellectual virtu^^instead of on social and 
^tellectual confcuW^yle something that in these 
days at Cambridge we may
look back to with both pride and nostalgia. 1
This liberal attitude reaches its climax in the work of professor
describes '
ChadvdLck which î^îrs Leavis rightly latekx as 'disinterested*. This
disinterestedness is supremely represented in his rejection of the
idea of forcing Anglo-Saxon as a compulsory subject on the students
in ^ite of the fact that he was the professor and chairman of that
department. In a spirit of complete self-denial, and in the
interests of promoting these studies he suggested that they should
be optional and free from philological associations. Instead of
constraining his students to the rigid rules of Anglo-Saxon
philology, he concentrated on relating these studies to their
northern social background, and in this way he managed to
cultivate a taste/and a critical ^predation of these studies.
________________A  __________________________________________ _
1. Scrutiny, Vol.XV, no.l, December 19U7, p.11
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He insisted that Anglo-Saxon should be studied in 
his universlt%^ in its proper context, in association 
with the early history and antiquities of the country 
and in comparison with early Scandinavian studies 
similarly organized* 1
In this way he opened new avenues for the relevant study of
sociology and archaeology that in turn enrich the study of
literature and reveal its social implications* Is it not
this principle of social and moral relativity that we find
at work in }]rs Leavis* s Fiction And The Reading Public ? I
think that the point is worth examining*
A cursory review of the book vdll immediately suggest the
notion of relative human values* The book is divided into three
sections; The Contemporary situation. The past, and The bestseller.
Each of these sections relates the novel form to a certain state
of affairs by means of which it either, degenerates as it does in the
present, or maintains its refined standards as it did in the past,
or adapts itself to the process of commercialization (the divisions
apply to the thirties).
Mrs Leavis again classifies the reading public into highbrow,
middlebrow and lowbrow, indicating that each class has to be
catered for by a respectively appropriate type of novel.
A novel received with unqualified enthusiasm in a lowbrow 
paper will be coolly treated by the middlebrow, and 
contemptuously dismissed if mentioned at all by the 
highbrow press; the kind of book that the middlebrow 
press will admire wholeheartedly, the highbrow 
reviewer will diagnose as pernicious; each has a 
following that forms a different level of public. 2
1* Scrutiny, Vol.XlV, no.3, Spring 19U7, p.205
2. Q.D. Leavis, Fiction And The Reading Public, London, Chatto and 
Windus, 1932, reprint 19b8, pp* 20-21
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But this is not all, for the reading public of a certain class
seems to be so completely shut off from other classes that it is
almost Ignorant of what caters for or interests these classes.
It is not perhaps surprising that, in a society of forty 
three millions so decisively stratified in taste that each 
stratum is catered for independently by its own novelists 
and journalists, the lowbrow public should be ignorant of 
the work and even of the names of the highbrow writers, 
idiile to the highbrow public Ethell M. Dell or 'Tarzan* 
should be convenient symbols drawn from hearsay rather 
than first-hand knowledge. 1
With the statistics she offers in mind we realize that the
highbrow readers form the minority ^ diereas the lowbrow readers
constitute a sweeping majority. The highbrow novelists sell only
by thousands because they are usually abandoned by the majority of
readers as their novels demand an intellectual effort and a degree
of sensibility for which they are not prepared. They take the
novel as a form of entertainment to amuse them in their leisure.
By contrast the lowbrow novelists sell by millions because they are
commercially minded and strive by all possible means to gratify, in
a cheap way, the desires of the public or to quote a phrase frcaa
2Mrs Leavis «to give the public -vhat it wants". This means that 
lowbrow writers achieve popularity and prosperity since they satisfy 
•herd instincts* and are tremendously encouraged by both publisher 
and journalist because they secure for them the maximal profit. The 
good novelist on the other hand finds himself placed under extremely 
difficult and unfavourable conditions. In the first place he is 
subwdinated to and at the mercy of the publisher udio is keen on 
profit and not on artistic refinement, and of the journalist \ho
1. ibid, p.35
2. ibid, p. 27
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cares for the masses and not necessarily for intelligent appreciation
of art. The situation becomes worse for the good novelist if he
depends, for his living, solely on writing. Materially he will be
impoverished and intellectually he will deteriorate. The journalist
dictates his own terms - terms that usually run counter to genuine
artistic taste.
... one must be aware that idien an editor writes 
’Nothing heavy, morbid or neurotic, he is 
condemning by implication (for the terms are 
accepted counters and used for the sake of delicacy) 
the living tradition of the novel. 1
Tracing this perverted taste back to its origin Mrs Leavis finds its
nucleus in the corrupt literary criteria that followed industrial
development. She states that the mechanical attitude Wiich the
worker adopts when he is on duty is reflected in his approach to
works of art. If in the past people read out of a desire to enjoy
and to avoid tedium and in the present they read to fill the time
and the leisure wl^ ich followed the reduction of work hours.
They read not with any artistic, spiritual, moral 
or informative purpose, but simply in order to 
pass time. 2
The malady, as Mrs Leavis in her admonitory way, diagnoses it, 
is deeper than that. The bestseller, too, has his own qualifications 
for character portrayal* Such characters - the bestseller insists - 
should be loveable and socially endearing. They should not confuse 
the reader or cause him any mental exertion or psychological depression, 
and in this fashion, most of the genuine novels that penetrate into 
human nature and delineate the workings of the human heart become 
undesirable and unpopular. This Inaccurate critical approach gives
1. ibid, p . 28
2. ibid, p. 1^9
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rise to the flourish of second and third class writers whose works are
crudely sensational and artistically cheap, and to the diminution of
first class genuine artists who write for artistic excellence and
sincerity. In this context l£rs Leavis raises a critical question
of first iitportance, namely the failure of both the journalist and
the publisher, and with them the editors of magazines and newspaper
critics to distinguish between art and life, taking art to be a
compensation for what they lack in their daily life. On the
other hand the writers of the bulk of bestsellers are artistic
failures. They can hardly manage to depict a convincing social
or moral ideal.
Unfortunately since the author has been educated 
neither in thinking nor in feeling, the moral 
passion exhibited is fatally crude, fatally only 
by the standards of the sophisticated. 1
Both the writers for the bestseller and their readers glorify the
heart at the expense of the mind, and by the heart is meant ’barbaric*
©notion, unrefined, unpurged and degenerate. Levelling her charges
against the corrupt and pernicious tendency of her age Mrs Leavis says:
... the novel can deepen, extend and refine eDgerience 
by allowing the reader to live at the expense of an 
unusually intelligent mind, by giving him access to a 
finer code than his own, but this we have seen, the 
popular novels do not ... 2
It is needless to say that a public confuses artistic experience
with social life in the sense that they favour the superficial work
that meets their expectations and condearuy/ an artistic achievment
that happens to shock or surprise than. I need hardly point out,
too, that these factors combined contributed to the gradual decrease
1. ibid, p .50
2. ibid, p.74
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of the Intelligent reading minority. It may be obvious, too, that 
given these conditions the bestseller comes out victoriously as the 
master of the situation, thriving at the expense of withstanding 
and repressing genuine artists who, in turn, suffer starvation 
and neglect.
In contrast to this decadent and degenerate present there is
the vitality and liveliness of the past where
the masses were receiving their amusements from 
above (instead of being specially catered for by 
journalists, film-directors, and popular novelists 
as they now are) They had to take their amusments 
as their betters. 1
The attitude of wishful thinking-dr eam-fulfilment and self­
dramatization was excluded in favour of artistic maturity and superiority.
The technique of the novel of that time rendered 
such a process of self-dramatization impossible, 
the eighteenth century novelist reports (even in 
Richardson’s epistolary convention) that is to say, 
the author is felt to be present, commenting on 
the action coolly, rationally, end often with a 
malicious pleasure in disappoinTting the reader’s 
expectations, who is therefore forced to distance 
the subject matter. 2
Mrs Leavis* s technique of holding relations between the artists, 
the reading public, the age, the journalist, the publisher, the past 
and the present, is part and parcel of a general conception of 
relative human values - a conception that ccmpellingly recalls to 
mind the influence of Santayana on that particular topic.
To associate Santayana with Leavis on the assumption that the 
former exerted a certain influence on the letter’s critical ideas 
is necessarily to be aware of a number of questions and difficulties.
First one cannot point, in general terms especially in the realm of 
literature, to clear-cut influences which can be traced back from one 
writer to another. In most cases this process has to be carried out
1. ibid, p.85
2. ibid, pp. 235-236
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by deduction, con^arisen and analogy. The question is further
eoirplicated because Leavis* s claim to distinction lies in his
use of critical vocabulary and his discrimination, Santayana,
in spite of his occasional diversion into critical vjriting and
poetic composition, remains in the last analysis a philosopher
by profession Wiereas Leavis keeps on reminding us that he
should be viewed only in his capacity as a literary critic -
and as a literary critic who insists that the line of demarcation
between philosophy and literary criticism should always be kept
distinct. Reviewing Leavis* s Revaluation, Rene ¥ellek called
upon Leavis to define his own critical stand or more explicitly
to state his philosophical views. Leavis answered:
... ry reply to him in the first place is that I 
myself am not a philosopher^ and that I doubt whether 
in any case I could elaborate a theory that he would 
find satisfactory. I am noL howeve:^relying upon 
modesty for my defence. If I profess myself so 
freely to be no philosopher, it is because 1 feel that 
I can afford my modesty; it is because I have p  
pretensions to being a literary critic ... literary 
criticism and philosophy seem to me to be quite 
distinct and different kinds of discipline^at least^
I think they ought to be. This is not to suggest 
that a literary critic might not, as such.be the better 
for a philosophic training, but if he were, the 
advantage, I believe, would manifest itself partly in 
a surer realization that literary criticism is not 
philosophy ... it is no doubt possible to point to 
valuable writing of various kinds representing varying 
kinds of alliance between the literary critic and the 
philosopher. But I am not the less sure that it is 
necessary to have strict literary criticism somewhere 
and to vindicate literary criticism as a distinct 
and separate discipline* 2
Leavis* s main argument in the whole essay rests on his view that
philosophy is an abstract discipline, whereas literature,and
poetry in particular can be approached only in terms of the concrete.
1. Scrutiny, Vol.V, no.4, March 1937, pp. 375-383
2.F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, London, Penguin Books, 
reprint 1969, pp. 211-212
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This accounts for his Insistence on being a practical critic with
no preconceived theories or fonsulae at the back of his mind#
His criticism is mainly concerned with the exposition of the
significance of a given work of art as a work of art.
In fact Leavis*s refusal to commit himself to a body of
theories or doctrines has been shovjn on a number of occasions.
In an essay entitled ’Under which King, Bezonian?’ contributed
to Scrutiny at a time when the Marxist ideology was noticeably
gaining ground, Leavis and the other Scrutiny writers were called
upon ’to show their colours’ and the phrase - as Leavis tells
us - derives from a number of writers the chief amongst whom is
2Santayana himself. Categorically Leavis refuses to commit 
himself to the Marxist doctrine, since it is based on what may 
roughly be called class-distinction. In other words it seeks to 
dismiss the bourgeoisie to provide ample and unquestionable scope 
for the proletariat. This class distinction is at odds with Leavis*s 
central conception that, in a healthy society, culture should be 
possessed by 'people at large* and not be a privileged class. To 
put the matter in strictly critical terms Leavis refuses to align 
himself with Marxist doctrine because he finds that Marxist _ critics 
like Edmund Wilson and Prince Mir sky (though Mir sky contributed some 
reviews to Scrutiny , Leavis does not hesitate to attack him on this 
principle) are using words in a loose and abstract way, and this is
1. Scrutiny, Vol.1, no.3, December 1932, p.205
2. In a letter sent by Leavis and dated^31 December 1972, Leavis 
reports that Santayana asked him to do that in a letter which 
he smt from * Hotel Bristol’, Rome.
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the same defect which he notices in philosophers. ^ To be concerned, 
as Scrutiny is, for literary criticism is to b e vigilant and 
scrupulous about the relation between words and the concrete.
The inadequacies of Mr Wilson and Prince Kir sky as literary critics 
are related to their shamelessly uncritical use < of vague
(f 4
abstractions and verbal counters. This point is further enforced 
by a lecture entitled "literature and society**, delivered to the
2
Students* Union of the XiOndon School of Economies and Politics.
This lecture is of cardinal importance since it crystallizes the 
characteristically Leavisian critical approach namely that it 
is only through tackling the work of literature in the first place 
as a work of literature that we can discern its social and political 
significance. To elaborate this point Leavis demonstrates that 
the work of literature is the product of certain social and cultural 
conditions which can be grasped through an examination of the 
peculiar operation of the language embodying that work of literature.
This language peculiar to that work, is of paramount importance as it
represents the fundamental evidence on which both the sociologist
and politician should rely in order to render their accounts convincing
and plausible. This point has a direct bearing on Santayana* s
misconception of the relation between the work of art and its medium
Wiich I am going to take up in the following pages. In point of
fact the whole question was openly raised when Santayana contributed an essay t
to Scrutiny entitled "Tragic Philosophy". ^ Because this
1. ibid, p.212
2. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, Penguin Books, reprint 1969,
pp. 182-194
3. G. Santayana, "Tragic Philosophy", Scrutiny, March 1936, pp. 365-376
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essay provoked Leavis to point to Santayana* s radical misconception
of the relation between the form and contait of the work of art,
not just in his reply "Tragedy and the Medium",^ but also in
2
Education and The University, I would dwell for a while on it,
Santayana wrote this essay with Eliot* s essay "Shakespeare and The
Stoicism of Seneca" in mind. In this essay Eliot argues that,
though it is not corroborated by documentary evidence that Shakespeare
was influenced by Seneca, yet *the attitude of self-dramatization
assumed by some of Shakespeare’s heroes at moments of tragic 
h
intensity* seems to be modelled on Senecan devices, Coirpared 
with Marston* s and Chapman* s (Wio are obviously influenced by Seneca) 
the self-dramatization exhibited by Shakespeare* s heroes is finer 
and superior. Some of Shakespeare’s heroes like Othello, Goriolanus 
and Antony show a degree of pathos and self-pity at the moment of 
their death. Having been disappointed by worldly conditions 
largely hostile to them, they resort to some kind of Senecan 
stoicism, Santayana takes this subject and elaborates it, in 
his own way, by drawing a comparison between Shakespeare and Dante 
Wiereby he stresses the difference in their poetic medium of 
egression. In this process he reveals a radical misconception as
1, ibid. Vol.12 no,4, Autumn, 1944, PP* 249-260
2. FJl. Leavis, Education and The University, London, Chatto and 
Hindus, reprint, 1965, pp. 66-66
3* T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, London, Faber and Fsber 1932, pp 126-l40
4. ibid, p. 129
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to the nature of the dramatic value of Macbeth* He says that
Shakespeare has no clear-cut attitude such as Dante’s, and that
if he were called upon to state his philosophy he could do
nothing but resort to the outbursts of Macbeth* In other words
Santayana tends to separate the form of the play frcm its contents
in a bid to discuss its ideas or ’philosophy* independently of
the means of expression, and to recommend a certain philosophical
approach and condemn another* Furthermore he conceives of the play
as being constructed in terms of preconceived ideas to idiich a
form would later be given* I would quote an illustrative passage
that was quoted by Leavis in his discussion of the essay:
Shakespeare was not expressing, like Seneca^ settled 
doctrine of his own or of his times* Like an honest 
miscellaneous dramatist, he was putting into the mouths 
of his different characters the sentiments that^for the 
moment were suggested to him by their predicaments*
Macbethuwho is superstitious, undecided, storms excessively 
when he storms: there is something feverish and wild in
his starts of passion, as there is something delicate in 
his perceptions. Shakespeare could rein in such a 
character to his own subtle fancy in diction and by-play^ 
as well as in the main to the exaggerated rhetoric proper 
to a stage where everybody was expected to declaim, to 
argue, and to justify sophistically this or that extravagant 
Impulse* So, at this point in Macbeth, where Seneca could 
have unrolled the high maxims of orthodox stoicism,
Slmkespeare gives us the humours of his distracted hero; 
a hero non-plugsed, confounded, stultified in his eyes, 
a dying gladiator, a blinded lion at bay. 1
Leavis*6 reply helps to put things in a proper critical perspective and
reveals Santayana * s defective sense of drama. Leavis says:
 ^ to
u^not from the author, but from the playf emerging 
dramatically from a dramatic context. It offers no ^ 
parallels to Seneca’s ’high maxims’, And the%)hilosophy, 
moral significance^or total upshot^of the play isn’t 
stated, but en^ted. . But for l'æ Santayana significance 
is a matter of ideao, and ideas have to be stated, and so, 
looking for an epitomizing statement*he excises that
1. Scrutiny, Vol.|V, no.l, March 1936, p. 367
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Epeech from the organism to idiich it belongs, fixes 
it directly on Shakespeare, and gives us his surprising 
commentary ••• Ih? Santayana’s inappreciation seems to 
me to go with a naivete about the nature of ^nceptual 
thought that is common among philosophers-toj^heir 
disadvantage as such ... to demand that poetry should 
be aTaedium^for previously definite ideas is arbitrary/ 
and betrays a radical incomprehension. The control 
over Shakespeare’s words in Macbeth (for what Harding 
describes as the essentially poetic use of language, 
a use in which Shakespeare is pre-eminent) is a complex 
dramatic theme, vividly and profoundly realized,^ot 
thought of, but possessed imaginatively in its 
concreteness, so that as^it grows in specificity, it in 
turn possesses the poet’s mini and commands expression. 1
To this commentary I would add that Shakespeare does not, except 
in saae exceptional cases necessitated by dramatic exigencies, put 
anything into the mouths of his characters in the sense that they 
are not reduced to mere puppets or mouthpieces, but they are in 
most cases, recognizable and living characters, with all the 
claims and attributes that natural characters have (Leavis’s view of 
lago as a tool used to bring forth the tragedy of Othello; that is 
to dramatize a play in which Othello should be viewed as the hero, is 
intended not to divest lago of life, but to subordinate him to his 
natural status - a status in which he is subsidiary to Othello the 
hero, and in so doing he counteracts misconceptions that portray 
lago as the leading character of the play). These characters do
not at all boil down to mere types, because they are singularly 
and individually depicted absolutely in harmony with their natural 
springs and impulses.
On this division of form from content Santayana is most 
insistent. His repetition of the idea becomes so obvious that he 
seems to settle into a belief that ideas should be discussed apart
1. F.R. Leavis, Scrutiny, Vol 12, no.4, Autumn, 1944, pp. 25jf-25^
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from their form. Distinguishing between poetry and prose 
Santayana maintains that the Images or situations manifested 
in a poem are false or at least fictional, but in prose they 
are factual or real. Poetry is superior to prose in that its
A
fanciful images are clothed in a beautiful form. To carabine
the merits of both a writer must have clear and truthful ideas
expressed in a beautiful style.
Hhy should not discourse then have nothing but truth 
in its import, and nothing but beauty in its form ?
With regard to euphony and grammatical structure 
there is evidently nothing impossible in such an ideal, 
for these radical beauties of language are independent 
of the subject-matter. They form the body of poetry, 
but the ideal or the emotional atmosphere idiich is its 
soul depends on things external to language, idiich no 
perfection in the medium could modify. 1
In forwarding this statement Santayana is making a plea for the creation
of what he calls 'rational poetry’, a poetry which is predominantly
ideational and consequently corresponds to his rational philosophy.
Like Wordsworth in his Preface, Santayana believes that rhyme, metre,
euphony are external elements of beauty that are superimposed on the
poem instead of forming part and parcel of it. This outlook upon
2language and poetic devices as a kind of ’ornament’, roninds us 
that, in his early years, Santayana was brought up in the traditions 
of Romanticism.
Santayana believes, in his own way, that the conditions on 
wiiich these elements depend are physiological in origin, and when 
they are transmitted to poetry they lend it a new elaaent of beauty.
1. G. Santayana, Reason in Art, London, Archibald Constable Co. 
Ltd., 1905, p. 107
2. Cleanth Brooks, Modern Poetry And The Tradition, The University 
of North Carolina Press, reprint 1967, pp. 1-17
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In poetry ••• euphony, metres and rhyme colour the 
images they transmit and add a charm \diolly 
extrinsic and imputed# 1
Coupled with this dichotomy between form and content there is 
a restrictive tendency on the part of Santayana to determine the kind of 
vision that will be worked out by the dramatist, so as to elicit the 
desired response from his audience and afford it a sense of 
psychological relief# This prompts Leavis in the essay under 
discussion to associate Santayana with Johnson and the Augustan 
tradition on the ground that Johnson conceived of tragedy as a kind of 
formal construction with a direct moral purpose in view# Leavis 
accuses Johnson of failure to understand that works of art enact their 
moral valuation, and it is, I need hardly say, the same charge he 
Imputes to Santayana# Leavis* s argument in the whole essay on 
Santayana can be summed up as to the effect that the tragic experience 
is neither personal (because it does not necessarily feflect the 
personal life of the dramatist, whose identification with the 
different dramatis personae irrplies impersonality) nor utilitarian 
recomposing our nerves and mitigating our tension as Richards would 
have it. It is an elevation or sublimation of personal claims in 
favour of something more urgent and important; the tragic experience 
Itself that captures our interest for the time being. Leavis*s 
formulation of this notion suggests the sense of impersonality which 
I have already identified with morality# It is, I think, worth quoting:
1# George Santayana, op.clt, p.77
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Actually the experience is constructive or creative, 
and involves a recognizing positive value as in some 
way defined and vindicated by death. It is as if we
were challenged at the profoundsst level with the
question »in what does the significance of life reside*?a 
and,^ found ourselves contenplating, for answer, a view 
of life-and of the things giving it value, that makes 
the valued appear unquestionably more important than the 
valuer, so that significance lies clearly and inescapably^  
in the vjilling adhesion of the individual self to 
something other than itself. 1
If I have, in my concluding stat©nent on Santayana, referred 
to his inperfect understanding of the nature of dramatic art, and
to his abstract way of thinking, this does not mean that I want to
minimize Leavis* s indebtedness to him because Leavis has really 
benefited from Santayana*s mature critical vjritings. My object 
is to define the extent to which he has conformed to Santayana’s 
critical principles, when they have served Leavis*s purpose, and 
the measure in which he has deviated from them when they become 
philosophical or abstract, to focus on literary criticism 
proper# Only through this definition, I think, can Santayana’s 
influence upon Leavis and Leavis*s indebtedness to Santayana, 
be discerned.
1# Fja. Leavis, op.clt , p. 258
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CHAPTER 2
ELIOT end LEAVIS
in the critical writings of Leavis Eliot’s influence looms 
large* This chapter proposes to trace this influence; and to 
suggest reasons for Leavis*s later disenchantment with Eliot.
This latter point is bound up with a consideration of Eliot in 
relation to Ehitehead, Collingwood and Polanyi. Leavis’s 
repudiation of some of Eliot’s critical ideas will be seen to be 
in harmony with the views of these philosophers. hhitehead’s 
philosophy of organism and the emphasis which both Collingwood 
and Polanyi place on ’personal knowledge’ do not easily combine 
with the critical views of Eliot*
Eliot, for example, consistently denies the potency of the 
self in the act of cognition, saying in his early doctor^ al thesis:
... Theoretically that which we know is merely spread 
out before us for pure contemplation and the subject ••• the 
I or the self is no more consciously present than is the 
inter-cellular action. 1
In"Tradition and the Individual Talent" he reduces the artist
to a mere catalyst, a medium, and a slired of platinum, and in
another context he likens the creativity of the artist to a
carpenter’s maidLng of a table. In "The Pensees of Pascal" he
draws a distinction between inspiration and craft sanctioning
the latter:
1, T.S. Iliot, Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of 
F.H. Bradley, London, f'^ er and Faber, 19ch, p. 154
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I have no good word to say for the cultivation of 
automatic writing as the model of literary conposition.
I doubt whether these moments can be cultivated by the 
writer, but he to whom this happens assuredly has the 
sensation of being a vehicle rather than a maker.
No masterpiece can be produced whole by such means. 1
This spproach is incompatible with the basic position of
Vdiitehead in which individual creativity is essential to the
understanding of objective phenomena, and "the process of
2creation is the form of unity of the universe",
Eliot’s bias for form - his affiliations - with The Bloomsbury 
Group with their interest in ’pure art’ and their slighting of 
Lawrence are further aided reasons for Leavis’s dissociation from 
Eliot. Laiijrence’s critical ideas and philosophy of vitalism, 
on the other hand, consort well with Hhitehead’s philosophy of 
organism and the integrative ideas of Colling wood and, Polanyi.
Lawenoe, Lhitehead, Coilingwod and Polanyi with their 
insistence on the genuineness, creativity and spontaneity of 
human experience offset - in Leavis’s view - the deficiency of 
Eliot’s notion of tradition depending as it does on dry intellectuality 
and bookish pursuits, and identified as it is with a restrictive 
Christian dogma. In other words they provide the necessary 
counterpart idiich makes Leavis’s approach to literature viable 
and humane.
But to leave the matter of Leavis’s relation to Eliot at this 
point is to oversimplify the whole issue because it entails a 
narrowing down of the conception of influence. Influence can
1. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, London, Faber and Faber, 1932, 
reprint 19^ 9, p. WS
2. A-N. bhitehead, Adventures of Ideas, Cambridge University 
Press, 1933, p. 231
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assuirie a jpatai^ iyo as well as a Aicr^ ative form, aiid in both forms it
is effective and potent. Both Eliot and Leavis believe that the
idea of ’influence* is not singly a matter of qjiiescent and placid
assent, but rather provides a strong urge for dissent# They are
of the opinion that if an author inertly subordinates himself to
the spell of a predominant influence without affording his faculties
the chance to scrutinize the essence of that influence, he is bound
to deaden his intellectual energy, to reduce himself to a mere
imitator, and ultimately to deprive himself of original thinking
and the right to be himself# On this point Eliot and Leavis are
in manifest accord# Nominating Irving Babbitt for the professorship
of poetry at Oxford Eliot saj'sj
For a professor of poetry, I believe that I should 
choose an American, Professor Irving Babbitt#
Not that I agree with all dir Babbitt’s opinions;
but partly that there are fevj writers so well worth
disagreeing with. 1
Adopting the same tone in his preface to The Common Pursuit
(a title that Leavis derives from Eliot’s essay on "The Function of
Criticism") Leavis develops the same notion:
Collaboration may take the form of disagreement and 
. one is grateful to the critic whom one has found worth 
disagreeing with# 2
And when he reverts to the same theme some years later he expresses
the same opinion:
One’s very indebtedness to the authors to idiom one 
is most indebted is commonly in some measure a matter 
of their compelling one to a convinced ’but’. 3
1# T.S. Eliot, ’Letter to The Dial’ The Dial, vol.73, July and 
Dec# 1922, p.9k
2# F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p# IV
3. F.R. & Q.Û# Leavis, Lectures in /imerica, p. k9
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Leavis* s Interest in Eliot dates back to the early twenties 
when his attention was drawn to Eliot* s Love Song of J.Alfred Frafrock 
and The Sacred h'ood#
In 1929 Leavis published an article in The Cambridge Review 
called *T,S, Eliot - A Reply to The Condescending* in which he tried 
to win recognition for Eliot’s poetry. The article is a reply to 
what Leavis considers a censorious review in The New Statesman, 
reproaching Eliot for his dogmatism and dry intellectuality. ^
The article expresses a number of valuable pointy. First it 
explicitly states Leavis’s indebtedness to Eliot ^  offers Leavis’»' 
to use his own words *- "a fair opportunity to acknowledge the debt and 
to define its nature". Secondly it, in a sense, charts the course 
which Leavis is going to talce in his future critical career. When 
Leavis indicates that, in his search for adequate critical canons, 
he finds an almost unanimous agresïKsat on the pre-eminence of Eliot’s 
Homage to John Dryden, he is in other words reflecting the impressive 
appeal he felt as teacher and critic of Literature in Eliot’s critical 
writing. Thirdly in countering the charge that Eliot is a writer of 
’fashions’ Leavis invokes the unanswerable idea of tradition - a 
notion that exercises the strongest hold on Leavis as a critic. 
Expressing this admiration Leavis says:
1. ’In a letter dated April 2, 197k, Leavis tells me that he has 
lectured on Eliot’s poetry from the middle twenties onwards.*
2. cf, infra, my qualification of this reply*.
3. F.R. Leavis, "T.S. Eliot, A Reply to The Condescending",
The Cambridge Review , February 8, 1929, P# 29k
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I‘îr Eliot* s acquaintance with the past, then, has 
impressed us so much, because it has illuminated for 
us both the past and the present. His acquaintance
with the past is profound enough to have reshaped
the current effective idea of the English Tradition. 1
The change of sensibility and the re-orientation of the course
of English poetry are two major merits, among others, that Leavis
imputes to Eliot. VJhen Leavis says
if no serious critic or poet now supposes that English 
poetry, in the future, must or can develop along the 
lines running from the Romantics through Tennyson, 
this is mainly due to lîr Eliot, 2
he is, in effect, anticipating the central argument of
New Bearings in English Poetry. But New Begrings too, as Leavis
admits in his prefatory note, is "an acknowledgment, vicarious as
3
well as personal, of indebtedness to a certain critic and poet*
the critic and poet is unquestionably Eliot and the chapter on Eliot
is by far the most prominent in the book. This prominence can be
accounted for by the leading role which Eliot played in rejecting
the late Romantic pre-suppositions of his time and affording poetry
a new start. In its tone and wording the article is a tribute -
an unqualified eulogy vehemently hailing a long-awaited patron of
art and criticism. It may sound strange that Leavis who is noted
it
for the scant nature of his praise, in this article lavishesyupon 
Eliot almost iniiscriminately, but this may be because he was then 
a newly initiated critic feeling his way in an atmosphere of lurking 
romantic haze and suddenly coming across what seemed to him a *hslo* 
of enlightenment,
1. ibid, p. 29k
2. ibid,
3. F.R. Leavis, New Bearings in English Ppetry , p.11
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The indiscriminate endorsement of Eliot’s approach is
demonstrable in Leavis’s unqualified acceptance of Eliot’s
ideas# For instance he takes over Eliot’s rigorous interest
in literature, and his approach’by way of technique’. It is
in terms of teclmique that Richard Church characterizes Leavis’s
i%)proach in New Bearings,^ and Leavis approves of this
characterization saying
I'^y critical approach which (to my gratification) 
leads Ilr Church to note that I am pre-occupied 
with technique, I have always imagined myself 
(as I hint in my prefatory note) to derive from 
ilr Eliot as much as from anyone. 2
It is this technical approach which Leavis has learnt in the
course of his development not only to avoid, but to assail - an
endeavour entailing a gradual disengagement from Eliot. This
point will be taken up in due course.
In The C gjnbridge Review article Leavis underscores two key- 
concepts; impersonality and order. Impersonality is the clue to a 
proper comprehension of the creative activity, an impartial tone 
deducible from the artist’s handling of his material, and order 
makes for the idea of tradition, the reorganization of a previously 
established pattern of works of art in the light of the newly 
created ones to form an integral whole. These two notions loom 
large in Leavis*s critical writings. In the same article Leavis 
says:
*•• We are much impressed by his way of stating the 
problem of preserving civilization* At any rate, we 
feel that we must consider very seriously his view of 
civilization as depending upon a strenuously achieved 
and traditional normality, a trained and arduous 
commonsense, a kind of athletic poise that cannot be 
maintained without a laborious and critical docility 
to traditional wisdom. 3
1. Richard Church "The Labyrinthine Way" The Spectator, Mardi 2o, 
1932, p. k53
2. ibid, p. 911
3. ibid, p. 296
-  1 2 5  -
Thematically this idea anticipates what Leavis and Thompson 
were to discuss in Culture an' Environment. The lack of a strong 
linic binding the past to the present is what is profoundly lamented 
in that work# The quotation also contains two critical terms that
were to figure prominently in Leavis*s critical vocabulary:
’normality* and ’health’; and it may be relevant to note that it 
is in connection with Eliot that they are first used.
In the same article we also find a discussion of the function
of the critic. The sense of fact with which the critic must be
endoifed is a prerequisite for sensible critical appreciation.
The critic can attain this sense of fact by keeping himself apart
from the work he is criticizing and by the exercise of self-discipline.
This will help create a climate of opinion wherein critics will
collaborate to reach a true judgment. On the opening page of the
anthology Determlnations, Leavis quotes (and not for the last time)
these words from Eliot’s "The Function of Criticism",
Here, one would suppose, was a place for quiet 
co-operative labour. The critic, one would 
suppose, if he is to justify his existence, 
should endeavour to discipline his personal 
prejudices and cranks, tares to which we are 
all subject, and compose his differences with 
as many of his fellows as possible in the 
common pursuit of true judgment • 1
But this sense of fact is partial as there is no conclusive
judgment in literature* Eliot himself is unduly sceptical about
the soundness of human judgment. He says: ’In practice our
2literary judgment is always fallible’. And in ’Experiment in 
Criticism’ he expresses a similar view:
1. F.R. Leavis (ed) Determinations, London, Chatto and Wlndus, 193k, p.l
2. T.S. Eliot "Poetry and Propaganda", 0.M. Zabel (ed). Literary 
Opinion in America, New Xorkyp.38.
1937
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We have to see literature through our own 
temperament in order to see it at all, though 
our vision is always partial, and our judgment 
always prejudiced; no generation and no 
individual can appreciate every dead author 
and every past period, universal good taste is 
never realized, 1
Eliot’s Insistence on the use of the word ’ always’ in both
quotations shows his distrust of human abilities - a distrust
that falls in line with his cehtral view of Original Sin,
Leavis*s belief in the relativity of human judgment, on
the other hand, makes hiia less pessimistic:
Actually, of course, there is no one demonstrably 
right judgment. But a critic is a critic only in 
so far as he is controlled by these ideals, and 
their inaccessibility leads not to arbitrariness, 
but to askesis^ not to assertiveness but to docility.
In his "Restatements For Critics" Leavis draws on Eliot’s
critical dicta.
It is part of our debt to î'-îr Eliot that he has 
made it so plain that there can be no easy way 
or simple solution. Of tradition he wrote
"It cannot be inherited, and if you want it
you must obtain it by great labour," 3
In "what is wrong with criticism" (an article originally 
written - as Leavis tells me in a letter dated /ipril 2, 197k -
for The Criterion Miscellany on a suggestion from Eliot, and returned
to Leavis, on his request, because of Eliot’s unjustifiable 
procrastination, to be published in Scrutiny) Leavis says:
1# ibid, p.12
2, F•R,; Leavis, The Cambridge Review, February 8, 1929, P*259
3* F,R, leavis. For Continuity, Cairbridge, Gordon Fraser,
The Minority Press, 1933, p. 178
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Cue may start, paradoxically, by asserting that 
this age will be remarkable in literary history 
for its achievement in criticism. The histories 
of literary criticism contain a great many names, 
but how many critics are there who have made any 
difference to one • improved one’s apparatus, one’s 
equipment, one’s efficiency as a reader. At least 
two of them are of our time: lîr Eliot and Mr Richards, 
ih* Richards has immensely improved the instruments of 
analysis and has consolidated and made generally 
accessible the contribution of Coleridge. Mr Eliot 
has not only refined the conception and the methods 
of criticism; he has put into currency decisive .
reorganizing and re-orientating ideas and valuations.
Leavis's admiration for Eliot springs largely from a cherish©! 
belief that Eliot’s criticism provides ample scope for the free 
play of the critical mind on a wide range of subjects, and his
poetry impersonates a refined modern sensibility.
In 193k Eliot published After Strange Gods (The book was
originally The Pag e-Barbour Lectures delivered at the University of
Virginia in 1933). It is made up of three lectures dealing with
the nature of tradition and literary taste. In this book Eliot
identifies tradition with the teachings of the Christian church in
the belief that they provide the right safeguard against ’personal
heresy’ and the ’inner voice’* He sums up the argument of the
whole book saying;
Vdiat I have been leading up to is the following 
assertion; that when morals cease to be a matter 
of tradition and orthodoxy; that is, of the habits 
of the community formulated, corrected and elevated 
by the continuous th/ought and direction of the church, 
and when each man is to elaborate his own, then 
personality becomes a thing of alarming importance. 2
In his review of this book Leavis does not fail to spot the 
relevant merit of tradition, and he approvingly endorses Eliot’s 
apophthegm ’Tradition is the vitality of the past that enriches
1. F.R. Leavis "What is wrong with Criticism", Scrutiny, vol.l, no.2 
September 1932, pp. 132-133.
2. T.S. Eliot, After Strange Gods, London, Faber and Faber 193k, p.Sk
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1
the life of the present* as a critical maxim. But with the
publication of that work it became increasingly obvious to Leavis
that Eliot’s criticism was more and more restricting itself to a
specific theological doctrine, that is Christian orthodoxy, thereby
exhibiting a parochial and reductive ^proach to literature. In
his review Leavis regretfully exposes the shortcomings of Eliot’s
obsessive Christian criticism saying:
... since the religious preoccupation has become 
insistent in them, Mr Eliot’s critical vjritings 
have become notable for showing less discipline 
of thought and emotion, less purity of interest, 
less power of sustained devotion, and less 
courage than before. 2
In his review of Eliot’s Essays Ancient and Modem Leavis’s
strictures on Eliot become much more articulate. He begins the
essay by hazarding that most of those who are indebted to Eliot
are justified in fearing any neiv book he publishes sin ce it will
oblige them to condemn him by the very criteria thejr have learnt
from him. Leavis is particularly stringent on Eliot’s
criticism of Tennyson, and is obviously censorious of Eliot’s
cynical tone regarding the teaching of English literature to the
neglect of Greek and Latin. Leavis harks back to the question
of religion as, in a large measure, accounting for Eliot’s lack
of precision end particularity of thought :
There is, in fact, something very depressing about 
the way in which nowadays, he brings out these 
orthodox generalities weightily, as substitutes for 
perticularity of statement, rigour of thought, and 
various other virtues we have a right to expect of 
him. We no longer e^ gect them unfortunately. 3
1. ibid, p. 30
2. F.R. Leavis, "Mr Eliot’s After Strange Gods’, Scrutiny, Vol.Ill 
no,2, September 193k, p.lFo
3.F.H. Leavis, Scrutiny , Vol.V, June 1936, p. 68
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This Christian discrimination is bound "to absolve Eliot from
i
the literary critic’s kind of discrimination," to adopt a 
judgment which Leavis passes on George Ihrery.
Leavis’s continued championing of Eliot’s cause (and it is
in connection with the poetry that it is consistently sliown) can,
however, be seen at its highest when he volunteers to take issue
with an adverse anon^ rmous reviewer of Eliot’s East Coker. In his
letter to The Times Literary SuiTplement, Leavis says:
vvliat is not permissible in a serious critical journal is to 
w write in contemptuous condescension of the greatest living 
English poet (lAat other poets have we now Teats is gone?) 
and exhibit a complacent ignorance of the nature of his
genius and of the nature of the technique in which that
genius is manifested. If Fast Coker were an experiment 
on unprecedented lines, your reviewer would have had some 
excuse, but the work of a decade and a half has led 
directly up to it. 2
Later on Leavis published an article in The Cambridge Review 
titled ’East Coker’ in which he came again to Eliot’s defence. The 
article seeks to resolve a crucial issue related to the doctrine of 
inpersonality. East Coker, as Leavis intimates is definitely 
personal and even autobiographical, but the rendering, the technique 
"is an evidence of a profound iiapersonality • an impersonality rare
and difficult of attainment, sought as it is and sustained in the
realm of the most immediately personal."
A year later Leavis published an essay in Scrutiny called 
"T.S. Eliot’s later Poetry". In this essay Leavis deals with 
Eliot’s The Dry Selvages, Burnt Norton end East Coker and 
forecasts a fourth poem that will complete what later came to be 
Four Quartets.
1. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p. 2k9
2. F.R. Leavis, Letter to T.L.S. September 21, 19kO, p. kô3
3. î’.R. Leavis, The Cambridge Review , February 21, 19k1, p.2o8
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In this critique Leavis underlines a fundamental idea
pertaining to the appreciation of Four Quartets, namely that these
poems can be enjoyed without reference to their specifically
Christian content;
Eliot is known as professing Anglo-Catholicism and 
classicism, but his poetry is remarkable for the 
extraordinary resource, penetration and stamina 
with which it makes its explorations into the concrete 
actualities of experience below the conceptual 
currency; into the life that must be the raison d'etre 
of any frame - while there is life at all. In any 
case to feel an imiaense indebtedness to Eliot and 
recognize the Immense indebtedness of the age one 
doesn’t need to share liis intellectually formulated 
conclusions, his doctrinal views, or even to be 
uncritical of his poetry. 1
In Scrutiny for Decaiber 19k7 Leavis reviewed Rajan’s
’Approaches to T.S* Eliot’. Leavis recalls the daring and
leading role he played in establishing Eliot’s reputation as
an accomplished artist against a background of what he designates
as fanatical and conventional thinking. In this review Leavis
clarifies the nature of Eliot’s influence saying;
True respect is inseparable from the concern to see 
the object as in itself it really is, to insist on 
the necessary discriminatiniu and so to malce the 
essential achievement.with xne special life and 
virtue it embodies^ effective as an influence. 2
Speaking in personal terms Leavis recognizes this influence
in the following words;
It is a debt that I recognize for myself as immense.
By some accident (it must have been^ had not come on 
Mr Eliot’s name before) I bought Tb'e Sacred Mood just 
came out .in 1920. For the next few yearj^î 
,  ^ read it through several times a year, pencil in hand.
I got from it, cf courir o^ ientstions, particular 
illuminations A and ^ ^&%udeas of general instrumental 
value* But -af I had to characterize the nature of the 
, debt briefly I ^ ^gjTsiiy that it was a matter of having
had incisively deraonstrated-for pattern and incitement.^  
what the disinterested and effective application of
1. F.R. Leavis "T.S. Eliot’s Later Roe try" Scrutiny, Vol. XI, 
no.l, summer 19b2, p.71 ^ ^
2. F.R. Leavis- "Approaches to T.S.Eliot", Scrutifir, /December 19^ 2
p. 5S - ' V
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intelligence to literature looks like, vdiat is the 
nature of purity of interesi^ and what is meant by 
^ e  principle (as Mr Eliot hihself states it) that 
viien we are considering poetry we must consider it 
primarily as poetry and not as another thing. 1 
/ V
 ^ In The Great Tradition Eliot’s critical formulae such as
’impersonality’ and ’objective correlative* are adopted by
2
Leavis as distinctive measures of judgment.
In his British Academy Lecture on Milton, Eliot attempted 
to create an ambiguous situation in which Mlton’s defects can 
be taken together with his merits, thereby blurring the earlier 
strictures expressed in his first lecture. In an essay titled 
’Mr Hiot and Milton’ Leavis taiæs Eliot to task considering his 
attitude as amounting to "a surrender of the function of criticism". 
Leavis uses the iford ’insidious’ to describe this ambiguous 
attitude, and it is the same word which Leavis later employs to 
characterize Eliot’s ambiguous approach to Lawrence, ^ though he 
does not fail to .indicate that "our time in literature may fairly 
be called the age of D.H. Lawrence and T.S. Eliot".
In 1998 Leavis published another article in Cor#entary on ,
"T.S. Eliot as Critic".^  In this article he repeats that he had
purchased The Sacred Wood' immediately after its publication;
How I came to buy it so soon after the publication 
I can’t novr say. I had never heard of Eliot, and 
I had no;more literary sophistication than I had 
acquired at school before the war. And though I
1. Ibid .^ .58-:^
2. This point is elaborated in the chapter on Santayana.
3. F.R. Leavis "Mr Eliot and Hilton" Sewanee Review, no. 97 
1949) p.b.
k* F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence; Novelist, London, Chatto. and Wlhdu:
1999, p.304 
9. ibid. p. 303
6. The article is now reprinted in Anna Karenina and Other Essays 
from which future quotations will be taken.
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turned the book over a good deal and no doubt 
profited, I won’t pretend that I absorbed rapidly 
what it had to give, or that it became for me, 
after a short acquaintance, decisively formative, 
or anything but a vague and minor stimulus. 1
That these words suggest some kind of indebtedness is 
certain, but that they also reveal a growing sense of disenchantment 
is much more obvious. Does Leavis here withhold the praise he has 
already accorded Eliot? Is this a sign of sobriety, or has he 
become satiated with Eliot’s writings now that he has achieved 
individual distinction and maturity as a critic. Gan these 
words be taken as conclusive or does he still draw on Eliot’s 
directions as his subsequent critical witings attest ?
The article marks an obvious change of tone. Jbmay 
tentatively be argued that Leavis condemns Eliot on account of 
his betrayal of the same principles he taught his readers to 
uphold in the early twenties. He also condemns him for some of 
the very principles which he found i'X»rthy of praise in the twenties, 
and v^ ich he no longer thinks are valid*
Is the change of emphasis due to Leavis’s reinstatement of 
LawTence and his growing interest in the ideas of Lliitehead, 
Collingwood and polanyi ? Does Leavis in his later critical 
writings discover in Lawrence some merits which he missed or 
neglected in his early career - merits which relate him to these 
humane philosophers ? The next chapter will seek to answer 
this question,
Leavis ailvocated the early Eliot because he found that his 
critical practice and poetic output were then most needed for a 
revival of both poetry and criticism. Eliot’s reputation once 
established, .however, Leavis becomes conscious of an element
1# F.H. Leavis, Anna Karenina and Other Essays, London, Chatto and 
Windus, 1967, p. 177
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missing from his works, namely human spontaneity and individual
creativity# In English literature in our Time and The University
he opposes Lai>rence to Eliot, to opt eventually for the former#
In his ’Introductory Note* to Nor Shall My Sword# Leavis points to
the antithetical relation between Eliot and Blake to underscore
his interest in Blake’s creativity# In Dickens The Novelist
Leavis associates Blake with Dickens and Lawrence on the score
of their creative and vital interest in life;
The kind of vital strength that makes Dickens a 
’romantic novelist’, and relates him to Blake is 
what Eliot rules out from the creative process, 
and the mind of the artist in his account of 
impersonality, wiiich has for essential purpose 
to deny that art expresses or in any way involves 
a responsibility towards life# 1
Leavis had already expressed this view in the same words in
2his introduction to Peter Coveney’s The Image, of Childhood, where 
Blake is related to both Dickens and Laixronce#
Nevertheless it does not seem to be an unwarranted generalization 
to say that Leavis takes Eliot, whose ideas and poetry are usually 
somevdiere at the back of his mind, as a point of departure either 
for agreement or disagreement, and in both cases Eliot is 
undeniably influenjz^ tial#
Fld-ot and Leavis’s New Bearings
Reference has already been made to Leavis*s dedication of 
New Bearings to Eliot - a dedication that becomes self-explanatory 
in tile light of the telling adjective ’new’ wdiich qualifies both
1# F.R# & Q.D, Leavis, Dickens The Novelist, London, Chatto end Windus, 
1970, p. 270
2# Peter Coveney; The Image of Childhood, London, Penguin Books, 1967, 
p. 12
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Leavis*s ’bearings* and his view of Eliot’s poetic and critical 
assumptions, and the question that logically proposes itself is:
Vlhat is there in Bearings that is owed to Eliot ?
Most evidently New Bearings looks at the present moment in 
English poetry in terms which are largely derived from Eliot’s 
criticism. Leavis*s historical perspective is identical -with 
Eliot’s in outline, although a number of small adjustments are 
made in the course fa of the book.
The central idea of the historical view shared by Eliot and 
Leavis is that of the ’dissociation of sensibility’ - an idea 
idiich has been the subject of much controversy and to which Leavis 
has clung insistently ttiroughout his critical career. It is 
given its classical statement in Eliot’s essay on ’The Metaphysical 
Poets’•
The poets ox the seventeenth century, the 
successors of the dramatists of the sixteenth, 
possessed a mechanism of sensibility which could . 
devour any lelnd of exj^ eriencc. In the seventeenth 
century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from 
vhich we have never recovered. 1
This idea figures prominently in Leavis’s writings. It is a key 
stone in Reveluaticn, is dra^ m upon in his lectures in ijnerica, is 
referred to in The Cheltenham lecture, and is made the centre of 
interest in the four essays on Eliot in English Literature in our 
Time and The University.
Eliot is a central figure in New Bearings because Leavis sees him 
as representative of the unified sensibility of which the age stands 
in need. Taking over Eliot’s criteria Leavis extracts the folloiing 
from Eliot’s essay on Massinger:
1. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, pp. 287-288
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Mith the end of Chapman, Middleton, Webster,
Tourneur, Donne, we end a period when the intellect 
was liîiraediately at the tips of the senses; sensation 
became wrd and word sensation*
And then comments;
’GenîntinrLÎ- answers to this description as well as 
, anything by any of the authors enumerated* It 
expresses psychological subtleties and complexities 
in imagery of varied richness and marvellously 
sure realization* The whole body of the words 
sems to be used* Qualities that (if we ignore 
Eopkins as he was ignored) have been absent from 
English'poetry since the period (the Elizabethan) 
that Mr Eliot descrit><^  (his^re-occupation with it is 
significant) reappear with him* 1
Thus Leavis attributes to Eliot a reintegration of thought
and feeling that was in abeyance for the last two hundred years*
This reintegration logically associates Eliot with his favourite
Metaphysical poets* Eliot in this capacity contributes
positively both in his criticism and poetry to the idea of a
unified sensibility held dear by Leavis*
It is with the antithesis, the dissociated sensibilit^that
Leavis was pre-occupied in the first two chapters of his book*
They are, in effect, a summary view- of Eliot’s notion of
dissociation. It has been stated that this idea plays a leading
role not just in New Bearings , but also in most of Leavis’s
later account of Eliot, It must be added that throughout all
his essays on Eliot, the idea is always referred to In laudatory
terms so that even after his later disillusionment with Eliot,
his deprecation of some of his rmarks-end suggestions, the idea
always enjoys Leavis’s favour*
Harold Wendell Smith questions the basis on which Eliot
discriminates between a unified and a dissociated sensibility:
1* F,R* Leavis, Neif Bearings, p. 70
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"Eliot’s view", he says, "is too xtiuch regarded as a self-evident
truth and too little investigated"*' ^
He carries on what seems to him to he the right investigation
of Donne’s poetry, and concludes'that Donne’s sensibility is a
dissociated and not a unified one as Eliot claims. He suggests
that Donne’s apprehension of thought was not sensuous but rather
abstract - and the idiole gist of Metaphysical poetry is to
create unity out of diversity in abstract statements. He also
draws an analogy between Coleridge and Eliot indicating that
both are engaged in a life-long struggle to create’unity* out of
’multeity’ to make up for acpsychological feeling of disintegration
and a mental sense of fragmentariness*
Pursuing a similar line of thought Marius Bewiey analyses
Donne’s ’Songs end Sonets’ end disclaims Eliot’s statement that
Donne exhibits a unified sensibility. He cites Donne’s manipulation
of the thane of love in terms of a polar conflict between the body
and the soul as illustrative of a dissociated sensibility:
These two opposite attitudes in Dœme’s poetry sever 
the normal functional co-operation between the body 
and the soul which had been persistait throughout the 
precedent age. Each slightly lane in itself, goes 
limping off in its private direction to find its 
pleasure and peace, not in a unified but fragmentary 
universe. 2
It may safely be indicated that Harold Wendell Smith and 
Marius Bewiey represent a viewpoint which Leavis in the early 
fifties would be prepared to discuss (especially if we consider 
that Smith is a contributor to Scrutiny, and Bewiey is one of 
Leavis’s proteges), but he would straightaway reject a différât
1* Harold Wendell Sraith^ "The Dissociation of Sensibility", Scrutiny, 
Vol. x m i ,  no.3. Winter 1991-1992, p. 179,
2. Marius Bewiey,"Donne and the Dissociation of Sensibility",
Kenyon RevieÎK Vol.XLV, no.4. Autumn 1992, p. 640
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viewpoint advanced by both Frank Kermode and G.6. Lewis.
Kermode contends that the dissociation of sensibility is 
"a false theory". He points out that it Is more of a 
European than an English phenomenon, and goes as far back in 
history as Greek thought itself, so "that there is little 
historical propriety in treating it as a seventeenth century event?'
Ruling out any line of demarcation made in temporal terms
as inaccurate, O.S. Lewis similarly dissolves the sharp distinction
traditionally drawn between The Middle Ages and The Renaissance:
If we do not put the Great Divide between the 
Middle Ages and The Renaissance, where should 
we put it ? I ask this question with the full 
consciousness that in the reality studied, there 
is no Great Divide. There is nothing in history 
that corresponds to a coastline or watershed in 
geography. 3
Leavis, on the other hand, considers that the phrase is one 
of Eliot’s felicitous formulae and that "it serves its purpose 
quite well in the context Eliot gives it".^ He also indicates 
that the notion of dissociation is also valid as a gâaeral point 
of critical reference. The Victorian and Georgian poets with 
whom he was concerned in the first two chspters of New Bearings 
attest to the existence of an opposition between actual living 
and the idealized non-existent world into idiich they escape. It 
may also be suggested that Leavis*s handling of the Metaphysicals 
establishes a coherent line of wit running from Ben Jonson to 
Donne. It is in relation to this coherence that Leavis enunciates 
his principle that there is a reciprocal interaction between the
1. Frank K e r m o d e , Romantic Image, London, Fontana Books, 1971, p.171
2. ibid. p. 196
3# C.S. Lewis, "De Descriptions Temporum", An inaugural lecture, .7 7 . cf 
Cambridge University Press, p.4
4 . F.R, & .Q,'D*: Leavis, Lectures in America, p.38
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poet and his environment. ^
The subject crops up again with persistent urgency when
Leavis deals with Milton, Grouping Milton into the class of
poets noted for their ’dissociated sensibility* Leavis says:
I have in mind Milton’s habit of exploiting language 
as a kind of musical medium outside lilmself^ as it 
were ♦ There is no pressure in his verse oJ^any complex 
and varying current of feeling and sensatipn; the words 
have little substance or muscular qualityApressure and 
muscular quality are well-known Elio tic termsXlMilton is 
using only a small part of the resources of the English 
language, 2
The theme again recurs in the affinity Wiich Leavis discerns 
between Milton and Dryden, Their poetry marks the beginning of the 
Restoration with its polished style, but degenerate and crude 
sensibility. On this point, both Eliot and Leavis are in obvious 
agreement:
this dissociation as is natural, was aggravated 
by the influence of the two most powerful poets of 
the century; Milton and Dryden. The language went 
on and in some respects improved. But while the 
language became more refined, the feeling became 
more crude, 3
Drawing on Eliot’s assumptions Leavis says:
Mr Eliot, who put the phrase into currency, ascribed 
the dissociation very largely to the influence of 
Dryden and Milton. Dryden is the voice of his age, 
and may be said to have in that sense responsibility.
And even without reference forward to the eighteenth 
century the coupling of his name with Milton’s can 
be readily justified. 4
In his account of the dissociation of sensibility Leavis reckons^ 
not just with the predominating climate of rationalism, but also with 
the emergence of a new mode of social life associated with the coffee-
1. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, London, Chatto and Windus, reprint 1969, p.19
2. F.R. Leavis, New Bearings, p.71
3# T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p. 288 
4# F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p.38
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house life, the tendency towards sociability, the emergence of
wit and satire, and the consequent preponderance of prose. The
Restoration of monarchy at the hands of Charles II <Ud not restore
the court culture and the sense of fineness characteristic of
earlier times# leavis shows this point in practice in his
exegesis of Rochester’s status as a poet:
Rochester is not a great poet of any kind; yet he 
certainly had uncommon natural endowments which, it 
is reasonable to suggest, he might have done much 
more with had he been b o m  thirty years earlier#
As it is his few best lyrics are peculiarly individual 
utterances with no such relation to convention or 
tradition as is represented by Garew or Marvell. 1
Holding a comparison between Marvell and Prior, leavis states
that in Prior’s verse
the tradition died • died so coirpletely into the 
modes, into the conventions of sentiment and 
expression of a new age (and postulates that)’The 
Restoration had resulted in a hiatus, a discontinuity, 
one too anomalous to persist. 2
When Leavis takes up the same topic later he refers to 
Sprat’s History of The Royal Society where the members are 
called upon to "bring all things as near the mathematical 
plainness as they can,"^ and in the same context he comments 
that it is this process of regularization that inaugurated the 
technologico-Berthamite age in which we are now living.
In an essay entitled "Bacon and The Dissociation of Sen^bility" 
L.C. Knights approves of the historicity of the idea. He relates 
Bacon’s intellectualism to the typical seventeenth century over-
1. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p. 39
2. ibid, p. 113
3. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and The University,
P# 94
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estimation of the mind and reason at the expense of sensibility
and emotion. He links this over-erophasis on reason with the
Restoration spirit and the rise of English prose. "This
development", he maintains, "is larg^y responsible for the divorce
between reason on the one hand and the creative perception and the
feelings generally on the other - reason, of course, having the 
1pre-eminence." ^
In the same essay Knights emphasizes that this dissociation
has wider iirplications and tends to permeate life as a whole, and
extends beyond the Au^stan period to coirprehend the Romantic
one as well with the result that there is a persistent schism
between life and poetry. He ends the essay by remarking that*
reason has dominated life for a long time within 
an area of experience which is defective because 
it takes the part for theivhole. There are still 
gains to be won by reason, but by a reason or 
intelligence that recognizes the claims of the 
sensibility. 2
Basil Vd.Hey confirms the previous assumptions of Leavis and
Knights and argues that the Cartesian spirit helped to create a
separation between prose and poetry. Prose became a vehicle
for conveying factual statements and was addressed to the mind,
whereas poetry was for expressing delight and addressed to the
fancy. He concludes that the outcome of this separation is
the preponderance of reason or rationalism over feeling, hence,
3
the branding of the %e as the Age of Reason.
Summing up Eliot’s achievement Leavis s^s "He has made a
1. L.C. Ihiights, "Bacon and The Dissociation of Sensibility", 
Scrutiny, Vol.XI, no.4. Summer 1943, p. 282
2. ibid, p. 269
3. Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background, London, ^ -77 - </- 
Penguin Books, pp. 83-64
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new start and established new bearings." To justilÿ this 
verdict Leavis reviews the body of verse produced before Eliot
began to exert his influence. This review covers two phases:
\
^he Victorian age and the Georgian Period till thé end of The
First World War. This review is made in terms of "the
poetical" and "the poetry of withdrawal" - qualities that
characterize the poetry of these two phases ’The Poetical’
Leavis associates with the pre-conceptions of the age regarding
poetry namely that it should be in the Miltonic phrase, ’ simple’,
’sensuous* and ’passionate’. The rejection of the poetical is
associated by Eliot with a revival of interest in Dryden and
the Metaphysioals (but it should be noted that Leavis replaces
Dryden by Pope). In his essay on ’John Dryden’ Eliot traces
these pre-cone options back to the notion of sublimity*
With regard to Dryden, therefore, we can say this 
much. Our taste in English poetry has been largely 
founded upon a partial perception of the value of 
Shakespeare and Milton, a perception vhich dwells 
upon sublimity of thaae and action. %
In a similar way Leavis says:
Poetry, it was assumed, must be the direct 
expression of simple enotion^ and these of a 
limited class: the tender, olie exalted, the
poignant, andyàn general, the sympathetic. ^
In their reappraisal of English poetry both Eliot and Leavis
go back in history - the first to Hazlitt, the second further back
to War ton. Eliot quotes these words from Hazlitt:
Dryden and Pope are the two great masters of the 
artificial style of poetry in our language as the 
poets of whom I have already treated - Chaucer,
Spenser, Shakespeare and Milton were of the natural. ^
T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p. 309 
F.R. Leavis, New Bearings, p.16 
^  T.S. Eliot, op.cit, p. 309
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Quoting from Warton Leavis gives the followingi
The sublime and the pathetic are the two chief nerves 
of all genuine poesy. What is there transcendently 
sublime or pathetic in Pope ? (Warton goes on to 
classify the English poets.) i In the first class I 
would place our only th^e sublime and pathetic poetff 
Sp^ser, Shakespeare^»» Milton. 1 ^
To understand the full inport of New Bearings, it is useful
to recall Eliot's late statement:
I was in reaction not only against Georgian 
poetry, but against Georgian criticism. 2
and his complementary confession:
the mphasis on tradition, came about, I believe, as 
a result of my reaction against the poetry in the 
English language of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and my passion for the poetry both dramatic 
and lyric of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries. 3
It is in terms of 'the dream world* - a phrase that Leavis 
borrows from EHot,^ that Leavis epitomizes the predominant 
Romantic background against which Eliot writes his poetry and
1. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p. l9
2. T.S. Eliot, To Criticize the Critic, London, Faber and Faber 1969, p.l6
3* ibid, p. 19
4. In a footnote in New Bearings, p. 17 Leavis tells us that 'Eliot has 
pointed this out ^n*Hoaagejbo_Jj?hnJ3ryd^ e^  ^ But a reading of Eliot's 
'Homage to John Dryden* will not bear this out. The phrase first 
occurs in Eliot's ess^ on "Andrew Marvell" where Eliot says: "The
effott to construct a oream^worlcf idiich alters English poetry in the 
nineteenth century ^  a dream world utterly different from the 
visionary realities of the Vita Nuova or the poetry of Dante's 
contemporaries is a problem of which various e^lanations may no 
doubt be found". Selected Essays, p.301. And in his Introductory 
essay to Johnson's Vanity of Human Wishes, Eliot comes nearest to the 
phrase when he says: "Those who demand of poetry a day-dream or a
metamorphosi^-of^^<^heir own feeble desires and lusts or what they 
believe to |^ e - intensity of passion will not find much in Johnson. He 
is like Popl^ and^bryden, Crabbe and Landor, a poet for those who want 
poetry and noT^something else, some stay for their own vanity"
(Samuel Johnson: London and The Vanity of Human Wishes, with an 
introductory essay by T.S* Eliot, London, Frederick Etchells and 
Hugh Macdonald, p. 17)
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criticism*
Leavis’s reliance on Eliot’s critical practice is also seen
in his reliance on Eliot’s notion of "dissociation of sensibility"
which becomes a dominant theme in New Bearings, and most of
Leavis’s subsequent critical writings. Leavis argues that
’rootedness’, being an essential requirement of integrated poetic
works, is lacking in Victorian poetry as a consquence of the
dissociation of sensibility. In the course of his diagnosis of
Victorian verse he says*
For the most part it is not so much bad as dead • 
it was never alive. The words lie there 
arranged on the page have no root^ the writer «
himself can never have been more than superficially 
interested in thm. 1
He again says, more explicitly referring to Eliot’s ’dissociation’*
But if the poetry and intelligence of the age lose touch 
with each other, poetry will cease to matter much, and 
the age will be lacking in fin«* awareness. 2
And in a curt but revealing statement Leavis once more says*
Losing all touch with the finer consciousness of the age, 
it (poetry) would be;-, not only ’irresponsible, but 
anaemic, as indeed, Victorian poetry so commonly is. 3
Leavis attributes this dissociation partly to the terrifying
advances of industrial civilization.
In considering our present plight we have also to 
take account of the incessant rapid change that 
characjrerizes the machine^age. The result is breach 
of continuity and the uprooting of life. 4
This alienation from ’traditional wisdom’ to borrow a phrase
from Eliot that Leavis capitalizes upon in his later writings is,
in Leavis’s view, the raison d’etre of the degeneration of poetry.
1. F.S. Leavis, New Bearings, p. 14
2. ibid, p. 20 .
3# ibid, p. 46
4. ibid, p. 78
9. T.S. Eliot, After Strange Gods, London, Faber and Faber, 1934, p.48,
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Leavis starts off with the assun^tion that proper literary
values and genuine artistic taste were in abeyance before Eliot
began to make himself felt as a directing influence. Harold
Monro had argued that there were, at that time, many minor poets
in English each producing a few good poems; if his age’s claim
to distinction rested on these few good poems it would be worth his
1while to edit such a collection. By way of commenting on these
meagre aspirations Le avis says*
They could have been made only in an age in idhich there 
were no serious standards current; no live tradition of 
poetry, and no public enable of Informed and serious 
interest. 2
With his eye on The Oxford Book of Victorian Verge Leavis
discerns that for forty or fifty years poetry has been on the decline.
Enlarging on the Victorian phenomenon of poetastry Leavis 
singles out the works of minor versifiers* O’Shaughnessy* s ’Ode* and 
Andrew Lang’s ’The Odyss^’, for particular reference to show that 
they are deficient by reason of their lack of informed personal 
experience. They are poetasters because they express their inert 
desire for a dream-world which they would yearn to inhabit, cutting 
them off from actual living. It is this insulation from the vital 
sources of ejq)erience that gives rise to the decadence of poetry.
That is why Leavis’s concern with an interfusion of thought and 
feeling making for the liveliness and integration of works of art 
is so emphatic.
Leavis’s definition of ’the poetical* deserves closer scrutiny 
as it assumes a focal role in the course of his argument. To 
Leavis poetry is the product of the poet’s con^lex relationship 
with his social and historical situation. In the absence of such 
relationship the poetic experience offered by the poet becomes 
unconvincing and shaky because it is not rooted in reality. This
1. Harold Monro (ed) Twentieth Century Poetry. London, Chatto and Windus 1930,
2. F.R. Leavis, op.cit. p. l4
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point directs our attention to another complementary aspect, namely
the indivisibility of the poetic e^gerience. If a poet is to
communicate an experience that is not genuinely felt, his
insincerity would be immediately exposed.
Indeed, (says Leavis) his capacity for experiencing and his 
power of communicating are indistinguishable; not merely 
because we should not know of the without the other, 
but because his power of making the words e3q>ress Wiat he 
feels is indistinguishable fronÆat he feels. 1
This indivisibility is worth di*relling upon because Richard Church in
his review of New Beerijigs (and in spite of Leavis’s apparent
approval of it) misrepresents the nature of Leavis*s critical
fipparatus and defines it as exclusively concerned with technique*
It is to be noted throughout the whole of his study that 
he is preoccupied with technique, and in this respect he 
is a poet’s critic. When he speaks of tradition he 
means the trodj.tion of form and expression. 2
It is clear that Leavis’s discussion of form is inseparably bound
up with content. To illustrate this is not difficult. Consider
his discussion of Eliot*s ’technical edifice’. Talking about
Ash-V7ednesday he says*
The sequence is poetry and highly formal poetry. let 
it is impossible not see in it a process o^ self-
scrutiny, of self-explorat^ion^ or not to feel^^e 
poetical problem at any .^ «pî-point was a spiri&ual 
problem, a problem in the attainment of a difficult 
sincerity. 3
C Î h
Again he says* "For the poet technique was the problem of sincerity".
Speaking about the Dantesque and ritualistic suggestions in
Ash-We<inesdgy he says*
1. FJl. Leavis, New Bearings, p. 19
2. Richard Church "The Labyrinthine Way" The Spectator, March 26, 
1932, p. 453
3. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p. 98
4. ibid, p. 99
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They go with the formal quality of the vers^in 
which we have already noted a suggestion of Ritual, 
and with the liturgical element, to define the plane at 
vjhich poetry works. The spiritual discipline is one with 
the poetical. 1
In New Bearings also we find that the other crucial term that
Leavis applies to Eliot « a term that gained currency at the hands of
Eliot himself is inç>ersonalityj «Gerontiôn", says Leavis, "has the
2impersonality of great art". Again he says* "Jh The Waste Land 
the development of iu^ersohality that Gerontion shows in comparison 
with Prufrock reaches an extreme limit".^ Here it should be observed 
that Leavis adopts the criterion of *In^ersonality* to distinguish 
Gerontion* and »The Waste Land* from the earlier poems (Prufrock and 
Portrait of a Lady) that are * concerned with the directly personal 
embarrassments, disillusions, and distresses of a sophisticated 
young man*# ^ Vihen we look closely at Leavis*s qualification of 
inpersonality in The Waste Land* we find him saying *it would be 
difficult to imagine a coupleter transcendence of the individual 
self, a conpleter projection of awareness*# The ‘transcendence 
of the self* is a foresight of his view of Impersonality expressed 
in ‘Tragedy and The Medium*# ^ The projection of awareness provides 
a favourable occasion for Leavis to voice his cherished view that 
the highest level of consciousness and sensibility is attained only 
by a mall minority, and that good poets and men of letters are
1# F.R. Leavis, New Bearings# p.lOU
2# F Jl. Leavis, New Bearings, p.72
3# ibid, p. 60
U. ibid, p. 72
5. ibid, p. 80
6# of the chapter on Santayana#
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foremost amongst that minority# Leavis associates this
consciousness in modern literature with a sense of futility
largely arising from the role played by science and anthropology
in reducing human moralities and religious beliefs to a matter
of human habits# Leavis finds a confirmation of this view in
the theme and the anthropological background of The Waste Land#
But the anthropological theme is an apt illustration of a notion
favoured by leavis: breach of continuity and alienation from
organic life:
The remoteness of the civilization celebrated in 
The Waste Land from the natural rhythms is brought 
out, in ironical contrast, by the anthropological 
theme# Vegetation cults, fertility ritual, with 
their sympathetic magic, represent a harmony of 
human culture with the natural environment, and  ^
express an extreme sense of the unity of life#
In The Waste Land the elements of fertility, unity and 
harmony are replaced by sterility, disgust, and spiritual 
disintegration# The whole concept of New Bearings is inspired 
by Eliot in the sense that it is Eliot who constitutes the pivot 
around which both Pound and Hopkins revolve#
It is owing to Mr Eliot that Hopkins and Pound can 
be discussed as having the significance here 
attributed to them and can be associated with him 
in terms of a revised tradition, 3
and Leavis frequently repeats that in solving his own problojis
I
as a poet Eliot helped others to do the same#
1. F#R# Leavis, New Bearings, p# 80 
2# ibid, p# 79 
3# ibid, p. 157
li# ibid, pp# 28 - 58 • 99 - 198
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In his essay on Eliot, Leavis establishes relations
between his poetry and that of the Metaphysicals. He pursues
this line of argument in his essay on Pound:
• throughout there is a subtlety of tone, a conplexity 
of attitude such as we associate with seventeenth century 
wit* 1
And in the Epilogue he speaks of Empscn*s poetry in terms
o
rendered through the influence of Eliot.
New Bearings also shows that Leavis is remarkably scrupulous 
about indicating the affinities between Dante and Pound, and Dante 
and Eliot, the first seen in the Canto a, the second in The Waste Land, 
But Eliot’s affinities with Dante can be observed at a much more 
articulate level in Eliot’s e3q>licit invocation of ’reason* 
supervening upon emotion as constituting the potential urge behind 
his own writings. ^
Leavis’s discussion of Pound’s poetry in New Bearings, however, 
leads to criticism of Eliot and marks the beginning of a tone of 
dissent that will grow stronger as time goes on. In his
Introduction to Selected Poems of Ezra Pound, Eliot considers 
Manberley a great poem and Pound’s "finest before the Cantos", ^ 
but he also brands It as naive and rough, and asserts that it can 
hardly be understood without bearing Pound’s earlier poems in mind.
Leavis on the other hand, finds Mauberley convincing and self- 
sufficient. He justifies this verdict by indicating that though
1. ibid, p. 117
2* ibid, p. l6l
3. T.S. Eliot, Criterion, January 1926, vol.iv, p.5
li* Ezra Pound, Selected Poems, (ed), T.S. Eliot, London, Faber and
Faber, 1928, reprint 1938
9* F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p. 112
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Mauberley Is the summing-up of an individual life and is in 
essence autobiographical, yet it achieves, through its technical
( 4
perfection, "the impersonality of great poetry". Here we witness 
a view of impersonality that will be seen remarkably at work in 
Leavis* s criticism of Eliot* s later poetry, Wordsworth, Lawrence and 
Blake. It is this interest in the personal aspect of experience 
that will -gradually dissociate Leavis from Eliot and draw him closer 
to Lawrence and the ideas of Whitehead, Collingwood and Polanyi.
To account for Eliot’s insistence on relating Mauberley to 
Altaforte and the other earlier poems Leavis draws our attention 
to Eliot’s interest in form, or more properly in the aesthetic aspects of 
Pound’s earlier poems. Leavis refers in particular to Eliot’s 
Introduction to-sèife Selected Poems of Ezra Pound, and the essay 
titled "Isolated Superiority".
In his Introduction to Selected Poems of Ezra Pound, Eliot 
hesitates between two poles of form and content, sometimes according
2
approval to the one, sometimes to the other, and scanetimes to both.
In "Isolated Superiority" Eliot argued that Pound had an influence, but 
was without disciples: "Influence can be exerted through form thereas
3
one makes disciples only among those who sympathize with content", 
and he suggests that in form Pound far outgrew his age whereas in 
content he lagged behind and contented himself with the outmoded 
ideas of the preceding age.
In the same article Eliot confirms this division between form 
and content by saying "I confess that I am seldom interested in vhat
1. F .H. Leavis, New Bearings, p.ll9
2. Ezra Pound, Selected Poems, London, Faber and Fsber 1928, 
reprint 1938, p. XV
3. T.S. Eliot "Isolated Superiority", The Dial, Jan, 1928, p.ij..
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he is saying, but only in the way he says it".  ^ This divisive 
tendency provokes Leavis to disagree with Eliot and to argue that 
the verse of Mauberley exhibits a coherence in which form consorts 
with content.
The verse is extraordinarily subtle, and its subtlety 
is the subtlety of the sensibility it expresses. No 
one would think here of distinguishing the way of 
saying from the thing said. 2
Apart from Mauberley, which in Leavis* s view, represents Pound at
his best, Leavis thinks that Pound is an aesthete: "his main
concern has been art,’ art as represented by Flaubert • saint and
3
martyr of the artistic conscience". It is against this 
exclusive concern with an aesthetic life that Leavis launches his 
later attacks, and it is mainly with Flaubert’s aestheticism in 
mind that he brings an equally compelling plea for social and moral 
life into play.
Leavis, and Eliot’s After Strange Gods
"With Eliot’s entry into the church of England a new 
restrictive and incoherent tone emerged. In an essay entitled 
«E5q>eriment in criticism (1928) for example, he demonstrates a sense 
of confusion and contradiction. In the first part of the essay he 
is seen as an e:{ponent of the doctrine of art for art’s sake, a 
champion of the aestheticism of Clive Bell, Leonard and Virginia 
Woolf. He regards literature as "primarily literature, a means of
1. ibid, p. 6
2. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p. 1l5
3. FJl. Leavis, New Bearings, p. 118
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refined and intellectual pleasure"* And towards the end of the 
essay he states:
*#* the possession of clear literary standards must 
inply the possession of clear moral standards* The 
various attempts to find the fundamental axioms behind 
both good literature and good life are among the most 
interesting experiments in criticism in our time* 2
By providing the missing and necessary counterpart Eliot
unconsciously undermines the refined intellectual pleasure he
establishes at the beginning of the essay# As he moves on he
is lured again by the aesthetic doctrine, succumbs to its chaim,*
severs the bond between morality and aesthetics and opts for a
one-sided pleasure*
So long as poetry and fiction and such things are written 
its first purpose must always be Wiat it always has been; 
to give a peculiar kind of pleasure which has something 
constant throughout the ages. 3
In"Catholicism and International order" which may be
considered an essay on clear moral standards, Eliot’s
professed intentions of treating Catholicism as a universal order
applicable to all communities betray a sense of inconsistency and
contradiction, for in the early part of the essay he dismisses
Fascian and heresy, in the middle he hurls his attacks on humanism,
and at the close he draws a distinction between Catholic faith and
protestant doctrine, thereby e^ qjosing idiat he takes to be the
deficiencies of the latter and the advantages of the former*
1* T.S# Eliot "Experiment in criticism". The Bookman, LXX, no.3,
November 1929 and reprint D.M. Zabel (ed) Literary Opinion in
America, London, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1937, p. 1U
2* ibid, p. 20
3. ibid, p. 2k
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At the beginning Eliot identifies Christianity with world 
order*
We are committed to what in the eyes of the world, 
must be a desperate belief, that a Christian world 
order is ultimately the only one, which from any 
point of view will work. 1
Similarly in his essay on Irving Babbitt he declared that
It is quite irrelevant to conjecture the possible 
development of European races without Christianity* 
to imagine, that is, a tradition of humanism ^
equivalent to the actual tradition of Christianity.
To identify Christianity with world order means to conceive 
of Christianity as an over-all syst^a comprehensive of, or 
capable of ccanprehending, other recognizable systeas. This 
lofty conception is grotesquely anticlimaxed by Eliot’s 
systematic assault on other such systems as socialism. Fascism and 
humanism in the name of Christianity and world-order*
Against this sectarianism in Eliot may be set Leavis’s 
essay on ’The Logic of Christian Discrimination» where he is 
sharply critical of spproaching a work of art with a preconceived 
notion of ’discriminating ânristianly’. Leavis suggests that the 
critic’s primary function is to ^proach the work of art as a work 
of art, end if he has acquired a refined sense of appreciation 
through his Christian faith it should be revealed through his 
finer discriminations without being biassed by a premeditated 
Christian dogma.
Leavis instances the poetry of Eliot as representative of 
a refined sensibility that is at once aaotionally gratifying and 
spiritually edifying to any reader, whether he is Christian^or not.
1. T.S. Eliot, Essays Ancient and Modem, New York Harcourt, 
Brace and Coup any, 1932, p. 117
2. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p. U73
3. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p. 2^ h
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To prejudice one* s judgment by a Christian doctrine is to exert 
a pernicious influence on the soul and to do a disservice to the 
cause of criticism; and this is the problem underlying After 
Strange Gods# It is true that Eliot wrote this work under extremely 
difficult personal conditions and this may induce in the reader 
willingness to make allowances for its shortcomings - an attitude 
that is further encouraged by Eliot’s later realization of the 
defective nature of the work and his subsequent suppression of it#
But it is equally true that this work with its explicit attack on 
Lawrence is largely responsible for Leavis’s gradual disillusionment 
with Eliot and his mounting interest in Lawrence# It can, on the 
other hand, and in a paradoxical way, be seen as leading to Leavis’s 
rehabilitation of a genuine, but displaced artist, and in that sense 
it can be looked upon as providing the incentive for a new contribution 
to our sense of ’The Great Tradition’#
It is in place, then,to see what is there in After Strange Gods 
that occasions disagymient between Eliot and Leavis*
The book is ostensibly designed to promote a certain conception* 
the inter-relation of tradition and Christianity* The defence of this 
idea involves Eliot in a programme of excluding non^Christian doctrines 
and races to keep tradition "Christian and homogeneous"# He looks 
unfavourably upon Sanscrit; views protest anti an as decadent, and 
attacks the Humanism of both Irving Babbitt and Ezra Pound; the first 
because it contains Confucian elements, the second because it draws 
on Chinese doctrines* To Eliot , Pound, like Babbitt, "is an
4
individualist and a libertarian"#
1# T#S# Eliot, After Strange Gods, London, Faber and Faber, 1931*, p#^2
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Lawrence Is also discredited because "he is reared in an agnostic
atmosphere".^ It is the sum-total of the doctrines upheld by
these writers that Eliot labels ’modern heresy’ •
Lawrence - according to Eliot - does not belong to the
tradition he is promoting because his mother did not give him a
proper religious orientation. In effect she did not give her son
membership of the Church of England.
Nothing could be much drearier than the vague hymn singing 
pietism which seems to have consoled the miseries of 
Lawrence’s mother, and which does not seem to have provided 
her with any firm principles by which to scrutinize the 
conduct of her son. 2
Do these statements exemplify the principles of objectivity and
impersonality favoured end propagated by Eliot ? In his early
essays, Eliot has been at pains to set up a principle of
objectivity ^ diereby a work of art could be appraised without much
regard for personal idiosyncrasies. He does not seem to be
objective enough in these pronouncements. To Eliot the works of
Lawrence have an alarming strain of cruelty and his characters
are imriioral. In the course of comparing Lawrence’s short story
•The Shadow in the Rose Garden" with Joyce’s "The Dead", Eliot
rejects the former and endorses the latter on the assumption
that Joyce’s shows a more refined sensibility whereas Lawrence’s
is illustrative of a strain of cruelty.
One can readily concede that Joyce’s short story is
artistically more mature than Lawrence’s, but as Stephen Spender has
judiciously argued, Eliot’s choice of representative specimens from
both Lawrence and Joyce is infelicitous and does injustice to
Lawrence because the story is one of his worst, and Eliot’s summary
1. ibid, p. 38 
2f ibid, p. 39
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of it is imperfect, because it singles out those aspects that 
illustrate Eliot’s viewpoint without taking the better aspects 
into consideration. Spender denies Eliot’s contention that 
Lawrence’s characters are cruel and lifts this quality onto 
Joyce’s in his other stories. He convincingly indicates that 
Lawrence’ s treatment of situations is natural and realistic,
Pereas that of Joyce’s is sentimental and idealistic, and in 
opting for Joyce Eliot enlists himself in the romantic carrç) to idiich 
his theory of tradition is presumably opposed. ^
It is again in connection with his notion of tradition that
Eliot exposes his narrowness*
The point is that Lawrence started life wholly free 
from any restriction of tradition or institution, 
that he had no guidance except the Inner Light; the 
most untrustworthy and deceitful guide that ever offered 
itself to wandering humanity. 2
The crux of the matter is Eliot’s definition of tradition.
If it is the kind of abstract idea wrung from books and 
absolutely cut off from life that Stephen Spender finds it, ^ 
it is a very impoverishing notion, and it Is better to replace 
it, as Leavis has, by the human spontaneity and genuineness of 
personal experience for which Lawrence stands. A tradition that 
shies away from the concerns of actual living is doomed. A 
tradition that does not accommodate personal experience is to say 
the least one-sided.
Eliot identifies Lawrence with the ’inner light’, the most
1. Stephen Spender, The Destructive Element, London, The Life and 
Letters series, no.87, 1939, pp.168-172
2. T.S. Eliot, op.cit, p.5U
3. Stephen Spender, op.cit, p. 161
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•untrustworthy g u i d e y e t  paradoxically enough sums up his 
life as being carried on the spiritual plane. He describes 
his diagnosis of the death of modem civilization as 
’unanswerable, and recommends Fantasia of The Unconscious as 
"a book to keep at hand and re-read,”
Eliot’s charges against Lawrence reach their highest pitch 
when he accuses him of sexual morbidity and moral perversion.
He thereby suggests that Latsrende exercises a pernicious 
influence on those to whcm he appeals, Leavis had already 
written a pamphlet called D.H. Lmrence, expressing his 
admiration of Lawrence, and therefore he was in a sense implicated 
in Eliot’s adverse verdict on Lawrence, Leavis’s response was 
sharp;
Moral or religious criticism cannot be a substitute 
for literary criticism^ and it is only by being a 
literary critic that Hr Eliot can ^pdy his recovered 
standards to literature. It is only by demonstrating 
convincingly that his ^plication of moral principles 
leads to a more adequate criticism that he can effect 
the kind of persuasion that is his aim. In these %
lectures if he demonstrates anything, it is the opposite.
Leavis hits directly on Eliot’s inadequacies*
... it has, more generally, to be said that since the 
religious preoccupation has become insistent in them,
Mr Eliot’s critical writings have been notable for 
shoifing less discipline of thought and emotion, less 
purity of interest, less power of sustained devotion, 
and less courage than before. 1*
Leavis argues that Eliot’s charges against Lawrence as 
Eliot himself admits, are based on an inadequate reading bf
1. cf the preceding page and the chapter on Santayana.
2. T.S. EHot, op.cit, p.60
3. F.R. Leavis, ’Hr Eliot, "Wyndham Lewis and Lawrence’, Scrutiny 
Vol.Ill, no.2, September 193U, p. 185
1*. ibid, p. 186
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Lawrence and ought to be reconsidered and probably changed in
consequence of a better and more comprehensive reading of
Lawrence, This procedure is calculated to disarm Eliot.
The work singled out for praise by both Eliot and
Wyndham Lewis - Mornings In Mexico - is, as Leavis remarks,
one of the worst works of Lawrence, and if this choice signifies
anything it is either a vicious taste or a wilfulness not to 
Lawrence
understandyat his best. This point is brought home by Leavis’s
exposure of the instability and inconclusiveness of Eliot’s
approach to Lawrence. The praise he accords him with one hand
he withholds with the other, Leavis expresses surprise at Eliot’s
’over-insistence on Lawrence’s sexual morbidity’,because this
quality reflects back on Hiot himself. Lawrence’s concern
with sex - Leavis contends - far from being morbid or distasteful
is a genuine effort to get recognition for it as a normal social
activity making for the establishment of one of Eliot’s favourite
ideals; that is the vital connection between the ’individual and
the race’. Thus Leavis suggests that Eliot’s definition of tradition
in its livelier and more stimulating aspects is Laurentian rath^ than
Eliotic - Leavis quotes from Lawrence - that statement on the novel
which portrays human life as being dynamic, flexible and in a stq(e .
of flux; it is the task of the novelist to figure forth that’ebb
2
and flow’ that is constantly refreshing *é To undertake this 
task the novelist must be preoccupied with the motive aspects of 
life that underlie its mysteries.
As for Eliot’s conplaint that Lawrence’s works are void of moral 
struggle, Leavis makes the complementary suggestion that Eliot’s own
1, ibid, p. 189
2. ibid, p. 190
- 158 -
obsession with original sin is contrariwise, boring and 
uninteresting because remote from actual conditions of living. 
Concluding, leavis indicates that if Lawrence’s 
realization of life does not cover the whole range of human 
experience, Eliot’s understanding of orders of perception is 
also incomplete. It is only by bringing them together that 
a sense of conpleteness, of health, and of growth can be 
attained. From the totality of Lawrence* s sensé of vitality 
and human passions, and Eliot’s sense cf order and form, a sense 
of balance, normality can be discerned. It is the realization 
of this sense of equilibrium, of conç)lementarines3 that 
characterizes many of Leavis’s consequent references to these 
two artists. It is Eliot’s onslaught on Lawrence that takes 
Leavis away from Eliot’s influence, broadens the scope of his 
critical oeuvre, enlarges his concept of tradition to include 
levels of experience that Eliot’s ostracizes, because it is under 
the stimulus of Eliot’s assaùlt on Lawrence that Leavis comes to 
a more mature realization of Lawrence’s significance in the body 
of English tradition, and so dedicates to him one of his major 
"works,
Eliot and Leavis’s Revaluation
Linking Revaluation to New Bearings, Lea-vLs, in his 
introduction echoes Eliot’s notion of tradition;
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The book was planned when I was writing my 
New Bearings which offers an account of the 
situation as it appears today, indeed the 
planning of the one book was involved in the 
planning of the other. An account of the 
present of poetry, to be worth anything, must 
be from a clearly realized point of view, and 
such a point of view, if it is critically 
responsible, must have been determined by and 
defined as much in relation to the past as to 
the present, 1
The words show that Leavis attenpts to bring Eliot’s notion 
of tradition into the field of practical application.
it should be observed that, at this stage of his development
as critic, Leavis adheres to some principles borrowed from Eliot
which he was later bound either to qualify or repudiate. In
’The Function of Criticism’ Eliot, for instance says:
The critic, one would suppose, if he is to justify 
his existence, should endeavour to discipline his 
personal prejudices and cranks, tares to which we 
are all subject and compose his differences with 
as many of his fellows as possible in the common 
pursuit of true ’judgment’ # 2
Modelling his views on those of Eliot Leavis says* "A critic 
will endeavour to be as little merely individual as possible",^ 
and following upon Eliot’s rigorous principle of self-sacrifice he again % 
says; "observing this rule and practising this self-denial, the critic 
limits, of course, his freedom, but there are kinds of freedom he 
should not aspire to", ^ This self-denial is in harmony with Eliot’s 
view that there is no creation in criticism. In the course of his 
development and with the dawning on him of the vital role played by
1. F.R, Leavis, Revaluation, London, Chatto and Windus, reprint 1969, p.l
2. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p. 25 
3* F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p.2.
1*. ibid, p*3
5. T.S. Eliot, op.cit, pp.30-31
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the individual in the formation of any judgment (largely 
suggested by the ideas of Lawrence, Whitehead, and perhaps 
confirmed by Collingwood and Polanyi) Leavis came to modify 
this view and to postulate that criticism is creative, and that 
a judgment is personal and cannot be otherwise#
In the first chapter of the book Leavis associates the modem 
sensibility with the metaphysical line of wit with Wiich he 
identifies Eliot. The title of the chapter is taken from Eliot’s 
essay on Marvell, and the chuter as a whole is written with Eliot’s 
views in mind. Attempting a definition of wit, Leavis harks back 
to that essay and the tough reasonableness beneath the slight lyric
i
grace with Wiich wit is equated by Eliot is the guideline of
Leavis’s subsequent remarks. Yet Leavis’s elaboration of Eliot
suggests a qualification regarding the association of Mlton’s
Cornus with that line of wit - a qualification rendered necessary
by Leavis* s later critique of Flilton. To clarify the notion of
wit, Eliot writes:
What is meant is some quality wiiich is common to 
the songs in Cornus end Cowley’s Anacreontics, and 
Marvell’s Horatian ode. 2
Ruling out the songs in Cornus Leavis argues:
But the songs in Cornus have not in or beneath their 
simple grace, any such order of implications as leads _
us to call the apparently simple poise of Jon son ’wit’.
The finesse attributed by Eliot to Cowley’s Anacreontics is
challenged by Leavis, and replaced by a callous and ruthless tone
idiich he discerns in the poem, Anplifying this point Leavis
1. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p. 2k
2. T.S. Eliot, op.cit, p. 293
3. F.B. Leavis, op.cit, p. 25
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chooses another poem by Cowley called ’Wit’ in Wiich wit is 
stripped of its tough reasonableness, divested of its inherent 
grace to herald the new mode of social manners of the 
Augustan period.
When it comes to placing Dryden Leavis finds that Pope’s
affinities with Jonson, Donne and Marvell are stronger than
Dryden’s, and that it is Pope and not Dryden, Wio carries the
line of wit with him. Pope - Leavis tends to think - is a
member of the community of the literary tradition, Wiereas
Dryden is a provincial poet representative only of his age.
In view of this sense of community Leavis reverses Eliot’s
judgment and rates Pope higher than Dryden. Leavis again
challenges Dryden* s affinities with Jonson as postulated by
Eliot. Eliot says:
He is a successor of Jonson and therefore the 
descendant of Marlowe, he is the ancestor of 
nearly all that is best in the poetry of the 
eighteenth century. 1
Eliot’s defence of Dryden - it should be noted - is made 
against a background of what he thinks to be a prevalent 
nineteenth century prejudice and an inviolable taste for 
Shakespeare and Milton* Leavis’s angle of vision is different.
The affinities he seeks prompt him to associate Dryden with 
î'Iilton - that is with the hollow, the superficial and the magniloquent. 
Both Eliot and Leavis hold IMllton responsible for that dissociation 
of sensibility in which language is insulated from thought.
To proceed to Pope is to be conscious of an original line of 
thinking that Leavis develops even thilst most under Eliot’s influence.
1. T.S. Eliot, op.cit, p. 309
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He finds that Eliot has done more than justice to Dryden and 
has been unfair to Pcpe. Leavis believes that Pope* s achievement 
is more directly relevant to the modern sensibility than that of 
Dryden (here the notion of historical relativity which he largely 
derives from Lawrence, VJiitehead, Collingwood and Polanyi is a 
determining factor) and in consequence of this Pope is entitled 
to greater attention. That is what his chuter on Pope argues. 
Leavis*s reappraisal of Pope entails a reconsideration of 
traditional approaches to that poet. To Leavis Pope is on the 
one hand linked to the Metaphysicals by virtue of his speculàtions 
on the life of the soul and the body and his metaphysical wit, but 
on the other hand he is related to the modern sensibility by his 
sense of humourpioducing the tone of Eliot’s own Prufrock. It is 
in this emerging sense of affinity, of relational bonds that the 
originality of Revaluation resides. To establish these affinities 
Leavis rules out the approach to Pope in terms of his personal life 
as outmoded and doing violence to the artistic achievement of the 
poet.
Pope’s rehabilitation is effected with the tools adopted by 
Eliot in his essay on Dryden. Eliot maintains that Dryden 
resembles Swinburne in his mastery over words but whereas 
Swinburne’s words are connotative, those of Dryden are precise but 
denotative. Leavis attributes the merits of both Swinburne and 
Dryden to Pope and argues that Pope’s words are both precise and 
connotative. Furthermore Eliot’s celebrated view that poetry 
should occasion a sense of surprise in the reader, a quality which 
he Imputes to Dryden’s dexterity  ^is s^plied to Pope with greater
1. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p.308
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intensity.
As Leavis proceeds to the August ans we find him keen to
establish affinities between Pope and Gray on the one hand, and
Milton and the August ans who found Milton’s melancholic and
ruminative modes together with his blank verse congenial^on the
other. He finds in ’Thomson’s declamatory )dLltonics in particular
a terse illustration of these affinities. On this last point we
notice an obvious resemblance between Leavis’s and Eliot’s ideast
In his Introductory essay to The Vanity of Human Wishes, an
essay to which Leavis attaches a capital importance, Eliot holds
Milton responsible for what is poor and dreary in eighteenth
century verse. **A good part of the dreariest verse of the time
2
is written under the shadow of Fiilton". Accounting for the
failure of that verse Eliot again says in the same essay "Instead
of working out the proper form for its matter, Wien it has any, and
informing verse with prose virtues, it (the eighteenth century)
merely applies the magniloquence of Hilton." ^
But if the Augustans have links with the Metaphysical and
Elizabethan predecessors they are not so much the precursors
of the Romantics as the Romantics are their descendants.'^  This
is an original stroke on Leavis* s part:
The point of Professor Nichol Smith’s observation 
should be not that Akenside anticipates Wordsworth, 
but that Wordsworth with an essential life of a very 
different order has a certain eighteenth century 
strength; it is not any romantic spirit in Akenside 
that links him to Wordsworth, but the common-sen se 
ethos and social habit implicit in the meditative 
verse - verse that as Professor Nichol Smith points 
out, looks so like Wordsworth’s. 1*
1* F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p. 88
2. Samuel Johnson’s London and The Vanity of Human Wishes, with an 
introductory essay by T.S. Eliot, p. 13
3. ibid, p.1b
b. F.R. LeavUs, Revaluation, p. 109
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The originality of Leavis* s idea can be brought home if
we recall that Elibt thought that Akenside, together with
Cowper, Thomson and Young "prepared the way for Wordsworth". ^
Apart from Pope thorn Leavis considers as of his time and
superior to it in his poetic attainment, the age bears witness
to a dissociation of sensibility*
The Restoration had resulted in a hiatus, a g 
discontinuity, one too anomalous to persist*
Leavis* s word ’hiatus* reminds us of the eighteenth
century tendency - as Eliot conceives it - to apply a grand
style to a poor content ’ so that what the writers have to say
3
appears surprised at the way in which they choose to say it.’
This inqpression is later confirmed then Leavis cites Prior
as giving evidence to the death of tradition.
It is not merely that sensibility has changed; 
senses and faculties have been lost, a perceptive 
and responsive organization has ceased to function, 
a edacity for fineness has disappeared. b
The new civilization with its bent for urbanity and polish failed
to achieve an inward grasp of experience, and poetry, in both
Eliot’s and Leavis’s view dissolved into artificial Miltonic devices*
Lhile Leavis endorses Eliot’s view of the eighteenth century
as exhibiting a state of decadence, and an incongruity between form
and content, he nevertheless denies his assertion that prose
virtues should be a criterion of ^praising poetry. He reinforces
this denial by appealing to Eliot’s manipulation of language in
Ash-¥ednesday, a manipulation that resists the very neatness and
ordered stmxcture of prose argument* That is to say that from
1. T.S. Eliot, op.cit* p.1b
2. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p.113
3. Samuel Johnson’s London and The Vanity of Human Wishes, with an 
introductory essay by T.S. Eliot, pp.1b-l9
b. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p.112
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their arrangement and association in a poetic composition 
words acquire shades of meaning and connotations not usually 
present in their patterned structure*
Leavis* 8 chapter on Wordsworth is a departure from Eliot
in two main respects* First he interprets Wordsworth’s view
of nature primarily in terms of human nature and Indicates that
1Wordsworth’s interest in mountains was secondary* The
sanctions sought by Wordsworth are essentially Laurentian in
the sense that they "recall Lavn’ence’s preoccupation with the
deep levels, the wrings of life, the illimitable mystery that
2wells up into consciousness."
Secondly Leavis counters Eliot’s derogatory approach to
Wordsworth’s conception of poetry as ’emotion recollected in
tranquillity’ and suggests that it is inaccurate. In
"Tradition and the Individual Talent" Eliot says:
... We must believe that "amotion recollected in 
tranquillity" is an inexact formula. For it is 
neither emotion, nor recollection, nor without 
distortion of meaning tranquillity. It is a 
concentration, and a new thing resulting from the 
concentration, of a very great number of experiences 
which to the practical and active person would not 
seem to be exq^eriences at all^ f t is a concentration 
which does not happen consciously or of deliberation. 
These experiences are not recollected; ^ d  they^ 
finally unite in an atmosphere which is tranquil only 
in that it is a passive attending upon the event. 3
Leavis on the other hand, tliinks that spontaneity in 
Wordm^forth, is not ’ a turning loose of emotion’ as Eliot would 
contend, but rather an advanced form of control:
1. cf the chapter on Whitehead.
2. E.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p. 166
3. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood, London, Methuen Co.Ltd., 1920, 
reprint 1969, p. 56
-166
Spontaneity, that is, as Wordsworth seeks it, 
involves no cult of the instinctive and primitive 
at the expense of the rationalized and civilized; 
it is the spontaneity supervening upon complex 
development, a spontaneity engaging an advanced 
and delicate organization* 1
Leavis’s chapter on Shelley, however, takes Eliot’s view
as its point of departure and for the most part develops its
significance* Both draw on A.E. Housman’s The Name and 
2
Nature of Poetry, in their approach to Shelley but for 
different purposes, for vhile Eliot invokes Housman to 
corroborate his view that Dante’s poetry can be enjoyed without 
necessarily sharing his beliefs - a view that Leavis %)plies 
with marked stress to Eliot’s own poctpy « Leavis adduces 
Housman to support his contention that Shelley carries on 
the tradition of the ’poetical’*
But the passage tjhich Leavis quotes from Eliot’s 
The Use of Poetry and The Use of Criticism  ^is intended for 
dissent, because it is a ’personal statement’ which departs 
from proper critical appreciation and therefore needs qualifying.
Accounting for his early interest in Shelley, Eliot suggests 
that it was then favoured by a view in which the question of belief
I
or disbelief did not then arise* Eliot says:
1* F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p. 170
2. T.S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and The Use of Criticism, p.95 
and F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p. 2ÜÔ
3. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, pp. 203-201*
1*. T.S. Eliot, op.cit , p. 97
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VJieix the doctrine, theory, belief or view of life 
presented in a poem is one vAiich the mind of the 
reader can accept as; coherent, mature and founded 
on the facts of experience, It interposes no 
obstacles to the reader’s enjoyment, whether it 
be one that he accept or deny, approve or deprecate.
Lhen it is one which the reader rejects as childish 
or feeble, it may for a reader of well developed 
mind, set up an almost complete check. 1
Eliot’s choice of words is not happy. To present a belief,
a view of life in a poem means to consider the poem as a container
of ideas , a receptacle into which ideas can be poured and this
implies a division of form from content. Again Eliot’s wcrdw
give the impression that this belief or view of life is something
external to the poem and is separately considered as acceptable
if mature, and unacceptable if immature. This impression is emphasized
by Eliot’s words "Shelley did not live to put his poetic gifts Wiich
were certainly of the first order at the service of more tenable 
2
beliefs". Eliot’s distinction between form and content, between 
music and vision in tdlton is still lurking in our minds and has 
been encountered more than once in this chapter (Leavis associates 
Shelley with Milton and Tennyson whose use of language seems to him 
external and inorganic; and in relation to whom Eliot exposes the 
split between form and content). This situation induces the reader 
to think that Eliot is more of a dualist than an organicist, and in 
this sense he can hardly be in harmony with the philosophy of 
organism espoused by Leavis and exq)licated by VJhitehead, Collingwood 
and Polanyi and seen at work in Lawrence’s vitalistic ideas (it was 
not an accident that the lecturer on Nevanan’s Idea of a University
1. ibid, p. $6
2. ibid, p. 97
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gathered that Leavis was a vitalist )  ^and it is not 
surprising that Leavis shifts the focus of attention frcaa Shelley’s 
ideas end ideals’ to the poetry , the totality of the poetic 
exqperience.
Kristian Smidt has remarked, on the other hand, on the
dualist tendency in Eliot interestingly expressed in his defence
of Paul Elmer More’s Christian dualism in The Times Literary 
2Supplement > But what Kristian Smidt has failed to draw our
attention to is that in the same essay on Paul Elmer More, Eliot
seems to endorse this dualism in literature too. Speaking
about More’s Essay on Criticism Eliot says:
The essay is a protest against certain modern 
tendencies in art and philosophy and it is to 
these tendencies that the author opposes his 
dualism. The dation of the absolute is for 
More the spirit of heresy in all things - the 
human craving for unification which will push 
any theory to the extreme. 3
Smidt comes nearer to a realization of this disparity when
he says earlier in the book
... if it were possible to weigh his various 
statements in opposite scales, it is probable 
that a slight preponderance would be found in 
favour of the formal elonents as the prime 
factors in poetry # b
1. FJl. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and The University, 
London, Chatto and Windus, 1907, p. 5'3
2. "This dualism was right - he thought - in maintaining the idea 
of a gîÇ) between the material and the spiritual, between science 
and religion as opposed to the merging of these things in the 
writings of Vdiitehead and others". Kristian Smidt, Poetry and 
Belief in The Work of T.S. Eliot, London, Rout ledge and Kegan 
Paul, 19u1, p. 212.
3* T.S. Eliot, "Paul Elmer More’s The Demon of The Absolute",
Times Literary Supplement, February 21, 1929, p. 136
b# Kristian Smidt, op.cit, p. b?
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Following upon this quotation he argues*
And this must be because the formal elements, 
after all, are the truly dynamic ones* Eliot’s 
basic idea seems to be that beauty of form provides 
a stimulus which, as far as emotiona)., sensual or 
intellectual content goes is undifferentiated* And 
each reader is allowed to differentiate the meaning 
to himself by his particular responses much as is 
commonly done in the case of music. , 1
Leavis’s argument gives a different account of the reader’s
diseaichantment.'withlShelley’s poetry* It is not so much the
intrusion of Shelley* s ideas, beliefs or view of life that poses
an impediment to our appreciation of the poetry as the abstract
process by which feeling is insulated from thought*
Actually that quivering intensity offered in itself, 
apart from any substance, offered instead of any 
object, is what, though it may make Shelley intoxicating 
at fifteen, makes him almost unreadable, except in very 
small quantities of his best, to the mature* 2
And again he says *
Shelley at his best and worst, offers emotion in 
itself, unattached in the void* In itself, for itself, it 
is an easy shift to the pejorative iuplications ’for its 
own sake* 3
while Eliot finds the difficulty in Shelley in the inter­
position of his personal views and life which are ’pedantic and 
repellent’, Leavis sees the problem in the lack of objectification, 
or to use Eliot’s words - in the absence of ’objective equivalence’*^
Leavis’s chspter on Keats, in Revaluation, is written from an 
independent point of view, and points to the moral tone that will 
consistently govern his later critical writings. To clarify this
1. ibid, p. b9
2* F.R* Leavis, Revaluation, p. 211
3. ibid. p.21b
b. Harold Bloom argues against Leavis*s contention in Shelley’s 
Mythmaking, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999, 
pp. 23, 75, 79, 80, 81*
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et at aient one must refer to Keats’s letters in -tddch Leavis 
and Eliot took interest, but for different emphases. Quoting 
from one of these Letters Eliot gives the following:
. # Ken of Genius are great as certain ethereal 
chemicals operating on the Hass of neutral intellect 
- but they have not any individuality, ary determined 
character. I would call the top and head of those 
who have a proper self Hen of Power. 1
And then comments:
This is the sort of rmark, idiich, when made by a 
man so young as was Keats, can only be called 
the result of genius. 2
Leavis, on the other hand, postulates that Keats’s 
achievement in both his poetry and Letters suggests something 
superior to mere aesthetic!an - something which relates to a 
common human morality. Leavis gives us the following extract 
from ^ ^  ^
</
Lhile a great deal is made of aesthetic sensibility 
and its refinements, we hear very little about moral 
sensibility. It is ignored; and the deep-seated 
spiritual vulgarity that lies at the heart of our 
civilization commonly passes without notice. 3
Again Leavis quotes these words from apA-tbi» letterAScenery
I ^
is fine, but human nature is finer".
1. T.S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and The Use of Criticism, London 
Faber and Faber, 1933, reprint 1970, p. 101
2. ibid.
3. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p.265 
b« ibid.
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Leavis and Eliot on Milton
Leavis's discussion of Kilt(m*s stature as a poet is carried
out with Eliot’s achievement in the forefront of his mind. This
achievement set the seal on Mlton’s tiislodgment» to adopt a
favourite word of Leavis reiterated in the context of his
discussion of Milton. But the question of MUton is complicated
by the two lectures Eliot gave on Milton in the second of which
(The British Academy lecture 19U7) he tried to modify some of
the pronouncements he voiced in the early lecture of 1936. This
gesture was interpreted by some critics as a recantation of the
earlier views. The change of tone shown in the British Academy
lecture involved Leavis in a difficult situation, and by his account,
encouraged his detractors to make fun of his unqualified adoption
of Eliot’s ideasj
The diriders represent it (Milton’s dislodgraent) 
as showing me in the posture of comically servile 
deference to authority* Mr Eliot in his own 
pontifical way, says Milton’s no goods and I 
innocently supposing that to settle the matter, 
proclaim Milton’s annihilation to the world. And 
now Mr Eliot goes back on his tip, leaving me 
exposed in my discomfiture for tiie amusement of 
his snobbish, his judicious and real admirers. 1
in this connection it must be indicated that Leavis’s essay
on Milton was first published in Scrutiny for September 1933,
t-/hereas Eliot’s first lecture on Milton was in 193^ * So it is,
in a sense, Leavis himself^ wiio started the carnpaign against
Milton, "aided no doubt, by Eliot’s critical asides and
2creative achievonent."
1. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p. 12
2* F.R. Leavis "Milton”, Scrutiny, vol.11, no.2, September 1933, p*123
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IJhen Leavis takes up the question later in Lectures in 
America, he tells us that Eliot did not ’recant* about Hilton 
he merely contrived a discourse in which while actually (to 
do him justice) he conceded nothing but confirmed the 
judgments he made earlier with such economy, he had enabled 
his audience to feel that he had recanted# How clear he was 
in his o%vn mind about what he was doing X don’t know (there 
are penalties for espertness in that art) but he knew that he 
couldn’t recant about Hilton without repudiating his genius and 
his raison d’etre.
In view of this equivocal situation it will be as weU to 
scrutinize the whole affair in some detail#
The gist of Leavis’s argument on }Iilton, is that by his 
preOoccupation with words and their sonority, with the Grand 
Style, with the magniloquent, Hilton debarred himself from the 
exploitation of the fuH resources of language# In other words 
his obsession with form did not afford him the opportunity 
to realize adequately ^ propriété human feelings and values#
Even this obsession with form was superficial in the sense that it 
did not permit a vital interaction between words because îlilton’s 
private interests and character intruded upon the experience 
instead of allowing words to work out their proper relations 
naturally#
He exhibits a feeling for words, rather than a 
capacity for feeling through words; we are often 
in reading him, moved to comment that he is 
external or that he works from the outside# 2
1# F.R# &Q.D. Leavis, Lectures in America, pp. 37-38 
2# F.R# Leavis, The Cmmon Pursuit, p.^ 0
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In handling the language externally, Hilton was paving the
way for and forestalling the characteristic approach to language
represented by the eighteenth century practitioners# Milton’s
latinizing was a departure from the genuine sources of vitality
inherent in the English language# But this pernicious influence
moves further forward* It is manifest in Tennyson vhose interest
in the musicality of words is pursued irrespective of, or rather
at the expense of, a profound realization of their content*
"Tennyson descends from Spenser by way of Milton and Keats#" ^
To associate Hilton with Tennyson is to establish a line of
development along which a dissociation of sensibility is marked,
aid which calls for a counterbalancing movement to unification#
It is in Eliot that Leavis recognizes this counterbalance. In
this respect Leavis considers Mlton and Eliot two poles apart,
the recognition of the one cancels the other#
Eliot’s first lecture is a confirmation of Leavis’s
earlier pronouncements*
Milton’s images do not give this sense of particularity 
nor are the separate words developed in significance.
His language is, if one may use the term without 
disparagement artifical and conventional. 2
And if in his essay on ’The Het^hysical Poets’ Eliot attributes
to both [Hilton and Bryden ’the aggravation of the dissociation of
3
sensibility’, in this essay he views Milton’s influence as 
detrimental and perverse, whereas that of Dryden is healthier.
1. ibid, p.$6
2# T.S. Eliot, On Poetry and Poets, p.lljO
3. T.S# Eliot, Selected Essays, p. 288
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I have said elsewhere that the living English which 
was Shakespeare’s became split up into components one 
of which was exploited by Hilton and the other by 
Dryden , of the two I still think Dryden’s development 
the healthier because it was Dryden Wio preserved, so 
far as it was preserved at all, the tradition of 
conversational language in poetry and I might add that 
it seems to me easier to get back to healthy language 
from Dryden than it is to get back to it from Milton# 1
Again Eliot confirms Leavis*s view that Hilton’s use of
language is external*
A disadvantage of the rhetorical style appears to be 
that a dislocation takes place through the hypertrophy 
of the auditory imagination at the expense of the 
visual and tactile (which he attributes to Hilton’s 
blindness) so that the inner meaning is separated from 
the surface, and tends to become something occult or 
at least without effect upon the reader until fully 
understood# 2
It should be noted, however, that Eliot’s conniv^ce at
the meaning for the sake of sound is at odds witli his later
remark in The British Ac ad any Lecture that ’the music of verse
is strongest in poetry ^ riiich has a definite meaning expressed
3in the prop ere st words’ # In the same essay he recurs to that
division suggesting that Mlton’s achievement inheres in his
musical long periods and not in any significant ideas#
The peculiar feeling, almost a physical sensation 
of a breathless lei%), communicated by Milton’s long 
periods, and by his alone, is impossible.to procure 
from rhymed verse# Indeed this mastery is more conclusive 
evidence of his intellectual power, than his grasp of 
any ideas that he borrowed or ’invented’# U
This sense of contradiction incites Leavis to take issue 
with Eliot on the subject. Leavis’s intention as he proclaims 
it, is not to score points against Eliot, but to vindicate the 
critical function.
1# ibid, p. 1it2
2. ibid, p. Ili3 
3f ibid, p. 160 
li# ibid, p. 158
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It seems ^propriété to give a summary view of Eliot’s 
lecture to furnish a background, on which further discussion 
can be clearly pursued.
The British Acaieny lecture shows tliat Eliot ’retracts* 
on two main points. First he no longer holds Milton and Dryden 
exclusively responsible for bringing about the dissociation of 
sensibility and puts this responsibility onto a more general 
social plane related to the Civil War* Secondly he disavows 
responsibility for his earlier view that Hilton’s influence is 
much more pernicious than Dryden’s.
Apart from this Eliot reports that Milton’s style is
purely individual and untraditional because it draws on
foreign idioms and forms of expression (which he describes in
the same lecture as eccentric).
In Hilton there is always the maximal, never the 
minimal alteration of ordinary language. Every 
distortion of construction, the foreign idiom, the 
use of a word in a foreign way or with the meaning 
of a foreign word from which it is derived rather 
than the accepted meaning in English, every 
idiosyncrasy is a particular act of violence 
which Hiltoi^as been the first to conjmit. There 
is no cliche, no poetic diction in the derogatory 
sense of the word, but a perpetual sequence of 
original acts of lawlessness. 2
The question that comes readily to mind is whether this is a
form of praise or depreciation. The words ’distortion’,
’violence*, ’lawlessness’ convey an impression that is
opposed to the presumably laudatory connotations of
Z'
’originality’, ’absence of cliche* and ’poetic diction in the 
derogatory sense of the word’. There is an obvious contrailctioi
1. ibid, p. 153
2. ibid, p. 15U
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in terms here, an anomaly, that betrays a sense of uncertainty
and confusion on Eliot’s part. The last two sentences end. in
an anti-climax shattering the impression conveyed by the
preceding words. Ostensibly Eliot aims at preserving a
condemnation in a tortuous and ambiguous style. Yvor Winters
says that Eliot "can speak with equal firmness and dignity on
1
both sides of almost any question", but what is obvious here
is the lack of firmness and certainty, and one is induced to
believe with Leavis that there is a price to be paid for this
presumed expertness* that is, confusion. If Eliot is
offering these words as a form of praise his concluding
statements come to shatter that impression. Alluding to the
danger of sudden and rapid changes in language (implying
thereby the harmfulness of Milton’s practice) Eliot says;
We cannot in literature, any more than in the /’ /iy
rest of life^ live in a perpetual state of revolution* ^  i
If every generation of poets made it their task to ^
bring poetic diction up to date/ with the spoken u r /  , 1
language^  poetry would fail in one of its iirportiant ^  J
obligations. For poetry should help^ not only to
refine the language of the time, but to prevent it
from changing too rapidly; a development of language
at too great a speed would be a development in the
sense of a progressive deterioration* 2
If that is Eliot’s intention, it means that he has brought us
back, but in a confused and confusing way to his seasoned first
lecture. This ambiguous situation is apparently intended to
appease an English audience looking for a vindication of ïîilton*
This confusion is perpetuated in Eliot’s statement that
Milton’s poetry is purely poetic in the sense that it is at the
1. Quoted in Christopher Ricks, Milton’s Grand Style, Oxford, 
The Clarendon Press, 1964, pp.6-7
2. T.S. Eliot, op.cit, p. 160
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opposite extreme of a prose statonent,  ^ one is left
wondering whether this is meant to figure as a credit or a
debit in the poet’s account. The words that immediately follow
point to the commendatory aspect.
To say that the work of a poet is at the farthest 
possible raaove from prose would once have struck 
me as condemnatory; it now seems to me simply 
when we have to deal with a Ml ton, the precision 
of its peculiar greatness. 2
But towards the end of the lecture Eliot comes back to >diat he had said
in his Introductory essay to Johnson’s The Vanity of Human Wishes that
’to have the virtues of good prose is the first and minimum
requirment of good poetry,’^  and in consequence he goes back on his
earlier suggestion and settles down to a conviction that the study of
Milton’s poetry is more of a hindrance than a help in this respect.
In this manner he recapitulates, but in a distorted form, what he
had elegantly phrased in his first lecture.
Eliot further argues that Milton is bent on the vocal and the
verbal rather than on the visual and notional part of artistic
experience* He talks of Milton’s greatness in relation to what
he calls his ’sense of structure*. This lack of a sense of
■ 1
direction is viewed by Leavis as *a surrender of the critical function’.
Leavis*s arguments, in consideration of all this, run something 
as follows; A distinction should be dravzn between the music of the 
musician and the music of the poet for the forma? depends on the 
adept handling of musical instruments whereas the latter derives
1, ibid, p. ^Sh
2. ibid. pp. 15U-155
!
3* Samuel Johnson’s London and The Vanity of Human Wishes, mth an 
introductory essay by T.S. Eliot, London, p.12
4f F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p. 13
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essentially from words end words are by nature semantically 
significant* As Eliot himself admits, the music of these words 
is only realised when these words convey a certain meaning. This 
reflects adversely • as Leavis tends to think - on Milton. To 
say that in reading Paradise Lost our sense of sight is diminished 
and our sense of sound refined is to commit a fallacy because the 
words used by Milton ere intended for their musical effect, for 
their ’orotundity*, to adopt one of Leavis*s words, and not for 
any significant semantic purpose, and the Miltonic music produces 
in the reader a state of inertia and relaxation, which is opposed 
to the exercise of the critical function. Eliot’s opinion that
1
M l ton’s eloquence relieves the mind and facilitates declamation
means - as Leavis contends -• that he is virtually acquiescing in
principles >diich make his own achievement negligible •* Christopher
Ricks argues, against Leavis’s allegation that Hilton’s language
conduces to Inertia and relaxation, that Hilton’s style is dynamic 
2and energetic, and that Milton’s deviations from the normal run
of speech do not derive from an eccentric desire to be freakish,
but from the wish to admire the grandeur associated with the epic;
that is to be decorous and normal.
Mr Jolm Crowe Ransom has said that ’we should be so
much in favour of tragedy and irony as not to think
it good policy to require them in all our poems for 
fear we might bring then into bad fame’. In the 
same spirit, we might say that we should be so in 
favour of natural English, as not to require it in 
all our poems or throughout all our poems. 3
1. That part is excised from Eliot’s essay on Milton in
On Poetry and Poets, but is retained in the original Proceedings 
of The British Academy, Vol.XSmi, p.76
2. Christopher Ricks, Hilton’s Grand Style, London, Oxford,
The Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 31
3. ibid, p. 38
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Leavis questions Eliot’s proposition that Milton’s Imagery 
is vocal rather than visual indicating that the word ’image’ 
tends to encourage the notion that imagery is necessarily 
visual.  ^ Leavis’s point sounds sensible in view of the fact 
that the word ’image’ suggests the representation or imitation 
of something concrete in the external world or the visualization 
of a certain conception or notion.
Eliot makes allowances for KUton’s inconsistencies, as
pointed out by Samuel Johnson, on the assumption that the world
which i'iilton creates does not call for a consistent order. To
this tendency Leavis retorts postulating that these inconsistencies
are not confined only to a failure in visualization | "they affect
/ —
2
the poet’s grasp of his themes, conceptions and interests."
Leavis quotes these words from Eliots
The emphasis is on the sound not the vision, upon the 
word, not the idea, and in the end it is the unique 
versification that is the most certain sign of 
Milton’s intellectual mastership ... 3
and argues that if this verse creates a mood of relaxation, of 
indifference to ideas, it cannot simultaneously constitute ’a 
sign of intellectual mastership’* ^ Of Milton’s digressions 
in Paradise Lost, Leavis is highly critical. These digressions 
relate in Leavis’s mind to the mood of relaxation induced by Milton’s 
music. Hilton’s manipulation of so much extraneous matter is not 
mblematic of his achievement, but is symbolic of his failure to
1, F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, pp 16-17
2. F.R. Leavis, The Ccamon Pursuit, p.20
3* T.S. Eliot, op.cit, p. 157
4* F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p. 21
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concentrate on something significant on which our attention can 
be focussed#
Leavis ascribes the lack of coherence in Paradise Lost to 
the constant intrusion of Milton’s character upon the narrative in 
verse# He invokes professor VJaldock on the disjunction between 
Milton’s real interests and the denands made on him by the Genesis 
story# The development of the story deprives ïîilton of satisfying 
these interests (Professor Waldock identifies these interests with 
Milton’s personal desire to represent the myth in terms of Passion 
and Reason, and enumerates effort, combat, the life of the 
wayfaring Christian as highlighting Milton’s personal urge) and 
so what he wants to say is resisted by what the myth in itself 
communicates#
Leavis concludes that Milton failed to conceive Paradise 
Lost dramatically and as a whole, capable of absorbing and 
depersonalizing the relevant interests of his private life.
"He remains in the poem too much John Milton, declaiming, 
insisting, arguing and protesting#«
Leavis*s arguments have themselves been subject to close 
scrutiny by younger critics and have not been found in every ^ay 
satisfactory#
Christopher Ricks, for example, argues that though the subject
2of the epic is i^ blime, yet the style is colloquial and ordinary,
that Milton’s 1 at ini zings "are no more than completely normal
3seventeenth century English", that Milton, contrary to what Eliot
says, seeks to be original with the minimum rather than the
1
maximum of alteration#
1. F.R# Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p. 25 
2# Christopher Ricks, Milton’s Grand Style, pp. 37-38
3. ibid, p. 63 4# ibid, p# 58
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To Leavis*s charge that Milton’s style is declamatory and 
not dramatic Ricks replies that it is not alKays necessary to 
use a dramatic style, and that an expository or descriptive 
style VTill be in certain situations, more effective, Ricks 
shows that Leavis himself admits that in his critique of 
’The Vanity of Bman Wishes’ where he recognizes as great 
Johnson’s poetry of statement and e^ qsosition. On tliis point 
Ricks sounds convincing because Leavis seems to have coined the 
term ’constatation’ as opposed to ’realization’, to provide 
scope for non-dramatic but convincing pieces of poetry. In 
his critique of Wordsworth Leavis also admits that Wordsworth 
’has no dramatic gifts’, * but he achieves the inçiersonality 
Leavis favours in good literature.
Complementary to this view is the necessary recognition
of the inadequacy of human language as a medium of expressing
such a lofty subject. Paul J. Alpers says:
For Leavis, Hilton’s medium calls attention to 
itself in the bad social s^se, as if unwittingly 
to distract the reader from what it cannot do.
But if one looks at the beginning of this passage 
(the passage describing Eden) it is evident that 
Hilton is drawing attention to his medium in a 
quite different way • one that is fully compatible 
with alert intelligence and an e3q)loitation of all 
the resources of language. As the poet turns to 
describing Eden, the phrase "if art could tell" 
explicitly raises the question of whether the 
merely human slcills of poetry are sufficient to 
his task. 2
Thus Milton attenç)ts to match the reality of Eden by 
linguistic ’artifices’ hence the suggestion of magniloquence 
and even artificiality. ' The whole problem of Paradise Lost
1. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p. 172
2. Paul J, Alpers, "The Milton Controversy", Hyvard English Studies, 
/^ Twentieth Century Literatii^ e in Retrospect,Jl971, p. 273
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inheres in an effort to reconcile the siifplicity of the English 
Bible and the grandeur of the Greek epic.
The inadequacy of the human medium of expression naturally
evokes the personal element. Stanley Fish suggests that "our
own experience is part of the poem’s subject".^  Fish suggests
that part of Milton’s intention in Paradise lost
is to worry the reader, to unsettle him, to force him 
to doubt the correctness of his réponses, and to bring 
him to the realization that his inability to read the 
poem with any sense of confidence in his own perception 
is its focus. 2
Criticizing Arnold Stein’s contention "that Satan’s speeches
create a dreiaatic conflict between his immediate utterances
and the wider context of the epic," Fish says that such an
argument
... ignores the way the reader is dravm into the 
poem, not as an observer who coolly notes the 
interaction of patterns (this is the mode of 
Jonsonian comedy and masque) but as a participant 
whose mind is the locus of that interaction. 3
Vliat is interesting about these later critiques of Leavis’s 
attitude to I4ilton is not so much the fact of disagreement as the 
way in vhich this kind of disagreement harmonizes with Leavis’s 
Own grovïing insistence on the reader’s personal involvment in 
the work of literature in his later work. It is the IJliitehead, 
Collingwood, Polanyi side of Leavis that is capable of registering 
the force of these arguments brought against him.
1. Stanley Eugene Fish, Surprised by Sin» The Reader in Paradise Lost 
London, Macmillan, 19o7, p.3
2. ibid, p.U
3. ibid, pp. 10-11
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Eliot and Leavis* s Education and The University
Education and The University has a ^ecial significance since it
deals with a topic not just of particular interest to both Eliot and
Leavis, but one on -vdiich they referred favourably to, and quoted from
each other. In his essay titled "The Christian Conception of
Education" Eliot says:
I have read an admirable article by Dr Leavis which 
speared some months ago in Scrutiny in \Aiich he makes 
very sensible suggestions for the improvauent of the 
English Tripos. In this article he observes "the 
probloji of producing the educated man; the man of humane 
culture who is equipped to be intelligent and responsible 
about the problems of contemporary civilization , 
becomes that of realizing the idea of a University in 
practical dispositions ^propriété to the modern world".
And he quotes a sentence by Mr Brooks Otis, an American 
writer, ’It is an urgently necessary work to explore the 
means of bringing the various kinds of specialist 
knowledge and training into effective relation with 
informed general Intelligence, humane culture, social 
conscience and political will*, one agrees. 1
But Eliot’ 8 agreement is immediately qualified by questioning
the whole set-up of humane and liberal education - a questioning
that arises from a deep-seated belief in the indispensable
function of Christianity in moulding the concept of education:
But to such questions as ’why should we want humane 
culture ? idiy is one conception of humane culture 
better than another Î bhat is the sanction for your 
conception of social conscience or of political will 
as against that, for instance, now dominant in Germany ?
I do not think that the humanist can give a satisfactory 
ans^ rer* 2
This prompts Eliot to question the adequacy of both the 
humanism of Irving Babbitt and that of Leavis:
1. Malvern 1941, The Life of The Chwch and The (^ der of Society 
being the proceedings of the Archbishop of York’s ConferenceT 
London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1941, p. 208
2# ibid. p. 208
m  184 —
if a secular or non-religious humanism can 
provide an adequate foundation for general education 
such that from our point of view it requires only to 
be supplemented by a religious instruction, then we 
not only have a common ground with the wiser, though 
smaller body of non-Christian educational theorists, 
but we could afford to leave to the disciples of 
Irving Babbitt in America and such groups as Dr Leavis 
and his friends in this country, the elaboration and 
Implementing of policies. 1
This commentary gives rise to Leavis* s qualifications in 
Education and The University.
Dissociating himself from the Humanism of Irving Babbitt,
Leavis draws on Eliot’s references to him.
It occurred to me to make the dissociation because 
î'ïr T.S. Eliot, referring at the Malvern Conference 
(in a complementary way) to an essay of mine, the 
substance of Wiich is included in this book, used 
the word ’humanist’ in commenting on the approach 
(the acconpanying mention of Irving Babbitt made 
the bracketing force of the word plain) 2
The difference between Leavis and Babbitt, as Leavis sees 
it, is that Leavis deals with practical methods and concrete 
questions, whereas Babbitt is concerned with theories and doctrines.
Leavis uses one adjective ’humanist’ to qualify both literary 
criticism and education; thereby combining literature and culture 
in a wider human spectrum.
Prescribing liberal education as a remedy for the ills of
modem civilization, a liberal education that does not
inculcate any religious doctrine or frame, Leavis writes:
The point is that, whatever else may be necessary, 
there must in any case be, to meet the present crisis 
of civilization, a liberal education that doesn’t 
start with a doctrinal frame, and is not directed at 
Inculcating one. The Christian comments that the
1$ ibid, pp. 205-206
2. F.R. Leavis, Education and The University, p.l?
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culture represented by such an education is incomplete 
and for him^ perhaps, the frame will always be there.
And when he says that the cultural tradition we belong 
to and must aim to preserve is in very important senses 
Christian he commands assent. But this is the age not 
of Dante or of Herbert, but of T.S. Eliot, and Eliot’s 
genius which is of the kind that makes a poet profoundly 
representative, runs to that marvellous creative 
originality in the use of language, because he cannot, 
for the ordering of his experience in poetry of directly 
religious pre-occupation, make anything like that direct 
Use of a received doctrinal frame or conceptual apparatus, 
ikjhich for Dante or Herbert was natural or inevitable. 1
And in his reappraisal of Eliot’s later poetry, which he reprints
in this book to consolidate this argument, Leavis observes in a
passage I have already quoted that the poetry "makes its e3ç>lorations
into the concrete actualities of experience below the conceptual
currency into the life that must be the raison d’etre of any frame".^
Leavis’s concern with life  as something wider and more
significant than any doctrinal frame has behind it  the Laurentian
plea for "spontaneity and fullness of life,"  ^ a life that is free
from inhibitions and moral taboos whidi Lawrence takes as a
prerequisite for a healthy system of education.
But to give the subject more attention one notices that Leavis’s
Hass Civilization and Minority Culture appeared in 1930; Culture and
Environment (about which William lJalsi^ ;on information from Denys
Thaupcon, tells us that ’apart from the general design, the ideas
are exclusively Leavis* s’  ^ speared in 1933, and Education and The
University began as a series of essays in Scrutiny and took final
fom in 1943*
1. ibid, p. 20
2. ibid, p. 104
3. D.H, Lawrence, Psychoanalysis and The Unconscious, p.1l6 
4* yjilllam Walsh, A Human Idiom, London, Chat to and Windus,
1964, p.141
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Eliot on the other hand started publishing his essays on 
culture in The New English Weekly and the New ihpjish Revj.ew 
in 1945 (though his concern with culture goes back to the early 
days of The Criterion). These essays were meant to form the 
material of his Notes Towards the Definition of Culture published 
in 1948» His views on education were adequately expressed in 
The Aims of Education, a series of lectures delivered at the 
University of Chicago in 1950.
While Eliot is preoccupied with general issues of education
%
and describes himself as ’a dabbler in semantics and semasiology* 
Leavis singles out one concrete issue, the teaching of literature 
at a certain level; that is, the University. He becomes even 
more particular when he defines the method of that teaching in 
terms of practical analysis and ai^ preciation of certain works of 
art. This practical analysis is carried out along lines suggested 
by I.A, Richards. In his definition of culture Eliot is engaged 
in identifying the terra in relation to the individual, the family 
and society on one hand, the region, politics and religion on the 
other. Leavis* s Culture and Environment has for its major theme 
the loss of the organic community - a community that was essentially 
rural and was later the grist of the industrial mill. Here it may 
be in place to distinguish Eliot’s use of the word ’organic’ from 
that of Leavis. By ’organic* Eliot means the inter-relation 
between the individual, the family and society on one hand, and 
the different strata of society on the other (Eliot’s society is 
fundamentally hierarchical):
1. T.S. Eliot, To Criticize The Critic, London, Faber and Faber, 
1905, p. cj
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• • • I discuss what seem to me to be three important 
conditions for culture. The first of these is 
organic (not merely planned but growing) structure, 
such as will foster the hereditary transmission of 
culture within a culture; and this requires the 
persistence of social classes. 1
And l&trr he says;
We only mean that the culture of the individual cannot 
be isolated from that of the gro\p, and that the 
culture of the group cannot be abstracted from that of 
the whole society; and that our notion of ’perfection* 
must take all tliree senses of ’ culture* into account 
at once. 2
In Leavis the word ’organic* means the latent bond enbracing 
an essentially homogeneous rural community.
Eliot cannot think of education without associating it
with Christianity; and he does the same with regard to cultures
"The culture of Europe, such as it is, is a Christian culture".^
Again he sayss
It is in Christianity that our arts have developed; 
it is in Christianity that the laws of Europe have 
until recently been rooted. It is against a 
background of Christianity that all our thought has 
significance. 4
Eliot looks unfavourably upon liberal education and the 
teaching of English literature, or more Epecifically ’the 
literature of one’s own language*;^  Leavis takes the opposite 
line of thought advocating liberal education and focussing his 
attention on English literature.
1. T.S. liiot. Notes Towards The Definition of Culture, London, 
Faber and Faber, 1948, reprint, 1961, p. 15
2. ibid, p. 24
3. T.S. Eliot, To Criticize The Critic, p. 160
4. T.S. Eliot, op.cit, p. 122
5. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p. 5l2
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For Eliot the two cornerstones of tradition are; literature 
and Christianity; for Leavis it is the English language alone 
which is the m^ibol of ’traditional vdsdom’ Jbr the English 
speaking peoples,
Leavis keeps on quoting Eliot’s dictum that it is the 
vitality of the past that enriches the life of the present and 
that it is in the present that the past lives, and the past is 
alive in so far as it is alive for us#  ^ To repudiate the 
present and reject the teaching of contemporary English 
literature as Eliot does is to make nonsense of his oim theory 
of tradition. He hankers after the remote past with Greek 
and Latin as his supreme ideal, and hardly reckons with modern 
English literature, and when he does he looks to the classics 
and French literature as a model#
Leavis*s preoccupation with modern English literature 
viewed from the point of view of tradition may also be 
considered defective. It is true that he is aware of the
presentness of the past and that he studies modern English 
literature as a manifestation of both the past and the present, 
but Leavis’s identification of tradition with the English language 
will restrict tradition to the span of history covered by "modern 
English"; that is from the England of Shakespeare and Buryan to 
the modem age. This will seriously restrict and narrow the 
range of tradition. Leavis's consciousness of the present force of 
tradition, however, surely might be combined with Eliot’s insistence 
on a literary past going back to the Greeks.
1. cf the early part of this chjqjter.
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Leavis’s "i^ proaches to T.S. Eliot"
Reviewing B.Rajan’s T.S. Eliot; A Study of his Writings 
by Several Hands, Leavis recognizes his indebtedness to Eliot 
using words that are partly repeated and partly echoed in his 
later essay on"Eliot as Critic." ^
In this review Leavis is particularly keen to recall the 
painstaking efforts he has made to rehabilitate Eliot into the 
English tradition. His tone is slightly impassioned and 
egotistic, but since it touches on personal themes and 
Influences the reader may find tliis forgivable. let Leavis*s 
recollection of literary history is questionable. In a statement 
tdiich he later quotes in his "Retrospect to New Bearings",
Leavis sayss
When in 1929 an innocent young editor printed an 
article of mine on Mr Eliot* s criticism in 
The Cambridge Review (a reply to a contemptuous 
dismissal of him by a Cambridge’English don* in 
Mr Deanond McCarthy’s Life and Letters) he very 
soon had cause to realize that he had committed a 
scandalous iirç>ropriety, and I mj^ 'self was left in 
no doubt as to the unforgivableness of my offence.
And when, in 1932, a book of mine came out that 
made the study of Mr Eliot the centre of an attempt 
to define the distinctive aspects of significant 
contemporary poetry, so much worse than imprudent 
was it found to be that the advanced academic 
intellectual of the day declined (or so the gloating 
whisper ran) to have anything to do with it, and 
The Cambridge Review could find no reviewer for it in 
Cambridge. I remember, too, vith some amusement, 
the embarrassed notes I received from correct friends 
who felt that some form of congratulation on the 
Êppearance of a book had to be gone tlirough, but 
knew also that the offence was rank, disastrous and 
unpardonable. Yet the matter of tiiat offensive 
book is seen, in Dr Raj an’s symposiu^to be now
1. F.R. Leavis, "Approaches to T.S. Eliot, Scrutiny, vol.XV, 
no.l, December 1947, p. 58
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’common form’. How was it done 7 ^
It must be noted first that Leavis’s article "A Reply to The 
Condescending" was a reply not to a contemptuous dismissal of 
Eliot by a Cambridge ’English don* and not in Mr Desmond 
McCarthy’s Life and Letters. A search in Life and Letters 
volumes 1 and 2, 1928-1929, reveals no plausible candidates 
and only favourable mention of Eliot.
Leavis’s reply was to an anonymous review - not at all 
contenç)tuous - of Eliot’s For Lancelot Andrewes in 
The New Statesman for December 29, 1928.
I have already said that Leavis’s reply was to what he 
considers a censorious review reproaching Eliot for his 
dogmatism and intellectuality.
Leavis has ostensibly built his reply on the following
words from the anonymous review;
Mr Eliot’s reputation among the young is due to two 
r facts; that, of those men who practise and criticize
the more recent fashions in literature, he has some 
acquaintance with the past, an acquaintance that 
strikes with awe the young men whose readings begin 
with the Edwardians; that he holds very distinct 
and reasonable dogmatic opinions, and evidently 
writes from his mind rather than from his ’dark 
inwards’ or the red pavilion of his heart. k
It is obvious that Leavis’s reading of these words to 
mean simply that Eliot is censured for being a writer of ^ fashions 
and for his dogmatism and dry intellectuality is a misrepresentation, 
rather than a misreading of the words; his practice of ’recent
1. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p. 58
2. "For Mr T.S. Eliot; For Lancelot Andrewes", Hew Statesman, 
December 29, 1928, pp. 387-388
3# cf. p.4 of this chapter.
4. op.cit, p. 387
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fashions* is followed by his acquaintance with the past, his 
dogmatic opinions are qualified as being distinct and 
reasonable, his writing from the mind is opposed to ’the dark 
inwards*.
Furthermore these words are taken out of context and Leavis
is obviously building on the harder part of the review, neglecting
the ’brighter* aspect which constitutes the major part of the
review. Take for instance these remarks on Eliot’s essays on
Babbitt, Bradley and Kachiavellij
Thoæ on Bradley, Babbitt Kachlavelli are admirable 
academic exposition in jq^ucious praise or reasoned 
blame of the philosophies discussed. The essay on 
I'iachiavelli is a brilliant piece of work ... Mr Eliot’s 
calm restatement of what Machiavelli said and meant is 
succinct, clear and capable. 1
And again:
The essay on Andrewes is a noble panegyric of a much 
neglected prose writer.
The essays that showier Eliot’s critical taste at 
its best are those on Crashaw, too brief a note, and 
on Baudelaire. 2
One may believe Leavis’s story about his article in 
The Cambridge Review , and the adverse climate of opinion then 
prevalent in Cambridge, but one has also to reckon with such 
established facts as the invitation extended to Eliot by 
Cambridge, an invitation that fructified in The Clark Lectures 
in 1926; and with I.A. Richards’ s Principles of Literary Criticism 
published in 1924, with its appendix on ’the poetry of T.S. Eliot’.^
1. ibid, p. 387
2. ibid
3# I.A. Richards, Principles of Tdterary Criticism, London, 
Routledge and Began Paul, 1924; reprint 1970, pp. 231-235
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George Watson argues that there is ample evidence testifying
to Eliot’s widespread acceptance before Leavis*s publication 
1
on Eliot, Leavis’s ’Approaches to T.S. Eliot’, however,
defines the general nature of Eliot’s influence on Leavis, and
suggests that it inheres in the intelligent analysis of works
of art and the consideration of works of literature primarily
as works of literature. Yet the recognition of Eliot’s
prestige as a critic is coupled vjith a demonstration of his
limitations - limitations that began with Eliot’s conversion
and made his dealings with the relation between literature and life
relatively defective compared to the ’sure rightness’ of
D.H. Lai^ ence. Leavis’s appraisal of Eliot from now on is most
decidedly made with reference to Lawrence. Leavis had already
eubarked on a series of essays in Scrutiny on Lawrence as a
novelist - a series of essays that forms the substance of his
later book D.H. Lawrence: Novelist. It is in Lawrence that he
finds a fulfilment of that intimate and indissoluble relation
of literature to life as opposed to Eliot’s ’purity of interest 
2
in literature, and if Leavis uses Eliot’s ’objective
3correlative’ as a critical instrument in The Great Tradition,
he more Importantly states, in the same book, that "Lawrence
iiin the English language is the great genius of his time."
1. George Watson ’The Triumph of T.S. Eliot, The Critical Quarterly, 
Vol.7, 1965, pp. 328-337
2. T.S. Eliot, On Poetry and Poets, p. 191
3. F.R. Leavis, The Great Tradition , pp. 79-174
4. ibid, p. 23
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Leavis*s Criticism of Eliot’s Later Poetry
Life as Lawrence, Whitehead, Collingwood and Polanyi see
it is ’what we have to live by’ # This is the measuring rod
that Leavis ^plies to the later poetry of Eliot, and in view
of which he assigns greater value and more maturity to the
later as opposed to the earlier poetry* It also accounts for
the tempering of his enthusiasm for The Waste Land in favour
of Four Quartets* The latt^ - as Leavis observes T "are
1
relevant to the stresses of our time", a judgment which
1 ■ #
Leavis pronounces with Lawrence’s influence at the back of
his mind, because he follows it by saying*
To him, in fact, might be edited the tribute 
that he once paid to that very different genius;
D.H, Lawrence; he pre-eminently has stood for  ^
the ^irit in these brutal and discouraging years.
And idien he to the same topic in English Literature in
our Time and The University he devotes a full chapter to Four
Quartets titled ’Why Four Quartets matters in a Technologico-
3
Benthamite Aige’, which is vritten, as the chapter on Lawrence 
argues, with Laurentian criteria in mind#
L-lfe, as Lawrence, Lhitehead, Collingwood and Polanyi, and 
with them Leavis, conceive it, is individual. This is an added 
reason for Leavis’s admiration for Four Quartets The experience 
which ’East Coker* offers is personal and even autobiographical, 
and herein lies the right of the individual as a manifestation 
of life to e:<press himself. But the question of expression 
brings in the importance of art, for this expression to be
1. F.R, Leavis "Eliot's Later Poetry", Scrutiny, Vol.XI, no.l^ fp. 71
2. ibid, p.71
, ^
3. F.R. Leavis, Ihglish literature in our Time and The Univerêity, 
. pp. 109-132.
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impressive and persuasive has "got to be something more than 
1merely personal" , to adopt Leavis*s words in this context.
Hence the question of impersonality arises. To clarify this
general proposition Leavis*s criticism of Eliot’s later poetry 
must be dealt with in some detail.-
In his review of "Collected Poems by T.S. Eliot", a review 
that Leavis looks upon as * ex^aordinarily interesting and 
penetrating, and pre-eminently the note on Eliot to send people to’,' 
Harding draws a contrast between the earlier and later poetry. In 
the earlier poetry he notices that the tone of protest is 
pervasive. The poet and the reader join hands in hurling their 
protest against a general state of affairs. The later poetry is 
more mature in the sense that it entails a better understanding and 
a fuller realization of experience in consequence of which the 
individual becomes humbler and more submissive. To say that the 
tone of the later poetry is submissive does not mean that it is 
depressed since an "extraordinary toughness and resilience
3
underlie it". This qualification is essential because the 
tone of protest that gives way to resignation does not mean that 
the poet has bettered his conditions, but rather reconciled 
himself to suffering.
The other element in the later poetry to which Harding 
draws attention is the personal strain which distinguishes it 
from the earlier impersonal poetry. This personal strain is 
of capital importance as it relates Eliot to the livingness of
1. ibid, p. 122
2. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p. 60 (footnote)
3^«W. Harding "Collected Poems by T.S. Eliot, 1909-1935 Scrutiny 
Vol.7, no.2, September 1936, p. 173
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e^ qperience which Leavis discerns in the writings of Lai^ ence
as in those of l&itehead, Collingwood and Polanyi* It speaks
for an immediacy of experience highly desiderated by Leavis,
and seen at work in Lawrence, Blake and Dickens*
Paradoxically enough this personal strain goes with *a
greater maturity* as Harding puts it, or what Leavis calls
* an impersonality difficult of attainment* .
The most revealing point that Harding makes is that the
later poetry constitutes a remarkable achievement in "the
creation of concepts",^  a pVirase that has been frequently
repeated by Leavis. The phrase roughly means, the skilful
manipulation of ideas, in suggestive and convincing words. To
harness words to the service of a personal experience pregnantly
conveyed is, in Harding's vimv, the greatest of linguistic 
2achievements.
This achievement induces Leavis to take up Eliot's
defence in a letter to The Times Literary Supplement* The
letter is a reply to an adverse and sarcastic review of
Fast Coker. In an article sardonically entitled
"Mr T.S. Eliot’s confession *.& poem of Humility - And Funeral"
the anonymous reviewer acidly observes*
The poets of the nineties wanted to purify poetry of 
all that was not poetry. lir  Eliot's aim seems to 
purify poetry of all that is poetry. That is not 
unfair statement. He has accepted as a dogma something 
D.H. Lawrence had said about the need for poetry to be 
bare and stark. It must suit the barren futile 
conditions and the misdirected purposes of our 
prematurely afflicated century - poetry Mr Eliot has 
said "with nothing poetic about it" - poetry so 
transparent that we should not see the poetry. In
1. ibid, p. 174
2. ibid, p. 175
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reading it we should be intent on what the
poetry points out and not on the poetry# 1
Le avis assumes a sharply critical attitude to this
review# He denies that the poem is * fashionable* indicating
that it relates directly and logically to its predecessors#
"If East Coker were an experiment on unprecedented lines your
reviei^ jer would have had some excuse# But the work of a decade
2
and a half has led directly up to it# This remark is intended 
to establish the proper coherent relations within the body of 
Eliot*s poetry and vindicate its right to figure in the canon of 
important English verse.
The crucial issue that Leavis raises in this connection is 
that of impersonality and the possibility of its emergence 
from a directly personal experience as the body of *East Coker* 
shows# This impersonality is attained tî-irough Eliot* s adept 
handling of language and in this respect Leavis is tacitly 
echoing Harding*s view of Eliot*s ‘linguistic achievement or 
what Eliot calls his
intolerable wrestle 
with words and meanings#
In this ezcploration of personal experience Eliot is betrayed
and eluded by words; a state which reflects the treacheries of
3 h .personal experience, hence "the spiritual exercise" whicli
Leavis imputes to the poem# This spiritual exercise foreshadows
1# "Hr T.S# idiot*s Confession poem of Humility - Mid Funeral"
T.L.S., Beptember lU, 19U0, p. hl2
2# F.R# Leavis ‘Letter to T.L.S., September 21, 1?U0, p. U83
3# F,R, Leavis, "East Coker", Cambridge Review, February 21, 19Ul, P.2o9
U# ibid, p. 268
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*the technique for sincerity* postulated in Leavis*s later
essay on that poetry# To place Fast Coker in the body of
Eliot* 8 poetry Leavis contrasts it with Burnt Norton on one
hand and The Journey of The Kpgi on the other; the first relates
it to Four Quartets of which it is part and the second to the
earlier group of poems of widLch it makes a whole# Leavis
disagrees with Harding on the high rank he accords Burnt Norton,
and "is more conscious of a procédé at work than of any total
effect attained*" ^
Leavis argues that J:ast Coker lacks the positive
orientation and tidiness of construction exhibited in
Ash-X-ednesday and Marina* It hardly provides a new start.
Compared with The Journey of The Magi it lacks dramatic quality,
2
and shows a notable looseness of construction*
Leavis*s longer critique of Eliot*s later poetry bears
strong evidence to the presence of a social and human morality
deducible from the writings of Lawrence and Whitehead; a morality
that goes beyond and beneath Eliot’s Christianity* Leavis* s most
articulate statement on the subject is given in the follovdng words:
The preoccupation is with establishing from among 
the illusions, evanescences and unrealities of life 
in time, an apprehension of an assured realitjv a 
reality, that, though necessarily ^prehended in 
time, is not of it. 3
Leavis discerns this transcendental view of reality in Karina
a, poem for which Leavis*s admiration does not wither and to which
he later refers as his favourite* Evoking the Shakespearean
1. ibid. p. 268
2# ibid, p. 270
3# F.R# Leavis, *T*S* Eliot*s Later Poetry*, Scrutiny, Vol.Xl
no#l. Summer 19^ 2, p# 6l
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heroine, Eliot portrays the father’s sense of dismay at the loss
of the daughter and the consequent sense of victory over death
following upon her reappearance* In passing Leavis points out
that the vjord ’grace’ is the only religious term that occurs
in this poæü and even that word can be interpreted equivocally*
This paves the way for his assertion that the later poetry can
be appreciated without necessarily sharing the Christian
beliefs on which it draws* Again Leavis* s main point of
ei3Ç)hasis is that the poetry secures its effects not by direct
stateirients but by Implication and suggestion and by the
evocation of subtle shades of meaning. The Coriolan Poems
depict the deficiencies of public life and politics. They
rely for their effect on satire and shifts of tone*
As Leavis moves on to his criticism of Burnt Norton,
however, one becomes conscious of a sense of contradiction.
In his review of East Coker he had already said
Burnt Lor ton, as a matter of fact, doesn’t seem to 
me as successful as Harding’s account implies*
Coming as the poem did^  (Leavis reports), at such 
an interval after the Ariel group^ it encouraged 
conclusions regarding the exhausting nature of the 
effort and conditions represented by Ash-wednesday ' 
and Marina, which as poems^ are decided and wonderful 
successes. Could success of that kind be indefinitely 
repeated or the attempt ? Every attempt a wholly 
new start Î 1 , -
Now he describes Burnt Nortoniin the following terms:
Burnt Norton has the effect of being in a special 
sense a^ew start I It is as if the poet were 
conducting a radical inquiry into the nature and 
methods of his exploration. The poem is as purely 
and essentially a poem as anything else of Mr Eliot’s/ 
but it seems to me to be the equivalent in poetry of 
a philosophical work, to do by strictly poetical means 
the business of an epistemological and metaphysical inquiry.
1. F*R. Leavis, op.cit, p.
F.a. Leavis, "T.S. Eliot’s Later Poetry" . Scrutiny.
.a.n,
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In this context he seems to forget his earlier disagrement with 
Harding on the value of the poem and to acquiesce in his verdict 
’Harding, in the illuminating commentary referred to above, 
registers this character in his own way idien he speaks of the-^  
poem as being concerned with the creation of concepts.’ ^
V
He further blurs the distinctions he had already drawn
between "precede" and "total effect" - a distinction which
purports to a differentiation between a mechanical and an
organic mode of composition:
The general propositions of the first ten lines have, 
by the time we have read the rest of the passage, 
become clearly ptjrt of a procédé and a total effect 
that belong to poetry, and not to the order of 
abstraction or discursive prose. 2
Leavis’s criticism is seen at its best when he takes up
a passage and analyses it. He quotes a passage from
Burnt Norton containing these lines:
Footfalls echo in the memory 
Down the passage which we did not take 
Towards the door we have never opened 
Into the rose-garden.
Leavis comments:
"Footfalls echo" is a fact, and ’memory’ becomes the 
’passage’ which though we did not take it, is thus 
itself a present fact. Negative and positive aspects 
of reality are skilfully fused. The ’footfalls’ that 
echo in the "memory" are the assured reality, the 
passage which we did not take and the door we have 
mver opened are its negative elements, and thé totality 
of negatives and positives forms a complex reality.
Carrying tliis analysis further Leavis quotes these lines:
But to i^at purpose
Disturbing the dust on a bowl of rose-leaves 
I do not know
On the separation of this last sentence from what preceded it 
Leavis comments:
1. ibid,
2. ibid, p.62
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••• in its sudden drop to another plane, to a 
distancing comment (it) brings out by contrast 
the immediacy of what goes before, while at the 
same time contributing directly to the sensuous 
presentness of the whole - the words that echo 
thus disturb in front of us ’the dust on a bowl of 
rose-leaves (dust and rose-leaves together evoke 
one of the co-presences of opposing associations 
vAiich seem to replace words by immediate sensation 
and the whole sentence, of course, relates back 
with various subtleties of significance to the 
rose-garden, and time of the opening paragraph. 1
Contrasted with Fast Coker and Burnt Norton, The Dry Salvages 
has neither the personal historical touches of the former nor the 
at struct qualities of the latter. It is concerned with dissolving 
the habitKireated reality of routine experience and commonsense,
' X -  2with their protective (and constructive) anaesthesias", to 
borrow Leavis*s words in this connection.
Leavis ends his critique by making the most important point
in the whole argument namely thai the poetry can be enjoyed
7
without reference to any specific doctrinal frame; ^
Eliot is knom as professing Anglo-Catholjcism and 
classicism, but his poetry is remarkable for the 
extraordinary re sources,penetration and stamina 
with which it makes its explorations into the concrete 
actualities of experience below the conceptual currency 
into life that must be the raison d’etre of any frame 
wiiile there is life at all. 3
This is the Judgment which brings in the human morality 
of Lawrence and V«hitehe^.
But engagement with life as humane and individual is also 
the major theme underlying Leavis’s later criticism of Eliot.
1. ibid, p .66
2, ibid, p. 08 
3t ibid, p. 71
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Leavis* s Later Criticism of Eliot
This final section will piece together Leavis* s views on 
Eliot the dramatist and the critic. Right from the start it 
should be said that Leavis* s remarks on the dramatic and later 
critical writings of Eliot are adverse and negative, because he 
thinks that Eliot’s real achievement inheres In his poetry.
The plays, he feels, lack the sense of sincerity and engagement
with life that characterizes the poetry. He attributes this
1failure to Eliot’s awareness of ’the social world’, a phrase 
which he interprets in terms of the Newtonian and Lockean ethos 
where the individual is treated ’mathematically and quantitatively’. 
In a passage which relates Blake to Dickens and Lawrence, Leavis 
juxt€Ç)oses Blake’s achievement with the growing anphasis on the 
social;
His (Blake’s) creative achievement was to redeem the 
English language for the expression of an intensely 
individual sensibility; by which I mean that he 
reversed what happened when the Augustan age set in 
and the emphasis came to be laid heavily on the social; 
a man is a social being, yes, he inescapably is; but, 
as the movement and life of Blake* s finest lyrics insist 
inplicitly with such power, a man is an individual and 
his individuality is his reality. And with his eye on 
Locke and Newton^ Blake points to the continuity running 
from the creativeness of the artist, and insists that 
life, while it is life, is of its very nature creative. 2
Leavis relates Eliot - whose view is that poetry should have 
the virtues of good prose - to this social world against which 
Blake reacts.
1. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and The University 
p. 102 and Lectures in America, p.U0
2. ibld.pjp. 105 - /é 6
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And the poetry of the prose virtues 1^  general Ipsists 
that what (as Eliot puts it) the poet has to say must 
be suited to a mode that implies overtly social and 
’civilized presentation’^  s/p. experience that doesn’t 
lend Itself to such treatment is implicitly told that 
it doesn’t exist, or is of no consequence. 1
Some pages earlier he has already told us that
whatever his own delusions about the possibility of a 
triumphant alliance between his creative genius and his 
weakness for the social world, he can hardly have imagined 
a discussible modern poet producing, or trying to produce, 
a mode analogous to Marvell’s ’urbanity’ or ’wit’. 2
To leavis’8 mind the plays are associated with ’the social -^jorld’.
"The plays belong to the social world, Wiere,as I have said, his genius
didn’t function; their unconscious falsity makes them repellent".
Leavis attributes this failure to the ethos of manners, to EHot’s
social conformity rather than the ability to be himself. This
criticism is ^plied to Eliot’s view of Eanilet. In his essay
on Hamlet Eliot says:
Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an motion which is 
inexpressible because it is in excess of the facts as 
tliey ^ pear. And the supposed identity of Hamlet 
with his author is genuine to this point: that Hamlet’s
bafflment at the absence of objective equivalent to 
his feelings is a prolongation of the bafflment of his 
creator in the face of his artistic problem. Harslet 
is up against the difficulty that his disgust is 
occasioned by his mother, but that his mother is not an 
adequate equivalent for it; his disgust envelops and 
exceeds her. It is thus a feeling \diich he cannot 
understand; he cannot objectify it, and it therefore 
rmains to poison life and obstruct action. 3
Leavis postulates that this judgment reflects back, not on
Shaltespeare and Hamlet, but on Eliot and Harry in The Farrdly Reunion*
Our sense that Eliot’s essay tells us more about Eliot 
than about Shake^eare’s Hamlet finds a striking, if 
hardly necessary confirmation in Eliot’s own Family
1, ibid>yt7./<?
2, ibid, p. 102
3, T.S, Eliot, Selected Essays, p.1^ 2
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Reunion. It is remarkable how much of his account of 
the artistic problem facing Shakespeare seems to 
describe his own problem in writing that play. 1
Censuring Eliot for reducing Hamlet to a mere feeling of
disgust endured by the hero towards his mother, and for equating
the play with what the producer can do with ’the external facts’,
an approach that empties the play of its inherently rich poetic
qualities, Leavis says that it is Harry's emotion that is
baffling and inexpressible because it is Eliot himself who does not
understand the nature of his hero, and hence fails to objectify
it. It is this lack of comprehension that leaves the emotion of
the hero to poison life and obstruct action."
John Peter similarly argues that in The Family Reunion, an
emotion, personal in origin, is infelicitously transferred to a
fictitious setting. The personal experience exhibits itself in
the feelirig of revulsion voiced by Harry, but this revulsion is
hardly given a satisfactory point of emphasis in the text. To
render Harry’s sense of despair plausible Eliot should have
intensified the suggestions giving rise to guilt. Harry’s
obsessive mood of de^air can only be justified by qualms of
conscience over the ’murder* of his vife, but the act of murder is
strangely and consistently glossed over. On the other hand to
ascribe this sense of loss to hereditary reasons is to make Harry
m  irresponsible lunatic:
To attribute Harry’s despair to his neurosis is 
seriously to risk branding him as an irresponsible 
ps’ûJpBath; and in more concrete terms, it is also 
to locate a prime mover dn the play - guilt • outside 
the compass ofH^ he facts as they are presented ' , 
the plot. 2
1. F.R. Leavis, Anna Karenina and other Essays, London,
Chatto and hindus, 19o7, p. 182
2. Joim Peter "The Family Reunion", Scrutiny , Vol.lVl, no.3, 
September 19b9, p. 229
•• 20U •
Given Ms present role Harry is reduced to a mere
mouthpiece articulating statements which the language of the
play does not corroborate. They are *in excess of the facts'
a: they appear, to use Eliot's words against his ovm hero.
t
If the objective correlative is "precisely what is 
deficient in Hamlet4 it is^ equally precisely.what 
is deficient in The Family Reunion. Two forces 
are pulling in opposite directions. The requirement 
^of the total t h e m ^ o n o n e  side, demands that the 
iTiurder should be as nebulous as possibl^andfon the 
other.the ferment of the personal experience Tequires 
the murder to be a very real and substantial 
o^bjective correlative: It cannot however^ be botb^ Tar.ctr
in effect Harry becomes (what Elhot would have ud 
believe Hamlet becomes) no more than a mouthpiece for 
obsession, disturbing si.d impairing the play in which 
he appears. 1
Another major defect which John Peter notices in the play is 
the lack of impersonality • the criterion by vjhich Leavis 
distinguishes Eliot elsewhere end finds absent from this play. 
Martin Tumell's criticism stresses this point and places 
particular emphasis on the abstract and unconvincing
p
moralizing of the play.
In this context it is opportune to recall one of Leavis's
persistent reproaches against Eliot, namely that he blames
Lavrrence for 'sexual morbidity and insensitivity to ordinary
social morality*. Leavis maî:es these charges reflect back on 
3
Eliot himself and keeps on reminding us that it is Eliot's 
preoccupation with sex that evokes our revulsion and disgust, and 
that it is his characters idio are indifferent to ordinary social 
and moral codes. Katharine Worth stresses this point saying :
1. ibid, p.. 230
2. Martin Turnell "The Faiaily Reunion", Scrutiny, Vol.Vlll, 
no.l, June 1939, pp. 108-llL.
r
3. F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence: Novell sty London, Penguin Books, 
p.&k and Anna Karenina, p. 163
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It is understandable that he, v%o criticized 
D.H. Lavirence's people for the)i)&isensibility 
to ordinary social moralité, should find the 
prominence of this trait in his own heroes an 
embarrassment. For their indifference to 
ordinary social morality is a striking feature 
of their behaviourj in sexual matters especially, 
they are airily amoral. Even the gentle Celia 
feels no qualms of conscience over her adultery 
Xfith Edward, while iigatha, an eminently ruthless 
being, glories in her special relation with 
Hariy/de scribed by Eliot himself as ambiguous, which 
is the fruit of her liaison with his father. 1
Related to this point is Leavis*s discussion of The 
2
Cocktail Party. This discussion draws on D.W. Harding's 
analysis of that play and is largely rendered by 
quotations from it.
Stating the nature of the theme Harding sayss
The theme is spreaii rather thinly over a full- 
length play and The Cocktail Party, lacking the 
richer complexity of The F amily Reunion, relies 
a great deal on the devices of stage entertainment, 
amusing dialogue, unexpected twists of incident, .
delayed disclosures and a slight sir of mystification.
Reilly combines psychotherapy with spiritual guidance.
Assisted by agents like Julia and Alex, he assumes the role of 
a professional consultant helping people like Celia Coplestone 
cind Peter Quilpe. Witliin the framework of the play Eliot wants 
to maintain an atmosphere in which the supernatural and the mundane 
blend. Harding says:
1. Katharine Worth "Eliot and The Living Theatre", Graham Martin (ed) 
Eliot in Perspective, London, Hacmillan 1970, pp. 160-161
2. F.R. Leavis, Ibglish Literature in our Tlrae and the University, 
pp.lb5-1b6 and Lectures in America, pp. 50-5l
3. D.W. Harding "Progression of Theme in Eliot's Plays", Kenyon Review, 
Vol.XFlll, no.3, Summer 1956, reprint in Experience Into Words, 
London, Chatto and Windus, 1963, p. II4.I.
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The danger Is of a slight cheapness creeping in.
It is hard, for instance, to see a serious purpose 
in Reilly* s account of his original intuition 
(expressed in an apparition) that Celia was destined 
to a violent death. It seems beside the point; the 
significance of her choice was unconnected with the 
variety of death to which she was on her way, and 
presumably Reilly* s help would have been equally 
available to such a person whether she was to die 
from violence, disaster or old age. It seems to 
be one of the incidents that fills out the stage - 
play without being required by the dramatic thane.
John Peter on the other hand says; "Edward is in fact,
in a position analogous to the ostentatious professor of 
2
virtue". Peter further argues that Celia's character at 
the beginning of the play was convincing, but as the play 
proceeds, the other characters begin to magnify her character 
"that it cracks, and aHows her validity as a symbol to 
drain away".^
Harding ascribes this dramatic incoherence and untidiness
to a ♦ psychological over-simplifie at ion in the central argument;
Eliot offers the view that only a small number of 
chosen or doomed people, the saints, like Celia, can 
take the course that leads towards selfless love, in 
the sense of something fully outside themselves*
Apart from these few saints everyone is relegated to 
the condition of the chamberlaynes and the very 
possibility of a deeply satisfying human love is 
excluded -without argument. I4.
Leavis on the other hand interprets Eliot's attenpt at 
creating an atmosphere of the 'supernatural* in the play as a 
token of unconscious insincerity, a lack of grapple with the
1. ibid, P.II4I4.
2. John Peter* "The Cocktail Party", Scrutiny, Vol.XVlll,no.l 
Spring 1926, p.63
'
3. ibid, p. 63
h. D.¥. Harding, op.cit, p. 114;
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teclinologico-Benthemlte civilization and a departure from
genuine concern with intrinsic moral and human values. *
Expressing his dissatisfaction with Eliot the dramatist Leavis
draws on the principle of the interrelationship between
literature and life « a principle consistent with the writings
of Lavjrence, Whitehead, Colling wood and Polanyi* Leavis says:
The discussion of drama in general suffers from the 
same wealniess (the incapacity to relate literature to 
life)^ the examination of the possibility and the 
practical problem of poetic drama comes from a mind 
in which the thinking about matters of form and 
techjiique hasn't the life, grapple^ and force that 
critical thought cannot have apart from the habit of 
full engagement - the habit that manifests itself in 
the kind of preoccupation vrith value, significance, 
and responsibility to life that makes it impossible 
to talk Jbout 'purely literary values'. 2
Hence Leavis, by implication, ascribes Eliot's failure as a 
dramatist to his criticàl ideas, ideas that favour the isolation 
of literature from life and the consideration of literature as an 
exclusive academic and intellectual pursuit. This leads logically 
to Leavis's later strictures on Eliot’s criticism and poetry.
The most positive contribution which Leavis imputes to Eliot
as critic is that of The Sacred yood which he describes as 'a
rare thing, a fine intelligence in literary criticism,'  ^and
speaking in general terms he recommends the early essays as they
possess "critical intelligence". He singles out for particular
comraendation that revealing dictum of Eliots
Sensibility alters from generation to generation whether 
we will or no, but ezipression is only altered by a man 
of genius. k
The significance of this statement for Leavis is twofold. First
1. F.R. Leavis, Lectures in America, p.21
2. F.R. Leavis, Anna Karenina, p.19c
3. ibid, p. 178
U, Johnson's London end Vanity of Human Wishes with an Introductory essay 
by T.S. Eliot, pp. 9-10
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it brings home one of his favourite critical ideas; namely the 
doctrine of historical relativity and secondly it confers upon 
Iliot the practitioner the high quality of being a genius ' who 
- after the long post-Swinbumian arrest, - altered expression*.
This realization of the crucial importance of changing 
expression leads Leavis to postulate that Eliot? s best, his 
imîîortant, criticism has an immediate relation to his technical 
problems; after the Victorian stagnation Eliot was faced with 
the very problem of altering expression. Leavis qualifies 
this view by noting that it does nou follow that the criticism 
is of greater value than the poetry, on the contrary, the poetry 
can stand on its own merits idLthout much need for the criticism. 
The service tdiich the criticism has rendered the poetry is that 
it has created a new climate of opinion congenial to the proper 
^preciation of that poetry. Furthermore the criticism has 
brouglit into fuller consciousness the indispensable need for 
continuity from the past to the present: thàt is the sense of
tradition^
From these positive merits Leavis moves to his strictures 
on Eliot - strictures that largely emerge from Leavis*s 
preoccupation with life as embodied in human individuals. This 
preoccupation is induced in him by the writings of Lawrence and 
bhitehead.
These strictures centre mainly on Eliot's 'Tradition and 
The Individual Talent', and the notion of the 'objective 
correlative' formulated in his essay on Hamlet. Related to 
these are two further points: Eliot's conventionality of
judgment and his association with The Bloomsbury Group.
1. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p. 178
—  2 0 9  "
Leavis* s adverse remarks on'Tradition and The Individual 
Talent» are usually provoked by the constant presence in his 
mind of the kind of creativity represented by Lawrence.
Contrary to the prevailing tendency that takes 'Tradition and 
The Individual Talent' as an example of cogent thought, Leavis 
reports that the essay is "notable for its ambiguities, its 
fallaciousness and the aplomb of its equivocations and its 
specious cogency".
Picking on Eliot's notion of the artist as a mere medium
a shred of platinum, a catalyst, exerting no force wiiatsoever
on the creative activity Leavis turns to the opposite example
of Lawrence Wio asserts that without the distinguished
individual, distinguished by reason of his potency 
as a conduit of urgent life, and by the profound 
and sensitive responsibility he gives proof of 
towards his living e3q>erience there is no art 
that matters. 2
Exposing Eliot's specious logic Leavis argues that the 
shred of platinum with which the mind of the artist is identified 
cannot in any possible way 'digest and transmute the passions 
wdiich are its materials. Digestion end transmutation are 
human operations carried out by the effective agency of the 
human organs, and not by an inert medium like the shred of 
platinum. To digest and transmute - Leavis observes,-the 
medium should be in full control of its material, but this 
asamption is ruled out by Eliot's contention that the feelings 
are at liberty to enter into new combinations. That is to say 
that they are left to take care of themselves, and the creative
1. F.R. Leavis, Anna Karenina and other Essays, p. 179
2, ibid, p. 179
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process is now left to the hazard of chance. Leavis
wonders how one can call such haphazard combinations an act
of creation or more exactly 'the mind which creates' (the
emphasis on the creativity of the human mind takes on a
particular significance with the creativity of Lawrence and
Blake now in the forefront of Leavis's attention). Eliot's
subsequent remarks serve to emphasize the inactivity of an
inherently active human faculty; the human mind. Under the
impact of the benumbing theory of Eliot it has been reduced to a
mere receptacle.
The poet's mind is, in fact, a receptacle for 
seizing and storing up numberless feelings, 
phrases, images which remain there until all the 
particles which can unite to form a new conpound 
are present together, 1
How can a receptacle exert the pressure under which the fusion
talces place ? The question is left unanswered. Yvor Winters
whose critical tone bears a noticeable resemblance to that of
Leavis raises the same kind of query;
He (Eliot) does not say whether this intensity is 
a function of the inert mind of the poet or an accident 
affecting the mind from without. Nor if we try to 
inteiTpret the figure, to translate it into plain language, 
can we determine what is meant either by inertness or by 
intensity nor can we guess what occurs when the poet 
vjrites, the entire process is a mystery. 2
And like Leavis hinters adopts a view in which the creative
process is one of moral evaluation of human experience.
Leavis sets Eliot's statuent "the more perfect the
artist, the more con^ letely separate in him will be the man who
suffers from the mind which creates" against the kind of creativity
1. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p.19
2. Yvor Winters, In Defense of Reason, London, Routledge and Keg an 
Paul, I960, p.
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represented by great artists like Tolstoy, Lawrence, Shakespeare
and George Eliot and argues that the word 'separate* here would
not be meaningful because their creativity makes for an integrity
and inseparability between the man who suffers and the mind Wiich
creates; and concludes that in writing this statement Eliot has
Flaubert in mind. The integrity and inseparability of the man
who suffers from the mind which creates prompts Leavis to
advocate the reciprocity, the natural interaction between art
and life, a principle that underlies the writings of Lawrence,
the organic philosophy of hhitehead, the efficacy of individual
life higlilighted in the writings of Gollingwjood and Polanyi.
Leavis comments:
In contemplating the work of one of the great 
creative powjers we don't find ourselves impelled 
to think of the pressure of the artistic process 
as something apart from the pressure of the living^ 
the living life and the lived experience-out of 
which the work has issued. 1
In making this point Leavis argues for a coherent order that
has been shattered by Eliot. It may be pertinent to indicate
that in his description of the creative process Eliot uses terms
such as 'Catalysis*, 'medium', 'stired of platinum', and in
diagnosing the achievement of the Metaphysicals in the realm of
creative art he says:
The poets of the seventeenth century, the successors 
of the dramatists of the sixteenth possessed a 
mechanism of sensibility which could devour any kind 
of experience* 2
The -question that immediately comes to mind is how can a mechanism
that devours tilings create ? Is it not a contradiction in terms
to assign an Inherently intuitive faculty to the devouring maw
1. F,R, Leavis, Anna Karenina and other Essays, p.l8l
2. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p.26?
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of the machine ? The very nature of creation being essentially 
human jars against this mechanization. The situation is 
further complicated when Eliot qualifies these poets as having 
"a sensuous apprehension of thought, or a recreation of thought 
into feeling", apprehension and recreation are characteristic 
mental activities showing the human mind vitally at work, but 
in retrospect, they are eclipsed by the mechanical regularity 
of the machine.
As for the 'objective correlative' Leavis argues that the 
first inadequacy of this notion is displayed in the reduction 
of Hamlet to a mood of disgust evoked in Hamlet by his mother. 
Without having a first hand experience Eliot placidly takes 
over the assuirptions made by JJ4. Roberston and E.E. Stoll 
and itdiat is worse is that he builds on them a concept that the 
text does not fully reinforce.
Leavis draws on Lawrence's counterbalancing account of the 
play in Twilight in Italy -sdiere Lawrence shifts the focus of 
interest from Hamlet's preoccupation with the sense of disgust 
towards his mother to the lively representation of the father, 
whom Hamlet idolizes. The image of the murdered father, idio 
stands in Hamlet's mind, for the ideals of royalty and virtue
1
provides a new cue for an essential appreciation of the play.
When Eliot considers Corloianus and Antony and Cleopatra 
as Shakespeare's consuimate works of art, Leavis expresses his 
surprise at the neglect of Macbeth and Measure for Measure 
(the latter is associated in Eliot's mind with Hamlet, and 
hence a failure). In Leavis's view these last two plays are
1. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and The University, 
pp. 162-165
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instances of Shakespeare' s sureness of grasp aa± whereas
Antony and Cleopatra and Coriolanus lack the fuller engagement
Shakespeare exhibits in the other great tragedies. Following
up the ramifications of Eliot's argument Leavis elicits there
a Flaubertian sense of withdrawal and rejection of life.
There is in Eliot's criticism abundant evidence of 
negative attitudes towards life, attitudes of disgust 
L. and fear and rejectioi^ that play a part of which he 
is not properly conscious; entailing as they do the 
Flaubertian kind of self contradiction^  they portend 
radical failure of wholeness and coherence in himj 
and consequently a defeat of intelligence- 1
This negative attitude towards life is attributable to his
over-estimation of French literature and la poesie pure.
Identifying Eliot's impersonality with a strained
intellectuality that is hostile to human living and creativity
Leavis suggests that it is this defective approach that prompts
Eliot to elevate someone like Landor to the status of a major poet.
Moving on to Eliot's conventionality of judgment Leavis
asserts that it is displayed in his parroting of conventional
assessments such as his rating of Spenser's Faerie Queene as
a long poem in the first-ranlv. This conventionality is seen
%
at its most disastrous in his appraisal of Congreve's The Way 
of The World as superior in maturity to any play Shakespeare 
ever wrote. In this respect Eliotrsays;
Me cannot but [feel that a play like Congreve's 
May of the world is in some way more mature than any 
of Shakespeare's^  but only in this respect^ that it 
reflects a more mature society, that is, it reflects 
a greater maturity of manners. 2
1. F.R. Leavis, Anna Karenina, p. l83
2. T.S. Eliot, On Poetry and Poets, p. 06
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This superficial evaluation rests on the highly rated 
qualities of wit, and refinement of style, attributed to the 
Augustan8. The second manifestation of tliis conventionality
is seen in Eliot's preference of Joyce to Lawrence# Thie 
preference, in Leavis's vieif, is temperamental because it 
harps on the theme of pure art which furnishes the common 
ground on which Joyce and the early Eliot met and for the elaboration 
of which Eliot is .partly indebted to Joyce# Needless to say, 
this doctrine of 'pure art' is adverse to the claims for human 
life and individuality which Leavis and Lawrence, and with them 
bhitehead, Collingwood and Polanyi champion.
In opting for Joyce Eliot is restricting his range of 
experience to the fragmentary and insular to the exclusion of 
the comprehensive sense of interrNationships envisioned in 
Lawrence's works.
Closely associated with this is the biassed tone governing 
Eliot's glorification of social celebrities. This glorification 
ananates either from intimate personal acquaintance or from high 
social repute. His overvaluation of VJyndham LevhLs stems from 
close personal acquaintance, that of W#P. her arises from social 
prestige; Charles vJhibley is accorded greatness simply because 
he was a "current social literary value".
This conventionality of tone and the antipathy to Lawrence 
naturally bring in the Bloomsbury thme# It was by The Hogarth 
Press then sponsored by Virginia and Leonard Woolf that both 
The Waste Land and Homage to John Dryden were first published in 
England. If we set that fact aside, what then is the main 
reason for Leavis's complaint agàinst the group to whom Eliot 
was loyal ?
Very briefly, he thinks they constituted a coterie intent
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on the elaboration of idiat seemed, to them to be the over—ridingly
si^ ipiificant aesthetic values of art, end of visual art in
particular; for the ideal of idiich they looked to France; and as
a group they showed a general distaste for Lawrence.
In his criticism of 'Eliot as Critic', Leavis complains both 
of Eliot's over-estimation of Virginia Woolf and the consequent 
under-rating of Lawrence, and his introduction of David Garnett 
to a French sophisticated public as 'a master English writer' on 
the strength that he belonged to the Bloomsbury elite. In another 
context Leavis says; ,
It is true that the Bloomsbury of the 1920 vent in 
for the dix-huitieme and had produced Lytton Strachey 
and Clive Bell's coterie manifesto entitled 'Civilization* 
and that Bloomsbury (in a patronizing way) took up Eliot 
who let himself be taken up. 1
John Keith Johnstone tells us that the circle were mainly interested
in the aesthetic appreciation of art, and in the creation of a
climate of opinion countering Victorian morality and sentimentality.
But James Smith hits the nail on the head when he suggests that
Eliot's purity of interest in ar*b to the exclusion of the human mind
and personality can be partly attributed to Clive Bell's book 'Art'
This book, he says, contains many terms, phrases, sentences even,
which Eliot - I would say - no more than echoes .... Clive Bell's
views provided matter for lively discussion by the Bloomsbury Group
during the years when Eliot, newly arrived in London, cultivated
more than 'a nodding acquaintance vith its members'. ^
1# Fd^ . Leavis, English Literature in our Time and The University 
P, 102
2. John Keith Johnstone, The Bloomsbury Group, London, Seeker, 
Warburg, 1921;, chapters 2-3, pp-20-92
3. James Smith "Notes on The Criticism of T.S. Eliot, Essays in 
Criticism, October 1972, p. 322
\ * "
But what is there in Clive Bell's Art that inclined
Eliot to a 'purity of interest in art*7 I would risk the
following lengthy quotation as esq^ressive of the exclusive
and parochial aesthetic interests of the group - interests that
negate vital human values:
The contemplation of pure form leads to a state of 
extraordinary exaltation and complete detachment from 
the concerns of life.»'"It is tempting to suppose 
that the enotion which exalts has been transmitted 
through the forms we conteirplate by the artist who 
created them. If this be so the transmitted emotion, 
whatever it may be, must be of such a kind that it can 
be expressed in any sort of form.4 * * Now the emotion that 
artists express comes to seme of them from the apprehension 
of material things^ and the formal significance of any 
material thing is the significance of that thing considered 
as an end in itself* But if an object considered as an 
end in itself moves us more profoundly (i.e. has greater ' 
significance) than the sarae object considered as a means 
to practical ends or as a thing related to human interests ■ 
and this undoubtedly is the case • we can only suppose 
that when we consider anything as an end in itself we 
become aware of that in it which is of greater moment 
than any qualities it may have acquired from keeping 
company with human beings. 1
Again he says:
In so far as a picture is a work of art, it has no 
more to do with dogmas or doctrines, facts, or theories 
than tjith the interests and emotions of daily life. 2
Defining the function of art he restricts it exclusively to the
production of good states of mind. ^
Lytton Strachey, like Clive Dell, is an advocate of
'significant form' which in its Bloomsbury sense means 'the
iiaesthetically moving form*.
Lawrence makes some sarcastic remarks on the doctrine in 
his "Introduction to These Paintings" when he likens it to "a 
form of masturbation", ^ and Leavis approvingly refers to these
1. Clive Bell, Art, London, Chatto and Windus, 19lU, pp.68-69 
(Italics mine). <
2. ibid, p,94
3. Ibid. p. 113 Ibid, p.8
5. B.B. tawrenee, Phoenix I, p.56?
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4
remarks in his review of the reissued Phoenix , In that 
introduction Lawrence points to Cezanne's dilemma as residing 
in a conflict between mind and intuition, and argues that
great discoveries of science and real works of art 
are made by the whole consciousness of man working 
together in unison and oneness, instinct, intuition, _
mind, intellect all fused into one complete consciousness*
Eliot on the other hand shows a marked and one-sided bias
for intelligence* In 'The Perfect Critic* he sayss
Aristotle had what is called the scientific mind, 
a mind which, as it is rarely found among scientists 
except in fragments, migiit better be called the 
int^ligent mind. For there is no other intelligence 
than this, and so far as artists and men of letters are 
intelligent (we may doubt whether the level of intelligence 
among men of letters is as high as among men of science) 
their intelligence is of this kind. 3
In a review of Middleton Murry's 'Synthesis' Eliot wrestles 
with Murry's opposed terms 'intuition* and 'intelligence' endorsing 
intelligence and ostracizing intuition as an irresponsible 
Romantic criterion. ^
Thus it is Laurence, and not Eliot that provides Leavis with 
a combination, a synthesis of both intelligence and sensibility, 
or what Leavis himself, in his review of Max Eastman's 'The Literary 
Mind* calls "sensitiveness of intelligence".
But Lawrence's advocacy of 'the x>jhole consciousness of man', of 
'unison'and 'oneness', does not only anticipate Lawrence's philosophy 
of vitalism discussed in the next chapter, but also Mhitehead's 
philosophy of organism, and the integrative ideas of Collingwood 
and Polanyi.
1. H. Coomb es (ed) D.H. Lavjrence, Penguin Books, p.i;23
2. i^, pp. 573-271;
3. T.S. Eliot, The Sacred Mood, p.13
k* T.S. Eliot "Mr Middleton Murry's 'Synthesis', The Monthly Criterion
October 1927, PP* 341-347
5. F Jl. Leavis, "The Literary Hind", Scrutiny, Vol.l, no.l, 1932, p.22
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CHAPTER 3
LEAVIS and tAW.E^E
**tt la Ufa we have te live by, net machines and Xdeal^ 
Fantasia of The Unconscious, p.152 
**Man is himself the vivid body of life**, Phoenix I, p.431
In this chapter leavis*s dealings with Lawrence will be 
considered with a view to demonstrating the seminal ideas in 
Lawrence that bear on Leavis*s critical practice. For the 
sake of both economy and convenience this chapter will be 
subdivided into sectional headings including; 
i# Leavis*s reasons for admiring Lawrence, i.e. points in 
common between them. This section will inevitably entail a 
consideration of Lawrence*s critical and philosophical ideas, 
ii. Leavis*8 change of emphasis in the course of his criticism 
of Lawrence. In other words Leavis*s Minority Press Pamphlet 
on Lawrence will be set, for contrast and coc^arlson, against 
his book D.H. Lawrence Novelist, and the other later essays, 
ill. Lawrence Versus Eliott Leavis*s demonstration.
These headings may overlap as a result of the Interrelation 
of the t^ics under consideration.
The course of this discussion will be largely controlled 
by an attempt to establish a relationship between its leading 
ideas and those outlined In the chapters on Santayana, Whitehead, 
Collingwood and Polanyi.
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Leavis*g Reasons for adTaltlng Lawrence
Paying a handsome tribute to Lawrence Leavis in his 
introduction to D.H. Lawrence; Novelist, sayst
1 myself, in this book, am dealing with a writer 
who has been for me & major contemporary fact. 1 
read him first before the war of 1914. I read a 
tale by him (not one of the good ones, but it made 
an impression on me* in Ford Madox mieffer's 
English Review# to which % subscribed at school, 
didn't rememberylf I ever noticed^the name of the 
author. But I '&ound,when in 1919f having for the 
first time the opportunity to begin exploring 
contemporary literature, X took down *The Prussian 
Officer from the'First Class shelves of The Cambridge 
Union; and X registered that the author X had^ad 
six or seven years before was D.H. Lawrence # A^ rom 
then on X read him pretty steadily# 1 '
And later on reviewing the reissued Phoenix Leavis sayst
Since, in 1936, the year of its original publication,
X first read Phoenix through# it has seemed to me 
irame amir ably the finest body of criticism in existence 
(and Lawrence left a good deal more critical writing 
than is included here). X am not, of course, claimii% 
to speak out of a knowledge of all the criticism there is, 
but expressing my conviction that no collection as 
valuable can be found. The interest and profit it 
yields seem to me Ineathaustlble, I still find, every 
time I open it, new things to remember and to use.
What a difference it would have made to me as an 
undergraduate, I tell myself. 2
This recognition of the influential role of Lawrence is bound 
to give rise to the inevitable question* What Is there in Lawrmce 
that Leavis found appealing and in what way did it affect his 
critical orientations? This question can be partly answered if we 
remember that for Leavis in 1955 Lawrence was ** still the great 
writer of our phase of civilisation**# ^ The kind of iaçjortance 
he attached to him may be judged In part by the use made of the 
passage from Lady Chatterley*s Lover*
1# F.H. leavis D.H. Law*r#nce* Novelist. London, Chatto and Wlndus, 
1955, p#9,
2. H. Coombes (ed), D_*H»_Lawrence. Penguin Critical Anthology, 
London, 1973, p.419#
3. r.K# Leavis, on#clt. p.9.
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There was a gap in the continuity of consciousness 
almost American, but Industrial really. What next? 1
In Culture and Environment Lawrence's perception of the loss of
organic community constitutes the axis upoh which the whole book
tum%. The diagnostic nature of the chapter In Ladv Chatterlev's
Lover, from which Leavis quotes for the confirmation of one of his
main points of interest is instructive, Lawrence depicts the
people of the present phase of civilisation as
a people in whom the living intuitive faculty was 
dead as nails, and only queer, mechanical yells and 
uncknnyowlll power remained. 2
This Waste-land type of life has arisen because Shakespeare's
England was blotted out, and replaced by ^
a new race of mankind over-eonsclous in the money, and 
social and political side,on the spontaneous and 
intuitive side dead. 3
It may be relevant to remark In passing that Leavis*s deep-seated
distaste for American society and life is probably inspired by
Lawrentlan directives. 4
The introduction to Culture and Environment which sets the
tone for the whole book. Is closely related to the Lawrentlan point
of view (expressed in Chapter 12 of Ladv Chatterlev*a Lover).
Leavis says:
What we have lost is the organic community with the 
living culture it embodied. Folk-songs, folk- 
dances, Cotswold Cottages and handicraft products 
are signs and expressions of something more, an art 
of life, a way of living ordered and patterned
1. F.R. Leavis & Denys Thompson, Culture and Environment. London, 
Chatto and Wlndus, 1933, reprint 1964, p.D3*
2. D.H. Lawrence. Lady Chatterley*s Lover. London, William Heineraann 
Ltd., 1951, P .174.
3* JLMâ* '
4. This point is elaborated, end, In a sense, qualified In the 
introduction to this thesis.
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involving social arts, codes of intercourse and a 
responsive adjustment growing out of immemorial 
experience to the natural environment and the rhythm 
of the year, 1
The phrase **rhythm of the year* can be found also in Lawrence**
2
A propos of Ladv Chatterlev*a Lover * To Lawrence** mind
the industrial England blots out the agricultural 
England, One meaning blots out another. The new 
England blots out the old England. And the 
continuity is not organic but awchmnical, 3
This is the *plight* (to use a term common to both Lawrence and
Leavis) of our civilisation. The blackness and ugliness that
accompanied industrial life and engulfed the whole of England is
acutely realised by Lawrence in images that strike a responsive
chord in Le avis,
the blackened brick dwellings, the black slate roofs 
glistening their sharp edges, the mud black with coal* 
dust, the pavements wet and black. It was as If dismalness 
had soaked through and through everything. The utter 
negation of the gladness of life, the utter absence of the 
instinct for shapely beauty which every bird and beast has, 
the utter death of the human intuitive faculty, 4
This is the Lawrence whom Leavia associate* with Dickens.
Leavis's reaction to this symptomatic decadence can be gauged by
his commentary on this description.
There are those who think D,H. Lawrence the greatest man of 
our time.and the reason is that he did more than anyone else 
to awake and spread a realization of what had happened. He 
devoted his splendid genius to making it impossible for us
1, F,B. Leavi* & Denys Thompson, Culture and Environment, London, 
Chatto and Windus, 1933, reprint 1964, pp, 1-2#
2, D.H, Lawrence, Phoenix Vol. II, (ed*> Harry T. Moore, London, 
Heinemann 1968, p.504,
3. D.H. Lawrence, Ladv Chatterley's Lover. p,178.
4. ibid, p.173 and in Leavis's Culture and Environment, p,95.
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to Ignore the nature of our loss.^
It is in this connection and under the Impetus of this Lawrentian
vision that Leavia develops two of his major critical terms *
terms that assume central roles in his later critical disccHirset
2normality and health « Leavia is aware that there is no going hack,
hut we have got to halt this terrible advance of the machine or at
least to slacken it to preserve a measure of normality and health.
Indeed Lawrence himself seems to be speaking for Leavis when he says*
Nothing will excuse us from the responsibility of living 
even death is no excuse. We have to live# So we may as 
well live fully* We are doomed to live# Ahd therefore 
it is not the smallest use running into pis aller and 
trying to shirk the responsibility of living# We can't 
get out of it#
And therefore the only thing to do is to undertake the 
responsibility with good grace# What responsibility? The 
responsibility of establishing a new system# a new 
organic system, free as far as ever it can be front 
automation or mechanism; a system which depends on the 
 ^ ■ profound spontaneous soul of men# 3
"Responsibility* and "responsibility towards life* have become key*
# a
terms in Leavis's critical discussion. This concern for living,
1# m d ,  P,94.
2# "normal* occurs on p#97 and "health* on p.95 of Culture and 
Environment#
3# D«R# Lawrence, Phoenix |, (ed#> Edward 0# McDonald, London, 
Heinemann 1939, reprint 1970, p#911#
4# The term Responsibility* makes its appearance in Revaluation. , 
p*179, and "responsibility for life" occurs in D.H. Lawrence 
Novelist# p#60, "responsibility towards life" is also used in 
Leavis's address at the University of Nottingham, (ed)
H# Coombes, D.H. Lawrence, p.404; "responsibility towards life" 
occurs in Anna Karenina, p*22, "responsibility towards life" is 
also used in Leavis's Introduction to Deter Covenev's The Image 
of Childhood# p,31,"human responsibility" is used in English 
Literature in our Time and The University. p,109; "responsibility 
towards life" is used in Pickens The Novelist# p,276 and human 
responsibility is repeated nine times in Leavis's introductory 
chapter to Nor Shall mv Sword# no# 11*26#
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for spontaneity and human responsibility can be contrasted with Elliot's 
view of tradition * a view that denies the individual the right to 
express himself. Here it must be noted that the social overtones of 
Lawrence's criticism inevitably infringe on the strictly literary 
implications of his critical writings. Juxtaposing Eliot's narrow 
view of tradition with Lawrence's concern with life and health 
Leavis says
those of us who find no such approach to tradition 
(the approach based on a narrowly Christian interpretation) 
possible can only cultivate the sense of health we have. 1
The sense of health suggested by Leavis is the inalienable claim of
personality that lends immediacy and livingness to human experience
(livingness is a crucial term in the framework of both Leavis's and
Lawrence's critical apparatus) * It is in terms of that livingness
and health that Leavis vindicates the creative achievement of
Lawrence i
/  My aim/is to win clear recognition for the nature of
\ Lawrence's greatness. Any great creative writer who
has not had his due is a power for life wasted. But
/ the insight, the wisdom, the revived and re*educated 
feeling for healthy that Lawrence brings/are what, as
our civilization goes, we desperately need. 3
It is in terms of this vitality and health again that Leavis relates 
Lawrence to both Dickens and Blake. They have in common a profound 
sense of life * a responsibility towards livi%% that is opposed to
1. P.B* Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p.241.
2* Livingness occurs in D.H. Lawrence Phoenix II, p.437, and in
Leavis's D.H. Lawrence Novelist, pp. 84-200, and in Nor Shall Mv 
8word. p.21.
3. P.R. Leavis, D.H. L^r)»nce; Novelist, p.15.
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the Inanimate classicism of EHot, and in this sense they have
indisputably contributed to the "human heritage".
Something of indisputable high value the Bconantic 
movement brought to the human heritage was a distinctive
sense of responsibility towards life# Lawrence
implicitly invokes this truth the comment with which
be dismisses Elsot's classicism, 1
Leavis argues that Eliot's"impersonality has for essential
purpose to deny that art expresses or in any way involves a
2responsibility towards life" , and Lawrence in maintaining that
"TM time to be impersonal has gone. We start from the joy we have
3in being ourselves, and everything must take colour from that joy" , 
helps to regain that sense of responsibility. To associate Lawrence
4
with Blake and Dickens and with the Romantic tradition in general 
is to point to a significant direction in which Lawrence's criticism 
definitely moves; namely "the spontaneity and fullness of life"® 
that is the antithesis of Eliot's sense of restraint and bookish view 
of tradition. Here it may be worthwhile to outline Lawrence's 
vitalistic philosophy * a philosophy that has appealed to Leavis's 
mind and which has Whiteheadian reverberations.
1. F,R, Leavis, Pickens the Novelist, p.276.
2. JLÈiâ.
3. D.H, Lawrence, Phoenix I# p.306,
4. Leavis has already associated Lawrence with the moral tradition 
of George Eliot, cf the chapters on Santayana and Eliot.
5. D.H. Lawrence, Fantasia of the Unconscious. London, Penguin 
Books, p.116,"
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Lawrence advocates a philosophy of dynamism In which life or
rather livingness inheres In a state of flux, a state >of constant
activity rather than of fixity or stasis. He conceives of life in
terms of a conflict between polar opposites* To ensure continuity
and dynamism these opposites must go on clashing with each other*
The lion and the unicorn should go on fighting each other withmit
final victory or defeat for any of them because it would mean the
cessation of life*
But think if the lion really destroyed, killed the unicorn, 
not merely drove him out of town, but annihilated him, 
would not the lion at once expire, as if he had created a 
vacuum around himself? Is not the Unicorn necessary to the 
very existence of the lion, is not each opposite kept in 
stable equilibrium by the opposition of the other?
This is a terrible position to have for a raison d'etre#a 
purpose, which if once fulfilled, would of necessity entail 
the cessation from existence of both opponents. They would 
both cease to be if either of them really won in the fight 
which is their sole reason for existing. 1
Enphasizing the need for the perpetuation of that conflict c a 
conflict that is essential for the continuation of life he again
says*
/hid there is no rest, no cessation from the conflict. For 
we are two opposites which exist by virtue of our inter­
opposition. Remove the opposition, and there is a collapse 
a sudden crumbling Into universal nothingness. 2
So it is in that constant opposition of the lion to the unicorn,
the darkness to the light that life resides. This is more or less
3the Whiteheadian view underlined in Process and Reality * Again 
this philosophy obviously rules cait the notion of the absolute aixl 
asserts a view of human and moral relativity. "We are in sad need
1. 0.H. Lawrence Phoenix II, p.368.
2. p .388.
3. cf the Chapter on Whitehead*
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of a theory of human relativity",^ and again ha saya "Morality is
a delicate act of adjustment on the eoul's part* not a rule or 
2
prescription"* and once again he says "morality is of temporary
g
Value* useful to Its times". The darkness which Lawrence
identifies with the womb from which man has originally emerged is
inconceivable without its integrative counterpart * the light which
Lawrence equates with the soul to which we ultimately aspire.
If there is universal infinite darkness* then there is 
universal infinite light* for there cannot exist a specific 
infinite save by virtue of the opposite and equivalent 
infinite. So that if there be universal infinite darkness 
in the beginning* there must be universal light in the end.
And these are two relative halves.
Into the womb of the primary darkness enters the ray of 
ultimate light* and time is begotten* conceived there is 
the beginning of the end. And there within the womb we 
ripen upon the beginning* till we become aware of the end. 4
The last two sentences In this quotation could furnish the thematic
groundwork of Eliot's Four Quartets where the statements: in my
beginning is my end and in my end Is my beginning* have become
familiar tags* but this point will be elaborated upon later. What
is relevant to the present discussion is the notion of relativity that
has been adopted by Leavis* and for which Lawrence* among others* is
certainly responsible. But the notion of relativity Is given
adequate expression in the field in which Leavis is - under
Lawrentian Impulsion - remarkably interested* that is the novel
everything says Lawrence - is relative - every cmmmandment 
that ever issued out of the mouth of God or man is strictly 
relative; adhering to the particular time* place* ahd
1. D.H. Lawrence. Fantasia of the Unconscicus. p.25.
2. ibid* p.54* p.4-/0»
3. D.H* Lawrence* Phoenix 1, p.478.
4. D.H. Lawrence, Phoenix II* p.388.
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circumstance» And this is the beauty of the novel; .
everything is true in its own relationship and no further*
And again he says
The novel is the highest form of human expression so 
far attained* Why? Because it is so incapable of the 
absolute* In the novel everything is relative to everything 
else, if that novel is art all* 2
Leavis in his turn, stressing the historical element of that relativity
raises this quality to the status of a critical maxim saying
Major quality in a creative writer manifests itself in hie 
being very exceptionally alive to his age and responsive to 
its deeper-lying spiritual stresses and sicknesses* 3
Yet one cannot leave Lawrence's view of the novel without making one 
or two remarks* First that when Leavis quotes Lawrence's contention 
that "the novel is a great discovery far greater than Gallleo"s 
telescope or somebody else's wireless^, Leavia is endorsing alwiew 
whose implications are worked out in his own critical practice# He 
talks of Lawrence as the great novelist of our phase of civilisation, 
and devotes special attention to the novel as a literary genre 
thinking that the present age is the age of the novel - a view already 
expressed by Lawrence*
One may contend that if New Bearings and Revaluation were written 
under direct Ellotic influences. The Great Tradition is at the cross­
road between Eliot and Lawrence, and D.H. Lawrences Novelist*
Pickens the Novelist. Anna Karenina and other Essays were inspired 
by Lawrentian suggestions, and that Lectures in America. Eiglish 
Literature in our Time and The University, and Nor Shall Mv Sword.
1. D.H* Lawrence, Phoenix II, p.420.
2. Ibid. p.418,
3. F.B# Leavis, Nor Shall Sly Sword, p.131.
4. F.&. Leavis, Anna Karenina and other Essays, p.11*
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have Lawrence, Whitehead, Collingwood and to a certain extent,
Polanyt) as guiding principles, although such schismatic discrepancy
is arbitrary, and hardly possible in the field of criticism where so
many divergent elements come to merge and overlap* Together with
this principle of relativity adequately exhibited in the novel,
there is the added virtue of portraying the flux, the fluctuation of
our psychic life, and hence it supremely embodies Lawrence's
vitalistic philosophy* In this context a quotation from Ladv
1Chatterley's Lover - one that Is favourite to Leavis » is in place*
It is the way our sympathy flows and recoils that really 
determines our lives* And here lies the vast importance 
of the novel, properly handled* It can inform and lead 
into new places the flow of our sympathetic consciousness, 
and can lead our sympathy away in recoil from things 
gone dead* Therefore, the novel properly handled^an 
reveal the most secret places of our life, for it is in 
the passional secret places of life above all, that the 
tide of sensitive awareness needs to ebb and flow, 
cleansing and refreshing* 2
The cue here is towards the substrata of consciousness, the 
significant layers of experience that lie dormant in our life and 
which are mostly suppressed by our constant intelleotualizlng; by
our wilful thinking
£y willing and intellectualising we have done all we can, 
for the time being,. We only exhaust ourselves and lose
our lives - that is our livingness - our power to live,
by any further straining of the will and the intellect*
It is time to take our hands off the throttle, knowing 
well enough what we are about, and choosing our course
of action with a steady heart* 3
1, Leavis's Interest in this passage goes far back to the early
pamphlet titled D.H. Lawrence. Cambridge, Minority press,
1930, p.10*
2* D*H, Lawrence, Ladv Chatterley's Lover * p«113*
3* D.H* Lawrence, fhoeol% II, p*437*
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This insistence on the instinctual and passional flow of life has a
twofold value for both Lawrence and Leavis. First it constitutes a
reaction against ideas and ideals;against conventions and social
masks; and directs attention to genuine life - life springing from
natural and real impulses; and it is in terms of this naturalness
and reality that Leavia develops his comments on the achievement
of Lawrence both as a novelist and as a critic. These comments turn
out to require the critical tools characteristic of Leavis's critical
machinery. 'Reality' and 'sincerity* are two bruelal terms that
Leavis sqjplies to the evaluation of works of art and they are largely
inspired by sheh Lawrentianintimations. But an understanding of the
full implications of Lawrence's philosophy necessitates that this
life of the unconscious should be pursued in more detail*
once we can admit the known, but incomprehensible presence 
of the Integral unconscious; once we can trace it home 
in ourselves, and follow its first received movements, 
once we know how it habitually unfolds itself, then at 
last we can begin to live from the spontaneous initial 
prompting, instead of the dead-machine principles of 
ideas and ideals. There is a whole science of the 
creative unconscious, the unconscious in its law - abiding 
activities. 1
Lawrence's claims for a spontaneous kind of life has far-
reaching effects. First, like his philosophy of vitalism, of the
dynamic "circumambient universe" it abolishes the conclusiveness
and finality of scientific and mental processes.
To know is to lose - when I have a finished mental concept 
of a beloved, or a friend, then the love and the friend­
ship is pead. It falls to the level of an acquaintance.
As soon as I heve a finished mental conception, a full 
idea even of myself, then dynamically I am dead. To 
know is to die. 2
And by "knowledge" here Lawrence means an overemphasis on
intellectual and mental pursuits at the expense of the indispensable
flow of physical and unconscious energy. In another context he
1. D.H. Lawrence, Psvchoanalvsis and^the Uneonscjous. London, Penguin 
Books, p.210.
2. Ikiif P-72.
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wages war against Ideas and mental concepts saying
An idea which is merely introductedi into the brain, and 
started spinning there like some outrageous insect, is 
the cause of all our misery today, instead of living 
from the spontaneous centres, we live from the head# We 
chew, chew, chew at some theory, some idea. 1
To Wage this life-long war against theories and ideas is also
and simultaneously to question the validity of scientific facta and
the utility of mechanical civilization* Lawrence says#
I honestly think that the great pagan world of which %ypt 
and Greece were the lasting living terms, the great pagan 
world which preceded our own era once, had a vast and 
perhaps perfect science of its own, a science in terms of 
life* In our era this science crumbled into magic and 
charlatanry. 2
In another context he says#
Let us look at a great seated statue of Rameses, or at 
Etruscan tombs, let us read of Assiburnlpal or Darius and 
then Say: How dd our modern factory workers show beside
the delicate Egyptian friezes of the common people of 
Egypt? or our Trafalgar Square lions beside those of 
%oene? Civilization? it is revealed rather In sensitive 
life than in inventions: and have we anything as good as 
the Egyptians of two or three thousand years before Christ 
as a people? Culture and civilization are tested by vital 
consciousness. Are we more vitally conscious than an 
Egyptian 3000 years B.C. was? Are we? Probably we are 
less. 3
'
This switch to an old and coherent system of civilization is coupled
with an attack on the modern mechanical civilization.
It is life - Says Lawrence. We have to live by, not 
machines and ideals. 4
Aldous Huxley reports that Lawrence's dislike of science was 
passionate and expressed itself in the most fantastically unreasonable 
terms.
1* ibid. pp. 82—83.
2., ibid* p.12.
3. D.H. Lawrence, Anocalvpse. London, Martin Seeker, 1933, p.83,
4. D.H. Lawrence, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, p.152.
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'All scientists are liars' he would say, when I brought up 
some experimentally established fact which he happened to 
dislike. Liars, liars. It was a most convenient theoty.
I remember in particular one long and violent argument on 
evolution, in the reality of which Lawrence passionately 
disbelieved. 'But look at the evidence, Lawrence,' I 
insisted, 'look at tim evidence*. Kls answer was characteristic. 
'But I don't care about the evidence. Evidence doesn't mean 
anything to me. I don't feel Ithfeer©', and he pressed his 
two hands on his solar plexus. 1
Lawrence himself repudiates rational and rigid scientific
thinking which does not take count of our emotional nature.
Man thought and still thinks In images. &it now our images 
have hardly any emotional value. We always want a "conclusion" 
an end, we always want to come, in our mental processes, to 
a decision, a finality, a full stop. This gives ua a sense 
of satisfaction. All our mental consèiohsness is a movement 
onwards, a movement in stages, like our sentences, a W  every 
full stop Is a milestone that marks our"progress" and our 
arrival somewhere. Cki and on we go, for the mental 
consciousness. Whereas of course there is no goal.
Consciousness is an end in itself...
While men still thought of the heart or the liver as the seat 
of consciousness, they had no idea of this on and on process 
of thought. To them a thought was a completed state of 
feeling - awareness, a cumulative thing, a deepening thing, 
in which feeling deepened into feeling in consciousness till 
there was a sense of fullness. Z
This reversion to a harmonious kind of life Is of a focal 
importance as It attempts to maintain the spontaneity of life without 
being hampered by too much intellectualisation.. Through this 
spontaneity our imagination is given full play, and contrary to 
methodical and rational expectations, the finest and highest level of 
perception Is attained. The knowledge go far attained is intuitive 
knowledge
... and our Imaginative life Is a great joy and fulfilment to 
us, for the Imagination is a more powerful and more 
comprehensive flow of consciousness than our ordinary flow.
In the flow of true imagination we know in full, mentally and 
physically at once, in a greater enkindled awareness* At the 
maximum of our imagination we are religious. Add if we deny 
our imagination, and have no Imaginative life, we are poor
1. Aldous Huxley (ed) The Letters o f H .  Lawrence. London, William 
Heinemann, 1032, pp. XIV, XV»
2. D.H. Lawrence, Apocalvnse. pp* 90-91*
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worms who toavo never lived*^
Tble life from the deep centreg from the spontaoemis flow ie what
Leavia designate* a* the morality of art, and here the affinity
between Leavis and Lawrence is obvious*
Leavis recognize# the potency of this wîiea in hie essay on
Wordsworth in h* defines Wwdsworth's morality in
Lawrentian terms#
Wordsworth's preoccupation was with a distinctively human 
naturalness, with sanity and spiritual health*,• His mode 
of preoccupation, it is true, was that of a mind intent 
always upon ultimate sanctions, and upon the living 
eonnexioas between man and the extra-human Universe ; it 
was, that is, in the same sense as Lawrence's was, 
religious* a
But this persistent claim for a spontaneous and organic kind of
life makes for another leading principle dear to both Lawrence and
Leavis namely the integrity and independence of human individuals*
There is only on* clue to the Universe* And that is the 
individual soul within the individual being# That outer «
Universe of suns and moons and atoms is a secondary affair*
And in the same context he says
life is individual, and always will be* Life consists of 
"living individuals and always did so consist, in the 
beginning of everything, 4
Therefore he discredits all attempts made by scientists and idealists
*at anatomising and retiooalislng life
*•• it is time for the idealist and the scientist - they are 
one and the same really » to st«^ his monkey-jargon about 
the atom and the origin of Ufa, and the mechanical clue 
to the Universe* %ere isn't any such thing* 5
1* #*H* Lawrence, fhoenix 1, p*650*
2* r.E* Leavis# dévaluation. p«ld5«
3, D*a. Lawrence, ,yftntaaia.,of the Unconscious. p*lSO,
4, x m *
6* JLSJLjâs p*l53*
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Elaborating on this challenging topid Lawrence says in another 
contextt
This causeless created nature of the individual being is 
the same as the old mystery of the divine nature of the 
soul. Religion was right and science was wrong. Evexy 
individual creature has a soul, a specific Individual 
nature the origin of which cannot be found in any Cause-and- 
effect process whatever. Cause-and-effect will not explain 
even the individuality of a single dandelion. There is no 
assignable cause, and no logical reason for individuality.
On the contrary, individuality appears In defiance of all 
scientific law, in defiance even of reason. 1
Leavis almost verbally repeats that concept saying#
Life is a necessary wordj; but what it denotes is there only 
in the individual# Psychology Is individual psychology 
and is still that In its dealings with Individuals in 
mutual relation# X mean psychology as a gifted novelist is 
concerned with it. A great novelist's interest in the 
individual focus engage a profound and conscious exploratory 
preoccupation with what the indispensable word "life" portends.
I am thinking of the kind of greatness Lawrence denies Forster 
when he writes "life is more interesting in its urdercurrents 
than in its obvious." 2
This is exactly where the wheel turns full circle to bring the views
of Collingwood, Polanyi, Lawrence and Leavis into & meaningfull focus -
whatever advances mechanical and technological civilisation may make,
the human individual remains paramount, indispensable and supremely
predominant. Leavis's quotation from Lawrence in this connection
shows how Lawrence is ever-present in Leavis's mind (the title
'Literarism versus 8 eiektism* under which it appears has recognisable
Lawrentian attributes).
But why so much - why repeat so often the mechanical movement.
Let me not have so much of this work to do, let me not be 
consumed overmuch in my own self-preservation. Let me not 
be imprisoned in this proven, finite existence all my days.
This has been the cry of humanity since the world began.
This is the glamouf of kings, the glamour of men who had the 
<H>portunity to be.
3Wherefore X do honour to the machine and to Its inventors.
1 . l î i l l t  P-214. 3* IM â *  P-152.
2. F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall BSr $%rd. p.17.
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And by way of commenting on that extract he reverts to Lawrence's
critical vocabulary
And he (Lawrence) knew that llvingyin the individual where 
only it can be, is an art, and one that is not merely 
individual, but depends on a heritage of arts of living that 
is kept alive and responsive to change. 1
And by way of defending the humane tradition, the one and indivisible
culture antithetical to Snow's divisive view of human life, Leavis
again invokes Lawrence
concerned with enforcing in relation to what may be called 
a quintessential presentment of the modern world the 
Lawrentian maxim that 'nothing matters but life*, he (Lawrence) 
insists on the truth that only in living individuals is 
life there, and individual lives cannot be aggregated or 
equated or dealt with quantitatively in any way. Z
The point bears immediately on Snow's assumption that individuals
instead of being considered as valuable entities can be grouped into
social categories called 'cenmunity' or 'society' and rely on 'social
hope' for their sustenance instead of being catered for as individuals.
But the point has special value for both Lawrence and Leavis because
it asserts the inherently vital human quality without which life would
be meaningless and helpless in the face of the strong claims for
scientific thinking and technology made by the proponents of social
revolutions achieved by technical and scientific progress. It hears
directly on human creativity in the face of the mechanical regularity
of the machines and here the social and literary criticism of both
Lawrence and Leayls Intermingle. Reference has already been made to
the kind of creativity Lawrence has - the creativity which Leavis
digooses as involving no separation between the man who suffers and
the mind which creates. It is basically in relation to the kind of
artistic experience offered by Lawrence that Leavis reverses Eliot's
dictum on the separation between the man who suffers and the mind
1. ib id . p.153
2 . ib id .
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which creates*^
To clarify the role of the personality of the artist in creating
a work of art is to bring the reader face to face with the problem of
form and content. Ideally form and content are interrelated, but
for the sake of clarity they will be dealt with separately. To insist
that there can never be any separation between the creative artist
and the same man in his ordinary moments is to make for that principle
of relatedness that has been emphasized in the writings of Whitehead.
The inseparability of the creative artist from the same man in his
ordinary life shows the link between Santayana and Lawrence.
Associated with this notion is the transfusion of the material of art
with human feelings#
When Van Gogh paints sunflowers he reveals or achieves the 
vivid relation between himself, as man, and the sunflower as 
sunflower, at that quick moment of time. His painting does 
not represent the sunflower itself. We shall i»ver know 
that the sunflower itself is. And the camera will visualize 
the sunflower more perfectly than Van Gogh can* 2
Here Lawrence anticipates in the most articulate terms what
Leavis finds in the philosophy so far outlined in both Collingwood
and Polanyi. Lawrence's preoccupation with the positive part played
by the artist in the formation of the work of art accounts for his
attack on 'representation* in the sense of reproduction or copying.
In his "Introduction to^ f^hese Paintings" #e speaks of the ever
present danger of perslsent mental activities, and imputes to
Cezanne a unique value because his intuitive perceptions are given
full play. It is this intuition being part of both the creative
ability and the totality of human personality that Leavis highlights
in bis criticism of Lawrence, Blake and Dickens. In Twilight
In Italy* Lawrence quotes from Blake's The Tiger and considers
%  ' - ' ■
1. P.I^Q.D, Leavis. Lectures in America, p.33.
2. Lawrence, Phoenix I, p.527.
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the tiger as "the supreme manifestation of the senses made absoluteT^
He extracts these two lines*
Tiger, tiger, burning bright ' '
In the forests of the night,
and comments "It does Indeed burn within the darkness,"^
In Twilight In Italy Lawrence has at the centre of his attention
a major theme or Leitmotiv i«e, the flux, the co-presence of polar
opposites of darkness and light, of lion and lamb, and they are
always related, but nwer identical. This is by far the central idea
underlying The Crown, Leavis's strong passion for Blaîie is obvious,
and by way of elaborating on the symbolic value of the tiger he says*
What the tiger symbolizes is a fact of life and necessary.
The necessary is a recognition that a fact is a fact, it is 
a recognition that entails a troubled sense of the nature of 
energy - which life cannot do without, 3
This intuition again is part and parcel of Leavis's critical cam­
paign against the mechanization of life.
In his review of Phoenix*. Leavis recommends the part on 
'significant form'*, where its Bloomsbury aesthetic connotations are 
satirized*
If you want to invoke an aesthetic ecstasy, stand in front 
of a Matisse and whisper fervently under your breath* 
"Significant Form? Significant Forml"- and it will come. It 
sounds to me like a form of masturbation, an attempt to 
make the body react to some cerebral formula, 5
Shifting the emphasis from the opposition between the artist and
his medium to the juxtaposition of the artist's mind on the one hand,
and his intuition on the other, Lawrence says*
1. D,H, Lawrence, Twilight In Italy, London, Penguin books, p.43,
2. Ibid.
3. F.&. Leavis, "Justifying oq^Valuation of Blake" The Human World*
No. 7, May 1972, p.52#
4. Quoted H. Coombes (ed.) P *H. Lawrence. n.423.
5. D.H, Lawrence, Phoenix I, p.567.
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And what Cezanne had to learn was not humility - cant word - 
but honesty, but honesty with himself. It was not a question 
of any gift or significant form or aesthetic ecstasy* it 
was a question of Cezanne being himself, just Cezanne, 1
In another context Lawrence says
And the honour which the novel demands of you, is only that 
you should be true to the flame that leaps in you, 2
This'honesty* can be viewed as equivalent to Leavis's bincerity*,
Lawrence's notion of form is of a piece with his general philosophy of
vitalism. Artistic form as Lawrence conceives itistthe reconciliation
of the two contradictory laws of love and law.
Artistic form is a revelation of the two principles of love and 
law in a state of conflict and yet reconciled with the 
spirit, 3
Significantly enough Lawrence underscores a point of major importance
to the modern critical approach namely that every work of art is
unique in the sense that It must have its individual quality.
Each work of art has its own form, which has no relation 
to any other form. 4
Tiie idea behind form is to objectify, to impersonalize, so to
speak, the personal experience of the artist
for form is not a personal thing like style, it is 
Impersonal like logic, 5
Here Lawrence comes very close to Eliot's later view of impersonality 
and affirms one of the modern critical canons.
But an overemphasis on foirm at the expense of matter or the 
"Spirit" as Lawrence would call it, produces a pernicious effect. In 
this respect Lawrence lumps Flaubert and Thomas Mann together as
1, ibid, p.673,
2, D.H. Lawrence, Phoenix II, p.425,
3, D.H. Lawrence, phoenix I# p.477.
4, ibid. p.477.
5, i^ld. p.3 & 8.
6, cf the Chapter on Santayana.
6
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proponents of form* The former "stood away from life as from a
leprosy"^, and the latter had to suppress spiritual values, and
suffer "a soul-aliment just to produce the formal art to which he 
2
aspired" * In his assault on aesthetioism, leavis draws on these
pronouncements*
Against the class of Fhubert and Thomas Mann must be set
authors like "Shakespeare and Goethe who gave themselves to life as 
3
well as to art" * In Lawrence's view life comes first and art second
and on this score Lawrence afu) Leavis are in full accord* It
should also be clear that Lawrence's shift of emphasis from form to
content is an attempt to secure the preponderance of life or "the State
4Mathexf Soul of the great old artist," as Lawrence would call it, and
here we are not very far from Leavis's preoccupation with the moral
centrality that a work of art must reveal, but this will come up in
due course* It is in the interests of life and the spontaneity of
human passions that Lawrence designates the neat tidiness and
methodical arrangement in a work of art as mechanical*
As a matter of fact, we need more looseness, we need an 
apparent formlessness* Definite form is mechanical* We 
need more easy transition frcna moOd to mood, and from . 
deed to deed* A great deal of the meaning of life and art 
lies in the apparently dull spaces, the pauses, the 
unimportant passages, the places of passing over* 5
It is with this idea in mind that Leavis forms his judgement of
Anna Karenina* It may sound paradoxical that Leavis should draw on
Lawrence's views on a subject on which they disagree. Lawrence
speaks unfavourably of both Tolstoy and Anna Karenina* but Leavis
1* D*H« L a w r e n c e . p«312*
2* Ibid* p*309*
3* p*309.
4* p*478*
8* ibid* p*248*
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does not concern himself with the judgement, but rather with the
application of the leading Lawrentian notions of livingness and
vitality to the evaluation of that work* leavis comes to disagree
with both Lawrence and Arnold on Tolstoy's aovdl* leavis's point is
that, in repudiating the formal and aesthetic approach to the novel
and in endorsing the more urgent claims of life, Tolstoy was acting
in accord with Lawrentian principles*
I want to insist that the relation between art and life it 
(Anna Karenina) exemplifies for us is the characteristic 
of the highest kind of creativity - a higher kind than James's, 
If Tolstoy gave no heed to any Jamesian canons it was not 
because he failed to give the most intelligent kind of 
attention to the demands of art* To confute Jam^s critical 
censures and show what is the nature of the composition 
that makes /tema Karenina superlatively a great work of art 
is to illustrate what D*R. Lawrence had in mind when he 
wrote:
The novel is a great discovery, far greater than Galileo's 
telescope or somebody else's wireless* The novel is the 
highest form of expression so far attained* 1
Leavis's amplification here is Lawrentian in the sense that he
identifies Lawrence's"highest form of human expression" with thought -
but thought diatisboth significant and Impressive for It pertains to
weighty human Issues and assumes the persuasive form of art* "It
2
precludes and defeats the distorting effects of abstratlon" to use
Leavis's words* In fact Lawrence has the precedence in this regard
when he describes the novel as "having got the courage to tackle new
propositions without using abstractions^ * Leavis again draws on
Lawrence when he says:
The organization of Anna Karenina expresses intense devotion 
to the pursuit of truth and Lawrence might have had the book 
in front of him when he wrote "The novel is the highest form 
of subtle inter-relatedness that man has discovered"* 4
1* F*iU Leavis, Anna Karenina an<! Other Essays, pp. 11-12,
2. ibid. p.11*
3* D.H. Lawrence, Phoenix I, p.520*
4. jjkld# p.11.
# 240
The Idea of relatedness rules out the concept of architectunil
patterns in which the form of the work of art Is manipulated apart
from the equally urgent claims of content (Percy Lubbockis
Interpretation of this doctrine in Henry James is expounded in
The Craft of Fiction): but it also abolishes the discrepancy between
the artist as a creative power and as an ordinary man.
The relation of art to life in Tolstoy is such as to preclude 
this kind of narrowly provident economy. It is an immensely 
fuller and profounder involvement in life on the part of 
the artist, whose concern for significance In his art is the 
intense and focussed expression of the questing after 
significance that characterises him in his daily 'living*, 1
This inter-relatèdness again prompts Leavis to draw a further
analogy between Tolstoy and Lawrence on the crucial question of
morality,
Tolstpy is a different kind of man from Jamesp^ he is the 
kind of man the greatest artist necessarily is, Tolstoy 
might very well have answered qs Lawrence did when asked not 
long before his deatl^what was the drive behind his creating 
"one writes out of one's moral sense, for the race, as it 
were", 2
And the morality which Lawrence seeks is identified with ultimate 
human values, with the profound cravings and workings of the human 
psyche. Here it is in place to enlarge on Lawrence's concept of 
morality,
Lawrence's view of morality is rendered in natural, even physical 
terms,
My great religion is a belief in the blood, the flesh, as 
being wiser than the intellect. We can go wrong in our 
minds, but what our blood feels and believes and says is always 
true. The intellect is only a bit and a bridle, 3
and when he defines religion he says
,,, religion is an experience, an uncontrollable sensual 
experience, even more so than love, X use sensual to mean an ^ 
experience deep down in the senses, inexplicable and inscrutable ,
1, P,R, leavis. assae&è^ » pp, 11-12, 3, Aldous Huxley (ed,)
The Letters of D.H. Lawrence.
2, ibid, p,12, p.94,
4, D.H. Lawrence, Phoenix I, p.144.
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In another context he says
The supreme lesson of human consciousness is to learn 
how not to know. That is how not to interfere. That 
is how to live dynamically, from the great source, and 
not statically like machines driven by ideas and 
principles from the head, or automatically from one 
fixed desire. 1
Once lagai# he says
I don't care about physiology of matter - but somehow - 
that which is physic - non-human in humanity, is more 
interesting to me than the old-fashioned human element 
which'causes one to conceive a character in a certain 
moral scheme and make him consistent. The certain 
moral scheme is what S object to. In Turgenev, and 
Tolstoi and Dostoevsky the moral scheme into which all 
the characters fit, and it is nearly the same scheme - 
is, whatever the extraordinariness of the characters 
themselves, dull - old, dead. 2
In his "Introduction to These Paintings" he again says
We have become ideal beings, creatures that exist in idea, 
to one another, rather than flesh-and-blood kin. And 
with the collapse of the feeling of physical, flesh-and- 
blood kinship and the substitution of our ideal, social 
or political oneness, came the falling of our intuitive 
awareness, and the great unease, the nervousness Of 
mankind. 3
Lawrence then goes on to deal with matter familiar in Leavis's
critical writing:
But by intuition alone can man be really aware of man, or 
the living, substantial world. By intuition alone can 
man live and know either woman or world, and by intuition 
alone can he bring forth again images of magic awareness 
which we call art. 4
Lawrence defines imagination as a combination of physical and
intuitional perception®.
Lawrence suggests that modern morality"has its roots in hatred, a 
deep, evil hate of the instinctive intuitional, procreative body®.
1. D.H. Lawrence, Fantasia of the Unconscious, p.70.
2. Aldous Huxley (ed) The Letters of D.H. Lawrence, pp. 197-198.
3. D.H. Lawrence, Phoenix I, p.558.
4. ibid, p.556.
5. ibid. p.557.
8. ibid. p.558.
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aAd later he clarifies this suggestion sayings
But of course this fear and hate had to take on a righteous 
appearance so it became moral, said that the instincts, 
intuitions and all the activities of the procreative body 
were evil and promised a reward for their suppression* 1
In one of his most revealing statements Lawrence says:
An artist can only create what he really religiously feels 
is truth, religious truth really felt, in the blood and the 
bones* 2
Characterizing the sense of tragedy as a recurrent theme in
Hardy's novels, Lawrence in his "Study of Thomas Hardy" indicates
that the individual is torn between two irreconcilable tendencies
first, that he is a member of the Community, and must, 
upon his honour, in no way move to disintegrate the 
Community, either in its moral or its practical form, second 
that the convention of the Community is a prison to his 
natural, individual desire - a desire that compels him, 
whether he feel justified or hot, to break the bounds of the 
Community* 3
This human morality irresistibly raises the question of sincerity 
which is germane to both Lawrence's and Leavis's criticism and here 
again both Lawrence the novelist and the critic affords Leavis the 
example "Before everything I like sincerity and a quickening
4
spontaneous emotion" * la Lawrence's view morality is synonymous with 
sincerity
The only morality is to have man true to his manhood, and 
woman to her womanhood and let the relationship form of 
itself, in all honour, for it is to each life itself* 5
And again he says
Morality in the novel is the trembling instability of the
1* ibid. p.559.
2. ib|<^ . p.562.
3. ibid. p.411.
4 Harry T. Moore (ed.) The Collected Letters of D.H, Lawrence. 
London, Heinemann. 1962, vol. 1, p.21.
5. D.H. Lawrence,'jtSSSU* p.531.
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balance* When the novelist puts his thumb in the scale 
to pull down the balance to his own predilection, that 
is immorality* 1
Leavis also makes morality synonymous with life when he saya
#*, Far from having anything of Flaubert's disgust or disdain 
or boredom, they (the great English novelists) are all 
distinguished by a vital capacity for experience, a kind of _ 
reverent; 4?penness before life, and a marked moral intensity.
Leavis's use of sincerity as a critical term has been elaborated 
in the chapters on Santayana and Whitehead, and it is worthy of
notice that whenever he talks of Eliot's accomplished poems he insists
■ 3that "Eliot's technique is a technique for sincerity." This high
valuation of sincerity has implications for both the nature of
literary criticism and the function of the critic* It is all the
more important as leavis himself has made spectacular claims for
Lawrence as a literary critic and as so much of that criticism is at
work in Leavis's critical practice* The clearest statement of
Lawrence's views on literary criticism, especially on sincerity and
intuition is to be found in the essay on "John Galsworthy", to which
Leavis refers a number of times:
Literary criticism can be no more than a reasoned account of 
the feeling produced upon the critic by the book he is 
criticizing. Criticism can never be a science; it is in 
the first place much too personal, and in the second much 
too concerned with values that science ignores* The 
touchstone is emotion, not reason* We judge a work of art 
by its effect on our sincere and vital emotion and nothing 
else. All the critical twiddle-twaddle about style and 
form, all this pseudo-scientific classifying and analyzing 
of books i)f| an imitation betahlcal fashion, is mere 
impertinence and mostly dull jargon. 4
1# ibid. p.528*
2. F.R* Leavis, The Great Tradition, p.9,
3. The present line of argument may help to counter Lionel Trilling^ 
contention that "When F.R. Leavis^in all seriousness distinguishes 
between those aspects of T.S. Eliot's work which are sincere and 
those which are not, we are inclined to note the distinction as an 
example of the engagingly archaic quality of Dr* Leavis's seriousness". 
Sincerity and Authenticity. Oxford University Press, 1972, p.6«
4. D.H* Lawrence, Phoenix 1, p.539.
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In these statements Lawrence drives home all the essential
points that Leavis deems central to the definition of criticism*
Literary criticism is"a reasoned account of" the reactions of the
critic to the work of art ho has in view. This reaction assîmes the
form of certain feelings generated by that work* But these feelings
far from being sentimental, anarchic or otherwise irresponsible are
controlled by the dictates of reason, and Lawrence's Insistence on the
qualifying adjective "reasoned" confutes Eliot's contention that
Lawrence is guided or rather misguided by
The "Inner Voice" 4» the most untrustworthy and deceitful guide 
that ever offered itself to wandering humanity. 1
To produce a reasoned account is to use the humantmind with care and
forethought, but to use it in the interpretation of one's Own feelings,
hence the inevitability of personal involvement or response. This
personal tone is justifiable on two main counts. First because
ericisa is not and does not claim to be a science; and second because
the work of art which the critic sets out to criticize is neither
scientific nor mathematical, but imaginative and emotional, hence
absolute dispassionateness and impersonality seem to be a remote
possibility* In this connection Leavis's axiom that "a judgment Is
2personal or it is nothing is pertinent. This personal element
3
belongs to what Lawrence elsewhere calls "the fourth dimension"
4
and Leavis in a pseudo philosophic way terms the "third realm", but 
the point needs elaborating*
1. T*S. Eliot's After Strange Gods. London, Faber and Faber, 1934,
P*63.
2. F.R. Leavis, Two Cultures? The Significance of C.P. Snow, p.28,
3. D.H* Lawrence, j^oenig I. p.527.
4. F.R. Leavis. Nor Shall My Sword. pp.98-110.
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Clarifying the viewer's reaction to a painting by Van Gogh
'
Lawrence in his intuitive, rather visionary way says:
The vision on the canvas Is for ever incommensurable with 
the Canvas, or the paint, or Van Gogh as a human organism*
You Cannot weigh nor measure nor even describe the vision 
on the canvas. It exists to tell the truth, only in the 
BMch debated fourth dimension. It is neither man in the 
mirror, nor flower in the mirror, neither is it above or 
below or across anything. It is in between everything in 
the fourth dimension. 1
In a similar way Leavis says:
«•* the literary-critical judgment is the type of all 
judgments and valuations belonging to what in my 
unphilosophical way I've formed the habit of calling the 
"third realm"^the collaboratively created human world, the 
of what is neither public in the sense belonging to 
I:science (it can't be weighed or tripped over or brhught 
into the laboratory or pointed to) nor merely private and 
personal. 2
And Leavis's famous phrase "This is so, isn't it"? is an attempt 
to invite others either to confirm or qualify the personal view of 
the critic in an effort to reach sotw kind of consensus or common 
approach to the work in view* Thus the poem provides a scope for a 
collaborative activity in which the poem has its life in the creative 
response of the individuals, who together renew and perpetuate what 
they participate in, a cultural community or consciousness* So, 
though the judgment is tinged with personal views, it is impersonalized 
in the sense that it is validated only when it is confirmed or 
qualified by a consensus. It should be noted that Lawrence, while 
being a staunch supporter of individuality is simultaneously an arch- 
enen^ of egoism. The livingness and vitality of the individual is 
seen at its highests in relation to other living individuals ahd 
herein lies Lawrence's idea of "at oneness"; and Leavis's notion of 
^collaboration"* This view, taken in its entirety, is bound to east
1. D.H* Lawrence,
2. F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall Mv Sword, p.98.
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doubt on Arnold*8 formulation that ’•criticism Is a disinterested 
endeavour to see the object as In Itself It really is” because 
unless the critic is personally Interested hia criticism will not 
contribute a sense of personal Involvement in the evaluation of the 
work of art* It will rather be anonymous* And so long as criticism 
is not a scientific treatise, and so longes the touchstone is emotion, 
not reason as Lawrence says, the attempt to see the object dispassion­
ately as it really is seems to be an inexact formula because the 
notion of taste Is by definition "relative and creative”^ as Leavla 
himself suggests* This relativity is seen In terms of life "the
judgments^ the literary critic Is concerned with are judgments about 
2
life” ,
This view again implies that, while the critic
should endeavour to discipline his personal prejudices and 
cranks, tares to which we are all subject - and cos^ose his 
differences with as many of his fellows as possible in the 
common pursuit of true judgment,
it definitely negates £Iiot*s notion of
théa relation of the work of art to art, of the work of 
literature to literature, of criticism to criticism* 3
This autonomy of the work of art, which is reminiscent of the school
of art for art*s sake is condemned and sensibly replaced by a' i
reciprocal relation between literature and life, between the function
of the critic as an assessor of the artistic values wiiich become
valuable only in à human and moral scale*
Yet Lawrence’s statement of the nature of criticism still
contains two key-terms that play a eonspicious role In Leavls’s
orltlolsm - ;
We judge a work of art by its effect on our sincere and 
vital emotion,
sincerity and vitality are crucial to the appreciation of works that 
1* y*R, Leavis, Nor Shall My Sword, p.97.
2. ibid* 3* T,8. Eliot, Selected Essays* p*25.
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Leavls singles out for particular study* his essay on Wordsworth,
on Blake, on little Dorrlt, and his book on Lawrence as a novelist,
Lawrence’s lack of interest in form or technique seems
important in the formation of Leavis’s critical taste. He is an
opponent of the formalists who would reduce literature to architectural
patterns. In passage quoted Lawrence protests against the "twiddle-
twaddle about style and form”; elsewhere he declares "Art ^ meaning
formal art) doesn’t interest me. Only the spiritual content”#^
This principle underlies Leavis’s critical work,
Lawrence’s phrasing of his anti-scientific and anti-formalist
approach to literature still repays further study. His choice of
words is significant* The reduction of literature to a scientific
method of Classification and analysis - a reduction against which
Lawrence reacts - does a great deal of harm and violence to the
unified subliminal impact that a work of art is reckoned to produce
in the reader* It la also a "dull jargooTy it does not properly
recognize the very creative nature of literature in which language
is ever adaptable to varying human moods and situations* In other
words what Lawrence is objecting to Is the rlgidifying and hardening
of language into standardized scientific formulae* Lawrence, it
should be noted, is a master of form, but form that is Intuited and
Informed by vibrant human values and feelings. He tries to adapt
language to fluctuating human modes and sensations* In a letter to
Edward Garnett he describes the style of W<xaen in Love as different
from that of Sons, and Lovers*
I shan’t write in the same manner as Sons and Lovers again 
I think, in that hard, violent style, full of sensation 
and presentation* 2
1, Edward Wehls, Lawrence; A Composite Plograohv* vol. I,
the University of Wisconsin^Press, 1957, p*293*
2* Aldous Huxley (ed.) The Letters of P.H* Lawrence, p.172*
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Repudiating thè traditional type of predictable and uniform characters
he again addresses himself to Edward Garnett sayingi
You mustn’t look in novel for the old stable ego of the 
character* There Is another ego, according to whose 
actions the individual Is unrecognizable, and passes through, 
as it were, allotropie states which it needs a deeper sense 
than any we’ve been used to exercise,
and in the same letter he diagnoses this characterization as "the 
r
real thing^. Reality here is identified with sincerity because it 
answers to Lawrence’s philosophy of human life as inhering in a state 
of flux and dynamism* This quality in Lawrence induces Leavis to say 
of him that
he is a most daring and radical innovattr^ i in form, method, 
technique, and his Innovations and experiments are dictated 
by the most serious and urgent kind of interest in life* 2
Supplying the critics with the right cue Lawrence says
Never trust the artist* Trust the tale* The proper function 
of the critic is to save the tale from the artist who 
created it* 3 (fhis is grounded on his belief that)"art 
speech is the only truth"* 4
Lawrence’s statement inevitably recalls to mind leavis’s aphorism that
"Intentions are nothing in art except as realized" * Leavis goes on
to point to the antinomy that the intention animating the work of art
may considerably vary from the original intention of the artist, and in
this respect the analogy with Lawrence is obvious* To define the function
of the critic as residing in saving the tale from the artist who created
it is to say - in Leavisian terms - that
the critic sh<xild be concerned with the work in front of him 
as something that should contain within itself the reason 
why it is so and not otherwise, and to determine what is 
actually there in the work of art* 0
1. laia, p.196
2* F.E. Leavis, The Great Tradition* p*24*
3* D*H, Lawrence, Studies in Classic American Literature. Penguin books 
1971, p*8*
4* iMd*
5* r.R* Leavis, The Common Pursuit* p*22$*
0* JL^ JLât p*224*
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This is, la effect a restatesaent of Lawrence’s maxim that art speech
is the only truth - a maxim which also specifies the nature of the
creative process in art* The material of art should apeak for itself
Independently of the artist who created it, and this necessitates
that the artist should employ a method of indirection through which he
can render and not state his experience* Lawrence says ,
If the novelist puts his thumb in the pan, for love, 
tenderness, sweetness^ peach, then he commits an Immoral 
act, 1
and when urged by his English publishers to excise some parts from
Lady phatterley’s Lover, he says
**, impossible, I might as well try to chip my own nose Into 
shape with scissors* The book bleeds* 2
Lawrence’s choice of the term "bleeds" is highly fortunate, and speaks
of the lively, organic relationship between the vital parts that form
the work of art* It is again in keeping with the philosophy of
organism outlined by Whitehead*
1# D,H* Lawrence, Phoenix I, p.529* 
2* D*a* Lawrence, Phoenix II, p.489* 
3* cf the Chapter on Whitehead*
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lié leavls’g Criticism of Lawrence 
In hta introduction to Lawrence. Novelist. Leavis describes 
bis first attempt to write on Lawrence in 1930 as "a quixotic folly"
To account for this change of tone it Is necessary to compare Leavis’s
'
Minority^ PatftDhlet on Lawrence with his book Lawrence. Novelist.
This change will be considered in the light of Leavis’s development as 
a critic. If a summary view is permissible it can tentatively be 
suggested that the Mlgorlty Pamphlet was largely inspired by Eli otic 
ideas or more generally by technical analysis* By the time Leavis 
started reconsidering Lawrence, he was drawing on other sources — sources 
that form "the human world", of which Lawrence himself among others 
including Whitehead, and later Collingwood and Polanyi, form a part.
But this is a crude oversimplification since Leavis’s object as he 
states it in both the Minority Pamnhlet and P.H* Lawrence. Novelist is 
"to vindicate Lawrence" yet here a distinction must be drawn between the 
two forms of Vindication* In the pamphlet vindication is rendered by 
ascribing "geniusf’ to Lawrence; in the book it is mainly with Lawrence 
the artist, the novelist that Leavis is preoccupied*
The quality of genius imputed to Lawrence in the first essay 
gradually diminishes as the reader goes on reading it (one presumes that 
genius is used in its laudatory sense as it is meant to be a vindication)* 
In imputing "genius^ to Lawrence Leavis draws a comparison between him 
and Blake on the ground that both were most unconventional, terribly 
honest in recording human experience, and primarily Interested in 
vindicating impulse and spontaneity against conventional attitudes.
But immediately after this Leavis quotes the following from Woaeh In Lovet
1. y.R. Leavis, Lawrence. Novelist. London, Çhatto and Windus,
1955, p.0*
2* The book first originated in a series of essays titled "The Novel 
as Dramatic Poem". The first essay on Lawrence was on "St Mawr" 
Scrutiny, vol. XVII, No. I, Spring 1950, pp* 38-53.
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H® turned away* Either the heart would break or cease to 
care. Whatever the mystery which has brought forth the 
universe, It is a hon-human mystery, It has Its own great 
ends, man Is not the criterion. Best leave it all to the vast, 
creative, nonMiuman mystery* The eternal creative mystery 
could dispose of man and replace him with a finer created 
being. Just as the horse has taken the place of the 
mastodon.
It was very consoling to Birkln to think this. The 
fountain-head was incorruptible and unsearchable. It had no 
limits,.,. To have one’s pulse beating direct from the 
mystery, this was perfection, unutterable satisfaction.
Human or unhuman matters nothing. 1
And then commentst
Blake, if he could have thought this, would not have found 
it consoling, Birkln, of course, though one of Lawrence’s 
obvious self-dramatizations is not to be taken as completely 
representative, but it is fair to make this passage an 
opportunity for noting that Lawrence’s preoccupation with 
the primitive fosters in him a certain inhumanity. The 
context gives the judgment Its appropriate force. 2
After recommending Sens and Lovers
as the record of emotional life such as is possible only 
to a genius, 3
Leavis concludes by dismissing both Sons and Lovers, and The Rainbow
for being difficult and monotonous;
Sons and Lovers for all its poignant beauty, everyone I have 
discussed it with agrees with me in finding difficult to 
get through. The Rainbow is a great deal more difficult, 
we do not doubt the urgency for the author of these 
shifting tensions of the inner life; this drama of the 
inexplicit and almost inexpressible in human intercourse, 
but for us the effect Is one of monotony* Lawrence’s 
fanatical concern with the"essential" often results in a 
strange intensity, but how limited is the range, and the 
intensity too fails to come through th us. 4
It may be observed that this obsessive intensity here 
condemned Is later seen as onecfKtevlrtues of Lawrence’s artl and in
1* F.R. Leavis, P.H. Lawrence. Cambridge, Minority press, 1930, p.5.
jLSljâe P*0*
3# ibid. p.S.
4* ibid» P*8.
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the same context I that Is The Rainbow.
Reviewing Women In Love. In the light of Lawrence’s notion that
the novel has the ability "to inform and lead into new places the flow
of our sympathetic consciouenes^, Leavis eays:
When, so authorized, we consider as a work of art Women In Love 
(written in 1916) a novel in which the mature conclusions 
are embodied, our judgtaent cannot be altogether favourable to 
them. For Women In Love hardly Informs and leads into new 
places the flow of our sympathetic consciousness. 1
. Leavis further argues that
the characters in Women In Love tend to disintegrate into 
swirls of conflicting impulses and emotions. It is 
difficult to keep them apart. 2
Leavis also maintains that in Women In Love Lawrence is concerned
to convey a kind of knowledge that can only be communicated by subtle
and poetic shades of meaning;
But Lawrence uses for the purpose a specialized vocabulary 
of terms that he tries to Invest with a new potency by 
endless re-iteration; "dark", "pure", "utter", "inchoate", 
"disintegrate", "uncreated", "violated", "abstract",
"mindless", "lapse out", "loins of darkness" and so on.
This method is to use one of Lawrence’s own terms of 
reprobation, mechanical. 3
And later on he says;
A great part of the book gets no nearer to concrete 
particularity than that (the specialised vocabulary).
And such methods as the insistent minute description of the 
colours of clothes are equally mechanical. 4
As Leavis proceeds to discuss the other novels he says
his later novels, as ho wanders from country to country,
Italy, Sardinia, Australia, iWxico, exhibit in varying 
measure the kind of defect indicated above; they are 
fascinating, exasperating and difficult to go through. 5
1. ibid « p.11.
2. ibid « p.12.
3. (bid, pp. 12-13.
4. Ibid. p.l3.
3. ihëJLd» P.14.
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Lawrence’s philosophy of spontaneity and elemental life is 
chastifédd and rebuked for its escapist nature and its lack of 
intelligences
••* let man be as primitive as primitive can be, he still 
has a mind, but it is plain that the civilization that he 
still seems in some way to care for could not exist if no 
one eared more about mind than he does* It is plain that 
his (Lawrence’s) devotion to the dark God is not so much 
an evangel of salvation as a symptom, a refuge from the 
general malady than a cure* 1
Having dismissed most of Lawrence’s novels Leavis settles down
to a simple admiration for The Lost Girl, then considered as Lawrence’s 
2
best novel and Lady Chatterlev’s Lover: the first because of its
"sensuous vitallty"^ y:= and the second because of its "sensuous 
concretenessf*
These two works were largely superseded, in Leavis’s final 
assessment, by The Rainbow and Women In Love.
In attempting a more judicious approach to the subject Leavis
apologises for his imperfect understanding sayings
I cannot judge that iny sense Of being critically qualified 
was well-grounded* And yet when I ask where 1 could have 
found the hint for a be^er understanding of^ sayJ Women 
In Love, the answer is^wher^*^ There wa^so far as I 
know-nothing more enlightened or enlightening critically 
than Middleton Murry’s review of the book*. ^  5
Leavis’s apology can be accepted as D.H. Lawrence. Novelist* 
redresses earlier shortcomings*
In fact, quixotic and Confusing as the early essay is, it 
still contains some of the original ideas that were to feature not
1# Ibid. p.18*
2. Ibid* p.14,
3. ibid* p.l7.
4 ibid. p.20*
5* P,R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence, N o v e l i jO
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only Leavis’s later criticism of Lawrence, but also the whole of leavis’s
critical apparatus, and before enlarging on this point, it should be
noted that in both the first essay and the bOok Leavis’s admiration
for the short stories and St Mawr is consistently maintained.
The notion of the "organic community" on which leavis draws in
Culture and Environment Is, as I have indicated in the first section,
Lawrentian* Leavis’s interest in the opening part of The Rainbow
underlines one of his major concerns with "The mysterious intercourse
of man with the world around him"^,
Leavis further draws an analogy between Lawrence’s writings
and Spongier’8 The Decline of The West^ regarding the sense of
communion between man and his native land thrtxtgh which we can discern
that Leavis is developing a leading critical principle that figures
in his writings. His interest in the points in consaon between Lawrence
and Spengler gives a glimpse of F,R. and Q,D, Leavis’s interest in
anthropology and the social context of literature seen at work in
Fiction and The Reading Public, and their Interest in Professor 
3
Chadwick,
The notion of "sincerity" which was to assume a central place
in leavis’s criticism la latent in the pamphlet. Speaking about
Sons and Lovers. Leavis says*
In Sons and Lovers <1913) his third novel, he is mature 
in the sense of being completely himself. If is a 
beautiful and poignant book showing a sincerity in the 
record of emotional life such as is poR3ible only to a 
genius, 4
1. F.R. Leavis, D.H, Lawrence. Cambridge, Minority press, 1930, p.0.
2. ibid. pp. 27-28.
3. See Q.D, Leavis "Professor Chadwick and English Studied", Selection 
from Scrutiny, vol. I, pp. 41-40 and F.R, Leavis, English Literature 
in our Time and The University, p.12.
4 F.R, Leavis, o p . cit. p.5.
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Furthermore there is the nebulous rellzatioa that "life" as
Lawrence describes It, and as Leavis later sums it up
depends upon emotional spontaneity and this has been made 
impossible for us by self-consciousness, by ideals, by 
mind-knowledge. 1
There is even a glimpse of Leavis’s later consideration of Lawrence’s
works as "dramatic poems";
«*, the early work leads one to talk loosely of the author 
as a "poet". (Ha did indeed write verse, but not much of 
it is poetry, though it is very interesting in various 
ways he rarely attained the level of The Ballad of a Second 
Ophelia). 2
Leavis’s distinction between verse and poêtry helps to mark 
off his earlier criticism of Lawrence from the later. The series of 
essays in which those on Lawrence appeared are suggestively titled 
"The Novel as dramatic poem". Leavis does not only attribute to 
Lawrence’s works a poetic quality, but a dramatic element which 
characterizes the finer layers of poetry. He is thereby refuting 
the notion that Lawrence’s genius is lyrical, as will be demonstrated 
later.
In the book we find that the vindication, "the long battle to 
recognition tor Lawrence*^  la substantially justified and Leavis comes 
to grips with the real prejudices that hampered the placing of 
Lawrence in the tradition.
In settling down mainly to The Rainbow. Women In Love. and 
The Tales as representative of Lawrence’s achievement as a novelist, 
Leavis, by implication, adopts a sociological and psychological kind 
of criticism rather than one based on formal excellence. Thus while 
parting company wit# the "technique" of Eliot’s criticism, he is acting 
in accordance with the fundamental principles of Whitehead, Collingwood,
1. F.E. Leavis, P.II. Lawrence, p.9.
2. iJàiâ» p.0.
3. F.R, Leavis, D.H, Lawrence. Novelist. p.12.
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and later Polanyl* key-note which Leavis’s introduction to 
DH# Lawrencep Novelist* strikes is that of the supersession of TheT •   -  •- ■
Lost Girl and Lady Chatterlev*a Lover by The Rainbow and Women In Love;
I deal with the lesser novels from The Lost Girl to Lady 
Chatterlev* g Lover ./«.and in dealing with them concede to 
adverse criticism of Lawrence what I think has to be 
conceded# 1
In moving in that direction Leavis is following the Lawrence whose 
attack on Flaubert’s aestheticism is so high in his esteem#
Accounting for his early imperfect appreciation of Lawrence* 
Leavis ascribes it partly to the uncongenial conditions prevalent in 
the thirties* and partly to the lack of genuinely appreciative critiques 
of Lawrence# He has in mind Murry’s Reminiscences of D.H. Lawrence 
(1930) and Son of Woman (1931)# The first relates a series of episodes 
in the lives of Lawrence. Murry and Katherine Mansfield* and offers 
the biographical background that, In Murry’s view, explains or 
conditions Lawrence’s works. Mürry’s interpretation of Lawrence is 
primarily biographical and impressionistic. In Reminiscences of 
D.H. Lawrence the emphasis falls on Lawrence’s works as reflections of 
various stages of his experience of life. In Son of Woman, as the title 
indicates, Lawrence’s failure to lead a normal and healthy kind of life 
is traced back to his crippling passion for his mother. It is a mother " 
complex that impedes him from establishing normal and natural relations 
with other women, and more specifically with Frieda* his wife# This 
failure prompts Lawrence to seek relation with men, and in 
Reminiscences of D.H. Lawrence l&irty tells us that he is the Gerald of 
Women in Lovo and that Lawrence looked to S&irry for an ideal kind of 
friendship. These general outlines need further elaboration.
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Son of Woman which Murry professes to be a critical appraisal
of Lawrence’s works, derives its substance from one central assumption
namely that Lawrence the man is the ever-present subject of his works#
The White Peacock (he says) is a story - Sons and Lovers is
the life of a man. It is easy to see that the experience 
which is so richly recorded in Sons and Lovers had supplied 
the solid foundation for the Imaginative structure of The 
White Peacock. 1
and then with an obvious contradicti&an he says
For those who do not care to follow Lawrence in the passionate 
exploration of life which subsequently engrossed him it 
(Sons and Lovers) will probably remain his greatest wbook.
If Lawrence is to be Judged as the "pure artist", then it is 
true that he never surpassed and barely equalled this rich 
and moving record of life* 2
Ho later tells us that in Ladv Chatterlev*s Lover. Mollors is
'3more or less identified with Lawrence himself , and that The Rainbow 
is the story of Lawrence’s "sexual failure" * He identifies Lawrence 
with Will Brangwen and Anton Skrebensky^i whereas all biographical 
Information in the third generation of The Rainbow, goes to show, as 
far as I can see - that if Lawrence is to be identified with any 
character It is with Ursula whose teaching experience and fa&ily 
relations bear directly on those of Lawrence*
Adopting the same procedure In his approach to Women in Love. 
Murry says;"
As a matter of fact, Lawrence is so immersed In his personal 
experience that he forgets his story. Birkln had not taken 
this knowledge of Ursula in the novel, Lawrence had taken it 
of the woman in life, and the record is in"Manifesto"«
There it only remained for him to be known, even as he knows, 
without which he cannot be free. Mow, in the novel, where 
he is master, he gives himself this "liberation". Ursula 
Brangwtn^'is made to desire what the poet of "Manifesto" 
desired that his woman should desire. 6
1. J, Middleton Murry, Son of Wtman. London, Jonathan Cape, 1931, p.22.
2. JUllà, p.23.
3. ibid. p.40.
4. Ibid, p.89.
3. ibid. p.82.
«. ibiâ, p.117.
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Aaron's Bod, which he views as Lawrence's masterpiece - is an
attempt on the part of Lawrence to
solve his personal problem; and he cannot solve it. He 
needs a man - and he needs a man of realisation like his 
own. He creates the man - Aaron Sisson. Sisson is a 
dream-Lawrence. 1
The point to be emphasized in this context is that Marry never mentions
or makes use of the notion of impersonality which he holds essential to
the plausibility and effectiveness of a work of art , and the reason
is that Lawrence, as Murry apparently thinks, does not secure this
quality In his works. When Leavis mminds us by way of apology for the
lack of a more adequate understanding of Lawrence that there was
nothing more enlightening than Murry's writings, one has to take note
of that# The biographical and personal interpretation initiated by
Murry is seen at work in Leavls's early essay. He, for instance says
Sons and Lovers bears obviously a close relation to 
Lawrence's personal history. The Rainbow deals with three
generations, yet it seems to bear much the same relation
to personal experience. In fact, Lawrence here is exploring 
his own personal problems living them in the book. 3
And though Leavis, at the end of his essay gives a glimpse of what
amounts to a notion of tsqpersonality (talking about The Woman who Bode
Away) he says
it has the air of starting in the common world, but it 
achieves a transmutation of ordinary reality so con^lete 
and intense that we have to go to such poetry as "The 
Ancient Mariner*' for parallels 4
he never employs the term "impersonality" as a critical instrument
here. This biographical criticism does not, in effect, take us far
away from Eliot's view of Lqrrence as a exponent of "The Inner Voice,"
1. jbld. fp.2 8* 5.
2. J. Middleton «kirry. The Problem of Style. Oxford University Press, 
1922, pp. 122-143.
3. F.R* Leavis, D.H. Lawrence. Cambridge Minority Press, 1930, p.8.
4. l-btd. p.33.
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and leavis’s aserl^Apn of genius to Lawrence in the first essay iuq>lie8
an erratic nature liable in effect to the "personal heresy" noted by
Eliot. Though Leavis’s earlier essay was meant to extort recognition
for Lawrence it was substantially reduced to acquiescence in the climate
of opinion then furnished largely by Murry and Eliot. This view of
Lawrence as a "man" and not "an artist" dominated the scene for almbst
two decades, so much so that when H# Coombes quotes illustrative
specimens of derogatory criticism of Lawrence^, one is struck by the
bulk of pernicious criticism of Lawrence, arising largely from the
influence esprcised by such early critics on Lawrence* P0. S. Savage,
for example, carries on these early misconceptions about Lawrence* In
The Personal Principle he says
The signUTicanoe of Lawrence lay in his life rather than in 
his workdr-his refusal to allow art its due rights and to be 
himself the considerable artist which he was. Lawrence’s 
abandonment of all that we understand the spiritual ^  
heritage of the west, and his turning^o vital primitivism* 
Because Lprence wyi not a thinker... Lawrence’s view of 
life, his biologism^which is a similarly retrogressive 
dissolution back into primary 11f^implies a refusal of 
spiritual values. 2
i have quoted this passage at second hand because It was 
published, among others, by Leavis in Scrutlgv at the request of
H. Coombes who called upon some of the Scrutiny editbraa to do something 
to save the reputation of Lawrence; and Leavis’s editorial note gives 
a promise of fulfilling that task®. The fulfilment came in the follbwing 
year with the first instalment of Leavis’s new rork on Lawrence. The 
fact that he quotes some of the passages given by Coombes^ emphasises
1. H. Coombes "A Letter to the Editor" Scrutiny, vol. XVI, no. X, 
March, 1949, pp. 45-42.
2. Quoted in Scyqtlny. vol. XVI, no. I, March 1949, p.45.
3. ütXâ, p.44.
4. See the footnote to D*Jf* Lawrence. Hovelist, p.20, where Leavis 
requotes V.8. Pritchett, in The Living Novel.
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that leavla’s defence of Lawrence is made against these perpetuated 
prejudices.
leavis argues that these prejudices and mi sunderstandings
persisted under "the prestifeuous influence of Eliott. Be reminds the
reader of Eliot’s adverse criticism of Lawrence, making particular
mention of Lawrence’s lack of humour, his sexual morbidity, and his
inability to transcend his own personal life and achieve artistic 
2
excellence . Leavis explains Eliot’s failure to recognize Lawrence’s
. -. ^  ^  ' ■ ■ ■ .
artistic merit by reference to Lawrence’s attack on Flaubert and 
Thomas Mann} and this brings us back to that constant opposition between 
art as a manifestation of life and art as a form of technical excellence « 
the first espoused by Lawrence and the second championed by Eliot • 
Leavis’s argument in P.H. Lawrence, Novelist shows him 
exploring the possibilities of different critical ideas and if New 
Bearings and Revaluation of the early Leavis bear the indelible 
imprints of Eliot, D.H. Lawrence. Novelist asserts the supremacy of 
Lawrentian ideas. In other words the book shows Leavis’s later critical 
ideas in mature form (in fact they have already begun with The Greaif 
Tradition), and if "genius" in the first essay on Lawrence is 
virtually void of any significant meaning (due to Eliot’s influence), 
in the book it becomes associated with artistic achievement - with life 
or rather with reverence for life - it is the genius that portrays 
civilization rendered through the invididual . But to leave the analogy
1. T.S* Eliot, After Strange Gods, p.58.
2. T.S. Eliot. The Criterion. V.IO, October 1930, July, 1931, p.769.
3. cf the first section of this chapter.
4* F.R. Leavis* s D ,H .Lawrence. Novell st. p.75.
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between Eliot and Flaubert at this point is to miss leavis*s Intention,
be .
because in his endeavours to refute Eliot’s charges against Lawrence
Leavis associates Eliot’s attitude with that of Flaubert, one of
"diSKusTland ^ dlstaste^^. ïîe further identifies this lack of Interest
in life with artistic deficiency. :
I am thinking of the Flaubert the stultifying nature of 
whose iniWr self-contradiction • art-defea^ng because life- 
defeatlngf*expOses itself so dismally In L’Éducation Sentimentale.
And by way of substantiating this analogy Leavis alludes to the
strait-Jacket form, la niece bien faite of The Cocktail Party where
there is the sick poverty, the triviality, and finally^the 
nothingnes^ of the dones^the human and spiritual nullity# 3
Leavis reinforces his point by reminding his reader that the Eliot who
is interested in Pound’s Cantos not because of what they s%r# but
because of the way in which Pound expresses himself
cannot be found reliable In distinguishing between what makes 
for health and what makes against It# 4
The phrase inevitably reminds us of the criticism applied in The Great
Tradition where the major novelists
are significant In terms of the human awareness they promote 
awareness of the possibilities of life; 5
far from having anything of Flaubert’s disgust, disdain or boredom#
A
(the words are taken verbatim from Lawrence) they afS dlltdigtlagufshed
7
by a reverent openness before life and a marked moral intensity#
1. p.25#
2# Ibid# p#25#
3# Ibid# p.20#
4# P*30*
5. F.R# Leavis, The Great Tradition# p.2#
6. D.B# Lawrence, Phoenix I, p.312#
7# F.R* Leavis, op#_ clt.. p.9.
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(
Hence the rightness of Including Lawrence in "The Great Tradition"#
Xs there no name later than Conrad's to be included in the 
great tradition? There is^ X am convinced one; D#H# Lawrence# 
Lawrence in the English language was the great genius of our 
time# 1
and later in his Introduction to D.H. Lawrencef Novelist be say*
"this book carries on from The Great Tradit1ont"
Xt should be noted that Leavis starts off bis discussions in the 
first and second chapters of D.H. Lawrence 1 Novelist with some of Eliot’s 
views on Lawrence; that is, Eliot’is present in Leavis’s mind, but his 
influence is negative and the course of argument reveals Leavis’s 
consistent disenchantment with Eliot# Associated with Eliot is The 
Bloomsbury Group to whom X have already referred. The aes€etlc interests 
advocated by that gr<nip are essentially at variance with Lawrence’s 
moral and human pursuits#
To realize the impact of all these hostile factors is to call for 
a juster appraisal of Lawrence; and that is what Leavis’s book sets out 
to do# Here It may be recorded that Leavis’s change of mind (from the 
early essay into the book) should not be regarded as a kind of 
inconsistency, but as a development of his own critical spectrum - a 
"maturing of his own experience, so to speak# In a revealing state­
ment he says
It is Lawrence’s greatness that to appreciate him is to 
revise one’s criteria of intelligence, and one’s notion 
of it, 3
and before that he has said that to understand Lawrence one has
to overcome certain difficulties - and the worst difficulty 
we have in coming to terms with his art is that there is 
resistance in us to what it has to comminicate) 4
1# F.R# Leavis, The Great Tradition# p.23#
2# F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrenceh Novelist# p,9#
3# ibid. p.27.
4. Ib id . f).H.
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The works that relate Lawrence to the great tradition are 
The Rainbow# Women In Love and The Tales. To justify this verdict Leavis 
Is bound to show why the other works fall short as integratednnovels.
The Lost Girl* formerly viewed as Lawrence’s best work (mainly because
of its sensuous ^ eone^etW^es) is now seen as illustrative of Lawrence’s
sense of humour and comedy
' 'n butjwe realize that there is no compelling total significance 
in control. I
The significance found wanting is conce^^ved in terms of social and
moral relativity — a significance of the kind that Leavis discerns in
The Rainbow and Women In Love. This significance partly derives from
2
Lawrence himself who Is essentially a relativist.
Aaron’s Rod Is different from The Rainbow and Women In Love, on
the one hand, and Sons and Lovers on the other* The first two are
remarkable for the s»asure of Impersonality therein achieved, and the
other, though directly bearing on the personal life of Lawrence, yet
in the final analysis it has the virtues of a good work of art that can
stand on its own merits (it should be noted that Leavis’s references
to Sons and Lovers are very fleeting and evasive and he tries to
justify this attitude by maintaining that it has had enough attention).
Aaron’s Rod (says Leavis) is far more .tentative, much more 
like an actual living of the problem (jut the author’s own 
predicament; something experinwntal embarked upon in the 
expectation that the essential Insight will have sufficiently 
clarified and established itself by the c l o s e . 3
To Leavis’s words one must add that there is no sense of direction
controlling the narrative. Lawrence precariously alternates between
Aaron and Lilly. The end of the novel where Lilly proposes a spiritual
relationship between himself and Aaron is quite different from the
1. Ibtd, P
2. See the first section of this chapter.
3. Ibia. p 3 p
— 264 —
beginning In which we are given Aaron trying to escape the possessiveness 
of his wife. In other words Lawrence the man seems once again to 
intrude upon the course of events to live his own problems through 
regardless of the exigencies of the woi^ of literature that call for 
coherence and organic relations. The point of weakness is again shown 
in Lawrence’s shift of emphasis (which does not receive enough justifi­
cation) from the social context of family life to the idea of leadership 
and the political problem it involves,
Leavis further argues that the tentative*nature of Aaron’s Rod 
can be represented by Lawrence’s attitude to the character of Jim 
Bricknell, His eccentric attitude occupies so much space in the early 
part of the book that we expect it to play an effective role In future 
developments, but after the eighth chapter Lawrence discounts him.
What is worse is that Lawrence’s diversions into descriptions of the 
life of Sir William and Lady Franks, the party at Novara, the English %  
speaking community at Florence, his love for the Marchesa are/revisions 
of immediate personal experience that can be easily excised from the 
text without much harm.
Ellseo Vivas’s criticism of Lawrence provides a good example of 
the influence expeted by Leavis on later critics of Lawrence* The 
distinction be drawn between the good and the poor in Lawrence’s works 
is inspired by Leavisian suggestions
... the difference between his best as represented by 
Women In Love and The Rainbow, and some of the short 
stories cm the one hand, and the poor work on the other 
is abysmal. 1
And then he goes on to say
And the worst of his novels is, in my opinion, Aaron’s Rod.
I say it fully aware that Mr. Leavis praises it highly. 2
1, Eli see Vivas, The Failure and the Triumph of Art. London, George Allen 
Unwin Ltd., 1961, p.21,
2* Ibid. p.21.
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Leavis’s criticism of the story as stated above does hot show that he
praises It highly at all. The reasons that Vivas gives for condemning
the novel are exactly leavisian. He says
The book is a mere transcription; mere reportage^,
2and the poverty is the result of "pure paddingf* ♦ These are precisely
the faults which Leavis finds with the book, and when Vivas says that
the book shows no trace of creative imagination, he is repeating Leavis’s
notion that the book manifests a failure of imagination*
Vivas is obviously echoing Leavis’s notion in saying;
When we consider the changes that have taken place between 
the year 1911 (when)Lawrence’s first novel appeared) and the 
present, it seems that this is as much Lawrence’s century 
as that of any other writer of the period. For he was one 
of the writers who helped give form to the sensibility we 
now possess, and who helped define the values and concerns 
that are the substance of our lives. 3
With Aaron’s Rod Kangaroo is associated by reason of the urgency
of personal problems# As Aaron’s Rod gives intimations of Lawrence’s
difficulties with Frieda# and the feasibility of political action,
Richard Lovat Somers being the central character in Kangarco is
obviously Lawrence himself and Harriet is Frieda. Somers’s complicity
with Calcott in political agitation in the interests of the working
classes - a complicity from which Harriet is excluded - is a variation
on Aaron’s escape from the possessiveness of his wife. In both Aaron’s
Rod and Kangaroo we notice that Aaron and Somers are attempting to
establish human relations beyond female love - relations of men to men.
Lsavis traces this attitude of Lawrence back to the Inescapable hold
which his mother had on him, outiofthe quotations which Leavis takes from
that work leavis extracts the following from the chapter called "Coo-£E*.
1. Ibid, p.22.
2. ibid. p.23.
3. ibid. p»4.
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The Somers of the dream was terribly upset* He cried
tears from his very bowelsoand laid his hand on the woman’s
arm saying^"But I*love yoq, J^n*t you believe in me? Don’t
you be 11 eve in me? But the woman, she seemed almost old
now - only shed a few bitter tears, bitter as vltrfj»!, from
her distorted face, and bitterl]|L hideously she turned
away, dragging her arm from the/touch of his fingers
turned.as it seemed to the dream-Smiers#awayo the dullen
and dreary*everlasting hell of repudiation. Ho woke at this,
and listened to the thunder of the sea with h o r r o r tJ
women in his life he had loved down to the quick of life and n
death# his mother and Harriet* 1 *-
And by way of commenting on that quotation Leavis sayst
For all the emancipating triumph of intelligence represented 
by Sons and Lovers, the tec-close relation established with 
him by his mother had Its permanent consequences* The dream- 
confueion of the mother with Frieda is significant# forcing 
himself to "come right awake", Somers tells himself that 
when he is asleep and off his guard his old weaknesses, over-* 
come in his full,day-waking self, rise up and take their 
revenge on the victorious healthy consciousness. The 
dream "means that the actual danger is gone". 2
Leavis carries on his quotations from Kangaroo with a passage in
which we leqm of Somers that
he could never take the move into activity unless Harriet and 
his dead mother believed in him.** In the individual man he 
was, and the sone of man, they believed with all the intensity 
of undivided love. But in the impersonal man^  the man.that '
would go beyond them,with his back to them, Ch^^ ^ n u a ^ jthey 
did not find it 80 easy to believe. 3 ^
Leavis’s commentary runs as followsI
•*• though he (Lawrence) was supremely intelligent, with the 
intelligence that manifests itself in a rare degree of self- 
knowledge, clearly his peculiar experience of emotional 
forcing, strain, and painful re-adjustment had some lasting 
consequences that made it very difficult for him to be sure
of his poise and centrality as a reporter on some of the
most delicate problems his genius drove him to explore* 4
In quoting fr«a both Lawrence and Leavis at such a length I would
like to drive home the following point; that Laavls’s conclusions on
1* Quoted in F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence.Novelist. p,46
3. j^ bid* p.40.
3* Ibid. p.47.
4. j M d . p.47.
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Lawrence are drawn from a close consideration of texts, and not from 
personal acquaintance as Murry does in both Son of Woman and 
Reminiscences of D.H. Lawrence. Leavis has his eye on the text as a 
work of art that is sometimes vitiated by the intrusion of Lawrence's 
personal problems upon it, whereas Murry takes these problems as the 
substance of these works. To put it succinctly Leavis sees the work 
from within, but Murry views it from without; and unlike MUrry, Leavis 
is aware that to draw normative conclusions about man's relation to 
woman on one hand and to man on the other is obviously a delicate 
matter.
Lawrence!a complexity of attitude, characteristically conveyed 
in his workyas in (say) Women In Love and Kangaroo, shows how 
far from unaware he is of the delicacy. 1
It is tills insight into the complexity and subtlety of Lawrence's
attitude to human relations discernible in his works that marks Leavis
off from Murry and the other critics cited by H« Coombes in his letter
2to Scrutiny of which Leavis speaks in D.H. Lawrence. Novelist. The 
delicacy referred to by Leavis is illustrated by the complex nature of 
Kangaroo. Hie book may be read as a day-dream in which Lawrence 
fictitiously imagines himself as a political activist, but such a 
reading will be inadequate because side by side with this imaginary 
aspect of the book - this self-indulgence so to speak - there are 
arresting moments of aloofness and detachment* Leavis takes the 
dramatic chapter titled "At Sea In Marriage" as an example* In this 
chapter Lawrence plays with one of his favourite ideas - the leadership 
assumed by the husband towards his wife, and the submission of the wife 
to, and recelait ion of, that leadership* The idea is woilced out in
1* ^bld. p.52*
2* cf the early part of this section*
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suggestive terms as family life Is represented by a ship that can be 
steered only by the real Captain - the husband - who in Lawrence’s view 
stands not for love but for power - the power of the dark God. But
. f
at a moment of dispassionate realization Lawrence recognizes the equally
valid claims of Harriet as she addressed him sayings
You! (she exclaimed) You a lord and master! Why, don’t you 
know that I love you as no man ever was loved? You a lord
and master! Ph! You look it! Let me tell you I love you
far, far more than ever you ought to be loved, and you 
should acknowledge it* 1
This is the sense of equipoise which achieves a fullness of
response, and which makes any abstract formulations about Lawrence
incomprehensive and inaccurate,
"The dark GocT, or rather the dark male power being the central
theme of Kangaroo, is also the subject underlying The Ladybird. The
tale has a diagnostic value as it portrays the maladies of post-war
England and Eurqp^. It exposes the fallacy of traditional ideas like th
the "love" and "truth* adopted by Lady Beveridge and the adoration - lust
of Basil - Lady Daphne’s husband. Lady Daphne is so constituted as to
rebel against the humanitarian tendencies of her mother, and the adoring
attitude of her husband* 3o her own blood turned against her, beat on
2her own nerves and destroyed her*
When Dionys tells her that she looks ill and that something had
3
struck her across the face, and she could not forget it , she
identifies this thing with the war*
Throughout the stress falls on the dark eyes of Dionys* «•
his eyes were dark and haughty*** and from across this 
shadow he locked with his dark, beautifully fringed eyes, as
1* D.H. Lawrence, Kangaroo. London, William Heinemann, 1923, p.192*
2, D.H. Lawrence, The Ladybird (published together with The Fax and 
The Captain’s Doll) London, Martin Seeker, 1923, pp. 13-14*
3* , p*i4.
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a proud little beast from the shadow of its Xair*^
It is the magnetic attraction of these dark eyes that awakens in
her a new sense of power and approximates her to that spontaneous energy^
to that real^livingness which is lost"by willing and intellectualislng^
' .
I leavis’s commentary on the ending of the tale is illuminating
in two important respects. First it draws a distinction between the
tests of reality and the laws of art. The first would suggest the
possibility of Daphne’s divorce from Basil and her remarriage to
Dionys as a feasible solution; the second would rule out that
suggestion as n^dve
The tale doesn’t move on the plane of such denouements; it 
is too portentous, too large, in the kind of significance it 
has proposed. 3
The portentousness and largeness are justified by Dionys’s faith
In the continuity of his relation with Daphne after death in the
darkness where be will be king of Hades. &it the way this faith is
brought out brings In the second main point made by Leavis*
instead of the frank Inconcluslveness of Aaron’s Rod and 
Kangaroo, we have this show^.^something positive and 
confident,''which, when we issfe-ail^ the larger suggestion 
of the tale, must affect us as something like an attempt to 
conjure the actual world, with Its tests and problems^ 
away. There is a betraying obviousness - It is of the 
order of sentimentality - about the quality of the final, 
would-be clinchingaincantatioDS. 4 
/
Leavis is right in indicating that the close is overeisphasized
and sentimental. These are Lawrence’s words at the end of the tale;
Future in the world he could not give her. Life in the 
world he had not to offer her. Better go on alone .^ Surely 
better go on along. But then the tears on his feet; and 
her face that would face him as ha left her. No, no.
1. ib j^ m p .27.
2. cf the beginning of this chapter.
3. F.R. Leavis, D *H. _ Lawrence . Novelist * Q
4. Ibid. p.64.
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The next life washhls. H© was master of the after-life. Why
fear for this life? Why not take the soul she offered him?
Now and forever, for the life that would come when they both 
were dead. Take her into the underworld. Take her into the 
"dark Hades" with him, like Francesca and Paolo. And in 
hell held her fast, queen of the underworld, himself master 
of the underworld* Master of the life to come. Father of 
the soul that would come after. 1
This overen^hasis comes only when there is a lapse of imaginative
grasp ; that is when Lawrence’s Imagination fails him, and he resorts
to his own personal feelings to offset ItJ that is when the world of
reality Intrudes upon an artistic experience imaginatively conceived.
This is what Leavis himself has indicated earlier in his analysis of
Aaron’s Rod* The obviousness of The Ladybird’s ending inheres in a
positiveness which takes us away from the world of art to that of
reality* In other words it does not show the "self-questionings and
partial recoils^ which characterized the earlier phases of the book$
and made the conclusion or rather inconclusion of both Aaron’s Rod
and Kangaroo artistically acceptable*
The same defect is manifest in The Plumed Serpent. It Is too
emphatic. Leavis’s commentary helps to bring out this point*
The Plumed Serpent/ has none of that flexibility of mode 
and mood for which the preceding novels are remarkable; it
is single-nindedly intent on imagining, as a piece of
' contemporary history, a revival of the ancient Mexican 
religion* The complexities of attitude in Lawrence are 
played down*^^r complexities there inevitably are, and 
the evidence of them has not been wholly eliminated 
from the book, of which single-minded is a description 
that would have to be qualified in a full analysis* But ; 
the deeper governing intention or impulse (underlying the 
writing of the book) has clearly been to escape as much 
as possible from that Inner drama of doubts and self- 
questionings and partial recoils/ whicl^  the evidence of 
Aaron’s Rod and Kangaroo so amply proves.would have made 
sustained imaginative conviction in such- an enterprise as 
The Plumed Serpent Impossible* 3
1, D.H. Lawrence, The Ladybird* p.77.
2. F.R. Leavis, on. cit.. p.07.
3* F.R. leavis. D.H. Lawrence. Novelist, p.67.
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leavlfl attributes the failure of the book to Lawrence * s lack
of full engagement*
The evoking of the pagan renascence strikes one as willed 
and mechanical* 1
The long tracts dealing with dances and rituals are redundant, tedious
and can easily be excised* Xate*s final decision to stay In Sfexico
does not carry much weight* Her fear of the drawlngOroom life back In
London with the sense of enclosure it involves does not males her life
in Mexico - a life from which she herself recoils » appealing or
convincing*
The Daughters of The Vicar, affords Leavls a good example refuting
a contention that no man was ever more conscious of class^dlstinctions
than Lawrence* The sense of class-dlstlnctions permeates the tale,
but Leavls has the clairvoyance to distinguish between snobbery and the
existence of such feelings in actual life.
The part they play In the given tale is a sinister one and 
the theme is their defeat the triumph over them of life; 2
and Leavls as if anticipating objections to the vagueness of such terms
resorts to one of his characteristic ai^uments; namely that bnlyoin?context
3Can such terms get their definition* In point of fact objections have 
been raised by a number of critics including Eliseo ViVas, Philip 
RahV| and Roger Poole, but let me outline Leavls*s argument first*
When Leavls treats the vicarage as the enemy of life he 
satisfies himself by pointing to the destructive nature of the father 
and the mother# This destructiveness arises from their paradoxical 
situation* The mother belongs, by birth, to a higher class# She 
suffers humiliation and isolation as a result of her marriage* In
!• jâlâ» P*68*
2# ibid* p»73#
3* Ibid* p#74*
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consequence she lives In constant turmoil, hates her husband and takes
to a constant state of illness. The husband on the other hand,
realizing his uselessness and redundancy in an active mining*
community begins to hate himself and that community. This fact is borne
in upon him by his realization that whilst supposedly belonging to the
higher strata of society, in fact he is enduring poverty. Eence the
irony of his situation. This paradoxical situation is reflected in the
upbringing of their children. Socially they have to retain "class pride*
inherited from their parents, but they have also to put up with conditions
hostile to that pride and potentially destructive of it* But the tale
does not make for such a clear*cut and straightforward argument. There
are shades of meaning created by Lawrence, and brought out by Leavls.
"The unbeautlful pride" says Leavls
places itself as hateful in Its manifestations and as 
essentially destructive of all fineness and nobility. And 
yet it appears as having something heroic about It * 
something almost tragic* That is, the attitude Implicit in 
the presentation of the drama is not one that goes with 
contemptuous exposure or satiric condemnation f it Is more 
subtle and poised. 1
And by way of substantiating this "poise" Leavls forwards the following
quotation from the tale;
The children grew up healthy, but unwarmed and rather rigid. 
Their father and mother educated them at home, and made them 
very proud and genteel, put them definitely and cruelly in 
the Upper classes, apart from the vulgar around them. So 
they lived quite isolated. They were good*looklng, and had that 
curiously, semi-transparent look of the genteel, isolated 
poor. 2
I would argue that If Lawrence manages to maintain that 
equilibrium in this situation, one feels that it does not last long, 
because in the opposition between the forces that make for life
1. ibid. p.78.
2, P.R. Leavls, D.R. Lawrence. ^ Xovelist. p*75*
m 273 *
(Louisa and Alfred) and these that make against it (Massy and Mary) later 
symbolized by the opposition of the Cottage and the vicarage, Lawrence 
"puts his thumb in the scale to pull down the balance to his own 
predilection^ * If we adhere to his own principle that one should 
not trust the artist, but trust the tale, one senses that the 
treatment of Massy and Mary is wilfully artifiolalized so as tb conform 
to type and press home the "moral" inherent in the contrast between the 
vitality of (Louisa and Alfred) and the mechanica!d^llty of (Mary and 
Massy), If morality, on Lawrence*s own terms, lies In "the trembling 
instability of the balance" , one Is bound to think that the balance is
stable and even fixed, and that Lawrence, is working according to
IP-
preconceived concepts; that subtle shades of meaning to which
Leavls alludes disappear to be replaced by a rigid demarcation between
Massy "the little abortion" whos% reactions are always mechanical and
lifeless, and "the fine jet of life"^ symbolized by Alfred# Massy is
invariably described as lacking
normal powers of perception and the full range of h&maa 
feelings. 3
is presented as having an
abstract mind m  which he lives, and which debars him from 
responding to art, and to an Irish sort of humour he 
listened curiously, examining it like mathematics. In 
normal human relationships he was not there# Quite 
unable to take part in simple everyday talk, he 
padded silently round the house, or sat in the dining-room 
looking nervously from side to side, always apart, in a
cold, rarified world of his own. 6
ibid if the humour of poking fun at the absurdities of others is shown
in the tale as a major defect, Lawrence himself takes delight In
poking fun at Massy# Take, for example, these words;
1. P.S. Lawrence, Phoenix I, p#528#
2# < . p.528.
3, 0.IÎ. Lawrence, 7ho Prussian Officer and other Stories. p#78,
4. p.83.
5# ibid. p.70#
0# j&ii# p.77.
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Nothing that he realized he oould do for anyone did he 
leave undone although he was so Incapable of coming into 
contact with another being, that he could not proffer 
help. 1
Or this picture of (Massy, Louisa and Mary) as they pay a visit to
the paralyzed, old Mr. Durant# Louisa is seen as
obstinate, but heavy-hearted under the load of unlivingness# 
It was Mr# Massy who kept her there in discipline# His 
non-human will dominated them all# 2
As Alfred comes back from the navy just before his father's death,
Louisa's reaction is given in these words
she could not bear it that she and Mr# Massy should be there# 
The latter stood nervously, as if ill at ease, before the
emotion that was running* He was a witness, nervous,
unwilling, but dispassionate# 3
The reasons given for Mary's acceptance of Massy's proposal to marry
her namely her need for material support and his social distinction are
plausible, but Lawrence's resort to the use of specialized vocabulary,
like "rigidf ,**lack of feeling^  "pure reason", which he had already
applied to Massy, makes the whole enterprise sound unconvincing# Here
is Lawrence's commentary on the situation!
Mary, in marrying him, tried to become a pure reason such 
as he was without feeling or impulse, she shut herself up, 
she shut herself rigid against the agonies of shame and 
the terror of violation, which came at first# She would 
not feel, and she would not feel# She was a pure will 
acquiescing to him# She elected a certain kind of fate#
She would be good and purely just# She would live in a 
higher freedom than she bad ever known, she would be free 
of mundane care, she was a pure will towards right# She 
had sold herself, but she had a new freedom# She had got 
rid of her body, she had sold a lower thing, her body, 
for her freedom from material things# 4
1 would further arguethat, following the marriage of Massy and 
Mary, Lawrence shifts the emphasis on the specialised vocabulary to
1# jyyjLâi p # 7 7 #
2. 1 ^ ,  p#80.
3# ifid# p.81.
4# p#88.
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an equally rigid and static picture - namely Massy's obsession with
the child# When they go for Christmas to Mary's family. Massy has
nothing to do but to close the windows of the train lest the child
should catch cold# When they are with the family he has no concern
but for the child# When Alfred dares the whole family by proposing
to Louisa who stands by him
All the time Mr. Massy had sat obscure, and unnoticed in 
a corner of the room. At this juncture he got up saying 
"there is a baby Mary#" 1
I would, therefore, conclude that Massy and Mary are, hteffect,
mere puppets voicing ideas against which Lawrence the man revolts#
If "art speech" according to Lawrence "is the only truth" there is
definitely a failure of artistic realization in the portrayal of these
two characters# -
Similarly if life according to Lawrence resides in a state of
flux, a constant opposition between the unicorn and the lamb, it also
manifests Itself on his own evidence in a state of ebb and flow * of
instability of the balance * and vitality being the quintessence of life
necessitates the constant activity of polar opposites. To render one
of these opposites static and "abstract" is to stop the constant tension
necessary for action# The story, as we see, reduces Lawrence to a
moralist in the vicious sense of the word* This morality, instead of
sexv^ ig life, is, in effect impoverishing it because it is not rendered
through the convincingness of art* If in life as well as in art the
balance is always trembling from one extreme to another a clear-cut
distinction is very difficult to draw, and to draw it deliberately is
precisely to commit oneself to what Lawrence terms immorality, because
1# ibid. p.137#
r- ^  - Î79 - R...
it is only in the spontaneity of life, the spontaneous creativity of 
art, that an experience becomes convincing. This bears directly on 
Leavis's criticism of this tale and the notion of art and life pud 
&rt therein discerned* leavis has already identified the spontaneity 
and vitality of life with the creativity of art; meaning thereby 
a fullness and naturalness of human experience. Fullness and natural­
ness in art are secured by a dramatic representation of the characters 
and situations involved in the work. It is true that in the declineation 
of both Louisa and Alfred there is a dramatic element making for the 
sense of life and vitality valued by Leavls, as opposed to the 
"nothingness and nullity" manifested by the class-conscious Mr. and 
Mrs. Llndley, but this dramatic element is obviously lacking in the 
presentation of Mary and Massy, and they are given in terms of abstract 
ideas. Leavis ^ describes the originality of Joyce as a matter of 
"contrivances” where insistent will and ingenuity confess the failure 
of creative llfe"^ . I think this kind of criticism can be applied to 
Lawrence in this particular tale, because both Mary and Massy are 
subjugated to a frame-work effect* Xnam inclined to relate the tale to 
Ladv Chatterlev's Lover where Clifford more or less receives the same 
treatment which Massy here gets. Leavis himself has noticed the 
preconception, the intentionallty of the whole scheme of the novel in 
consequence hf which, he has, ironically enough, preferred A propos 
of Ladv Chatterlev's Lover to the novel itself. His words are Illustrative
Lady Ch^tterlev'a Lover is a courageous, profoundly sincere 
and very deliberate piece of work; if it errs it Is not 
through lack of calculation. The trouble rather lies in its 
being in certain ways too deliberate - too deliberate at 
any rate, to be a wholly satisfactory work of art, appealing 
to imaginatively sensitised feelings. 2
1. f.R. Leavis, P .H« Lawrence. Npvelist. p.27.
2. ibid. p.70,
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Therefore when leavls keeps on reiterating that the tale is an 
artistic piece dramatically enacted,^ one does not feel absolutely 
convinced because the abstract ideas go side by side with the concrete 
presentation in the tale and seriously confoundr; its effect. Further- 
more Alfred's "centralisation in his mother", to use Lawrence's words, 
does not seem to have any artistic function in the tale. If it has 
any at all it is far from enabling Alfred to be "a jet of life". It 
inevitably reminds the reader of the unhappy effect such a centralization 
has on Paul in Sons and Lovers, a centralization that deprives him of 
establishing healthy and normal relations with others, Paul's 
failure to achieve a successful love-relation with both Miriam and 
Clara (but basically Miriam) is the outcome of this nother-conq}lex.
So centralization in the mother in this tale, far from promoting the 
idea of fullness of being produces a contrary effect. One would say 
that the presence of this idea here apart from being one of the 
obsessions of Lawrence the man, augurs ill for any future relation 
between Alfred and Louisa.
So while Leavis manages to iaqpress upon his readers that Lawrence
is neither snobbish nor class-conscious as Eliot contends, and that the
tale is an epitome of what makes for life and what makes against it,
he forgets his own principle that actual intentions, however sublime
they may be are nothing unless they are embodied in a compelling piece
3of art, and while Leavis emphasizes the reality of Louisa's attitudes , 
he begs the central question because the very essence of reality Is to 
convey a sense of genuineness of attitude in both art and life - this
1. Ibid, pp. 77-78.
2. D,H. Lawrence, The Prussian Officer_and other Stories. p.l23.
3. r.B. Leavis, on. cl$. pp.78-82,
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genuineness le lacking in the case of Massy and Mary* To reinforce 
this point I would cite Michael Polanyi'e passage which Leavis quotes
in Nor Shall Mv Sword I
At whatever level we consider a living being^the centre of 
its individuality is real* For it is always something we 
ascertain by comprehending the coherence of largely 
unspeclfiable particulars, and which we yet expect to 
reveal itself further by an indeterminate range of future 
manifestations* Thus the criteria of reality are fulfilled.
The "unspeclfiable particulars and the indeterminate range of
future manifestations" are deficient in the patterned presentation of
Mary and Massy, and thus would seriously call into question Lawrence's
view of reality, and by extension Leavls's too*
We Cannot say of The Daughters of The Vieai*» as Leavis says of
Bâ-Zâlskes»
that the marvellous reality of the evocation cannot be 
distinguished from an Intense specificity of dramatic 
significance* 2
And this brings the theme of The Rainbow into play*
Leavis conceives of life in this novel as a process of "fulfilment^
seen at Its highest in the relationship between Tom and Lydia as ppposed
to the failure represented by Ursula and Skrebensky# The variant that
makes either for success or failure in thlsrrelatlon is the conception
of love* in the first there Is nothing sentimental* Each realises
the separateness and individuality of the other, yet deep down in
their recesses they feel a need to come together* This recognition of
the separateness, and yet the need for togetherness gives a concrete
representation of Lawrence%s - and by extension - Leavls's maxim that
3
life is fulfilled in the individual or nowhere#
1* F.&, Leavls^  Nor Shall MV Sword. London, % Chatte & Windus, 1972,
. p. vili*
2* F.R* Leavls, P.H, L^wrepc#^Novelist* p*124.
3. ibid* p*117*
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The relation between Hrsula and Skrebensky Is, by contrast, a failure 
because It is based on a sentimental view of love that dissolves all 
distinctions of individuality*
This view of life seen at work in separate individuals presented 
in the concrete by Lawrence and critically brought out by Leavis 
crystallises Polanyifs idea of "coherence" as the quintessence of 
"livingnes^T (Lawrence's word and by extension Leavls's) where 
unspeclfiable particulars and indeterminate manifestations are portrayed 
and recognized, and thus the creative achievement of Lawrence, the 
critical views of Leavls, and the philosophical ideas of Polany! and 
Whitehead (Whitehead too, as will be shown, is a staunch supporter of 
human individuality) come together,The Rainbow offers an example of the 
reciprooal interaction between art and life enhancing both, and the 
identification of art with life favoured by Leavis is firmly established. 
Lawrence's and again by extension Leavls's phrase "spontaneous creative 
fullness of being/* is effectively given a dramatic meaning#
The notion of preoccupation with the children once the marriage 
relation fails - a notion that does not carry much weight in The Daughters 
of The Vicar, because it is given in abstract terms, now assumes a 
convincing form id Anna's attitude to her children, and the character 
of Skrebensky, who is, In a sense, the counterpart of Massy - has the 
plausible traits of a human being. It is true that he stands for the 
Benthamite view of "the good of the greatest numbei", and for the nation 
as having precedence over the individual, but this is the idealism that 
defeats life - an idealism against which Lawrence rebels not just in 
The Rainbow, but in other works like Kangaroo, and England My mrland.
One of his favourite maxims is that everyone should be first and fore­
most true to himself. The relation between Ursula and Skrebensky shows 
that, though Lawrence is up against Skrebensky*s conformist and 
collectivist doctrines, he does not fail to present him in a convincing 
and dramatic form. Ursula sayst
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I hate soldiers, they are stiff and wooden. What do you 
fight for really?
Skrebensky replies -
I would fight for the nation •
For all that, you aren't the nation. What would you do for
yourself?
I belong to the nation and must do my duty by the nation.
But when it didn't need your services in particular# When
there is no fighting? What would you do then?
He was irritated;
I would do what everybody else does.
What?
Nothing. I would be in readiness for when I was needed.
The answer came in exasperation.
It woeas toeme (she answered) as if you weren't anybody, as 
If there weren't anybody there, where you are. Are you 
anybody, really? You seem like nothing to me. 1
This situation is later objectified when Lawrence sets
Skrebensky in contrast with the bargee who manages to suggest to Ursula
what physical and spiritual love would be.
Skrebensky was envying the lean father of three children, 
for his impudent directness, and his wwi^ rship of the 
woman in Ursula, a worship of body and soul together.
Why could not he himself desire a woman so? Why did he never 
really want a woman, not with the whole of him, never love, 
never worship, only just physically wanting her? 2
This is the conflict which hmply illustrates Leavls's view of
the novel as a dramatic poem. At the wedding party of Frederick
Brangwen, Skrebensky draws Ursula's attention to the rise of the moon;
She turned, and saw a great white moon looking at her over 
the hill. And her breast opened to it, she was cleaved 
like a transparent jewel to its light. She stood filled 
with the full moon offering herself. Her two breasts opened 
to make way for it, her body opened wide like a quivering
1. 0.H. Lawrence, The Rainbow. London, Penguin Books, Chapt. XI, p.311.
2. JiSJià# p.310.
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anemone, a soft, dilated Invitation touched by the moon.
She wanted the moon to fill in to her, she wanted more, 
more communion with the moon, consummation. But 
Skrebensky put his arm round her and led her away. He 
put a big, dark cloak round her and sat holding her hand. 
Whilst the moonlight streamed above the glowing fires. 1
This presents the clash of opposite forces, the tension necessary 
for making life^manifest in human individualS|feasible and convincing. 
Leavls is quite right here when he points out that Ursula's judgment
"You seem like nothing to me", has been fully done, Bbdi^a 
forth. 2
Lawrence's Interest (as Leavis says) in the deeper life of 
the psyche cannot be an interest In the individual 
abstracted from the society to which he belongs. 3
Skrebensky*s failure here is the product of the Benthamite material
world into which he is born. Lawrence's hostility to Benthamism, his
ability convincingly to present it in terms of art, accounts in part
for Leavls's claim for Lawrence that "he is the greatest writer of our
present|Éiase of civilisation?'. The Rainbow offers another specimen of
this failure in the relation between To# Brangwen and Winifred Inger.
if Skrebensky is a Benthamite, Tom is a worshipper of the machine - a
materialist who has lost all the distinctive qualities of a human being.
He did not Care any more, neither about his body nor about 
his soul. Only he would preserve intact his own life. Only 
the simple, superficial fact of living persisted. 4
Lawrence's evocation of the social setting in which Tom Brangwen
makes his appearance has more than one ii^ortancei
He lived in a large new house of red bricky standing outside 
a mass of homogeneous red-brick dwellings, called Viggiston. 
Wiggiston was only seven years old. It had been a hamlet 
of eleven houses on the edge of heathy, agricultural country.
Then the great seam of coal had been evened. In a year 
Wiggiston appeared, a great mass of pinkish rows of thin, 
unreal dwellings of five rooms each. The streets were like
1. X&Jkâi p.319*
2. f.R. Leavis, oo. cit. p.l40.
3. Ibid. p.123.
4. B.H* Lawrence, ^he Rainbow, p.345.
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visions of pure ugliness; a grey-black macadamised road, 
asphalt causeways, held ihr,between a flat succession of 
wall, window and door a new-brick channel that began 
nowhere, and ended nowhere # Everything was amorphous, yet 
everything repeated itself endlessly* Only now and then, 
in one of the house-wlndows vegetables or small groceries were 
displayed for sale*
In the middle of the town was a large, open, shapeless space, 
or market-place of black trodden earth, surrounded by the 
same flat material of dwellings, new red-brick becoming 
grimy small oblong windows, and oblong doors, repeated 
endlessly, with just at one corner, a great and gaudy public 
house and somewhere lost on one of the sides of the square 
a large window opaque and darkish green, which was the post- 
office*
The place had the strange desolation of a ruin* Colliers hang­
ing about in gangs and groups, or passing along the asphalt 
pavements heavily to work, seemed not like living petals, 
but like spectres* The rigidity of the blank streets, the 
homogeneous amorphous sterility of the whole suggested death 
rather than life* There was no meeting place, no centre, 
no artery, no organic formation* 1
The passage confirms our belief In the topicality of Lawrence, 
but this is not all the value it has. Related to this is the sense of 
uprootedness, and disappearance of the arglcultural organic community 
resulting from a sweeping industrial advance* This sense is bitterly 
deplored by both Lawrence and Leavis, and is a governing principle in 
their writing* The sense of ugliness, unreality, uniformity and sterility 
definitely recalls the sombre Dickensian world of Hard Tliies and the 
Blakean world of "London**. This point Is worth making because it 
rightly places Lawrence in the literary tradition, and justifies the 
link which Leavis establishes between the three artists* The 
intuition informing their works commands leavis*s highest admiration.
But the sense of unreality, sterility, shapelessness and monotony also 
foreshadows Eliot's Waste Land (The Rainbow was first published in 1915 
and the Waste Land in 1922) and the notion of death in life represented
I
in this quotation is at the centre of Eliot's poem. The amorphousness 
and repetitiousness of that setting also give rise to a serious loss
1. D.a. Lawrence, The Rainbow, chapter Xll, p.345*
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Of human individuality; "the colliers azehanging about In gangs and 
groups^ that recall "the grey block of flats" and the loss of individ­
uality is Indicative of the loss of life. Here One is not just brought 
back full circle to the original theme of what makes for life and what 
makes against it, but is also reminded of fundamental concerns of 
Whitehead, Collingwood and Polany! * The quotation furnishes a good 
and comon ground on which tjiey all meet*
In marrying Winifred, Tom Brangwen confirms his worship of the 
machine in almost the same way as Winifred does; and in protesting 
against this match, In expressing her desire to smash the machine and 
destroy the colliery Ursula redresses the balance in favour of human 
life*
In this context it is appropriate to underline one of leavls's
major emphases in P.H. JLawrenceI Hove 11 st t namely that Lawrence is
a great successor to George Eliot* The Rainbow provides a 
good illustration of Lawrence's achievement as a recorder 
of essential English history* 2
His minute rendering of the setting, his main points of interest, his
%uman valuations" would be found appealing to George Eliot* But while
Gedrge Eliot's treatment of themes can be called "ethical"; Lawrence's
Can only be described as "religiouzf * His evocation of the background
comes in a form that is immediately sensuous and poetic, a form that
is alien to George Eliot and reminiscent of Shakespeare's use of
language.
In Leavls's view Lawrence's background, far from being a 
hindrance, was really conducive to his maturity* His congregational 
and nonconformist upbringing saved him from any dogmatic indoctrination
1* cf the fourth and fifth chapters on Whitehead, Collingwood and 
Polanyi*
2* leavis, P.H* Lawrence 1 Novelist. p.107.
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and h^36d him to achieve wider sympathies. The protestant community 
into which ho was born contributed to that "sensuous immediacy" that 
relates him to Shakespeare.
The loss Qt human individuality Issuing from the overpowering 
influence of mechanical and Industrial civilization underlies Leavls's 
main emphasis In Women In Love* Leavis shifts the emphasis from 
Blrkln and Ursula made by Middleton Murry, to Gerald and Gudrun. Murry 
views the novel as mainly concerned with Birkin and Ursula;
To the working out of this personal argument in the imaginary 
consummation of Birkin and Ursula, all else is really 
subsidiary in the novel. 1
Leavls's now critical perspective views the individual in relation to
his social sotting and is consistent with the line of argument so far
pursued by him.
I will consider the treatment of Gerald Crich's case* There 
we have peculiarly well exemplified the way in which, In 
Lawrence's art, the diagnosis of the malady of individual 
psyche can become that of the malady of a civilization. 2
’ After taking over the running the his father
Gerald comes to exemplify Skrebensky*s approach to life by emphasizing
the need for productivity and the "good for the greatest nmaber";
an idealism falsely maintained at the expense of an integrated and
living human personality. I would offer the following dialogue between
Birkin and Gerald as illustrative of Gerald's likeness to Skrebensky!
Can't ycai see (said Birkin) that to help ay neighbour to 
eat is no more than eating myself. { eat, thou eatest, he 
eats, we eat, you eat, they eat - and what then? Why 
should every man decline the whole verb, first person 
singular is enough for me.
tou've got to start with material things (said Gerald, which 
stfttement Birkin ignored)
1. J« Middleton Murry, Bon of Woman, pp. 118-119,
2. y.R, Leavls, P♦H, Lawrence * Move11st. p.152.
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And we've got to live for something* We're not just 
cattle that can graze and have done with it (said 
Gerald)•
Tell m  (said Birkin) What do you live for? (Gerald's 
face went baffled)
What do I live for? (he repeated) I suppose I live for 
work, to produce something# in so far as I am a purposive 
being. Apart from that I live because 1 am living.
C
And what's your work? Getting so many more thousands of 
tons of coal out of the earth everyday. M d  when we've 
got all of the coal we want# and all the plush furniture, 
and pianofortes and the rabbits are stewed and eaten, and 
we're all warm, and our bellies are filled, and we're, 
listening to the young lady performing on the pianoforte.
What then? What then when you've made aywal fair 
material start with your material things?
Gerald sat laughing at the words and the mocking humour of the other man » 
But he was cogitating too.
We haven't yet got there (he replied) A good many people are 
still waiting for the*Vabbit"t and the fire to cook it.
So while you get the coal 1 must chase the rabbit? (said 
Birkin, mocklng^at Gerald.
Something like that (said Gerald).
Birkin watched him narrowly. He say the perfect good-humoured 
callousness, even strange, glistening mallice in Gerald, glistening 
through the plausible ethics of productivity* 1
leavls's admiration for the author of this passage is consistent 
with his hostility to C.P. Snow's defence of a technological civilisation 
based on material well-being. This material well-being falls far short 
of meeting the profound psychological and spiritual aspiration^ of man 
and to say that the scientists have the future in their hands is to be 
blind to these aspirations, Leavis's commentary on the last quotation 
not only recalls.the criterion of excellence in The Great Tradition but 
also foreshadows a ruling principle running through his later critical 
works; Pickens The Novelist. Anna Karenina and other Essays, lectures 
in America and more particularly Nor Bhall My Sword
1. D.H. Lawrence, Women In Love. London, Martin Seeker, 1921, reprint 
Penguin Books, 1960, pp. 61-62.
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The plausible ethics of productivity is not only an 
irrevelance In the face of this problem (what do we live for?) 
it represents by the criterion that Lawrence's creative genius 
compels us to apply, a refusal of responsibility, of responsi­
bility towards life, 1
But the difficulty with Lawrence's distinction between what makes for
life and what makes against it as illustrated in The Daueht«*rs of The
ïlSâL» The Rainbow and Women i(n Lovq is that it is represented in a
didactic » rather missionary spirit* We can understand that Lawrence
is both an artist and a preacher, but we also presume that preaching
is persuasively conveyed If it takes an impressive literary shape. It
lacks the sense of humour and irony characteristic cf the Lawrence
of The Captain's Doll, and of The Dickens of Hard Times. To coop are the
previous dialogue between Birkin and Gerald with a quotation which
leavis himself extracts from Hard Timeq may serve to show the difference
in approach
Girl number twenty (said Mr. Gradgrind, squarely pointing 
with his square forefinger) I don't know that girl. Who la 
that girl?
Sissy Jupe, Sir (explained number twenty, blushing standing 
up and curtsying)
Sissy is not a name (said Mr. Gradgrind) Don't call yourself 
Sissy, Call yourself Cecilia.
It's father as calls me Sisqy, Sir (reiterated the young girl 
in a trembling voice, and with another curtsy)
Then he has no business to do (said Mr. Gradgrind) Tell him he 
mustn't. Cecilia Jupe, what is your father?
He belongs to the horse-riding # if you please, sir.
(Mr. Gradgrind frowned, and waved off the objectionable 
calling with his hand.) ,
#e don't want to know anything about that here. You mustn't • 
tell us about that here; Your father breaks horses, don't
he?
If you please. Sir, when they can get any to break, they do 
break horses in the ring, sir.
1. F.R. leavis, D.9, LawrenceI Novelist. p.100.
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You mustn't tell us about the ring here. Very well then, 
describe your father as a horse-breaker# Ho doctors sick 
horses, I dare say?
Oh, yes, sir.
Very well, then. He Is a veterinary surgeon, a farrier, and 
a horse-breaker# Give me your definition of a horse#
(Sissy Jupe thrown into the greatest alarm by this demand)
Girl number twenty unable to define a horseÎ (said Mr# 
Gradgrind, for the general benefit of all the pitchers#
Girl number twenty possessed of no facts in reference to 
one of the consnonest animals! some boy's definition of a 
horse# Bitzer, Yours.
Quadruped - Graminivorous, forty teeth, namely, twenty-four 
grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat 
in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs too. Hoofs 
hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks 
in mouth# 1
Mr# Gradgrind with his dominating tone in which he derides at 
Sissy's background represents the overwhelming triumph of the material 
and industrial civilization, and Bitzer, In his automatic and mechanical 
response, is the epitome of that civilization. The ^parent physical 
indications show that they have the upper hand, and that Sissy's 
inability to meet their requirements is a failure. But this impression 
turns out to be an illusion as Uiekens uses the symbol of the "sun" to 
show where genuine life really exists; not in calculated facts, but in 
spontaneous activity; not in mechanical response, but in natural 
reactions*
£kxt, whereas the girl was so dark-eyed and dark-haired she 
seemed to receive a deeper and more lustrous colour from 
the sun when it shone upon her, the boy was so light-eyed 
and light-haired that the self-same rays appeared to draw 
out of him what little colour he ever possessed..#. His 
skin was so unwholesomely deficient in the natural tinge 
that he looked as though, If it were cut, he would bleed 
white# 2
1. Quoted la P.R. leavlSi The Great Tradition, p.229,
2 . JJjU ,  p .230.
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Through the use of symollsm Dickons manages to draw the
distinction between appearance and reality, and eventually we areiloft
in no doubt as to where life as opposed to death resides. The
distinction is worked out in the concrete, and unlike Lawrence, Dickens
gives each of the opposed forces here his due, so that the clash between
them is rendered plausible and convincing. Leavis himself describes the
difference between these two forces
asdrendered In terms of sensation, so that the symbolic intention 
emerges out of the metaphor and the vivid evocation of. the 
concrete. Sissy is gener%is impulsive life. 1
In Lawrence, in short, the opposition between life and death Is 
stated, whereas in Dickens it is suggested, and in bis passion to heap 
praise on Lawrence, Leavls seems to loose sight of what is abstract in 
that opposition* However, if fullness and spontaneity of life are 
checked by mechanical and materialistic factors, they are equally 
haapered by piatonic and idealistic theories, and it is part of the 
achievement of Women In Love that the two extremes - as emblematic of 
the maladies of modern civilization - are brought together. In the 
following conversation between Gerald, Gudrun and Birkin we find 
Gerald saying;
... the idea was that every man was fit for his own little bit 
of a task - let him do that, and then please himself. The 
unifying principle was the work in hand. Only work, the 
business of production held^them together. It was B»chanleal 
but then society was a mechanism.
r c
Oh. (cried Gudrun) Then we shan't have names any more - we 
shall be like Germans, nothing but Herr Obermelster and 
Herr Untermelster. 1 can imagine it* I am Mrs. Colliery* 
manager Crioh. I am Mrs. member of parliament Roddies. I 
am Miss art-teacher Brangwen* 2
Tills is, in substance, the world of Aldoua Huxley's Brave New 
World, where distinct human individuality is dissolved and replaced by
1. pp. 230-231.
4
2. D.H, Lawrence, Women In Love, p.114.
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uniform types hatched by incubatory machines. Leavls's reaction to this
danger is very decided;
life is individual and Individual lives cannot be aggregated 
or equated or dealt with quantitatively in any way;
And it is a reaction that drawd' on Lawrence's critical principles.
The other banal defect is described by Birkin in his scathin^ng
attack on the abstract notion of equality. This notion is seriously
1
questioned by Lawrence in his essay on "Democracy".
After a lengthy discussion of Sir Joshua's social equality of
man, and as the members of the party began to disappear after lunch,
Birkin gives us his view on the subject, a view which seems to be
endorsed by Lawrence himselff
We are all different and equal in spirit, it is only the 
social differences that are based on accidental material 
conditions. We are all abstractly and mathematically equal 
if you like... But I, myself who am ny se If, what have I to 
do with equality with any other man or woman? In the 
spirit, I am as separate as one star is from another, as 
different In quality and quantity. 2
Lawrence, it is true, argues here for an integrity of human
individuality, for fullness of living, or for what Leavis would call
"psychic health" and not for a state of egocentricity or selfishness of.
which be is wrongly accused. But again one is conscious of a sense of
artificiality creeping in. Considered in context the argument is too
late to produce the desired effect* Lawrence himself describes it as
3"intellectual and artificial" , and even Birkin'@ strictures on equality
4are, in l%wrence's words, "a bitter declamatioif*, a defect on account 
of which Leavis takes Lawrence to ta^ in his Minority Pamphlet.
1. D.H. Lawrence, Phoenix I, pp. 699-730.
2. D.H. Lawrence, Women In Love, p.115.
3. ibid, p.114.
4. ibig. p.115.
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But Lawrence's conclusions (argues Leavls) Involve a 
great deal of declaiming against"idead* and Ideals" and 
mind-knowledge* 1
Under the spell of the relevance and appeal of these ideas to his critical
tendency Leavis now glosses over the question of their appropriateness
within a literary context*
Gerald's relation with Gudrun is an Illustration of the antithesis
between life and death* His character is symbolic of ruthless and
insistent will* He takes over the management of the colliery after
his father's death, and runs it on authoritarian lines - an attitude
that breeds hatred and grudge among miners* His father was the mainstay
on which he depended, and in the absence of this support he is left
desperate and unsettled* He rushes towards Gudrun with a delusion
that he can achieve a love-relation with her* Gudrun*s encounters with
him serve to uncover the superficiality and falsity of that relation
and in consequence she begins to hate him* Nevertheless Lawrence is
subtle enough, in this situation, to maintain"the instability of the
balance" in depicting Gerald's character* He does not satirize him,
and Gerald has the ability to flirt with other girls, to provide the
necessary male complement to Birkin* Above all he manages to exert an
effect on Gudrun hersAlft
He was so attractive and repulsive at once* The sardonic 
suggestivity that flickered over his face and looked from 
his narrowed eyes, made her want to hide, to hide herself 
away from him and watch him from somewhere unseen* His 
licentiousness was repulsively attractive* 2
But in the last analysis he makes against life, Lawrence describes
3
his effect on Gudrun as "a frost deadening her, and the simile 
foreshadows the fate of Gerald himself who dies out of jealousy and
1* f.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence* Cambridge, Minority Press, 1930. p.9.
2* D*H* Lawrence, Women In Love, pp. 463-464.
3. ibid. p.496.
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envy In the frosty cold on top of the mountains. This finishing 
touch has two major dramatic functions, first it depicts the defeat 
of the forces that make against life, or rather it shows that these 
forces being beat on destruction, eventually turn into self-destructive­
ness, and there is a hope, however flimsy it may be, for the positive 
factors that eonducb to life.
Second it suggests that Lawrence's preoccupation with the primitive 
and elemental life does hot always - as Leavls himself argues - 
foster health and vitality. On the contrary the snow and cold here are 
part and parcel of the factors that make for death. The point is worth 
making because Lawrence is wrongly accused of seeking a return to^j and 
glorification of primitivism. Birkin*s relation with Ursula provides 
the other constructive opposite - the element that malces for life.
To answer MUrry's charge that Lawrence is almost personal aad 
autobiographical in his presentation of characters, and that Blrkln is 
a reproduction of Lawrence the man, Leavls points out that Lawrence 
is primarily an artist who achieves the impersonality necessary for 
art, and that he transcends his personal concerns. To substantiate this 
claim he refers to the chapter entitled "class-room",^ in which Hermolne 
voices some of the ideas on education and on the detrimental effect which
g
a premature consciousness raised in children has on their future life. 
Birkin rejects the idea straightaway and through this gesture 
Lawrence transcends his immediate personal concerns to enable the 
character of Birkin as # unique and Independent dramatis persona to 
develop. I am inclined to think that in this particular instance 
Leavis is right because Lawrence manages to distance the character of 
Birkin from the ideas dear to him personally. But Murry's accusations
1 * jhÈLJwlf PP* 38—48.
2. ibid. p.43*
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are not only confined to this lack of Impersonal approach, but go so far 
as to deny Lawrence the capacity for creating distinct and recognizable 
characters!
We can discern no Individuality whatever In the denizens 
of Mr* Lawrence's worldt weshould have thought that we 
should be able to distinguish between male and female at 
least. But no! Remove the names, remove the sedulous 
catalogues of unnecessary clothing - a new element and a 
significant one, this, in our author's work - and man 
and woman are indistinguishable as octopods in an aquarium 
tank, 1
Vindicating Lawrence against this charge Leavis Instances the 
character of Hermoine Roddice as illustrative of a unique and 
distinguishable character, Leavis is correct in drawing the analogy 
between Gerald and Hermoine as forces antithetical to life, the first 
by reason of his r^ld interest in mechanical and industrial advance, 
the second by virtue of her "intellectuality" and her "insistent will"*
As Gerald, out of a feeling of personal insufficiency, desperately 
sticks to the idea of loving Gudrun, Hermoine, in a similar way, 
sticks to "intellectual knowledge" as a means of advancing towards a 
love-relation with Birkin, The presence of "insistent will" in both 
is obvious, and naturally both of them fall in their endeavours, and
" 2from the passages quoted by Leavis respecting Hermoine Roddice , the 
notion of enactment, of dramatic presentation is brought out in the 
concrete*
I have deliberately postponed a number of objections to Leavls's 
criticism of Lawrence to provide «3ope for discussing Leavls's 
distinction between life and death as worked out by Lawrence and 
critically stated by Leavls* It is high time to consider these objections. 
In his essay on "F.R. Leavis and D.H, Lawrence" Philip Rahr says I
1* John Middleton Mur 17, Reminiscences of D.H* Lawrence. London, 
Jonathan Cape, 1933, p.223.
2. F.R. Leavls, D.H, Lawrence: Novelist, pp. 184-188.
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Leavls's emphasis on "health" and sanity, and his mandatory 
distinction between what ^ makes tor life, and what does not 
are singularly "inappropriate*to placing^Lawrence, Terms 
like "health", "sanity" and even "life" are at once too 
vague and too inclusive, too invertebrate as it were, for use 
in any precise analysis, and above all too moralistic to 
make much sense in literary discourse, 1
Reference has been made to Leavls's awareness of the difficulty
in using Such general terms, but judging by the argument advanced above
regarding the distinction between what makes for life, and what does ndt,
one is at least conscious of the validity of the distinction. To say
that it is inappropriate to placing Lawrence is to gloss over
Lawrence's own views on what he felt be should be doing, already outlined
in the first section of this chapter. To say that these terms are too
moralistic to make much sense In a literary discourse, Is to deny the
interaction between art and life which is at the heart of Leavls's way
of reading literature. In Leavls's view there is no segregation between
the creativity of life and that of art because both are supposed to
contribute to each other. This is tlie meeting-place between Arnold and
Leavis, and the point should be emphasized because Leavls's tradition
is by definition British and moral, and not as Philip Rahv wants it
to be, American and formalistic. Again to say that
by radically separating his art from his doctrine, without 
fully acknowledging what he is up to, Leavls has been able 
to Create a Lawrence who never really existed, 2
is to distort the nature of leavls's atten^t and achievement, leavls's
3
quotations from and references to Psvchoanalvsls and The Unoonsoious. 
Fantasia of The Unconscious^, Phoenix^, A Propos of Lady Chatterley's
1,, Philip Bahy, Literature And The Sixth Sense. London, Faber and.
Faber, 1970, p,297,
2, ibid. p. 297.
3, F.R. Leavis, P«H. Lqwrence. Novelist, pp, 14-103-117-147-149-150-156- 
157-163,
4, ibid. pp. 103-147-150.
5, ibid, pp, 21-23-27-145.
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1 2 Loyejc and Assorted Articles serve to confute this allegation. Quoting
from Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious to diagnose the character of
Gerald, Leavis gives us this passage!
True, we must all develop into mental consciousness. But 
mental consciousness is not a goal; it is a cul-de-sac.
It provides us only with endless appliances which we can use 
for the all-too-difficult business of coming to your 
spontaneous creative fulness of being. It provides us 
with means to adjust ourselves to the external Universe*
It gives os further means for subduing the external, 
materio-mechanical Universe to our great end of creative life* 
And it gives us plain indications of how to avoid falling 
into automatism, hints for the applying of the will,.the 
loosening of false automatic fixations, the brave adWrence 
to a profound soul-impulse. This is use of the mind - a 
great indicator and instrument. The mind as author and 
director of life Is anathema. 3
And commenting on that passage Leavis says:
But that is what It has become in Gerald; hence the 
destructiveness of his "go" (the "go" which Ursula qualifies 
as pertaining to applying the latest appliances) as the 
following passage from the seme essay explains. 4
(Leavls goes on quoting from Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious):
The mind is the dead end of life. But it has all the 
mechanical force of the non-vltal Universe. It is a great 
dynamo of super-mechanical force. Given the will as 
accomplice, it Can even arrogate its machine-motions and 
automatizations over the whole life, till every tree becomes 
a chipped-tea-pot and every man a useful mechanism. So we 
wee the brain, like a great dynamo and accumulator, accumulattig 
force, and presuming to apply this mechanical force-control 
to the living unoonscious$esubjecting everything 
spontaneous to certain-machine-principles called ideals or 
ideas. 5
Commenting on the relevance of these quotations to Gerald's
situation Leavis sayst
The significance of these propositions reveals its full force 
and scope in the Afe and death of Gerald. A certain verbal 
identity may have been noticed between what Ursula says of 
his "go?*, and what Lawrence says of "mental consciousness. 6
1. ibid. pp. 14-43-70-78-91-94, 147.
2. ibid. p.87.
3. Quoted in F.R. Leavis, 0.H. Lawrencet Novelist. p.157.
4. p.157.
5. ibid. p.157.
8. ibid.
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Adopting a line of argument similar to that of Rahv, Roger 
Poole saysI
there is a sense in which the claim for life had not been 
securely enough established* Reading D.HV LawrenceJ 
Novelist la rather like being submitted to prolonged indo­
ctrination. it is not so much that life tkomown to be 
present in Lawrence, as that it is insisted upon as being 
there, again and again. Ostensibly, repeatedly, Leavis 
points to this passage and that, indicating his conviction
that this is virtually ineffable, that this is transcendent
art* If one cannot respond to this, it is implied, then 
one's sense of what life is is radically defective. There 
is no proof that Lawrence's sense of life is not some of 
the things, hostile readers, like Middleton Murry, have 
claimed it to be, Leavis dismisses the casek but does 
not prove his own. 1
These objections bring us closer to Eliseo Vivas's argument
that Leavis*8"emotional ties to his subject tend to make him see
2virtues that are not there"
The point 1 have been tiying to make in this section is that 
life is there in lewrence, but in some eases it is not objectified 
enough in the characters symbolizing it, and the reader sometimes senses 
that the ideas enunciated by these characters do not naturally spring 
from these characters but are rather imposed on them by Lawrence's
conscious mind and philosophy.so much so that they are turned into
/
mouthpieces voicing his favourite ideas, but this is not always the 
Case, and the characters of The Rainbow and V o m n  In Love redeed these
a
shortcomings. To argue then, as Roger Poole does, that Lawrence's 
sense of life is some of the things hostile readers like 
Middleton Murry have claimed it to be, is to deny the very nature of 
life outlined in that section, and Lawrence's right to being an artist* 
Murry in Son of Woman, and Reminiscences of D.H. Lawrence, considers
1. Roger Poole "life Versus Death In The Later Criticism of F.R. Leavis
Benaissance and Modern Studies. June 1972, p.118.
2. Rlieeo Vivas, "Mr. Leavis on D.H. Lawrence" Sewanee Review. Vol. IXV, 
no. I, 1957, p.123.
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Lawrence, a» I have already Indicated, not as an artist, but as an 
autobiographical writer, a judgment which, where Women In Love. The 
Bainbgg and the tales are concerned, one agrees with Leavls in strongly 
repudiating* But this final point gives rise to the discussion of the 
tales.
The Captain's Doll provides another Interesting example of the 
indeterminateness and flexibility of human character. In point of 
fact Leavls*s analysis of the tale comes to consolidate this 
contention. The doll which Haxmele makes as a reproduction of the 
character of Alexander Hepburn turns out to be not a reproduction at 
all, and is nullified once Alexander himself appears on the scene, 
hence the contradiction between what Alexander Hepburn actually is 
and idiat Hannele takes him to be^« As she hands him the puppet the 
following dialogue is carried on*
You’ve got me; (he said at last, in his amused melodious voice.) 
What? (she said)
You*ve got me, (he repeated)
1 don’t care (she said)
What you don’t care * (his face broke into a smile* He 
had an odd way of answering, as if he were only half* 
attending, as if be were thinking of something else. 2
Hannele has**not really got Hepburn** and the melodious voice 
which sounds the statement is meant as an irony on the conventional 
terms of love on which she wants to possess him; and the tale is, in 
a sense, a process of disillusionment which ultimately culminates in 
Hannele’s acceptance of Hepburn on his own terms of reality* Leavis’s 
commentary is worth quoting*
1* F.H* Leavls, B.H. Lawrence1 Novelist, p.201.
2. D.ÎI. Lawrence, The Ladybird and other Stories, London, Martin 
Seeker, 1923, p.108.
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Her sense In his presence when she can see him and hear him 
speak that what communicates with her through the voice and 
the dark eyes is scHoething unknown and unpossessahle imposes 
itself upon us with compelling force. Troubled and 
baffled^she rebels, and yet has to reckon with the fact that 
what she rebels against is what irresistibly attracts her. 1
Meanwhile Hannele too, though a plausible presence to the reader 
in the tale is also indeterminate and unspeciflable *she never knew 
what he saw when he looked at her" . Leavis’s words are again 
Illuminating
she too in her reality^ is unknown, for all the 
ostensible definitiveness of her outward presence, her face 
and her personalityt The problem that preoccupies her and 
the enactment of which provides the dramatic tension of the 
tale is that of determining whether the spell exercised 
upon her by the man owes its power to reality or illusion, 3
But if the doll symbolises the feeling of possessiveness which
Hannele first entertains towards Hepburn, it also connotes the
adoration, the kneeling at the feet which Mrs* Hepburn expects from
her husband. Both attitudes deny the independence and individuality of
Hepburn, and In this sense they join the forces that make against life.
In this connection Leavis’s words are an echo of Lawrence’s
one cannot live to make another person happy, and to propose 
to do so, to take that for a raison d’etre, is a denial of 
life that can only breed ill, 4
The Dickensian sense of humour is here manifested in the aimised 
melodious voice of Hepburn, his tartan trews, and the mistaken identity 
of Mitehka whom Mrs, Hepburn takes for Haniwle* The theme is evoked by 
situations, symbolism and scenes that adequately illustrate Eliot’s 
notion of the"objective correlative". When asked by Hannele whether 
he loved his wife Hepburn says*
1* F,R, Leavls, _op. cit. p,202,
2. D.H. Lawrence, on. cit. p.169,
3. ibid. p.202,
4. ibid. p.213.
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Yes# But in this way* When Ï was a boy I caught a bird; 
a black*cap, and I put it in a cage* And X loved that 
bird, X don’t know why, but X loved it, X simply loved that 
bird* All the gorse, and the heather, and the rook, and the 
hot smell of yellow gorse^blossom, and the sky that seemed 
to have no end to it, when X was a boy, everything that X 
almost was mad with, as boys are, seemed to me to be ia 
that little fluttering black-cap, and it would pick its seed 
as if it didn't qhite know what else to do, and look round 
about, and begin to sing* But in quite a few days it 
turned its head aside and died. Yes it died. X never had 
that feeling again that X got from that black**oap when X 
was a boy ♦ not until X saw her* 1
And when Hepburn takes Hannele on a trip to the top of the glacier we
find her very much impressed by the height of the mountain, whereas
Hepburn looks down for the sea and wants to live near the sea-level,
the first symbolising the sense of uplift associated with ideal love
conceived by Hannele, the second indicative of the down to earth and
matter of fact approach of Hepburn* At the close of the tale Hannele i
takes the doll to burn it, thereby announcing the renunciation of her
conventional idea of love and the triumph of the principle of reality
of life* Here the doctrine of impersonality In art receives adequate
expression and Lawrence’s creativity far from being autobiographical is
marvellously objective and at its highest. Xt may be argued that the
theme is one of Lawrence’s favourite topics namely male dominance and
female submission, but nobody can accuse Lawrence of "declaiming,
stating Or intruding personally to press the scale. The shattering of
the doll at the close of the tale is, in effect, a shattering of
conventional ideas and attitudes that check the natural flew of life
and the vitality of human activity.
The situations and symbols that adequately stand for human rela­
tions and em6tion@ in this tale resist Graham Hough’s contention that 
"in writing of human relations he (Lawrence) often leaves a residue of
1. ibldj pp. 206-207*
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the unoïjjeotlfieci**^ * The tale instances an integrity of art making for
the requisite vitality of life and the reciprocal interaction between
art and life desiderated by teavis is here most consummately brought
2
home, Graham Hough does not deny the success of such a tale *
Ht Mawr is a very controversial tale and does not so easily fit 
into the line of argument developed in this section,
leavis’s high praise for it has caused a wrangle among a number
of critics on the pages of Essays in Criticism. Robert Liddell started
3 *
the argument and was later replied by a set of critics including
4
David Craig, Mark Roberts and T,W* Thomas. ^
. Graham Hough thinks that ,
it is not an authentic piece of work, that there is a 
falsity in the motive and the conception that fat&lly 
affects the whole* 5
But Frank Eermode regards Leavis’s reading of the tale as "surely the
best study of any single Lawrence tale* In view of these contradictory
assessments of both the tale aW  Leavis’s critique of it, it is in
place to put the whole thing in some perspective.
In principle the tale raises a number of difficulties, but
Leavis’s points of emphasis cannot be missed. The affirmation :
emerging from the conflict between the positive and the negative is
clear./ The horse ^
stands for forces of life that the modern world frustrates; 
standing we see for the deep springs of life, for the life 
Impulsion, ' 7.
and the negative aspect is represented by Ricv. Leavls also says
1. Graham Hough, The Dark Fun. London, Gerald Duckworth, 1956, p.43.
2. Ibid. p.179.
3. Robert Liddell, Essays In Criticism. Vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 321-327.
4. Ibid, vol. 5, no. XI, pp. 64-80.
5. , Graham Hough, on.cit. 0.180,
6. Frahk Kermode, D.H. Lawrence. London, Fontana Modern Masters, p. 114*
7. F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence^ Novelist, p.239.
-300 -
that the h orse has been
mishandled and outraged by his human master so that his 
"break" Isn't mere viciousness but a compelledprotest of life,
2and correctly reminds us of Geraldaand the Arab mare, but Leavlsfs 
claims that
St Mawr seems to present a creative and technical originality 
more remarkable than that of The Waste Land. 3 (jmd that 
its achievement Is something thatj’*couldn*t be done outside 
Shakespearian dramatic poetry", ^4
^ e  too much exaggerated. What issurprising after all these high
claims is that leavis himself casts doubt on the close of the tale.
First he tells us that "if St. Mawi^ * deserved to be called a
dramatic poem It is not because it comes to what wodldaorainarilylbedcalled
a dramatic close"; although he also says that "the actual close Is as
5
clear proof of genius as anything else about the work" , then he
contradicts this effect In comparing the close of "Mother and Daughtei^
with that of "St Mawr" saying " ,
Its range, of course is less than that of "St Mawf", but not 
so much less as may appear at first sight, and the advantage 
it gains is the unquestionable, the immediately convincing 
perfection. No doubt arises like that which pits itself when 
one has finished "St Mawr". 6
The emergence of St Mawr (the horse) as a symbol and substitute for
Lou's frustration in her marital life with Rico is not adequately
justified because after the neïllaation of their failure they accept
their marriage as a "friendship
friendship, platonic. It was a marriage but without sex*
Sex was shattering and exhausting; they shrank from it and 
became like brother and sister. But still they were husband 
and wife. 7
1. ibid, p.238
2. ibid. p.239. ,
3. l&li, p*225. ,
4. i^jd. p.238.
5. jLkUt p.243. 
a. IbiÉ, p.276.
f. D.H* Lawrence, Ht. Mawr. London, Martin Seeker, 1925, p.11,
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1 would further argue the marital relation is so sketchily portrayed 
that it does not compellingly call for the dramatic course of events 
that has ensued.
To come now to the crucial opposition between the characters that 
make for life and those who do not* and remembering the "constant
instability of the balance" essential for action and life* one finds
\ ' ' 
that Lawrence’s attitude is again one-sided. The balance is always In
favour of the horsey Lou^and in a sense^Mrs. Witt whereas Rico is
lost sight of I and when Lawrence -turns his attention to him it is with
the object of making him more repulsive* After the cursory beginning
of the tale attention focuses first on Mrs* Witt’s interest in horses,
and in riding in F^de Park, then the focus shifts in two directions;
first to Lou’s hatred of Rico whose "claim was a sort of anger* and his
love was a destruction in itself* . Later on we are told
türlous how pleasant it was to sit there in the garden when
' Phoenix was about, or Lewis. But when Rico was there, she
was all aching nerve. 2
Then we get long stretches of description given to both Mrs. Witt and
Lou; the first is restless and full of life - the second is bored! 
men because "they have gone perverse, or cringing.
Lawrence’s doctrine of relativity should have brought him to a 
realisation that there is nothing absolutely good, or utterly evil.
Leavis’s criticism of the tale too, out of a sense of Ipyalty
to Lawrence.is also one-sided. He restricts our view of the horse to
' ' • ' 4 '
the way in which we see him "through Lou’s eyes*. He points to
passages where the beauty of the horse ie shown even after the "break*.
1. jbid. p.33.
2. I M d . p.50.
3. Ibid. p.61.
4. ?.H. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence. Novelist, p.238.
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She (Lou) aaw the pale, gold belly of the stallion upturned, 
the hoofa working wDdly, 1
neglecting the afflictions of Rico, because Lawrence wants to concentrate
attention only on the sufferings of the horsep. whereas a beneflcént
Imaginative vision should have done justice to both. Shakespear’s evil
characters are portrayed as having saving graces that endear them to us.
In this tale there is a lack of sympathy betraying a failure of
imagination. Mark Roberts view of both Leavis and Lawrence represents
the point I have been trying to advances
Dr. Leavis has a deflecting Interest in St Mawr; he agrees 
80 Strongly with what Lawrence here says that the
imaginative deficiency escapes his notice. 2
"The trembling instability of the balance" or rather the poise
between forces that make for life and the others that counter them is
maintained in a number of the other tales singled out for analysis by
Leavis. Needless to say that to maintain this poise is at the same
time to maintain an impersonal tone on the part of the artist allowing
the drama to be enacted; hence to achieve an artistic maturity
coalescing with the renewal and vitality of life. In other words it
involves an interaction intensifying the value of both life and art.
This interaction which is favourite to leavis, Lawrence^ at his best^
secures. Leavis’s criticism of England Mv England comes readily to
substantiate this contention and consolidate the line of argument
suggested in this section. Egbert, as the tale suggests, refuses
responsibility because he has pretensions to being an artist, but he
is not genuineI he is a dilettante who lacks the creative urge. If
I
he had been genuine, even without earning sufficient money to cater 
for his family, his dependence on his father-in-law would not have 
much mattered^the trouble is that he is not serious enough.
1  ^ p .239.
2. Mark,Roberts, Essays In Criticism, vol. 5^ no. 1, p.75.
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Winifred his wife loves him passionately. The interesting 
thing is that he is not reduced, nor dwarfed nor even denigrated by 
Lawrence. In fact he commands our syn^athy. Leavis’s words come 
relevantly to reinforce this line of argumenti
# $ the tale is painful because he (Egbert) conmands so 
large a measure of our sympathy* Essentially a dilettante, 
he is nevertheless not weak, and it is a remarkable triumph 
of the tale to make him decidedly not contemptible. Indeed 
the quiet endurance with which he continues without deflection 
to be what he is, when his world has turned against him y 
has an effect of resistant strength of character and gives 
his dilettantism a kind of stole dignity. In the matter of 
the scythe and Joyce’s cut knee, which raises the painful­
ness of the tale to its highest pitch, he is put so terribly 
in the wrong that he commands something of the 8yaq>athy that 
goes out to a victim# 1
The Same poise is seen at work in "The Foaf*. It is Banford
being the opposite of life, who welcomes Henry ahd treats him as a
brother at the beginning of the tale and refuses to charge him any
money for his stay.
Banford was quite charmed by him* He was so soft and 
courteous in speech, not wanting to say much himself, preferring 
to hear what she had to say and to laugh in his quick, half 
mocking way. Z
When Henry proposes to March his persuasive argument Inclines her
to accept him, but once she goes back home, she thinks of Banford’s
future, and out of a sense of loyalty to her, goesbback on her earlier
decision, and sends Henry a letter rejecting the offer. Leavis’s words
in that respect are again Illustrative*
She assef^s under his eoogmlslon to marry him. When she is 
with him, and relapses when she is with Banford* The drama 
of resblution on his side and irresolution on hers has the 
dignity given it by her loyalty to Banford. 3
The conflict in psychic fields of force is almost inarticulate, 
and in a sense inexpressible. March knows that she cannot get along
1. F.R. leavis, p.307.
2. D.H. Lawrence, The Ladybird and other Stories, p.103.
3. F.R. leavis, op. cit. p.263.
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forever with Banford. Their failure to get things right on the farm
is a manifestation of their inner conflict. Therefore the fox in
preying upon the chickens is tacitly attacking this incongruous way of
life. Once the soldier appears on the scene March immediately
identifies him with the fox. Her unconscious mind tells her that he
is the force that will effect her salvation but her Ipyalty to Banford
keeps her in a state of conflict I
Nellie and I are going to be married (says Henry)
(Banford put down her knife out of her thin, delicate ^ fingers 
as if she would never take it up to eat any more. She 
stared with blank, reddened eyes)
You what? (she exclaimed)
We're going to get married. Aren’t we, Nellie? (and he 
turned to March)
You say so, anyway (said March laconic ally. But again she 
flushed with an agonized flush. She too could swallow no more).
(Banford looked at her like a bird that has been shot* poor 
little sick bird) 1
The image of the bird that has been shot prepares our mind for
her final death by Henry. The night on which Henry shoots the fox,
March has another dream which is ominous
She dreamed that Banford was dead, and that she March was 
sobbing her heart out. Then she had to put Banford into 
her coffin, and the coffin was the rough-wood-box in which 
the bits of chopped wood were kept in the kitchen by the ; 
fire. This was the coffin and there was no other, and 
March was in agony and dazed bewilderment, looking for 
something to line the box with, something to make it soft 
with, something to cover up the poor dead darling. Because 
she couldn’t lay her in there, just in her white, thin 
nightdress in the horrible Irood-box. So she hunted and 
hunted and packed up thing after thing, and threw it aside 
in the agony of dream-frustration. And in her dream - 
despair all she could find that would do was a fox-skin. 2
The dream embodies the suppressed desire of March, and its significance
is that it gives the sense of artistic inevitability^namely Henry’s
I* D.H. Lawrence, on. cit. pp. 116-117.
2. iklâ, p.m.
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willed death of Banford by the branch of the tree. The box and the
chopped bits of wood that make up the coffin are prophetic, and the
fox-skin is, as it were, a look backward. To read the tale in this
1
was is not "to take the intention for the achievement* , as Ian
Gregor accuses leavis of doing. Commenting on Henry's wilful death of
Banford he says;
... his final act must in some way command our approval. It 
must^that is, be seen as fundamentally human, in the 
reverential human way Lawrence, above all people, has 
taught us to appreciate. 3 .
Lawrence attempts to Justify Henry's"final act* by intimating
the supercilious tone adopted by Banford towards him
... her manner was more remote and supercilious than ever;
the way she turned her head if she spoke at all, as if he were
some tramp or inferior intruder of that sort made his blue 
eyes go almost black with rage, 3
The black rage develops into & grudge borne by Henry towards Banford
and the conflict now assumes the form of a clash between conventional
feelings of class-consciousness and superiority represented by
Banford, and the forces of life symbolized by Henry, and in his victory
over Banford we have the triumph of life. But does the triun^h of
life justify murder's The tale seems to offer an affirmative answer*
Leavis himself seems to overlook the nature of the murder and describes
4
it as *a willed accident* , whereas Henry was, in fact, fully conscious 
of the murder he was going to commit. It is txue that Henry stands 
for life, and that Banford Is a symbol of the defeat of that life, 
but to murder her is to be one-sided, and what is more sericHis, to end
1. Ian Gregor "The Fox, A Caveat* JEssg^ vs In Criticism, vol. 9, no. I# 
1959, p.10.
2. p.15.
3. D.H. Lawrence, on. ctt. p.ll9.
4. F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence^ Npvelist. p.264«
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the opposition between hostile forces that Is necessary for life and 
action. It is only at the close of thé tale *hataweLseeaLawrenbocisching 
the balance in its instability. Both Henry and March are shown as n 
uncertain about the rosy future they were dreaming of, and they wish 
hopefor a better life in Canada* Leavis’s awareness of this fact is
consistent with the view of life’s unstable current, and the compelling
end of the tale* "The difficulty of adjustment - he says - is what
the tale ends on.^
One or two words must be said about Leavis’s criticism of Lawrence
in general, before ending this critique. It may, for instance, be
objected that leavis’s choice is edlectic and limited in scope, as
Elisee Vivas argues!
had he not rigorously restricted the number of works of 
Lawrence he chose to examine thoroughly he would have to 
indicate failure mch more often thaha he did, 2
but it may be answered that Leavis did not aim at exhaustiveness, and
to vindicate Lawrence as Leavis wants to do is not to go hunting for his
failures.
Secondly though Leavls sets the right tone for appreciating 
Lawrence yet in his final assessment jie bypasses works such as Sons and 
Lovers, considered by some critics to be Lawrence’s best work.
Leavis*8 criticism of Lawrence also betrays a nationalistic tone 
which is not, I think, to its advantage. Be prefaces his book with a 
quotation from Lawrence’s Letters* "And I am English, and English is
3
lay very vision" and at the end Leavis identifies himself with 
Lawrence’s cause against Eliot saying* "I am a fellow-countryman of
I'*D.H. Lawrence, Mr. Eliot is not. To be fair this occurs in the course 
of Leavis’s insisting on Lawrence’s rootedness in the English tradition
1. ibid. p.265.
2. Elisec Vivas "Mr, Leavis on D.H. Lawrence", p.131.
3. F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence2_Noyelist. p.8.
4. ibid, p. 3 6.
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a point which one may readily grant, and of which Leavis is much more 
conscious than Eliot, but this is not the happiest way of putting it* 
However, this is to anticipate Leavis*s juxtaposition of Lawrence*with 
Eliot.
308 -
III# Lawrence Versus Eliott Leavls's Démonstration
Opposing Eliot to Lawrence Leavis sums up the contrast in the
following wordst
That the creative Eliot could not draw on any wholeness of 
being, or free flow of life* has consequences for criticism 
and the social poverty of the spirit the unheroism (it led 
him to call Lawrence a snob)* was a manifestation of the 
disunity* the disability, the inner disorder that 
characterized him. There is much significance in its allying 
itself so readily with his Instictive animus against Lawrence, 1
leavis’s terms of reference in this extract are Lqwrentian in origin and
fall in line with the integrative philosophy of Whitehead, Collinswood
and Polanyi. That there is a contrast between Eliot and Lawrence is
out of the question, that there is even a strain of hostility is also
true. Eliot's adverse remarks in After Strange Gods cannot but come to
mind when we read his later preface to father William Tiverton’s
Lawrence and Human Existence. Eliot’s tone is ambivalent*
Perhaps one of the reasons why Lawrence’s books are now less 
read by young people than they were twenty or thirty years age, 
is that the books about him give the Impression that he is a 
man to read about rather than an author to read* a Johnson 
surrounded by a school of Boswells, some of them less tender 
towards the great man than was Johnson’s biographer#
This is not the only reason why Lawrence’s work needs to be
examined from a new perspective# He was an Impatient and impulsive man
(or 80 I imagine him to have been). He was a man of fitful and profound
insights, rather than of ratiocinative powers, and therefore he was an
impatient man. He expressed some of his insights In the form least
likely to make them acceptable to most of his contemporaries, and
sometimes in a form which almost wilfully encouraged misunderstanding#
If the foolish or the ill-disposed chose to regard him assa blasphemer,
fascist or pornographer, Lawrence would not put himself out to persuade
them. Wrong he often was (I think) from Ignorance, prejudices, or
1. f.R . Laavis, English literature in our time and the University. p.l39.
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drawing the wrong conoXuslons In his oonsoious mind from the insights
which came to him from below consciousness, and it will take time to
dissociate the superficial error from the fundamental truth* To me
also he seems to write very badly; but to be a writer who had to
write often badly in order to write sometimes well* As for his
religious attitude we can now begin to see better how much was ignorance,
rather than hostility; for Lawrence was an ignorant man in the sense
that be was unaware of how much he did not know* His strictures
upon Christianity (and Indeed upon Buddhism) are often ill-informed*
-After Strange Gods has been suppressed; and the ambivalent
tone manifest in the last quotation is changed into a much more
conciliatory attitude in Eliot's final statement on Lawrence - a
statement which touches on Ieavis's remarks on Lawrence %
Sly opinions of D«H* Lawrence seem to form a tissue of praise 
and execration* The more vehement of my ejaculations of 
dislike are preserved, like flies in amber or like wasps in 
honey» by the diligence of Dr* Leavis, but between two 
passages which he quotes, one published in 1927, and the 
other in 1933, I find that in 1931 I was wagging ay finger 
rather pompously at the bishops who had assembled at The 
Lambeth Conference, and reproaching them for missing an 
opportunity for dissociating themselves from the condemnation 
of two very serious and improving writers, namely 
Mr* James Joyce and Mr* D.H* Lawrence. I cannot account sEori such 
apparent contradictions* Last year, in the Lady Chatterlev 
case, 1 expressed my readiness to appear as a witness for the 
defence. Perhaps the Counsel for the defence were well 
advised not to put me into the witness-bœc as it might have 
been rather difficult to make my views clear to a jury by 
that form of Inquisition, and a really wily prosecutor might 
have tied me up in knots* % felt then, as I feel now, that 
tie prosecutor of such a book - a boi*: of most serious and 
highly moral intention was a deplorable blunder - the 
consequences of which would have been abhorrent to the author*
But antipathy to the author remains on the grwind of what 
seems to me egotism, a strain of cruelty, and a falling in 
common with Thomas Hardy - the lack of a sense of humour* 2
1. Father William Tiverton, D.H. Lawrence and Human Existence* London, 
Rochcliff publishing corporation Ltd., 1051, pp. vii-viii*
2. T.S* Eliot, To Criticize the Critic. London, Faber and Faber, 195®, 
pp. 24-25.
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Some of the old strictures are retained not just "by the diligence of 
Dr. leavis" but also by the intention of Eliot himself, yet the tone 
is much more benign.
Martin Jarrett-Kerr points to a further reconciliation saying
thereiis evidence (which will no doubt appear if and when 
Eliot's letters are published) that he modified his view 
of Lawrence towards the end. He told me (1 think in I960) 
that he hoped to re-read Lawrence and write afresh abcKXt 
him. 1
C.E. Baron in an essay titled "Lawrence's Influence on Eliot" 
points amonj other things, to the insistence in both writers on the 
necessity for a
naked and transparent language in poetic composition, to 
notions of past and future, beginning and end, time and 
timelessness - with the object of illustrating that "at the 
time of the gestation of Four Quartets Eliot was soaked in 
Lawrence's writings. 2
These notions are given adequate expression in The Rainbow in a chapter
calldd "Cathedral". The relevance of the chapter should not have
escaped the notice of C.E. Baron in his meticulous examination* It
compels one to quote at some length;
Here,in the church, "before" and "after^ were folded t%ether 
all was contained in oneness* Brangwen came to his 
consummation* Out of the doors of the womb he had come*** 
knowledge after knowledge, and experience after experience 
remembering the darkness of the womb, having preseiencefof 
the darkness after death. Then between-whlle he had 
pushed open the doors of the Cathedral, and entered the 
twilight of both darknesses, the hush of the two-fold silence 
where ddWn was sunset and the beginning and end were one.
Here the stone leapt up from the plain of earth, leapt up in 
a manifold, clustered desire each time, up, away from the 
horizontal earth, through twilight and dusk and the whole 
range of desire, through the swerving, the declination, ah, 
to the ecstasy, the touch, to the meeting ahd the 
consummation, the meeting, the clasp, the close embrace, the 
neutrality, the perfect, swooning consummation, the timeless
1# Graham Martin <ed), Eliot in Perspective, London, Macmillan 1970, 
p.244*
2. C.E. Baron "Lawrence's Influence on Eliot", The Cambridge Review> 
1968, p*249*
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ecstasy* There his soul remained at the apex of the arch, 
clinched In the timeless ecstasy*
And there was no time nor life nor death, but only this, this 
consummation, where the thrust from earth met the thrust from 
earth, and the arch was locked on the keystone of ecstasy*
This was all, this was everything* Till he came to himself 
in the world below* Then again he gathered himself together, 
in transit, every jet of him strained and leaped, leaped 
clear into the darkness above, to the fecundity and unique 
mystery, to the touch, the clasp, the consummation, the dllmax 
of eternity, the apex of the arch* 1
The co-presence of beginning and end, of time and timelessness
is a major theme in Eliot's Four Quartets*
K*p* Connelly notes that Fantasia of the Unconscious was
serialized in The Adelnhi at a time when Eliot was reading that journal
with keen interest* He also suggests that Eliot was ii^ressed by
' 71/
Lawrence's notion of consorting inatjjctive with intellectual knowle<^^,
in the Clark lectures of 1926 Eliot was pointing to the dissociation of
these two categories in The Renaissance* These lectures were meant to
form the substance of a projected book called "The disintegration of
Intellect" but unfortunately the book did not come out*
Connelly also argues that Eliot's interest in Lawrence's
philosophy has encouraged Eliot in Jii^  reaction against modern
civilization and his nostalgia for the past*
Concluding this analogy Connelly says;
in the Clark Lectures, we can see the change from a 
philosophical to a religious way of conceiving the act of 
writing a poem* When it can* to a fundamental decision 
Eliot did not view the creation of poetry as an affair of 
craftsmanship only, though some of his remarks tend to 
suggest this* it was through poetry and philosophy that 
he viewed the spiritual predicament of society, and his 
indictment of its awful state runs parallel to the 
living death of modern civilization* Lawrence always 
thought of himself as a religious artist but we have to take
1* D*H* Lawrence, The Rainbow* London^  Penguin Bocks, p.202.
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the wordjreligloh in Its broadest sense with him.^
These points indicate the complementary relation of Lawrence to Eliot 
Which underlies Leavls's interest in both of them.
Eliot's classical sense of restraint and sobriety appealed to 
the early Leavis because he found that it was urgently needed in the 
early twenties to save poetry from the sentimental dream-world in which 
he thought it was immersed. The sense of order and control was then 
desirable to give poetry a new start, but he later came to realize that 
this approach was in a sense, one-sided, and did not take countyof other
f
types of creativity notably represented by Blake, Wordsworth, Lawrence 
and Dickens. It did not fTether words account for the whole panorama 
of human experience. It was too restrictive.- Goupled with this 
realization Is Leavis!s predominant concern for"the loss of the organic 
community", a concern that derives from Arnold and Lawrence. This tragic 
loss of the organic community was represented by the alarming and 
blatant growth of industrial and mechanical civilization» It is in this 
context that Lawrence's significance came to the fore, and here we find 
that Leavis follows the principle of historical relativity derived from 
Santayana, Collingwood, Whitehead and Lawrence himself. Related to the 
change in emphasis in Leavis's writing is Eliot's early affiliation with 
the Bloomsbury Group and their exclusive aesthetic bias and their 
contempt for Lawrence - the Lawrence whose preoccupation with the 
vindication of the human individual and the human life he now saw to 
have a peculiar relevance to the stresses of his time. For Leavis 
Lawrence embodies the predicament of the age seen first ia the d(xnination 
of the machine over human spontaneity, and secondly in the obliteration 
of human individuality. The situation In Snow's THe Cultures and.The
1» K.P. Connelly, Influences on the Literary Criticism written by
T*S. Eliot from 1909 to 1926 with some reference to their reflection 
in his poetry of the same period, unpublished Ph.D. thesisif 
University of London, 1972, p.138.
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Scientific Revolution, was seen as part of the technological 
transformation of human culture to which D.H. Lawrence was opposed.
(It should be noted that Leavls was consistently registering this 
cultural decline from the point of view of the literary critic in 
Culture and Environment. Mass Civilization and Minority Culture, his 
introduction to Mill on Bentham and Coleridee. and in Education and the 
University, Thus a principle of historical and moral relativity Induces 
Leavis to Invoke Lawrence in support of his claim for a human life in 
which human creativity and individual integrity, not computerization 
nor material well-being are urgently heeded. Hence the prominence which 
Leavis assigns to Lawrence in his later critical writings - a prominence 
that falls in line with the advocates of "the human world*^  Whitehead, 
Collingwood and Polanyi. Even Eliot himself came to be evaluated 
in terms of the principle of historical relativity* Leavis's gesture 
towards Four Quartets is telling and the title which he gives them 
"Why Pour Quartets matters in a technologiCo-Benthamlte Age" is 
much more confirmative of this evaluation. The Cheltenham lecture 
appraises Eliot as a great poet because he has managed to change the 
sensibility of the age - that Is to bring poetry in close touch with 
the spirit of the age to show that the creativity of the individual artist., 
the human individual is a manifestation of the vitality of life.
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1
Whitehead and Leavis
Leavis*s references to Whitehead are not uniformly admiring#
Whitehead seems to have become more inqportant for Leavis in recent
years* When Whitehead's name £$>pears in Leavis*s work of the thirties
there is more than a trace of criticism*
Leavis mentions Whitehead for the first time, in his review of
G * Wilson Knight's The Christian Renaissance t "And myself I remind
that the age of j^ofessor Whitehead, Canon Streeter, and Mr Middleton <
Mirry is an age unfavourable to the development of critics, as it is 
2
of poets*" But if the reference here is negative it is not because 
Leavis dislikes Whitehead's writings - as he later recommends them for
3
study by students of English literature, but because he strongly 
reacts to the Marxising decade with its tendency towards political 
Ideologies and philosophical doctrines*
1# Alfred North MLtehead (1861-19U7) a distinguished mathematician 
(the teacher of Bertrand Russell, later his collaborator in 
Principia Mathematics), logician and philosopher, was b o m  into a 
family of school teachers* From school at Sherborne he went up 
to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1880 and became a fellow of the 
College in 1885* In 1910, he resigned and moved to London - 
teaching at University College from 1911 to I9IL and at Imperial 
College from 191b to 192b. In that year he accepted an invitation 
to join the philosophy department at Harvard, where he became 
eventually professor Emeritus. See; A* Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed)
The Philosophy of Alfred North WMtehead, New York, Tudor 
Publishing Company 1951, pp. 3-Vb, and B* Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
vol.23, p.b86.
2* Scrutiny, vol.II, no.2, September 1933, p. 210
3. F.R. Leavis, Education and The University, London, Chatto and 
Windus, 19b3, reprint 19ôÿ, p. VOd
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/
Whitehead's name recurs in the exchange between Leavis and
/
René Wellek of 1937# Wellek invokes Whitehead's reading of 
Wordsworth in order to "maintain the coherence, unity, and subtlety 
of Wordsworth's thought" against Leavis's view in Revaluation that, 
"his philosophizing ... had not the value he meant it to have."  ^
The relevant passage in Wellek reads t
y .
I grant that we to-day may not be increased by these 
speculations (these (peculations are related to 
Wordsworth's view of 'the one Interior life that lives" 
in all things, and the life of all beings with God' ) 
but they are the very life-blood of a great European 
tradition descended from Plato, and they are still 
considered valid and valuable by many prominent thinkers,
X recall e.g# A.K» Whitehead's interesting comments on 
Wordsworth's philosophy of nature, idiers the eminent 
mathematician, logician, and speculative philosopher 
commends Wordsworth precisely because he grasps the Wiole 
nature in the tonality of the particular instance. 2
Leavis's reply is to insist that, as critic, he is only
concerned with Wordsworth's poetry; not with his 'thought'.
In consequence, Whitehead, in his role of one ‘tdio would elevate
Wordsworth's 'thought'^must be excoriated;
I do not see ^ a t  serviee Dr Wellek does either himself 
or philosophy by adducing Chajier V of Science and The 
Modem World. That an eminent mathematician, logician 
and (peculative philosopher should be so interested in 
poetry as Professor Whitehead there shows himself to be 
is pleasing; but I have always thought that the quality 
of his dealings with poetry to be exactly idiat one would 
e^ect of an authority so qualified. I will add, 
perhaps wantonly and irrelevantly^that the utterances of 
Professor Whitehead quoted by Dr Wellek look to me like 
bad poetry; in their context, no doubt, they become 
something different, but I cannot see idiy even then they 
should affect a literary critic's view of Wordsworth 
and Shelley. 3
1. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, p. I6b
2. Rene Wellek. 'Revaluation'. Scrutiny. Vol.V. no. b 
March 1937, pp. 376-379  ^
3. F.R. Leavis, "Literary Gritioiasi and Philosophy; A Reply", 
Scrutiny. Vol.VI, no.l, June 1937, p. 68
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As far as Whitehead is concerned, Leavis* s remarks are
double-edged* At the same time as Wellek* s conversion of
Wordsworth's poetry to philosophy is rejected,' and along with
it Whitehead's ability to read poetry, the philosopher's
ability in his own field is conceded* But a further consideration
of what Leavis and Whitehead have to say about Wordsworth reveals
far more in common than the sharp exchange with Wellek would
suggest. Indeed, Leavis*s view that Wordsworth is essentially
a poet and not a philosopher finds confirmation in Whitehead's
dictum "Wordsworth is a poet writing a poem, and is not concerned
with dry philosophical statements." ^
Agaii^the original view idiich Leavis brings to bear on the
traditional ^predation of Wordsworth as a poet of nature springs
to mind as a point in common between Whitehead and Leavis.
Repudiating this traditional view Leavis says;
Wordsworth, we know, is the poet of nature# and the 
associations of the term 'nature' here, are 
unfortunate, suggesting as it does a vaguely 
pantheistic religion-substitute. If this is all 
Wordsworth has to offer, or if, as Mr S35>son, 
esqpressing (apparently) very much this notion of 
him, states, 'he had no inspiration other than his 
use when a boy of the mountains as a totem or father- 
substitute*, then (the world being what it is) one 
may save one's irony for other things than his super­
session, as the presiding genius of Lakeland, by 
Mr Hugh Walpole* Bu-h Wordsworth himself, in the 
famous passage, fthat taken from the conclusion of 
the first book of The Recluse.' he offers 'as a 
kind of prospectus of the design and scope of the whole 
poem,* proposes something decidedly diff er ent&^en 
he stresses the Mind of Man as;
2My haunt, and the main region of my song.
1# A*N* Whitehead, Science and The Modem World. Cambridge 
University Press, 1933, p* 10b
2. F.R* Leavis, Revaluation. London, Chatto and Vilnius, 
reprint 1969, P* lob
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On this evidence Leavis qualifies the term 'nature* associated
with Wordsworth to mean 'human nature* and not 'natural scenery*.
Wordsworth* s preoccupation was with a distinctively 
human naturalness, with sanity and spiritual health 
and his interest in mountains was subsidiary. 1
This view is again adumbrated in Whitdiead's conception of the
nature poetry of Wordsworth;
In citing Wordsworth, the point which I wish to make 
is that we forget how strained and paradoxical is the 
view of nature which modem science irposes on our 
thoughts. Wordsworth to the height of genius, 
expresses the concrete facts of our epprehension, 
facts idiich are distorted in the scientific analysis. 2
This protest against ' scientific analysis' is meant to counteract
the over-en^hasis on the material aspect of nature disseminated
by both Locke and Newton and the consequent splitting up of nature
into material and mental aspects - Whitehead refutes this view^
asserting that th/ough nature is inanimate it is only through human
feelings and evaluations that it is rendered alive. This organic
bond is at the centre of Vhitehead's philosophy of organism. It
conflms a ruling principle in Leavis* s criticism and logically
falls in line with leading ideas in both Collingwood and Polanyi.
This creativity of the human mind Wiich bestows value on external
nature is adequately ex0rç>lified when Leavis writes on Blake saying;
Perception, he insists in art and aphorism, is 
creative, and there is a continuity from the 
creativeness of perception to the creativeness 
of the artist. 3 s
1. ibid, p. 165
2. A.N. Vfliitehead, op.cit, p. 10b
3. F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall Hv Sword, London, Chatto and Windus, 
1972, p. 127
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Elaborating the same point Whitehead says;
• •• the mind in ^prehending also experiences 
sensations which, properly speaking, are qualities 
of the mind alone. These sensations are projected
by the mind so as to clothe the ^propriété bodies
in external nature. Thus the bodies are perceived
as with qualities which in reality do not belong to
them, qualities Wiich in fact are purely the offspring 
of the mind. Thus nature gets credit, idiich should, 
in truth, be reserved for ourselves^ the rose for its 
scentj, the nightingale for his song, and the sun for 
his radiance. The poets are entirely mistaken. They 
should address their lyrics to themselves, and should , 
turn them into odes of self-gratulation on the 
excellency of the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, 
soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying 
of material, endlessly, meaninglessly. 1
Reverting to the same topic and almost on the same
subject, Whitehead says;
4 y
Value is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of 
an event. Value is an element which permeates through 
and through the poetic view of nature. We have only 
to transfer to the very texture of realization in 
itself that value which we recognize so readily in 
terms of human life. This is the secret of 
Wordsworth» s worship of nature. 2
1. A.N. Whitehead, op.cit, pp. 68-69. It may be noted that 
M.H. Abrams disagrees with Whitehead's Interpretation of 
Wordsworth's organic view of nature arguing that Wordsworth 
'retained to a notable degree the terminology and modes of 
thinking of eighteenth century associationism' (Thejgrror 
and The Lamp, Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 16l-l82)J 
Nor does he accept Whitehead's notion that poets felt an urge 
to compose their lyrics as forms of 'self-gratulation' on the 
excellency of the human mind, because a poet • as Abrams 
argues - 'was usually inspired, like Addison, to praise not his 
own excellence, but the foresight and bounty of Providence which 
motivated him to add supernumerary ornaments to the universe, 
and make it more agreeable to the imagination», (ibid, p.265). 
Abrams also disagrees with Whitehead's suggestion that 
Wordsworth's contemporaries viewed nature as »a dull affair» 
because it is not a view that harmonizes with his theory of the 
'lan^*; the objective reality outside ourselves which he 
defines in terms of vegetable growth, and which conç>rehends 
'those aspects and relations of an aesthetic which (the) 
archetype of the work of art, as mirror leaves marginal or omits' 
(ibid, p. 35)
2. A.N. Whitehead, Science and The Modem World, Cambridge 
University Press, 1933, p. 116
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In other words it is Wordsworth the poet, the human being, who
infuses life into and assigns value to nature # In his essay
on Wordsworth, James Smith comes close to this view* He saysi
As he (Wordsworth) thought that nature, instead 
of repeating herself, provides for a development 
of the spirit or a gradual revelation of truth, 
it must have been because he felt he had something 
new within him , He was part of what he saw 
or vdiat he saw was part of him. And as early as the 
Descriptive Sketches, he ^eaks of 'abandoning the 
cold rules of painting' to consult both 'nature and 
his feelings'. From that date onwards he gives no 
mere lists of natural appearances, but groupings of 
them as they served to prompt a dominant emotion. 1
And later on he says:
.9 he creates and it is part of his own experience 
- a kind of being in which both the external world 
and himself can share. 2
Whitehead develops this argument to its logical conclusion and
comes to assert that "The Romantic reaction was a protest on 
3
behalf of value". Probably Leavis has a similar notion in
mind Wien he suggests that the Romantic movement 'enriched the 
iihuman heritage' because it is in terms of human creativity, 
spontaneity and intuition that Leavis speaks of the Romantic 
tradition. In the course of his interpretation of Dickens's 
genius he refers to the novelist's familiarity with Wordsworth 
and Romantic poetry in general and to his flair for assimilating 
those promptings of the Romantic heritage which confirmed his response 
to early Victorian England, confirmed the intuitions and the
1. James Smiths "Wordsworth : A Preliminary Survey", Scrutiny, 
Vol, VII, Uo.l, June 1938, pp. b3-Ub.
2. ibid, p. L8
3. A.N. Whitehead, op.cit, p. 118
b. F.R. & Q.D. Leavis, Dickens The Novelist, p. 276
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affirmations, that, present organically in the structure of 
Hard Times and Little Dorrit, make one think of Blake. ^
In this respect Whitehead's unequivocal assertion of 
human life and the right of the individual to be himself is 
consonant with Lawrence's life-long battle for 'individual 
and human Hfe*, and in turn strikes a sensitive and 
responsive chord in Leavls# Vthitehead's concern with 'human 
Value' in^resses itself on Leavis and confirms his intense 
admiration of Lawrence. Leavis subtitles the introduction 
to his latest book Nor Shall My Sword, with a curt, but highly 
e2q)ressive senteice: "Life ^  a necessary word", ^ and by
'life* is meant the human life that is being challenged and 
jeopardized by the horrifying advance of a technology 
heralded by the age of Locke and Newton#
It is interesting to note that Whitehead's plea for an 
integral and organic view of life and his relentless and incessant 
war against what he calls 'bifurcation', has not just influenced 
Leavis, but has had a far-reaching effect on a number of other 
critics and philosophers*
Susanne Langer, in Philosophy in a Nerv Key, which she 
dedicates to Whitehead, models her argument on the original 
Whiteheadian doctrine* She argues that "The limits of thought 
are not so much set from outside, by the fullness or (poverty of
1# F*R* Leavis's Introduction to Peter Coveney's The Image of
Childhood , Penguin Books, 1966, p.19
2* F*S* Leavls, Nor Shall Sword, p.l?
3# F*R* Leavis, Nor Shall Viy Sword, London, Chatto and Windus,
1972, p*9. The sentence first occurs in his essfty on Dickens
and Blake, in Dickens; The Novelist, p. 219
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eq^erlences that meet the mind, as from within, by the power of 
conc^tion, the wealth of fonmilative notions with which the mind meets 
e3Ç>eriences# ** ^
Dorothy Qnmett, in The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking# which,
she too, dedicates to Whitehead, explains his view of natnre in
the following terms*
Whitehead* s theory of perception in his epistemological 
theory is ^ developed cut of a view of nature in which 
perception is given a much wider significance# In fact 
he is concerned to show that perception in the epistemological 
sense is a particular instance of a much wider relationship 
Wiich he describes under the general term 'prehension*, 
'Prehension* is the general word used of any reaction of an 
organic entity to its environment, whereby, the environment 
is organized into a perspective related to that entity# 2
These passages reflect the cardinal importance of the human mind
with its organic, dynamic and animating nature and it is this leading
concept that binds this group of thinkers to each other#
It is relevant to pursue Whitehead's doctrine of nature still
further in the hope that it will disclose further affinities
between Whitehead and Leavis#
In The Concept of Nature# Whitehead argues against the
division of nature into internal and external because these two
aspects ultimately meet in the human mind Wiich is one and
Indivisible# In a similar way he disavows the split of nature
into material and mental and argues for a view of nature based upon
1
the concept of organism, and not upon the concept of matter#
1# Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Keys Cambridge Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Press, reprint 1p6$, p.8
2# Dorothy Brauett, The Nature of Metaphyslc^ Thinking# London, 
Macmillan, St.Martin's Press, 19o6, p# 228
3# A*N, Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, Cambridge University 
Press, 1920, pp# 30-31
it# A#N# Whitehead, Science and The Modem World# Cambridge 
University Press, 1^33, ï>*
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Whitehead's principle of organism can be seen as a major
force behind Leavis»s concern with the 'dissociation of
sensibility,' but to understand this contention one must refer
to Whitehead's 'coramonsense notion of the universe' vLeavis
uses the phrase approvingly*
What the student needs to acquire a minimum knowledge 
of is the way in idiich the 'commonsense notion of the 
universe' (Whitehead's phrase) took possession of the 
ordinary man* s mind«and with *diat consequences for the , 
climate of the West and the ethos of our civilization#
This involves being able to state Intelligently idiat 
the Cartesian Mewtonian presuppositions were and to 
Wiat kind of philosophical Impasse they led— that 
still exanplified in the philosophies of science and the 
positivist and empiricist fashions that prevail# 1
Whitehead explains the phrase as embodying the relatedness
of different disciplines or Wiat Whitehead likes to call "the
2
inter-relations of matter, life and mentality," that is, idiat 
Whitehead in his philosophical vocabulary terms 'prehensions' 
or 'prehensive unities'# Elaborating on this idea of 
coznmonsonse Whitehead traces it back to the early sixteenth 
century Wien it began to take foinn in Europe# It derived trm. 
a medley of Greek and Medieval ideas and governed the altitude 
of the early Renaissance thinkers so that they envisioned it in - 
all their approaches to any question# With the advent of the 
seventemth century this sensible doctrine was shattered by the 
Cartesian and Newtonian schemes and the resultant bifurcation of 
nature# This version of history tallies with Eliot's dissociation 
of sensibility, a notion to Wiich Leavis critically adheres#
1. F#S# Leavis, Nor Shall My Sword# p# 126
2# A#N# Whitehead, Modes of Thought# Cambridge University Press, 
1938, p. 176
323 -
Whitehead wrote a book called The Alms of Education#
outlining most of the views that Leavis finds necessary for
a humane system of education# On the first page of this
book Whitehead strikes the central note idien he defines
'culture' saying*
Culture is activity of thought and receptiveness to 
beauty and human feeling# Scraps of information 
have nothing to do with it# A merely well-informed 
man is the most useless bore on God's earth# What 
we should aim at producing is men *dio possess both 
culture and expert knowledge in some special direction# 
Their expert knowledge will give them the ground to 
start from, and their culture will lead them as deep 
as philosophy and as high as art* 1
These words, in effect, embody Leavis* s ideal of a University
education# In his Introduction to Mill on Bentham end Coleridge#
Leavis makes fun of the traditional picture of the 'bright*
student tdiose mind is packed with information and lecture-notes
2
and comes to vomit them in the examination# The object of 
University education, as Leavis repeatedly emphasizes, is not to 
create the best memorizing students but to foster a climate of 
thought in which critical training is promoted and individual 
opinions encouraged, because it is only in this spirit that the 
idea of research, of academic progress and of personal development 
in future life can be carried forward# Whitehead holds a 
similar opinion; he says "When we have once rid our minds of the 
idea that knowledge is to be emacted, there is no special 
difficulty or expense involved in helping the growth of artistic
1# A.N# Whitehead, The Alms of Education, New York, The Macmillan 
CoBç>any, 1929, p#l
2# FJl# Leavis*s Introduction to M U  on Bentham and Coleridge# 
London, Chatto and Wlndus, 195Ü, P# 23
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enjoyment#"^ Whitehead is quite emphatic on this 'personal 
appreciation' as a prerequisite for a University Prospectus 
so much so that when he comes to tackle the most crucial issue 
of 'inparting knowledge» traditionally associated with a University 
syllabus, he is at pains to define it in imaginative terms to 
secure the development of personal views and critical sensibility. 
"The University", he says "Imparts information, but it imparts 
it imaginatively. At least this is the function which it should 
perform for society. A University which fails in this respect 
has no reason for existence."
Both Whitehead and Leavis are in full agreement as to the 
dangers arising from a rigid and narrow specialization and the 
consequent need for related and cohesive disciplines. In one 
of his famous statements Whitehead says; " ... the increasing 
departmentalization of Universities during the last hundred years, 
however necessary for administrative puiposes, tends to trivialize 
the mentality of the teaching profession", and in consequence of 
this VJhitehead postulates that "Every special science has to assume 
results from other sciences". ^
Leavis's view is similar to Whitehead's. He says that the 
student should familiarize himself with and complement his 
speciality by other disciplines of thought "and the more ... he 
can feel that it (this speciality) transcends departmental 
frontiers the better". ^
1. A.N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education, p.90
2. ibid, p. 139
3# A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, Cambridge University Press,
1938, p.178
hm F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall My SiTord, p. 109
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Whitehead* s views on education seem in many ways to
anticipate those of Leatis. Enumerating the three ^sterns
of education prevalent in England Whitehead says that they are
the literary, the scientific and the technical, and that each
of these implicitly embraces or should W^race the other two#
What I mean is that each form of education should 
give the pupil a technique, a science, an 
assortment of general ideas and aesthetic 
appreciation, and that each of these sides of his 
training should be illuminated by others. 1
It is interesting to notice that Whitehead|3 drive at »an
assortment of general ideas* is intended to focus on a
comprehensive understanding of life such as both Whitehead and
Leavis discern in art and literature. Whitehead launches a
life-long battle against the division of educational disciplines
in a bid to secure a study of 'life in all its manifestations*. ^
It is appropriate to indicate that this preoccupation with 'life*
permeates Leavis* s vision of reforming University education.
If Whitehead insists that University education should be
conducted in terms of living in the 'midst of life*, ^ Leavis
finds that it is of the utmost importance that 'human centrality'
to quote one of his favourite phrases, should be the pivot around
which all curricula should revolve. In his essay entitled
"'Literarism* Versus 'Scientism*t The Misconception and the Menace",
Leavis e^licitly states that he does not deny value to science ^
nor does he advocate an aesthetic doctrine that would induce a
1. A.N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education, p. 75
2. ibid, p. 10
3. ibid,
1*. F.R. Leavis,' Nor Shall My Sword, p. Il;0
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belief in art for art's sake. On the contrary he is at pains to
witness the interplay between both science and literature, thereby
guaranteeing the organic relation and the continuity of the human
tradition. What he is up against is the disproportionate
mechanical progress that will eventually reduce man to the status
of the machine. Life as Whitehead conceives it is essentially
organic, throbbing with hum<an ^ intelligence and emotion.
You cannot put life into any schedule of general 
education unless you succeed in exhibiting its 
relation to some essential characteristic of all 
intelligent and emotional perception. It is a 
hard saying, but it is true and I do not see how 
to make it any easier. 1
Intelligence and emotional perception are focal points in Leavis's
criticism. In view of this perception of life Whitehead, like
Leavis, turns to art and literature to crystallize latent human
emotions and ideals.
It is in literature that the concrete outlook of 
humanity receives its expression. Accordingly 
it is to literature particularly in its more 
concrete forms, namely in poetry and in drama, 
that we must look, if we hope to discover the 
inward thoughts of a generation. 2
And in another context he says;
Art and literature have not merely an indirect 
effect on the main energies of life. Directly 
they give vision. Vision is the necessary 
antecedent to control and to direction. In 
the contest of racesvwhich in its final issues 
will be decided in the workshops and not on the 
battlefields, the victory will belong to those 
who are masters of stores of trained nervous energy, 
working under conditions favourable to growth.
One such essential is Art. 3
1. A  ' /)/- f  ^
2. A.N. Whitehead, Science and The Modem World. p.9U
3. A.N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education, p. 91
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With some reservations about the last part of this quotation
Wiioh smacks of Richardsian psychology and theory of valuet , '
I would suggest that Whitehead's notion recurs in such
passages from Leavis as this;
What we need, and shall continue to need not 
less, is something with the livingness of the 
deepest vital instinct; as intelligence, a 
power rooted, strong in experience, and 
supremely human • of creative response to the 
new challenges of time; 1
and this "••• there is a prior human achievement of
2collaborative creation, a more basic work of the mind of man.
I have expressed my reservations about the 1@* part of Whitehead's 
quotation because his phrase 'trained nervous energy' has a 
connotation quite different from Leavis's conception of the 
function of literature# It is clarified in the light of his 
statement that "Art can be described as a psychopathic reaction 
of the race to the stresses of its existence"# Whitehead 
assigns to art a curative function which reminds us of 
Richards's systematization of impulses and the sense of 
equilibrium that the work of art produces in the reader, t^diich 
Leavis looks upon as utilitarian# Leavis indicates that the 
experience of a mature work of art strikes at human depths that 
may be called 'religious' t
1# F.R, Leavis, Two Cultures^ London, Chatto and Windus, 1962, 
p. 2^
2# ibid
3. A.ÏÏ. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, Cambridge University Press, 
1933, p. 350
i*. I.A# Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, Routledge and 
Regan Paul, 192lv, reprint 1970, pp# 33-^3
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In coming to terms with great literature we 
discover idiat at bottom we really believe*
What for - idiat ultimately for? What do men 
live by? » the questions work and tell at 
tdiat I can only call a religious depth of 
thought and feeling* 1
If Leavis speaks of literature in sublime and transcendental
terms, he was, however, preceded in this also by ^ Jhitehead*
Art heightens the sense of humanity# It gives 
an elation of feeling idiich is supernatural# A 
sunset is glorious, but it dwarfs humanity and 
belongs to the general flow of nature# A 
million sunsets will not aptur on men towards 
civilization# It requires art to evoke into 
consciousness the finite perfections which lie 
ready for human achievement# 2
At first glance, the reader may be surprised by Whitehead* s 
statement that "The merit of Art in its service to civilization 
lies in its artificiality and its finiteness, but this sense 
of surprise and apparent paradox will be immediately resolved 
if we read the statement in the context of Whitehead's particular 
philosophy in Wiich the term • artificiality * is not used in any 
derogatory seise# He associates the word with 'appearance* on the 
one hand and with 'consciousness* on the other; and an 
Interpretation of these two crucial terms will help to show that he 
uses 'art* and 'artificiality* in a commendatory rather than in a 
vicious Platonic sense#
In Whitehead's schme of philosophy, truth, like God, is 
•dipolar»# It has a twofold element of reality and appearance# 
Reality, as Whitehead interprets it, is the set of data elicited
1# F.R# Leavis, op.clt, p# 23
.V
2# A#N# Whitehead, op.cit, p# 3L8 
3# ibid
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from the past, Wiereas appearance Is the manifestation of the
present#  ^ But a full understanding of these terms must
involve their inter relationship if it is to be congruous
with Whitehead's philosophy of organism# "The appearance of
the contemporary regions has its truth relations to the past,
2
and its truth relation to the contemporary reality#» The
perception of this truth necessitates the existence of a
percipient whose prehension effects a link between appearance
and reality, and in the case of ' symbolic reference' vhlch
Whitehead identifies with language and consequently with
literature (Whitehead and Leavis consider literature as the
suprme manifestation of language) this appearance becomes a
reflection of the reality; and the percipient can detect that
reality through his affective mode#
There is a right and a wrong use of any particular 
language among the group of people Wio are properly 
conditioned# Also, having regard to the aesthetics 
of literature, language, not only conveys objective 
meaning, but also involves a conveyance of 
subjective form# 1;
Thus it is this fusion tiiat constitutes the indirect inter­
pretative power of Art to express the truth about the nature 
of things# ^ This truth attains perfection Wien there is 
conformity between appearance and reality# It is in appearance
1# ibid# p# 317 
2# ibid#
3# Whitehead identifies the affective mode with the subjective 
form which determines the effectiveness of prehensions# 
ibid# p. 227
k. ibid. p# 319
5# ibid, p# 320
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that the affective tone manifests itself, "Appearance raises
into a distinctness of feeling factors which can be generalized
for salvation from the welter of fact."  ^ And again he says;
It sluplifies the objects and precipitates upon 
the simplification the qualitative contents of the 
given world. It saves intensities and massiveness 
at the cost of eliciting vivid experiences of 
affective tones. 2
Consciousness on the other hand is the element of perception 
Tdiich embrace8^both appearance and reality. It comes into _ 
existence as a conjunction of the fact and a supposition about 
the fact. It is also selective in the sense that it brings 
into prominence only certain aspects of experience. These 
aspects, as Whitehead contends, belong more to appearance than 
to reality.
It is appearance ^ diich in consciousness is clear 
and distinct, and it is reality which lies dimly 
in the background with its details hardly to be 
’ distinguished in consciousness. 3
Whitehead extends this distinctness and selectiveness
characteristic of consciousness to the nature of art, hence his
view that the service that art renders to humanity lies in its
artificiality. He defines artificiality in terms of human
effort or labour or 'artifice*, and finiteness in terms of
precision and accretion, or what we would call the specific
individuality of the work.
1. ibid# p. 336 .
2. ibid# p. 336
3. AJÎ. tJhitehead, Adventures of Ideas# p. 3U8
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It (art) exhibits for consciousness a finite
fragment of human effort achieving its own
perfection within its own limits* The work
of art is a fragment of nature with the mark v
on it of a finite creative effort, so that it
stands alone, an individual thing detailed
from the vague infinity of its background* 1
With these thoughts in mind Whitehead comes to conclude that
art 'heightens the sense of humanity', thereby affirming a
principle strongly tpheld by Leavis* The artist directs
his telescope upon the vague infinity of the universe to
single out a limited region for clarification and piminence,
and in so doing he saves it from the limbo and indefiniteness
of the macrocosm.
In this sense art can be described as an attempt to
explore the possibilities that 'He ready for human
achievement'. The purpose of art, as Whitehead insistently
indicates, is to fuse reality with ideaHty, the objective
with the subjective, with the object of creating a
2significant and integral idiole.
Leavis understands this sense of transcendence and 
sublimity created by the work of art on a basis of the 
collaborative nature that language works out outside the 
narrow specialisms of each member of society. This language 
creates a common ground on idiich people meet and assert their 
human attributes beyond their departmental frontiers. This 
language is pre-eminaitly embodied in Hterature. The sense 
of community Wiich Leavis discerns in language is supposed 
by him to counter the ruthlessness and Insularity effected by
1. ibid
2. Ibid, pp. 325-326 and 3US-3U9
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mechanical civilization; and In this connection Leavis seems
to have been Inspired by Whitehead. Mien Leavis objects to
Snow's complacent faith in technological advance, he says:
... there is a prior human achievement of 
collaborative creation, a more basic work 
of the mind of man (and more than the mind), 
one without tdiich the triumphant erection of the 
sci«atific edifice would not have been possible; 
that is, the creation of the human world.
Including language. 1
In framing this notion possibly Leavis had the following
Whiteheadian statement in mind;
Language is the triumph of human ingenuity, 
surpassing even the intricacies of modem 
technology. It tells of widespread 
intelligence, sustained throughout scores 
of thousands of years. 2
For both Whitehead and Leavis the critical activity is a
creative one involving personal response (but it is, as Leavis
qualifies it, pondered and responsible) and the establishment
of values is largely based on this personal response.
Qualifying the nature of the critical activity Leavis, for
exanple, speaks of 'That critical function which is a 
3creative one'. The phrase is adumbrated in Whitehead's 
statement that 'The appreciation of literature is really 
creation. The written word, its music, and its associations, 
are only stimuli. The vision which they evoke is our doing'. ^ 
Again both Whitehead and Leavis concur in the identification 
of tradition with a constantly realized present. 'The only use 
of a knowledge of the past is to equip us for the present». ^
1. F.R. Leavis, Two Cultures, p.27
2# A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p.^ li.
3. F.R. Leavis, Lectures in America, London, Chatto and Windus, 
1969, p. 23
h» A.H. Whitehead, The Aims of Education, p. 89
5. ibid, p .3
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Leavis*S saying 'a work of art has its life in the present or 
nowhere' has become a commonplace# To both Mzitèhead and 
Leavis tradition implies that the past contains within itself 
the seeds of future development. "The ccBQ>lete analysis of 
the past must disclose in it those factors which provide the 
C'^onditions for the present",  ^ in another context Whitehead
says "The how of our present experience must conform to the
2 * that of the past," and elsewhere i
You can only interpret the past in terms of the 
present. The present is all that you have, and 
unless in this present you can find general 
principles which interpret the present as including 
a representation of the whole conraunity of existents, 
you cannot move a step beyond your little patch of 
immediacy* 3
Thus 'the present controls the past as much as the past
directs the present', to quote a statement from Eliot that is
seen in practice in the critical writings of F*R* Leavis.
Both Whitehead and Leavis reject the doctrine of art for 
art's sake* For Whitehead art should be concerned with the 
'revelation of truth regarding the nature of things, and hence
li
the idea of art as the pursuit of Beauty is shallow* But 
while Whitehead describes this penetration of truth as 
♦psychopathic*, Leavis terms it 'religious*. This leads
1. A.N. Whitehead, Symbolism, Cambridge University Press, 1928, p.55
2. ibid, p* 63 V
3. . A.N* Whitehead, Religion In The Making, Cambridge University
Press, 1927, p. 72
li# A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 350
5* F JR. Leavis, Revaluation, p. 16I|., and Tt»ro Cultures? The 
Significance of C.P. ânow, p.. 23
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to a related point respecting aesthetics and morality, expounded 
by both Whitehead and Leavis. Leavis» s unflinching advocacy of 
the morality of art is well-known. To him a work of art is 
beautiful because it is essentially morally significant. Thus 
the aesthetic element of a work of art should be conceived as 
subservient to an all-embracing moral vision. Whitehead's 
manipulation of this notion is very subtle • His organic 
view of the universe ultimately issues in a comprehensive harmony 
manifested in God. This harmony being by nature aesthetic, is 
simultaneously moral; but because Whitehead originally sets out 
to refute the groundwork of Kantian philosophy based on cognitive 
and 'conceptive* assumptions he argues his cause from a specific 
standpoint. Kant reasons it out ,that there is a discernible 
moral order in the universe, and that, God being by nature 
beneficent and good, He must by necessity fall into that order. 
Whitehead's assumptions reverse this argument. He suggests that 
the harmony inherent in God is in the first place an aesthetic 
element and that the moral order is a by-product of it "All order 
is therefore aesthetic order, and the moral order is merely 
certain aspects of aesthetic order". ^ Thus the harmony in this 
world is a derivative of the major harmony latent in God. The 
actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order "and the 
aesthetic order is derived from the immanence of God". But 
is it not true that this ruling harmony which Whitehead insists
1. cf the chapters on Santayana and Lawrence.
2. A.N. Whitehead, Religion In The Making, p. 91
3. ibid, pp. 91-92
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upon as being aesthetic, is ultimately moral in its connotation 7
This seems to be TrJhitehead's implication when he states in another
context that God "is the realization of the actual world in the
1
unity of his nature". If Whitehead insists that God is "a poet
of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of
2truth, beauty and goodness", I should imagine that these ideals
proposed by God and the mere endeavour to secure them must have a
moral end in view# This image of God as a poet directing the
world has aesthetic implications, of course, and can be best
understood in relation to Whitehead's distinction between 'Truth'
and 'Beauty'* In Process and Reality, God is likened to a poet;
in Adventures of Ideas, Beauty is given priority to truth#
Whitehead even goes so far as to make truth subservient to beauty#
He contradicts the Keatsian view that beauty is truth and truth
beauty by contending that an object may be true but ugly
**# a truth relation is not necessarily beautiful#
; It may not even be neutral# It may be evil# Thus 
beauty is left as the one aim, Wiich, by its very 
nature is self-justifying# 3
Pursuing the same line of thought, Whitehead eadiibits a similar
tendency when he comes to specify the respective importance of
these two crucial terms with regard to the work of art# At
first sight he may give the impression that he is going to assign
equal values to the two terms, but we are immediately reminded of
the preponderance of Beauty, and in his concluding sentence, truth
comes as a corollary to beauty. By way of characterizing the end
1# A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. i;88 ,
2. ibid, p#l90
3. A.N# Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p# 3h2
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which art sets for Itself Whitehead says;
This end, idiich is the purpose of art, is two-fold 
- namely Truth and Beauty. The perfection of art 
has only one end, which is Truthful Beauty. But 
some measure of success has been reached, when 
either Truth or Beauty is gained. In the absence 
of Truth, Beauty is on a lower level, with a defect 
of massiveness. In the absence of Beauty, Truth 
sinks to triviality. Truth matters because of 
Beauty. 1
VJhitehead does not deny the importance of truth in bringing forth 
the sense of beauty but he gives beauty the upper hand. This 
gesture on his part does not mean that he advocates art for art's
2
sake, since he openly condemns it as has already b e ^  indicated, 
but it rather points to the fact that in visualizing the notion of 
organism with Kant's moral order at the back of his mind, he 
confers upon beauty a greater importance and conceives of it as a 
stronger and wider link in the chain of harmony he desiderates.
Having invoked Keats in this argument it is necessary to refer 
to the antithetical direction in idiich Leavis is proceeding in
interpreting the Keatsian phrase. Leavis is keen to bring Keats's
aesthetic Interests under the general heading of 'life', an attempt
Wiereby he secures an avoidance of the polar opposition between Art
and Life assumed by the advocates of the doctrine of art for art's
sake. Leavis's gesture is consistât with his imputing value to
the realm of life and morality, that is, with his effort to
harness aesthetics to the service of life and morality# In other
words for Leavis aesthetics is a component in a comprehensive
pattern he alternatively calls 'life' or 'morality', 'sdiereas for 
Miitehead morality or truth is & component in an inclusive
1. ibid, p.3Wt
2. cf, p . 26
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framework called 'harmony' or 'beauty'. Leavis says;
Keats may be an aesthete, and he may conteo$)late, 
among other 'things of beauty', a Grecian Urn 
or a Titian, but even then his joy would be better 
described as being in 'life' (the word 'art' could 
not have been used by Keats - or by any one of his 
time - in Johnson's way) ... Keats's aesthetic ism, 
in shorty does not mean any such cutting off of the 
special valued order of experience from direct, 
vulgar living ('Livel - our servants will do that 
for us') as is implied in the aesthetic antithesis 
of Art and Life. 1
Whitehead's denial of Kant's doctrine of e^ qperience as
cognitive and 'conceptive' and his endorsement of an intuitive
and personal realization is echoed by Leavis on a number of
occasions* In his exchange with W.W. Robson on literary
studies Leavis attacks the 'intellectuallst conception' of
education charted by Robson. He associates Robson's term
'content' with cognitive denotations which would render the
poetic experience dry and lifeless, a mere container of
information. In this regard Leavis introduces his alternative
view of an intelligent perception of the creative experience
presented by a work of literature. He insists on "a more
inward grasp" of the work of art. Together with what Robson
calls the 'historical sense' that is required for an
understanding of works of art, Leavis introduces the more vigorous
term intelligence', that Involves personal appreciation and
intuition. One might compare him here with Whitehead when
the latter stipulates that if the university is to communicate
any information at all, it should assume an imaginative form.
1. F JR. Leavis, Revaluation, London, Chatto and Windus, 
reprint 1969, p. 2^7
2. F .R.Leavis, "Literary SWdies; A Reply" Universities Quarterly 
Vol.II, no.l, November 1956, p. 25
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thereby affording the student the chance of personal and 
intuitive apprehension.
Both Whitehead and Leavis share an attitude of irony and 
1
distrust towards much in the university and its mei^and the
sarcasm of both is levelled against the guardians of their
common Institution; Cambridge. Exposing the arrogance of
Dr Whewell, Master of Trinity College, Cambridge from I8I4I to
1866, Whitehead quotes him as saying:
I am Master of this College 
And what I know not 
Is not knowledge.
"This attitude", Whitehead continues, "is always prevalent in the
learned world. It sterilizes imaginative thought, and thereby
blocks progress." Leavis*s criticism of Cambridge and its
custodians pervades most of his writings.
If Leavis postulates that a university student, in order not
to be parochial, should familiarize himself with departments of
thought outside the domain of his speciality; in the sense that
a student of literature must know something about science and
mathematics, and the other way round; the point had already been
made by Wliitehead. Attacking the narrow view of specialization
Whitehead says:
• •• the modem professionalism in knowledge works in 
the opposite direction so far as the intellectual 
sphere is concerned. The modern chemist is likely 
to be weak in zoology, weaker still in his general 
knowledge of the Elizabethan drama^ and completely 
ignorant of the principles of rhythm in English 
versification. k
1. A.N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education, p. 139
2. A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 59
3. Vide F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our T^e and The
University, p. 13, Letters in Criticism, pp. SL-lL?, and 
Q.D. Leavis, Scrutiny, Vol. Vll, no.];, p. Hi5
H* A.N. VJhitehead, Science and The Modern World, p. 2hh
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In Whitehead's view this specialization results in a hardening
of the human mind and a lack of balance. Whitehead's
alternative solution Wilch effects a blend of scientific and
literary topics aims at an 'appreciation of variety of values',
anc aesthetic growth; and this brings us again to Leavis's
favourite topic, that is artistic and literary appreciation as
a clue to the understanding of life, the intelligent sensibility
requisite for the realization of value and human worth. Leavis
offers the literary descipline as an ideal on which other
disciplines should be modelled.  ^ This point is so elegantly
worded by VJhitehead that it compels quotations-
There is something between the gross specialized 
values of the mere practical mai^ and the thin 
specialize! values of the mere scholar. Both types 
have missed something; and if you add together the 
two sets of values, you do not obtain the missing 
elements. What is wanted is an appreciation of the 
infinite variety of vivid values achieved by an 
organism in its proper é.nvironment. When you 
understand all about the sun and all about the 
atmosphere and all about the rotation of the earth, 
you may still miss the radiance of the sunset.
There is no substitute for the direct perception 
of the concrete achievanent of a thing in its 
actuality. We want a concrete fact with a high 
light thrown on what is relevant to its preciousness*
What I mean is art and aesthetic education. 2
In this respect it may be pertinent to point to the streak 
of pessimism and even de^ondency observable in both VJhitehead 
and Leavis regarding the gloomy future of civilization to be 
expected from the vitiating influence of the machine. "The evils 
of the early industrial system", says Whitehead, "are now a 
commonplace of knowledge. The point which I am insisting on is
1. F.R. Leavis, Introduction to Mill on Bentham and Coleridge, p; 27
2. A.N. Whitehead, op.cit, p. 2H8
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the stone-blind eye with which even the best men of that time 
regarded the importance of aesthetics in a nation's life". ^
In consequence of this Whitehead is ^t to take a desperate 
view of the pernicious impact of technology; "It may be that 
civilization will never recover from the bad climate which 
enveloped the introduction of machinery". Leavis adopts 
the same tone with notable verbal similarities, "The prospects 
of culture then", he says, "are very dark. There is the lesâ 
room for hope in that a standardized civilization (Wiat he 
calls in Culture and Environment 'levelling down') is rapidly
3
enveloping the whole world", and elsewhere he characteristically 
says "... the prospect is discouraging". ^ Leavis tries to 
remove this note of despair by resorting to the idea of University 
education and the appreciation of literature as a means of 
maintaining humane values and countering gross materialism.
"This battle", he says, "desperate as the odds look, must not,
d
shall not be lost."
In the chapter on Santayana I have referred to Leavis's
advocacy of historical and moral relativity. When he dubs 
Lawrmce the 'greatest novelist of our century* he relates 
Lawrence's writings to the temper of our age, its plights and 
predicaments. The same principle of historical relativity is
1. i ^ ,  p. 25U
2. ibid. p. 253
3. F.R. Leavis, Education and The University, p. 169
H. F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall My 8word, p. 35
5. F.R. Leavis, English Literature In Our Time and The University,
P# 33
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to be noted in bis endorsement of Peter Coveney's judgment of
Dickens as the 'greatest romantic novelist'. This endorsement
Leavis justifies by referring to Dickens* s skilful engagement
with the problems of his age and his exposition of the defects
of industrial civilization - defects which have been perpetuated
in the twentieth century. The same principle is seen at work
In his judgment of Blake. In other words the judgment of the
literary critic - as Leavis lays it down as a rule - should be
made in terms of 'relative human value'.^  This principle can
meet a nuiiber of objections to Leavis*s criticiaa. In his
essay entitled 'The Absolutism of F.R. Leavis', Bernard Heyl
argues that Leavis*s critical tone is absolutist and
exclusively final, and suggests as a proper alternative a
judgment based on relativism. In so doing he glosses over a
leading Leavisian formula 'this is so ... isn't it?' and then 
3'les .#* but», the appeal for confirmation may be positive, 
but it may also come in a qualified, even modified, form.
The judgment Wiich the literary critic passes is not absolute, 
but rather relative to the audience whose response determines 
the ultimate value of the work. In his preface to The Common 
Pursuit, Leavis points out that judgment is a matter of agreement 
and disagreement, and it is very important to find truly good 
critics to differ with.
But this 'relative human morality', ^ also meets an indirect
1* F.R. Leavis, The Great Tradition, p.29
2. Bernard Heyl,"The Absolutism of F.R. Leavis" The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, V0I.HII, no.l," 19%" PP* 2H9-255
3* F.R. Leavis, Two Cultures? The Significance of O.P. Snow, p.28
H. cf the chapters on Santayana and Lawrence.
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and implicit challenge posed a long time ago by S.L. Bethell, ^
and recently renewed in a milder and more delicate form by
Walter Stein. Each of them is trying in his own way to pin
Leavis down to the Christian tradition. Bethell argues that
if Leavis*s criteria are moral and spiritual they should be
affiliated to a defined Christian category, and Leavis himself
must recognize the fact, since otherwise they could only be
Wiimsical and cliquish as in Bethell's view, the writers of
Scrutiny bore witness. Stein argues that Christianity can
include the kind of morality that Leavis desiderates (the
book is written on the assumption that Christianity has a
comprehensiveness that enables it to accommodate a large body
of moral doctrines and this belief helps Stein to bring the
writers whom he examines to fit in with his general conception)
and in consequence of this he argues that, though Leavis does not
acknowledge 'Christian criticism» yet his moral tone can be
interpreted as ultimately Christian in spirit.
In any case, it seems a final vindication of the 
idea of a Christian criticism that our greatest 
living critic, though specifically concerned to 
preserve a 'liberal' independence in his work, 
should yet, again and again, embody the virtues, 
essentially, of the Christian critical ideal. 3
I need hardly refer to the loose and icpreclse way in which
Stein approaches this subject since it has already been
elaborated upon in a stringent review by Vincent Buckley, ^
1. S.L. Bethell, Essays on Literary Criticism and the English 
Literary Tradition, London, Dennis Dobson, 19H6, pp. 13-lH
2. Walter Stein, Criticism as Dialogue, Cambridge University 
Press, 1969, pp# 39-tO
3. Walter Stein, Criticism as Dialogue, Cambridge University 
Press, 1969, pT5B
H. Vincent Buckley, 'Stein's Criticism as Dialogue', Critical 
quarterly , Vol#lH, no.l, Spring 1972, pp. 75-83
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but what I would like to draw attention to is that Leavis* s 
morality is human and is adaptable to changing conditions, and 
in this sense resists any religious denomination or rather 
delimitation.
Whitehead's treatment of this doctrine comes quite close to 
Leavis . The principle is seen in practice in such statements 
as this;
Goethe surveyed the world, but it was from 
Weimar; Shakespeare is universal but he 
lived in Elizabethan England. We cannot 
think of Socrates outside Athens. 1
This applies to historical or rather spatial relativity. As
for moral relativity, it is brought home in Whitehead's
statement, "The point is that moral codes are relevant to
presuppositions respecting the systematic character of the
relevant universe. When the presuppositions do not apply
;
that special code is a vacuous statement of abstract 'irrelevancies'
In this context it is fitting to explain Whitehead's doctrine of 
relativity as he conceives it philosophically because it has strong 
bearings on the issue. Whitehead repudiates the notion of 
absolute finality for any actuality or occasion. Actuality can 
only be conceived in process or, as he says, in becoming. It 
has no absolute existence; since it can be perceived only in 
relation to other actualities; In this way he ensures the idea 
of interrelatedness -vdiich is at the root of his philosophy of 
organism. This interrelatedness is also the basis for his 
rejection of the bifurcation of nature. Referring to the mistake of
1. A.N. Whitehead, Religion In The Making, Cambridge University 
Press, 1927, p. 121
2. A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. l8
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preceding philosophers Whitehead contends that their difficulty 
was not with dogmatic theology as much as it was with dogmatic 
finality.
Their true enemy was the doctrine of dogmatic 
finality, a doctrine which flourished and is 
flourishing with equal vigour throughout Theology, 
Science and Metaphysics. The methodology of 
rational thought from the Greeks to our times has 
been vitiated by this fundamental misconception.
These errors are not confined to religious thought.
They have infected all departments. Their total , 
effect has been to introduce in each age a dogmatic 
sense of finality. The ©nphasis of certainty has 
been wrongly placed and with equal error dogmatic 
re j ection. 1
When Whitehead comes to define art he combines absoluteness with 
relativity in a dexterous way. He identifies relativity with 
the internal details that go into the making of the work of art 
or what Leavis calls 'the local concreteness*, and absoluteness 
with the ultimate significance and individuality of the work 
of art.
Art at its highest exoiplifies the metaphysical 
doctrine of the Interweaving of absoluteness upon 
relativity. In the work of art the relativity 
becomes the harmony of the composition and the 
absoluteness is the claim for separate individuality 
advanced by component factors. 2
It may be observed in passing that WhiteheM's definition of
harmony as a combination of elements of discord within a general
framework of concord or the blend of the real with the ideal
is essentially Coleridgean. His whole philosophy of organism
has a Coleridgean tenor. "All aesthetic experience", "Whitehead
1. A.N. ‘Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 208
2. ibid, pp. 339-3H0
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reports, "Is a feeling arising out of the realization of 
contrast under identity".  ^ This view is Coleridgean in 
principle and even in formulation, and there is nothing 
surprising in this. Throughout his career Leavis expresses 
his concern over the loss of organic community and the 
arbitrary breach between the past and the present arising 
from industrial development. The organic relation between 
the artist and his environment that contributed to the 
emergence of a Shakespeare and a Bunyan was, in his view, 
dissolved by industrial growth. Furthermore, in his 
constant references to Eliot and Richards, Leavis assigns to 
Eliot the credit of changing the sensibility of our age, and to 
Richards the role of popularizing Coleridge's ideas and the
2
emphasis on analysis as a proper tool of literary criticism.
I may even rmark that Leavis*s favourable references to Richards 
occur largely in Culture and Environment, and mostly in the 
context of this idea of organism which received adequate 
expression at the hands of Coleridge.
VJhitehead seems to be speaking for Leavis \dien he draws a 
distinction between the generality of philosophical thought 
and the particularity of the work of literature. When philosophy 
tackles an idea it moulds it in an abstract, generalized way, but 
in the realm of art it is rendered in a concrete, individualized 
form '... good literature avoids the large philosophic 
generality which the quality (of vagueness) exhibits. It fastens 
upon the accidental precision which inevitably clothes the
1. A.N, VJhitehead, Process and Reality, Cambridge University 
Press, 1929, p. 396
2. Fdl. Leavis, Scrutiny, Vol.I, no.2, September 1932, p. 132
-  343
qualitative generality*».  ^ In his protest against Snow's 
concern with the superficial aspects of material civilization and his 
exultation in technological advance^  Leavis adduces Lawrence as 
indicating that life is much more interesting in its undercurrents
O
than at its surface-level. These undercurrents, as both Leavis
and Lawrence intimate, pertain to the spiritual and humane 
attributes of man and are supronely evoked in literature*
Whitehead imputes to literature a similar role when he says:
"It is one function of great literature to evoke a vivid feeling 
of 'vdiat lies beyond words»». But Whitehead charges literature
with another important task. This task resides in bringing man
out of his solitariness into communion with others thereby achieving 
the interconnectedness that lies at the centre of his philosophy 
of organism. *»E2pression is the return from solitariness to 
society*», ^ and in another context he ssQTs, **The penetration of 
literature and art at their height arises from our dumb sense that 
we have passed beyond mythology; namely beyond the myth of 
isolation*». This is the sort of thing that Leavis has in mind 
when he quotes Lawrence as saying that one writes out of one's 
moral sense for the race, as it were . ^
1. A.K. #iitehead. Modes of Thought, p.6
2. F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall My Sword, p. 17
3* AJi, Whitehead, Modes of Thought^  p.7
k* A.N. Whitehead, Religion In The Making, p. 123
5* A*N$ 1*Jhitehead, Modes of Thought, p.9
6. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and the University.
Pt 51
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To consider Whitehead's views on the creative activity 
in relation to those of Leavis is to be conscious, not just 
of verbal similarities (at least on the formal level) but also 
of notional resemblances* This may seem to be a loose 
generalization especially in connection with two radically 
different frames of mind, but this is at least the luçjression 
idiich the following pages hope to convey* The phrase 'Modes 
of Thought', I which Leavis uses in his writings, is the title 
of one of Whit ell ead' s books, and the phrase 'Creative impulse* 
being the first chapter in this book, is a recurrent phrase 
in Leavis*
Associating the weak points in Forster with Bloomsbury
standards Leavis says:
That those standards are not complete in themselves 
or securely based or sufficiently guaranteed by 
conteB5)orary civilization there is no need to dispute| 
the recognition has bem an essential part of the 
, creative impulse in Mr Forster* 2
But this is just a superficial a^ect and a closer examination
of the operation of their minds will reveal closer affinities*
Affirming the correlation of thought with its concurrent
6]q)re68ive mode Whitehead says:
The notioncof pure thought in abstraction from all 
expression is a figment of the learned world* A 
thought is a tremendous mode of excitement* Like 
a stone thrown into a pond it disturbs the whole 
surface of our being* But this image is inadequate, 
for we should conceive the ripples as effective in 
the creation of the plunge of the stone into the 
water» The ripples release the thought, and the 
thought augments and distorts the ripples* In 
other words to understand the essence of thought,
1* F*R* Leavis, English Literature in our Time end The University, p*l30 
2* F*R* Leavis, The Common Pwsuit* p.276
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w© must study its relation to the ripples amid 
which it emerges. 1
Elsewhere he describes this interrelatedness as a process of 
2
•enactment.* This • enactment* is a favourite word in the 
body of Leavis*s criticism. Diagnosing Johnson's 
deficient view of Shakespeare he says "... he cannot understand 
that works of art enact their moral valuations".  ^ In another 
context he again says8 "It is the beginning of the sustained 
criticism of English life that the book (Little Dorrit) enacts",^  
end again he says: "But in that set inquest into Victorian
civilization Wiich Little Dorrit enacts for us he (Clennam) .is
q of guilt
a focal agent". Explaining Anna's feeling^Leavis says:
"Anna, we are made to see, can't but feel (we are considering
here an instance of the profound exploration of moral feeling
6enacted in the book).
Mhitehead is concerned with the interdependence of thought
7
and its expressive activities. Belief in such an 
interdep«adence is what underlies, for example, Leavis's criticism 
of the idea of poetry put forward i by Ezra Pound. "Language 
charged with meaning to the utmost possible degree". Leavis 
attacks the impliedidivision between the idea and the mode that 
bodies it forth:
1. A.N. IJhitehead, Modes of Thought, pp. 50-5l
2. A.N. IJiitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 321
3. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, pp. 110-111
U. F.R. Sc Q.D. Leavis, Dickens The Novelist, p. 216
5. ibid, p.220
6. F.R. Leavis, Anna Karenina and Other Essays, p.21. 
7# A.N. IVhitehead, Modes of Thought, p.^ O
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The relation (says Leavis) may be suggested by 
saying that the two are of each other. Not only 
is language an ^ t analogy for literary tradition; 
one might gay that such a tradition is a development 
of the language it belongs to, if one did not want 
to say at the same time that the language is largely 
a product of tradition. 1
Relations in which 'two are of each other' play an
important part in the philosophy of bhitehead, and not least
in his view of art. "All aesthetic esperience", he says,
"is feeling arising out of the realization of contrast under 
2identity", and 'feeling' is a term which embodies just
the kind of relationship attributed by Leavis to language
and tradition. "A feeling", says tihitehead, "cannot be
abstracted frcm the actual entity entertaining it",^  but
this entity itself stands in an ambiguous relation to the
feeling it incorporates. It has its being in relevance to
other things among ■shich are included feelings; but its
"individuality resides in the combination of these relevant 
kthings into it". Two things here are especially worth 
considering. First, for IJhitehead a feeling is a 'particular* 
in the same sense in which each actual entity is a 'particular* 
and such a view could well buttress Leavis's own preference 
for particularity within poems. Second, feelings are 
closely related to the person tdio feels, and may in a sense be 
regarded as his creation, since, as they contribute to his
1. F.R. Leavis, Education and The University, p. 1l8
2. A.N. lihitehead. Process and Reality, p. 396
3. ibid, p. 313
A.N. Whitehead, Symbolian , p. 3
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being, he is instrumental in theirs. A personal, creative
principle of this kind is central to "Whitehead's philosophy -
and to Leavis's criticism. It is seen at work, for exanple,
in his criticism of the part of Felix Holt that deals with
Mrs Transome. He attributes the integrity of that work to
the realized personal element, the perceptive tone that is
focussed and grasped.
If we ask how this art is so astonishingly finer 
and maturer than anything George Eliot had done 
before, the answer is in terms of a perception 
that is so much more clear and profound, because 
the perceiving focuses the profound experience 
of years • experience worked over by reflective 
thought, and so made capable of focusing. VJhat 
we perceive depends on yhat we bring to the 
perceiving... 1
This personal principle is ever present in Leavis's works and
is markedly so in his later critical writings, Dlckms; The
Novelist, Lectures in America, English Literature In Our Time and
The University and finally Nor Shall My Siford.
This personal principle is, I thinlc, different from the 
doctrine of subjectivity as a critical tool. When Leavis 
insists that a 'judgment is personal and cannot be otherwise' 
he couples it with the qualification that it is 'pondered and 
responsible'; and Wien he says that it is only in individuals 
that life exists; he is gesturing totirards a creativity that 
can be seen in the very nature of human life. In other words 
he is disavowing the aggregative view that reduces man to a 
mere number in a calculus, or to a screw in a machine. This 
personal judgment far from being anarchic or irresponsible or 
even 'romantic' in the vicious sense of the word should be a
1. F.R. Leavis, The Great Tradition, p.^ ll
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highly controlled and disciplined activity. This judgment 
is calculated to promote something which may be provisionally 
called * truth». Defining the function of the literary critic 
Leavis says:
The business of the literary critic is to attain 
a peculiar coiiqpleteness of respnnse and to observe 
a peculiarly strict relevance in developing his 
response into commentary; he must be on his guard 
against abstracting inç)roperly from what is in 
front of him and against any premature or irrelevant 
generalizing^ of^r from it. His first concern is 
to enter into ^ possession, of the given poem (let us say) 
in its concrete fulness^ and his constant concern iq^  
never to lose his completeness of possession, but rather 
to increase it. In making value-judgments (and 
jud^ents as to significance)^  implicitly or e^licitly, 
he does so out of that completeness of possession and 
with that fulness of re^onse#^*'He aims to make fully 
conscious and articulate the immediate sense of value 
that^ placeS^ the poem. 1
These words are self-e2q)lanatory and need hardly be 
elaborated upon. The sense of organization and self-discipline 
is sharply focussed. The sense of relevance and inward grasp of 
the text is predominant and is the antithesis of a sentimental, 
subjective or romantic tendency* Such measured words are the 
exact opposite, for exaii^ le, of Pirandello's rœiantic definition 
of criticism as the "adventure of the soul among masterpieces"* 
Since Leavis epitomizes the function of the critic as an attempt 
to arrive at true judgment, and since that critic appeals to the 
audience or readers for a confirmation of his own personal judgment, 
he is aware of something concrete outside himself which claims 
his full attention and on which the judgment he pronounces may 
or may not differ from that of his audience and In view of which 
he may or may not modify his judgment* So if he is personal in
1* F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p. 213-2114,
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voicing his judgment, he is Impersonal in his preoccupation 
with something outside himself. This notion is elegantly- 
put by Whitehead as he says:
Just as sense-perception seems to give knowledge 
of Wiat lies beyond individuality, so action 
seems to issue in an instinct for self-transcendence.
The activity passes beyond self into the known 
transcendent world. 1
and on the same page he again says point is that, in our
sense-experience we know away from and beyond our personality".
In consequence of this VJhitehead distrusts subjecti-vLsm, and
advocates an "objactivist philosophy adapted to the requirements
of science and to the concrete experience of mankind"* ^
Whitehead » s distrust of subjectivism issues from the radical
objection that it tends to centre attention on the self as the
source of all possible knowledge. In his view, it amounts to
some kind of solipsism which both he and Santayana repudiate*
IVhitehead's advocacy of an objectivist principle is not, I
think, at odds with the philosophy of organism he changions.
Both he and Leavis are at pains to distinguish between
personal perception or intuition and selfish egotism* tJhen
Leavis notes that the 'nned* idiich Eliot attempts to assuage
in » trying to use words* is » scmething more than merely
personal* the implication is one of praise* ^ Lea-vis's
discussion of the creative process is often associated with
an lirpersonalizing activity;  ^ but this impersonalizing
1* A*N* Whitehead, Science And The Modern World, p*111
2. ibid
3., ibid, p*11Q
it. F*R* Leavis, English Literature In our Time and The University, p* 122
This point is brought home in his discussion of Lawrence's'Ursula! 
in D.H. Lawrence: Novelist, Penguin Books, p. 137
\
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activity can involve personal feelings that are concretely 
rendered and dramatically realized. The point is illustrated 
in his essay 'Thought and Emotional Quality'J follows 
from all this that Leavis's directives are impersonal and 
objective rather than personal and subjective and in this 
connection he again concurs with Ifliitehead.
The point is worth making because Roger Poole, in a 
recent essay seems not to grasp the distinction between the * 
personal principle as developed in Leavis's work end a pure 
Romantic subjectivism. Suitinarizing Leavis*s view of 
Four Quartets, for example, he says* "It is, as a work, 
subjective* inward and personal, everything that cock-a-hoop 
Benthamism is not". What this leaves out is precisely Leavis* s 
sense of the drive beyond personality that ie part of his 
conception of the personal struggle for truth. Leavis says* 
"Eliot's absorption in trying to use words is the intensity of 
his need; that is as something more than merely personal".  ^
Poole's formulation omits, too, all that is present in Leavis*s 
praise of its 'concreteness* and the implications for its 
anti-Benthamism; of its involvement in language • the common 
human creation " ... the enforcing (of its opposition to neo- 
Benthamism) takes a form that compels a close attention to the 
subtleties of linguistic expression". ^
1. F.R. Leavis "Thought And Motional Quality", Scrutiny, Vol.XIII, 
no. pp. 53-81
2. Roger C. Poole "Life Versus Death in The Later Criticisa of 
F.E. Leavis", Renaissance and Modem Studies, June 1972, p. 128
3. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and The University , p. 122 
h. ibid, p. 131
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Closely allied, to the personal principle adopted by both 
Leavis and VJhitehead, is the notion of * presentational 
immediacy* outlined in Whitehead's philosophy. The notion 
exercises some influence on Leavis as a critic, but before 
elaborating on this point, an explanation of the idea itself 
seems to be in place.
According to Vliitehead "presentational immediacy is a mode 
of perception objectifying actual things",  ^and it is associated 
with sense perception. His subsequent discussion of this mode 
is verbally and notionally congenial to Leavis's critical impulse. 
He says*
Presentational immediacy is our immediate perception 
of the contemporary external world, appearing as an 
element constitutive of our own experience. In this 
appearance the world discloses itself to be a 
community of actual things, which are actual in the 
same sense as we are. 2
The sense of immediacy must be stressed because the word
'immediacy* is a ruling principle in Leavis's critical writings"
and is perhaps Vidteheadian in origin. The notion that
perception can be achieved only through individuals is again
Leavisian in colouring. "It is only in the individuals that
life exists."  ^ In an illuminating statemoit Lhitehead says:
The pure mode of presentational immediacy gives 
no information as to the past or the future. It 
merely presents an illustrated portion of the 
presented duration. It thereby defines a cross- 
section of the universe, but does not in itself 
define on which side lies the past and on which 
side the future. I4.
1. A.K. b'hitehead, Symbol!m, p.21
2. ibid, p. 25
3. F.R, Leavis, Nor Shall V!y Sword, p. 17
k* A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 233
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Mhat interests us in this statment is "Whitehead's insistence on
the concrete a^ect of this mod© represented in his use of the
adjective 'illustrated'. The sense of immediacy is discerned
in that spark -sdiich it throws on a limited 'cross-section' of
the universe to bring out its significance. Thus Leavis strikes
a Whiteheadian note idien he approvingly quotes Blake's words
'To generalize is to be an idiot'; 'Truth only exists in
minutely organized particulars' ; 'The Infinite alone resides in
1
Definite and Determinate Identity'; and comments?
VJhen he (Blake) used the verb 'generalize' in 
that pejorative way he was thinking of the 
problem facing anyone %dio aspires to present 
with cogent finality the essential truth about 
human nature. 2
In this commentary we notice the plea which the artist makes
through concrete and definite particulars to achieve a general
and universal appeal. But Whitehead also reminds us that this
activity of presentational immediacy has nothing to do with the
past or the future. What determines its efficacy is the
personal principle that informs its activity. For the influence
of the past and the future he reserves another mode called
•Casual Efficacy', and the combination of the two modes issues
3
in what VÆdtehead calls 'Symbolic Reference'. Leavis himself 
often uses the term 'immediacy'. Defining this term Whitehead 
says "Immediacy is the realization of the potentialities of the 
past; and is the storehouse of the potentialities of the future".^
1. F.R. Leavis, op.cit, p.l6
2. ibid, pp. 16-17
3. A.IÎ. Whitehead, Symbolism, p.21
U. A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 136
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Leavis, however, uses 'iBimediacy' in its presentational and 
sensuous sense. Relating this quality to Lawrence, Leavis 
says*
The point I want to make in stressing this 
obvious enough difference is that the given 
strength of Lawrence is not something separable 
from the strength vhich (I suggested) would 
have struck George Eliot as the poetic intensity 
of his art. This intmsity is an extraordinary 
sensuous immediacy (it is na more merely sensuous 
than the charged intensity of Sliakespearian poetry).
When Leavis uses the term in connection with Forster he charges
it with a meaning that is more intimately concerned with direct
apprtension and full realization of actual facts "Howards End
(1910) the latest of the pre-war novels and the most ambitious, is,
^ile offering agâin a fulness and immediacy of experience, more
mature in the sense that it is free of the autobiographical,
exhibits crudity of a kind to shock and distress the reader as
]Mr Forster hasn't shocked or distressed him before. " FJhen he
applies the term to Blake he loads it with connotations that are at
once visual and eraotive. Discussing Blake's "The Sick Rose"
Leavis says
We hesitate to call the Rose a symbol, because 
symbol is apt to in^ ly something very different 
from the immediacy with which Blake sees, feels 
and states in terms of his image - the inevitableness 
with which the Rose presents itself to him as the 
focus of his observation. 3
Again Leavis links presentational immediacy with objectivity
and detacluaent when he applies it to the Metaphysicals.
1. F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lat'yence* Novelist, p.116
2. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, pp. 268-269
3# F.R. Leavis, A Selection From Scrutiny, Vol.I, p. 228
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"Their attempts were always analytic" • to aiuOyze your experience,
you must while keeping it alive and immediately present as
1
ejqperience treat it in some sense as an object, he says; we 
are reminded of VJhitehead's initial statanent that presentational 
immediacy is a mode of objectifying things.
Applied to Dickens' g Little Dorrit, the term crystallizes 
the sense of misery and solitude in which little Dorrit is involved. 
"In the chapter I have been quoting from (Leavis refers to Book the 
Second Chapter XU) they (the scene and the setting) give us in 
poignant immediacy - give us as an experience or suffered state -
o
the peculiar loneliness and hunger of little Dorrit*s situation".
This immediacy is allowed to take on a realistic touch so that the
figurative and the actual, the bhiteheadian ' symbolic reference*
and the Leavisian 'symbolic significance' coalesce with actual
events in a dramatic form. Describing the ominous and domineering
presence of Clennara's mother at home Leavis says
Our acquaintance with that shored-up structure, the 
inmates and the gloom, is associated with these 
disturbing monitions, coming to us in the force of 
Dickens's prose with the immediacy of actual 
sensations, and having in terms of the symbolic 
significance a charging effect (the symbolism 
works as immediately as metaphor) that there is no 
need to enlarge upon. 3
These quotations serve to illustrate the fact that Leavis 
does not constrain himself to a rigid and preconceived use of 
terms. Cn the contrary he affords himself the freedom to cope
1# F.H» Leavis, "Judgment and Analysis", A Selection From 
Scrutiny, Vol.I, p.220
2* Fdl. & Qd). Leavis, Dickens The Novelist, p. 253
3, ibid, pp. 26U-265
with varying situations by refusing to pin hims^ down to a
Certain conception. Simultaneously he enriches the connotations
of such terns by enlarging the scope of their application. This
applies to the term 'objectification*. In iJhitehead the term
has a meaning directly associated with the philosophy of organise*
"The philosophy of organisa", says Wiitehead, "is devoted to the task of
making clear the notion of being 'present in another entity'. This
phrase is here borrowed from Aristotle; it is not a fortunate
phrase and in subsequent discussion it will be replaced by the
1term 'objectification". Thus objectification as VJhitehead
conceives it is the connecting link, the 'vector', between two
actual entities, and the realization that these two entities are
actual only in the sense that they are present in each other.
Mien VJhitehead uses the verb 'objectify' however, we are immediately
reminded of its literary inport. Specifying the functions of
presentational immediacy and casual efficacy he postulates that they
offer concrete and abstract qualities, which in their totality
constitute human experience. "I will therefore say that they
2
objectify for us the actual things in our environment".
Reference has already been made to Leavis's use of Eliot's 
'objective correlative' at the beginning of his career. In his 
later criticism he prefers terms like 'realization' and 
•concreteness'. Mien he uses the term 'objectivity' in 
'Judgment and analysis' he associates it with visual elements 
inherent in the experience " ... it will be noted by the way how 
inevitably we ship into the visual analogy, the type and model
3
of objectivity being the thing seen".
1. A.N. Miitehead, Process and Reality, p.69
2. A.N. VJhitehead, Symbolism, p.21
3. F.R. Leavis, Selection frcm Scrutiny , V0I.L, p.228
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If Jsmes Smith conplains of VJhitehead* s neologisms,
Leavis too, has coined new words and modified their use to 
suit his, like the word • constatation*, which is not mentioned
Ï- 2
as a noun at all in The Oxford English Dictionary. There is 
only the verb ^ constate Miich is rarely used at present; and 
Wiich means to ascertain, to verifÿ, to certify. Leavis*s
use of this term is completely different from the lexical 
meaning. It is an emendation of the verb state into constate, 
with a view to defining the work of art in terms of sharp 
realization or specific situations. Cos^ring Lawrence's 
'Softly in the dusk' with Tennyson's 'Tears, Idle Tears', 
Leavis says
... the vista of years leads back to something 
sharply seen, a very specific situation; that 
stands there in its own right, so that we might 
enend 'stating' into 'constating» in order to 
describe the effect of prose statement (we are 
inclined to call it) but the situation is vividly 
realized. 3
and in the same context he identifies 'constatation' with
• disinterestedness'; "the presentment of this situation
involves a disinterested or 'constatin'^ ' attitude”, ^ and
in the same discussion he expands the in^ lications of the
concept to have a cohering or relating effect
,.. we have our licence for saying that however 
strong an emotional effect the poem has, that is 
essentially conditioned by thought; the constating, 
relating and critical mind has its essential part 
in the work of sensibility. 5
If James Smith "Alfred North Whitehead", Scrutiny, Vol.III 
no.l, I93U, P*7
2. It is included only in the Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary.
3. F.R, Leavis, Selection from Scrutiny, Vol. I, p. 2l5
U, Ibid, p . 217 
ë. Ibid
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This cohcriiig function is further reinforced in his subsequent 
use of the t^m. In anoth^ context he says "The considerations 
that dispose^he Cartesian dualism entail that constatation"* ^
VJhitehead's congeniality to Leavis might have been enhanced 
by common debts, for example, to leslie Stephen; in his Preface 
to Adventures of Ideas, VJhitehead acknowledges that in the 
formation of his ideas, he is indebted, among other things, to 
Leslie Stephen's History of English Thought in the Eighteenth  ^
Cnntury, and to a number of his well-known letters.  ^ Leavis 
c^italizes on this book in his Fh.D. thesis and in his subsequent 
critical writings, especially in Revaluation ^  and The Great
I
Tradition , and Mrs Leavis, in the separate essay she devotes 
in Scrutiny to Stephen, describes him as "to be in the direct 
line of the best tradition of our literary criticism to exeif^ lify 
the principal virtues of a literary critic, and to exhibit a tone, 
a discipline, and an attitude that were desirable models to form 
oneself on". This may probably suggest some sort of common 
Cambridge background to which at least some of their formative 
ideas can be traced.
Similarly in his Preface to Symbolism, VJhitehead acknowledges 
his Indebtedness to Santayana's Scepticism and Animal Faith, and 
in most of his argument VJhitehead adduces the support of Santayana. 
Leavis explicitly recognizes that Santayana is a definite 
influence upon him.
At the beginning of this chapter it has been indicated that
X. F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall Sword, p. 21*
2. A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. VII
3. F.R. Leavis, Revaluation, pp. ?6-l63
1^ . F .R . Leavis, The Great T rad itio n ) p . 35
Vol.I, p. 23
5* Q.D. Leavis, 'Leslie Stephen; A Cambridge Critic' Selection from Scrutiny y
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Leavis res<^ rves for hiias^ Lf the right to disagree, if necessary, 
with Whitehead; and as he has already differed with Santayana, 
the point of difference is again their appraisal of Shelley. But 
if Santayana has been idealising Shelley, Whitehead endorses his 
poetry and vision because they fit in with his philosophy of 
organism, "Shelley's nature", says Whitehead, "is in its essence 
a nature of organisms, functioning with the full content of our 
perceptual e^ 5)erience". Shelley's view of nature testifies - 
in Whitehead's opinion - to 'a prehensive unification as 
constituting the very being of nature'. This unification is an 
intuitive vision and transcends the materialism of science. It is 
this idealistic strain in Shelley's vision that approximates 
Wliitehead to Santayana. Distinguishing between Shelley's and 
Vordsï^ orth's vision of nature Whitehead states that for Shelley 
nature is in a constant state of flux, 'of change that cannot die*, 
and this vision harmonizes again with Whitehead's philosophy of 
organism, whereas, for VJordm-jorth, nature 'shows the minimum of 
change'* 'For him change is an incident which shoots across a 
background of endurance'; a^nd paradoxically enough this concept 
is again Whiteheadian; because according to the philosophy of 
organism change is partial, and permanence too is partial, so 
that in every change there is a partial element of permanence; . 
end in p^ mmanence there is a latent element of change. Everything 
is relative to other things. This accounts for VJhitehead*s 
admiration for both Wordsworth and Shelley.
1. A.N. Whitehead, Science and The Modem World, p. 106
2. ibid
3. ibid, p. 107
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Leavis*S difference with Whitehead on his evaluation of 
Shelly brings critical canons to bear on the subject. If 
Shelley has been an idealist and a visionary, this idealism, 
and vision should be embodied in his poetry 'Intentions 
are nothing except as realized in the work of art' is a 
favourite maxim of Leavis and Shelley always offers emotion 
in itself - for itself, for its ot^  sake - emotion that has 
its life not in the poetry but in the life of Shelley himself;- 
80 that we are reminded all the time of Shelley the man. He 
falls to render, to realize, to concretize and this brings us 
back full circle to our starting point namely that philosophy 
is concerned with abstract theories and visions; but poetry 
always has its life in the concrete and the realized. VJhitehead 
takes interest in Shelley* s vision, but Leavis is keen to see how 
far this vision is rendered in a poetic form.
Does it not sound paradoxical to conclude oh a note of
difference, especially on a subject that is mainly devoted to
harmony and relatedness.? On reconsidering the subject we
shall notice that VJhitehead indicates that under every harmony
and relatedness there are elements of disharmony and discord.
In oth^ words there is 'sameness with difference'; and it is
this difference that secures further development and originality
essential for the continuity of life. Tliis is probably one
of VJhitehead's significant values which has escaped the notice
of James Smith and of which Leavis has made proper use. It
will help to clear up ambiguities as to 'the nature of his 
1importance'
1. James Smith "Aired North VJhitehead", Scrutiny, Vol.III, 
no.l, 19314, p. 2
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Leavis, Collingwood and Polanyi
In this chapter an atteriipt will be made to trace the 
influence of both Gollingwood and Polanyi on Leavis# In 
his recent critical writings Leavis frequently refers to the 
significance of VJhit^ ead, Collingwood and Polanyi* The 
three of them are brought in, for example, Wien he discusses the 
desirability of expanding the inglish syllabus to include study 
of thought other than literary, their names are those with Wiich 
he chooses to illustrate his arg;ument.
1* A* Robin George Col3,ingi-7Qod (l889-l9U3)s born at Coniston 
in Lancasliire, he received his first education at home because 
of the poverty of his parents, but at the age of thirteen he 
managed to go to a preparatory school and a year later to Rugby, 
thanks to the generosity of a family friend# In 1908 he went 
to University College, Oxford with a classical scholarship and 
in 1912 he was elected to a fellowsMp in Philosophy at Pembroke 
College# He served in the Intelligence department of the 
Admiralty in the First World War. In addition to his i-rork at 
Pembroke, he taught Philosophy at Lincoln College from 1921 to 
1928# From 1927 to 1935 he was University lecturer in Philosophy 
and Roman History* In 1935 he was appointed Waynflete professor 
of Metaphysical Philosopl:y and moved to Magdalen College# He 
died on the 11th of January 19l|-3# among his works; Essay on 
Philosophical Method (1933) Roman ]3rltain (1936) The Principles 
of Art (1936) The New leviathan ( 19i4-2) "
B# Michael Polanyi; born in Budapest 12 March 1891# Educated at 
BudapestAkarlsruheÿ^ rivatdozent Tecimische Hochsthule Berlin, 1923#
He beca# a member of Raiser Wilhelm institute Ihr physikollsche 
Ghmie in 1923, and resigned in 1933# From 1933 to 19U8 he was 
professor of Physical Chemistry at Victoria University, Manchester, 
and professor of Social Studies from 19U8 to 1958 in which year he 
retired. Among his writings; The Contempt of Freedom (19U0) 
Science, Faith and Society (1946}I The Logic of Liberty (195l) 
Personal Knowledge (1958) The Study of Man (I9b9) Beyond 
Nihilism (I9o0 The Tacit Dimension" (l9o6) Knowing and Being (1969)
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I eiri of course not assuming that, where expression 
in words is concerned, the 'significant* is confined 
to the creative work we call 'literature** The 
educated public we need - and this emphasizes the 
irq^ ortance of the point that it mustn't be thought 
of as a mere aggregation of individuals - will 
represent, for the creative writer and the critic 
(both of wiiom require such collaboration, for it 
amounts to that) a general lively awareness, or a 
readiness for it, of the significance of (say) 
lihitehead. Collingwood and Polanyi; I exemplify 
with a line of creative thought that is clearly 
of major significance for non-specialist -
intelligence and sensibility. 1
Again speaking about the function of the teacher in an
English school, Leavis says:
... there ^ould be at least one person in the 
school ready to read and discuss with students, 
say, Marjorie Grone's The Knower and The Kno>m 
or key parts of it. Vliere the conditions were 
ideal there might very well be a small group of 
students being helped by a qualified guide, to 
appreciate the significance of hliitehead, Collingwood 
end Michael Polanyi. 2
To VJhitehead I have devoted a separate chapter. To deal
with Collingwood and Polanyi in one chapter may be justified
in part by Leavis *s own not infrequent bracketing of them and
in part by the presence in both of similar ideas. To support
his claim that knowledge of the physical and mechanical world •
to be valuable and significant - must be complemented by an
intuitive or rather religious apprehension, for example,
Leavis invokes both Collingi-jood and Polanyi:
that human creativity has created and continuously 
re-creates in response to change is the human world; 
and it entails of its very nature the recognition
1. F.R, Leavis, Nor Shall My Sword, London, Chatto and Mindus, 
1972, p. 217
2. ibid, p. 126
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that (in Collingwood's words) it must ultimately 
depend for its existence on something other than 
itself; for as Polanyi insists, true creativity, 
like perception, is never arbitrary; but always 
seeks the real; which it knows that it can never 
with complete certainty, still less exhaustively 
or finally, know. 1
For the sake of clarity, however, these two writers will 
be treated separately, and whenever the need arises, an attempt 
will be made to relate their seminal principles. For 
chronological reasons I will begin by a consideration of 
Collingwood.
Leavis*s interest in Collingwod dates back to the middle
years of Scrutiny when J.C. Maxrwell revie^red Collingwood*s
2 1 Autoblography, and later his Three Laws of Politics.
It may be worthwhile asicing why Leavis elected Collingwood
and not Croce for his critical directives. The reason is, I
think, that unlike Collingwood, fJrocs excludes moral
considerations from our appreciation of the work of art, and
believes in its autonomous and intrinsic values. Croce had
too much in common with the Bloomsbury group whose
exclusive aesthetic interests Leavis has relentlessly
attacked. Croce says:
We have demonstrated that art as art is independent 
both of utility and of morality; as also of all 
practical value. Without this independence, it 
would not be possible to speak of an intrinsic value 
or art, nor indeed to conceive an aesthetic science,
1. F.R. Leavis, "Justifying one's Valuation of Blake" The Human 
World, no.7, Hay 1972, pp. 6>6U
2. Scrutiny, vol.VUl, mo.3, December 1939, pp. 319-32U
3. Scrutiny, vol.S, no.U, April 19U2, pp.. 392-39^ ;
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which demands the autonomy of the aesthetic 
fact as its necessary condition. 1
Strangely enough Croce argues that the work of art is
a vision or an intuition ;diich does not necessarily call
for expression or ext email z at ion
But it would be erroneous to maintain that this 
independence of the vision or intuition or internal 
expression of the art!at should be siiply extended to 
the practical activity of extemalization and 
coiiïïaunication which may or may not follow the aesthetic 
fact. If by art be understood the externalization of 
art, tlien utility and morality have a perfect right to 
enter into it; that is to say the right to be master 
in one's own house. 2
This sceptical and sardonic approach to morality was seized
upon in Scrutiny by James Bmith then he says "he seems, we
should normally say, to be emptying wrks of art of their
significance."^  Furthermore Croce differs from Colliugwood
in holding form to be the focus of interest in the aesthetic
activity; and form in Croce smacks of the formalistic school
of criticism; of art for art's sake; but in Collingwood it
is coupled with moral suggestions. This may account for
Leavis's preference of Collingw’ood to Croce. "Poetic^
material" - says Croce - "permeates the souls of all; the
expression alone, that is to say, the form malt es the poet -
end here appears the truth of the view vhich denies all
content to art". ^ Coilingwod's refutation of this view
comes as a pertinent corrective:
1. Croce, Aesthetic As Science of Expression and General Linr^ ui&tic, 
translated from the Italian of Bendetto Croce by Douglas ainslie 
second edition, London, Macmillan and Co.Ltd. 1922, p. 116.
2. ibid, p. 1l6
3. James Smith 'Groce', Scrutiny, Vol.11, no.l, June 1933, p.30 
U# Croce, op.cit, p. 25
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• •• these formalistic theories of art, popular though 
they have been and are, have no relevance to 
proper. The distinction between form and .oorüii'^tjon 
lihich they are based is a distinction belonging to 
the philosophy of craft, and not applicable to the 
philosophy of art, 1
It should be readily indicated that in Collingwood technique
and craftsmanship are identified; and craft in this context
can be equated with the term 'technique', which Leavis
condemns as inappropriate to the realm of achieved art in
almost all his critical writings and more particularly in his
essay on Blake.
In the same essay Leavis describes Collingwood as "very 
intelligent, consciencious, and well-informed". 2 To 
account for such a description one must recapitulate the 
context in which it occurs - a context that recalls Leavis's 
determined attempt to vindicate Blaise's genius against the 
background of Eliot's depreciatory, or rather inadequate, 
appraisal. In the first place Leavis expresses his 
dissatisfaction with Eliot's infelicitous term 'technique* 
as an indicator of Blake's achievement as a poet, since 
it only comprises the formal components of the work of art 
without taking into account its more significant semantic 
or intellectual connotations. To apply "technique" to Blake 
is to slight the essentially human values he is trying to 
secure. This leads logically to the second point in Leavis's 
criticism of Eliot. Concluding his essay on Blake Eliot had 
said;
1, E.G. Collingwood, The Principles of /txt, Oxford, The Clarendon 
Press, 1938, p. lU2
2. F.E. Leavis, "Justifying one's Valuation of Blake",
The Human World, no. 7, p. 63
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Blake was endowed with a capacity for considerable 
understanding of human nature; ivith a remarkable 
and original sense of language and the music of 
language and a gift of a hallucinated vision.
Had these been controlled by a respect for impersonal 
reason, for common sense, and for the objectivity of 
science, it would have been better for him. 1
It is against the last sentence in this quotation that Leavis
taJces. up arms. Leavis believes that it is Blake's reaction
against the whole background of eighteenth century rationalism
that constitutes his right to originality and distinction. To
adhere to that background means to abide by the erapiricist
philosophy of both Newton and Locke and the rigid rationalisa
of DesCartes, both of which are utterly uncongenial to human
creativity and mental originality. If riiot's comment is
intended to draw attention to his concept of tradition, then
tradition here, as Leavis points out vrould be a constraining
and bridling one. It is against this positive logic and
rational Augustan civilization that Blake is protesting. Thus
when Eliot says that 'He (Blalce) is very like Collins, he is
2
very eighteenth century', he is associating him with a poet 
to idiom he cannot be linked, because he is engaged in what 
Leavis regards as an exploratory, creative use of language.
It is on a basis of this misrepresentation that Eliot
3
designates Blake's poetry as 'abstract and formless',
Leavis* s vindication of Blake rests on principles largely 
derived from Collingwood and Polanyi; but a closer scrutiny
1. T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, London, Faber and Faber, 1968, p.327 
2# ibid, p. 318
3. ibid, p. 320
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of the central issues will shed more light on Leavis* s
intentions. To illustrate this point I would quote a
rather lengthy passage from Leavis:
Ills (Blake's) habitual use of the names of Keirton 
and Locke was not the expression of une marie; it 
was an insistence on human creativity - the 
creativity of life; a necessary insistence that 
is not less in place today. He insisted in an 
age of Lockean commonsaise that perception was 
not passive, and that there was a continuity from 
the inherent creativity of perception to the 
creativity, trained and conscious,of the artist. - 
'Jesus was an artist* he says. That remark implies, 
of course, a conception of art different from either 
Pater's or T.3. Eliot's - a conception that seems to 
me sound; at any rate, I share it. It implies a 
conception of human responsibility^  and one aspect 
of Blalce*s living importance is that he compels us 
to realize fully and clearly wiiat human responsibility 
means. 1
It is in connection with this sense of the activity of
perception and coromitment to humanity that the significance
of both Collingwood and Polanyi for Leavis is brought out.
That the artist or the knower sliould play an active role in
what is being created or knom - a point of focal interest
in Leavis' 8 criticism of Blake - is central in both Collingw’ood
and Polanyi; and the view that the artist, the critic and the
historian have to participate personally in interpreting works
of art and historical incidents is a ruling principle in
Colling^ TOod. But I will elaborate on this point later.
bhen Leavis quotes Collingwod's statement that 't^ e world
of nature or physical wrld, must depend for its existence on
2
something other than itself, ' we are conscious of the 
principle operating at the back of his mind; namely the 
refutation of Eliot's inç)ersonal view and the objectivity of
1. F.E. Leavis, op.cit, p. 59
2. F.R. Leavis, "Justifying One's Valuation of Blake", 
The Human World, no.7, Hay 1972, p. 63
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Gcience. But the point has more far-reaching effects. It
impinges on the so called self-sufficient world of science,
the belief in the absolute validity of scientific criteria,
and in the polite rational -vjorld of cormonsense. Leavis* s
drive in the whole argument is to establish a principle of
relativity - endorsed by both Collingwood and Polanyi, -
tlirough which the agency of the hmaan mind and the potency .
of the human spirit can be shorn and recognized. This
gesture implies in the first place a rejection of the
mechanical conception of nature. Here it should be indicated
that Leavis*s use of the term *nisus* in the same essay on
Blake probably derives from Gollingx-jood. The term is
recurrently and consistently used in connection with the
2creative drive in Collingwood»s The Idea of Mature.
Leavis also uses it in D.H. Lawrence; Hovelist, end 
Dickens The Novelist. The term has its immediate bearing 
on the point at issue as it emphasizes the operative and 
vital energy exerted by the human mind in corqjr eh ending 
nature or the material world. But this is not the only 
term wiiich Leavis derives from Gollingwod* His comparatively 
recent phrase *the third realm* seems to have been derived from 
Collingwood: "'matter* says Gollingijood, 'is no longer
contrasted with mind and life as a realm in which being is 
independent of acting and logically prior to it; it resembles
3
thm. as a third realm in which being is at bottom simply acting.»"
1. ibid, p.63
2. R.G* Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 
19U5, pp. IS, 83-SU-9 2, 110, 12U, loi, 16U, 169
3. ibid, p. Il*8
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Of course the phrase here occurs in a philosophical context 
indicating that the new concept of matter treated it as 
dynamic and active, not static, as used to be the case*
This dynamic nature of matter entitles it to consideration 
as a t^hird realm», after mind and life, to both of which 
it is now likened* Xet it seems that the phrase had some 
appeal for leavis in consequence of wiiich he transferred it 
to a critical framework, '
The view of art as a craft solicits a joint attack made
by both G oiling wood and Leavis on the psychological theory
of value expounded by Richards in The Principles of Llterei^ y
Criticism* To put the point in a clearer perspective one 
must go back t) Leavis* s allusions to Richards* Richards*s 
views figure prominently in Leavis* s early writings* In
Merr Bearings* Leavis quotes from and draws upon Richards*s
2
v1ct7S for the illumination of his oim ideas* In Culture
and Fnvironïïientj Richards is referred to with approval, four
4
I 3times,' and in the bibliography his works are recommended
as guiding text-books for a training in critical sensibility* 
Richards was also contributing to Scrutiny * Ee reviewed 
C*K* Ogden* s edition of Bentham*s Theory of Fictions*
Ogden being his collaborator in Tlie Meaning of Meaning is
1* cf the use of the..phrase in the chapter on Santayana*
2* F*R, Leavis, New Bearings in English Poetry,
3* F.R* Leavis and Denys Thompson, Culture and Environment, 
London, Chatto and VJindus 1933, pp*3-7-lb-01
it* ibid, p.lUB
*^ Scrutiny, Vol*l, no*l&, PP* U06-iil0
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defended together with Bentham against itdiat Richards takes
4
as an adverse criticism made by Oakeshott in Scrutiny,
 ^  ^  ^ Tliat Benthair^  says Richards) contrary to the
opinion of him (conveniently displayed by 
fi Oakeshott in a recent number of Scrutiny) was a
V-^^nigEIyJpersistent, penetrating and careful thinker/ 
as remarkable for his linguistic investigations as 
even for his political, social, and legal reforms,
Î-Ir Cgden^ in this selection and exposition of his 
methodical writing^makes out. 2
In defending both Bentliam and Ogden Richards seems to be -
defending his own personal views. With Ogden he is
associated by reason of their fragmentation of language into
arbitrary semantic unitsj and with Bentham he is connected
on a basis of their common utilitarian view of art, Leavis
discredits both the pedantic segmentation of language Into
units and the utilitarian calculus. In disavordng these two
approaches he seeas to have been influenced by Collingwood,
Commenting on Richards* s utilitarian theory Collingwood says;
If art is art only so far as it stimulates 
certain reactions; the artist as such is simply 
-a purveyor of drugs, noxious or wholesome; idiat 
we call works of art are nothing but a section 
of the pharmacopoeia. If we ask on what principle 
that branch can be distinguished from others, there 
can be no answer* This is not a theory of art. It 
is not an aesthetic, but an anti-aesthetic, 3
Leavis adopts Colling%iOOd* s attitude when he brands Richards*s
procedure as Keo-Benthamite - a term which he defines in the
same context as equivalent to the utilitarian calculus* ^
1, Scrutiny, Vol.l, no.2, September 1932, pp* III4-13I
2, Scrutiny, Vol.l, no.!:, Karch 1933, P* h07
3, R.G, Collingwood, op.cit , p. 3$
!:, Scrutiny, Vol.XU, no.!:. Autumn 19!t!t, p, 260
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Rejecting the idiole corpus of p^chologlcal studies as
irrelevant to proper artistic appreciation Collingwood says;
♦ psychological science has in fact done nothing 
towards explaining the nature of art, however much 
it has done towards explaining the nature of certain 
elements of human experience with which it may from 
time to time be associated or confused# The contribution 
of psj^hology to pseudo-aesthetic is enormous, to 
aesthetic proper it is nil# 1
Enunciating a similar view Leavis says;
The scientifico-p sychological ambition entails -
his (Richards’s) taking his diagrams of 'poised* 
and organized ’impulses* or ’appetmcies* too 
seriously; he couldn’t go on supposing he took 
his science seriously if he even began to recognize 
the rernoteness of their relevance to concrete 
experiences# 2
Closely linked to this point is their condemnation of
subjugating language to scientific and statable categories,
notably represented by Richards’s division of language into
scientific and emotive. CoUingtTOod’s definition of the
function of the grammarian will help to shed light on this
topic as he draws an analogy between the grammarian and the
logician in respect to their approach to language#
A grammarian is not a kind of scientist studying the 
actual structure of language he is a kind of butcher 
converting it from organic tissue into marketable 
and edible joints# Language as it lives and grows 
no more consists of verbs, nouns, and so forth than 
animals as they live and grow consist of foreheads, 
gemmons, rump steaks, and other joints# The grammarian's 
real function is not to understand language, but to alter 
it it, to convert it from a state (its original and native 
state) in which it ejq)re8ses emotion into a secondary 
state in which it can express thought# 3
1. R#G* Collingwood, op.cit, p# 36
2# f.E. Leavis, Scrutiny, Vol.XU, no.!:, 19W:, p.260
3# R.G. Collingwood, op.cit, p. 257
 ^ 373 #
Jxi the same context he indicates that language is inherently 
expressive and that it can maintain this expressiveness only 
by withstanding the divisive tendency of the grammarian. This 
notion is echoed in Leavis*s critical writings and largely 
malces for his assault on formal linguistics. In both Collingwood 
and. Leavis there is a preoccupation with preserving the vital, 
lively and human nature of language. Denouncing Richards’s 
reductive concept of language as a mere tool ColHngwood says;
Dr Richards assumes apparently without realizing that 
anyone could do otherwise, that language is not an 
activity, but something idiich is ’used’ and can be 
used in quite different ways while remaimig the same 
’thing’ like a chisel that is used either for cutting 
T-jood or for lifting tacks. 1
This id ratification of language ïith Inanimate objects finds
its parallelism in Leavi^ s strictures on Richards’s equating
the tragic experience with the experience derived from a
’pot’ or a ’carpet’, and Leavis attributes tliis misconception
to Richards’s Benthamite and scientific apparatus. That is
tdiy Leavis expresses reservations about recommending Richards’s
Principles of Literary Criticlm as a critical approach to
criticism. In a footnote he insists that the ’quasi-scientific
suggestions of that book should be discounted’ and in. the
Immediately following footnote he repeats the same remark
saying ”I.A. Richards’s Principles will be found helpfully
suggestive; if again the sclent if ic-psychology Is discounted”.^
bhen Leavis takes up the same topic again in English
Literature In our Time and The University, he draws a balanced
1. R.G. Collingwood, op.cit, p.261
2. F3# Leavis, op.cit, p. 260
3. F.R. Leavis, Education and The University, London,
Chatto end KLndus, 1968, p. 132
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picture of Richards’s status as a critic. He does not fail to 
pay a handsome tribute to Richards’s contribution to literary 
criticism, namely his ability to free criticism from the ’ spell’
of form. Keanidiile he points to his notorious relation with
1
C.K. Ogden and Neo-Benthamism - a relation that has resulted in 
hi a imperfect understanding of the nature of language and its 
significance.
In counteracting Richards’s rigid and arbitrary splitting 
of language into scientific and emotive, Collingwood brings into 
focus a significant dictum that bears directly on Leavis’s 
criticism. Collingwood argues that the drift underlying 
Richards’s division of language is to
-^Tintellectualize it, but language, being by definition 
a form of human intercourse tends to frustrate this 
endeavour, because it always retains personal 
attributes. Even in a scientific discourse which 
is supposed to be factual and dispassionate, we can 
discern the shifts of tone and the points of ©rrphasis 
that mark the personality of the scientist. ( On this 
basis Collingwood concludes that Richards’s distinction ) 
’is not a distinction separating scientific discourse 
trom artistic it is a distinction within artistic 
discourse as such and artistic discourse subserving the 
purposes of intellect”. 2
Impressing the point upon the reader in ccm^ elling terms,
Collingwood says:
Vt/hen Dr Richards wants to say that a certain view 
of Tolstoy’s about art is mistake he says this is 
’plainly untrue* scientific use of language, but 
how delicately emotive. One hears the lecturing 
voice and sees the shape of the lecturer’s 
fastidious Cambridge mouth as he speaks the words. 3
1. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in our Time and the Dnlversity, 
London, Chatto and windus, 19o7, p.17
2. R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, p. 262 
3f ibid, p. 261:
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The implications of these views are great# Firstly, the
feet that any statement or judgment passed by a critic is
inevitably coloured by his own personal tone is a major
feature# of Leavis* s criticism ”A judgment is personal or it
is nothing”, and it is the basis of culture as an assmbly
of values, hence "It is obviously absurd to ’posit a culture’
2that the scientist has qua scientist”# In point of fact
Leavis seems to reiterate Collingwood* s viewpoint when he s£^ s:
,.# science is obviously of great importance to 
manlcind; it is of great cultural iir^ ortance# But 
to say that is to make a value - judgment - a human 
judgment of value# The criteria of judgments of value 
and iiîÇ)ortance are determined by a sense of human 
nature and human need and can’t be a product of 
scientific method or anything like it# 3
Secondly, Collingwood*s marked emphasis on language as a mode
of popular intercourse is bound to afford it a comprehensiveness
transcending all narrow spécialisas and technical uses enabling
it to become, as Leavis says, "a mode of intercourse among
people, (Collingwood invests the word intercourse with popular
and communicative functions), to become a public world” or,
to very the illustration, to become ’the third realm’#^  Most
important of all, one notices that underlying Collingwood’s
rejection of Richards’s division of language into emotive and
scientific and his setting up of the principle that there is
only one language defined as artistic and occasionally harnessed to
serve scientific purposes there is the nucleus of Leavis’s attack
1. F.R. Leavis, The Two Cultures, London, Chatto and blndus 1962, p#2S
2# F#R. Leavis, Lectures in America, London, Chatto and yindus 1969, p#lL
3# F#R, Leavis, Nor Shall My Sxford, p#lUO
i:, ibid, p#iio
5# ibid.
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on Snow’s The Two Cultures # Both Collingwood and Leavis
are against the dualism represented by Snow and favour an
organic, integral view of both language and culture. This
point is worth making; as it puts Leavis’s argument in its
proper context, that is as a defence of a principle ^in his
view ^soundly established rather than a matter of personal
aniiiiosity entertained against Snos-r. Tliis can be clarified
in the light of Collingwood’s statement that science in
itself is inadequate to explain cr account for physical and
natural phenomena
« • # since modern science is now coimitted to a view 
of the physical universe as finite, certainly in 
space end probably in time, the activity which this 
sarae science identifies with matter cannot be a 
self-created or ultimately self-dependent activity.
Identifying this activity CollingTfOOd again says:
#.# if nature bears on its face the marks of 
depending for its existence on something else, 
that something is the human mind. 2
Leavis almost reiterates this vieif saying
... there is a prior huraan achievement of 
collaborative creation, a more basic work of the 
mind of man (and more than the mind) one without 
which the triuiîÇ)hant edifice would not have been 
possible, that is the creation of the human world; 
including language. 3
Even Leavis’s parenthetical phrase ’and more than the mind’
which recalls ’the nisus’, the ’ahnung’ (a word which Leavis
associates with intuitive and divine qualities)^  the Intuition
1. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, Oxford, The Clarendon 
Press, 19U5, p.l56
2. ibid, p.l56
3. F.R. Leavis, Lectures in America, London, Chatto and "Windus, 1969, p.l6
I:. F.R. Leavis, "Justifying one’s Valuation of Blake", The Human World, 
no,7, May 1972, pp,60-63, English Literature in QUr Time and The 
University, p.3l, and Nor Shall ly Swrd, p.27
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of God has its counterpart in Collingwood»s elaboration of the
same idea. Speaking about the evolutionary nature of the mind
in terms of the innate impulse or drive to reach something
hig'ior Collingwood says:
This next higher order of quality, as yet 
unrealized, is deity, and thus God is the 
being towards idiose emergence the evolutionary 
nisus of mind is directed! 1
Collingwood*s definition of language serves to enhance
Leavis*s high claims for it.
It is an imaginative activity (says Collingwood) 
whose function is to express emotion. Intellectual 
language is this same language intellectualized or 
modified so as to express thought. I shall try to 
show that the expression of any given thought is 
eSected through the expression of the emotion 
accompanying it. 2
And since human language is essentially tinged with this nisus
or Intuition, it follows that the theory of art for art’s sake
is a fallacy, rather, a contradiction in terms# On this
point both Collingwood and Leavis are in full agreement.
Since pure imagination (says Collingwood) nowhere 
exists, since all imagination builds on fact, and 
as question, returns to fact, there is no such 
thing as autonomous and self-contained life of art, 
art for art’s sake, aesthetic experience in which 
every trace of fact is absent. Empirically we all 
know that art for art’s sales is an illusion, that 
the self-contained life of art is a mockery. 3
To clarify Collingwood’s understanding of imagination one must
add that in Collingwood one’s awareness of the outside world
1. R.G. Collingwood, op.cit, p. l6l
2. R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, London, ,
The Clarendon Press, 1938, p. 225
3. R.G# Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, Oxford, The Clarendon 
Press, 192U, p. 80
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first takes the form of impressions# These Impressions are
transformed through consciousness into the imagination# Thus
in Collingwood * s view imagination occupies an intermediate
position between the ’sensum* and the ’intellect*#  ^ Leavis*s
rejection of the theory of art for art’s sake is consistently
2
expressed in most of his works#
Countering the view of the self-contained nature of art
Collingwood says t
Imagination is not thought and unless thought is 
present there can be no imagination; yet imagination 
is the focus, the luminous centre of all thought#
The attempt at a self-contained life of art is 
therefore of necessity futile. An art which hugs 
itself in the conviction of its own self-sufficiency 
and pretends to exist for its own sake is an illusion 
and can only end by becoming invertebrate 
and unproductive# But as art actually exists not 
in this isolation, but in the closest union with 
thought, what has by thought been grasped becomes 
expressive. 3
Pursuing the same line of thought Leavis in a memorable
stateuent describes Lawrence’s genius as*
the impulse end the power to transcend the merely 
personal predicament by the intelligence that is •
imagination - or the imagination that is Intelligence.
Leavis has already shown how inseparable from such creativeness
as Lawrence’s, how essentially of so un-Plaubertian an art, is the
e
5
un-Flaubertian attitude towards life; th  reverence tha^in its
responsiveness^ is courage and vitality
1. E.G. Collingwood, op.cit, p.215
2# F.R# Leavis, The Great Tradition, pp.lR-l5, D.H. Laurence:Novellst, 
pp.26-27, Introduction to Peter Coveney’s The Image Childhood, 
p.21:, Dickens The Novelist , p#276
3. E.G. Collingwood, Outlines of A Philosophy of Art, London,
Oxford University Press, 1925, p. 97
L# F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lairence: Novelist, p.
5. »- /'tZ ^
381 •
For Collingwood as well as for Leavis aesthetic values 
ere closely intertwined with moral significances.
To set the work of art off, Collingwood argues that the
artist must have a capacity for expression; and in Collingwood
ejq>ression is the exact antithesis of statement. It has the
vital function of transmuting the material of art into a
beautiful form. Thus Collingwood distinguishes between
e:jq?ression and description. To describe is to state, to
express is to render. For Colling wood description generalizes,
but expression particularizes. "To describe a thing is to call
it a thing of such and such a kind, to bring it under a conception,
to classify it. Expression on the contrary individualizes." ^
I think that it is with this sense of individualization in mind that
Leavis attacks Eliot’s denial of the artist’s right to ’express
himself’. He says in a once ’influential» dictum • which can’t
have influenced anything but quasi-intellectual fashion;
the more perfect the artist, the more completely 
separate in him will be the man who suffers and 
the mind which ggg^es. The relevant truth, the 
clear essential/is stated when one reverses the 
dictum and says that between the man who suffers 
and the mind tdiich creates there can never be a 
separation. 2
And shovdng this truth in practice in Hiot’s own poetry Leavis 
describes Eliot’s attitude in The Waste Land as follows;
1. R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, p.112
2. F.R. Leavis, Lectures in America, p.33
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The disthnctive attitude towards, the feeling about, 
the relations between men and women that predominates 
in the poem is the highly personal one we know so well 
from the earlier poems; the symbolic Waste Land makes 
itself felt too much as Thcmias Steams Eliot’s. 1
(in his critical practice Eliot tardily came to realize that
the poet can express his personal life in art in his essay 
2
on Yeats.
Collingwood defines art as ’the immediacy of experience’,^  
and he imbues the word ’ immediacy’ with connotations that - 
combine the beauty of form with truth to life or experience*
Leavis uses ’immediacy’ in a similar fashion, perhaps, in
the course of his commentary on Affray’s life in Little Dorrlt ,;
At the heart of it his (Clennam’s) mother presided, 
inflexible of face, indomitable of will, and austerely 
opposing herself to the great final secret of all life,
- is associated with the disturbing monitions coming 
to us in the force of Dickens’s prose with the immediacy 
of actual sensations; and having in terms of the 
symbolic - significance, a charging effect (the 
symbolism works as immediately as metaphor ) that there 
is no need to enlarge tpon. ^
For both Collingwood and Leavis the aesthetic and the moral
are identified (a view that had already been brought heme by
Santayana). Defining this relationship Collingifood says:
Now religion is art asserting! its object.
The object of art is the beautiful, and 
therefore the holy is the beautiful asserted 
as real. 5
1. Ibid, p.1:1
2. T.S. Eliot, On Poetry and Poets, p. 255 and cf the chapter 
on Santayana.
3. R.G. Collingwood, Outlines of a Philosophy of Art, p.97
1:. F.H. & Q.D. Leavis, Dickens The Novelist, London, Chatto and 
Windus, 1970, pp. 26ïr265
5. R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 120
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In another context he says:
For religion God is not one cause, but the 
supreme cause of causes, so for art, beauty 
is not one concept, but the very soul and 
secret of the world.
Soliciting Keats’s famous epithet in support of this view 
he goes on
Beauty is truth, truth beauty. ^
It is again in line with Collingwood*s central theme that both 
expression and intuition are co-efficient and simultaneous (a 
concept that he originally derives from Croce). Drawing on 
the same principle, Leavis, in the course of his coimentary 
on Collingwood* s view, which he quotes in his essay on Blake, 
says:
That would seem to be closely related to the 
intultion.uni^  stakabl^  and inevitably asking 
to be called râigious, as the great writer 
conveys it, expressed in Blake’s insistence 
that he does not belong to himself. 2
In Collingwood’s idea that ’beauty is the guise under which
3
ideas in general appear*, we find a hint of what Leavis*s
at
Use of the word •cons'^ tion’ is to convey - the presentation 
of ideas in a convincing literary form. Talking about Anna 
Karenina, Leavis says "... the book gives the compelling 
constatation of a truth about human life." ^
Both Collingwood and Leavis are in accord as to the 
function of the critic. "The critic’s business" says Coilingwod.
1. R.G, Collingwood, Outlines of a Philosophy of Art, p.67
2. The I-Iuman World, May 1972, p. 63
3. R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p.66
L. Fll. Leavis, Anna Karenina and Other Essays, p.23
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Is to establish a consistent usage of termsj to 
settle the nomenclature of various things which 
come before him conpeting for a given namej saying 
this is ar1^  that is not art, and being an e:^ ert 
in this business, performing it with authority. A 
person qualified so to perform it is called a judge: 
and judgment means verdict. 1 /
In another context Collingwood defines this function in more
articulate fashion;
h’hat is usually called criticism is the mere 
exqiression of opinion upon the aesthetic qualities 
of works of art. It is in fact what has been • 
called appreciation. The true function of the art-critic 
is not simply to say that he likes this and dislikes 
that, but to explain works of art, that is to say, to 
put people including himself in possession of 
information which will enable them to appreciate 
intelligently. 2
Leavis holds similar views saying;
The analysis and judgment of works of literary art 
belong to the literary critic, who is one in so far 
as he observes a disciplined relevance in réponse, 
comment and determination of significance* 3
The apprehension of the work of art envisaged by the critic 
taJces the fom of an assimilative activity designated by Leavis 
as a process of recreation and by CollingiTOod as an imaginative 
construction or re-enactment (the reader is not far away from 
Leavis’s major term ’enactment»). Here we come to grips with 
a major theme that binds Leavis to a host of philosophers 
including VJhitehead, Collingwood, Polanyi, Marjorie Grene and 
Maurice Natanson; but it is with Collingwood that the present 
discussion concerns itself# The point is that the critic, the 
historian or the knower must positively end personally participate
1. R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, pp. 88-69
2. E.G. Collingwood, Outlines of a Philosophy of Art, p. 100
3. F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p. 22U
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in the assesssnent or judgment of a given material or work of
art# In a lecture entitled *Ihe Historical Imagination’ a title
at once suggestive and explanatory of the part played by the
historian in shaping his authorities end data in terms of personal
logic Collingwood says;
The historian who tries to work on the common-sense 
theory, and accurately reproduce what he finds in his 
authorities resoxhles a landscape-painter idio tries to 
work that theoiy of art which bids the artist copy . 
nature# Ee may fancy that he is reproducing In his 
Own medipm the actual sliapes and colours of natural 
things, but however hard he tries to do this, he is 
always selecting, simplifying, schematizing, leaving 
out what he t^ iinks unimportant and putting in what 
he regards as essential# It is the artist and not 
nature that is responsible for what goes on into the 
picture# In the same way, no historian, not even the 
worst, merely copies out his authorities, even if he 
puts in nothing of his own (which is never really 
possible), he is leaving cut things, which for one 
reason or another, he decides that his work does not 
need or cannot use# It is he^ therefore, and not his 
authority that is responsible for what goes in# On 
that question he is his own master. 1
Historical judgmmt is thus tinged witli the imaginative
perception of the historian, who questions his material,
reasons it out and orders it along newly personal lines# This
procedure involves a great deal of critical effort largely
exerted by Imagination. "The A Priori imagination which does
the work(of historical construction supplies the mean of
2historical criticism as well".
To the historian - Colling>70od says in another context - 
the activities vhose history he is studying arc not 
spectacles to be vjatched, but experiences to be lived 
through in his own mind; they are objective or known 
to him only because tiicy are also subjective or 
activities of his om» 3
1. R.G. Collingwood, The Historical Imagination, Oxford,
The Clarendon Press, 1935, p.6
2. ibid, p.17
3» R.G. Collingwood, Human Nature and Human Hi story, London 
IW^hrey Milford, p.l8
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This view is consistently maintained in almost all Collingwood *s
tjritings. Speaking about the reader’s partaking of the
apprehension of the work of art he says:
The imaginary experience which we get from the 
picture is not merely the kind of experience the 
picture is capable of arousing, it is the kind 
of experience we are capable of having. 1
In a sliiiilar way Leavis says: "LTiat we perceive depends on what
we bring to the perceiving. In point of fact this view has
already received full expression in Santayana as he says:
Vhat will decide us to like or not to like the 
type of our apperception will be not so much what 
this type is, as its fitness to the context of 
our mind. 3
Anticipating Polanyi’s view on personal knowledge and Marjorie 
Grene’s The Knower and The Knoim, Collingwood in another 
context says "The knower and the known are interdependent. ^ 
Furthermore the participation in the apprehension of the given 
material means that the critic or historian aligns himself 
temporarily with this material or achieves a kind of ’interiorization’ 
or ’indwelling’ to use the words of Polanyi who pursues the same 
line of thought. This personal contribution made by the 
historian or critic to the understanding and judgment of an 
incident or a work of art implies the principle of historical 
relativity:
1. R.G, CollingxTOod, The Principles of Art, p.l50
2. F.R. Leavis, The Great Tradition , p.54
3. George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty. p.ll5
4» R.G^  Collingwood, An Autobiography , Oxford University 
Press, 1939, p.45
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## history, as In all serious matters, (says 
Collingwood) no achievenent is final. The evidence 
available for solving any given problem changes 
with every change of historical method and with every 
variation in the competence of historians. The 
principles by which this evidence is interpreted 
change too, since the interpreting of evidence is a 
task to idiich a man must bring everything he knows; 
historical knowledge, knowledge of nature and man, 
mathematical knowledge, philosophical knowledge, 
and not knowledge only, but mental habits and '
possessions of every kind, and none of these is . 
unchanging. 1
This principle is seen at work in Leavis* s writing. It
manifests itself in his criticism of Dickens. Speaking
about his preference for Forster’s Life of Dickens Leavis
says that it "gives us the sense, as no other biographer
does or now can, of being in the same room as Dickens, and
even more important of being really inx^ ard with Dickens’s
personality and character." And again he says:
I TOit offer to elaborate the parallel between 
Shakespeare’s development as the great popular 
playwright of our dramatic efflorescence and 
Dickens’s as the marvellously fertile, supremely 
successful and profoundly creative ejq>loiter of 
tie Victorian market for fiction. 3
His particular interest in Hard Times and Little Dorrlt
largely ©aanates from their immediate iii^ ingoTient on our
technologico-Benthamite age. In D.H. Lavjrence: Novelist
he saysi "The point I am making is that Lawrence is incomparably
the greatest creative writer in English of our tlmë]^ ^
Clarifying his singling out of the University as a temporary
1# R.G. Collingwood, Historical Imagination, p.20 
2# F.H. & Q.D. Leavis, Dickens The Novelist, p.X
3. ibid, p.214
4-f F.R. Leavls, D.H. Lat^ ence Novelist, p. 18
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resolution of our contemporary cultural crisis Leavis speaks in
tema of historical relativity sayings
The University as I contend for it is not an 
ultiinate human goal; it is an ansifer to a .
present extremely urgent need of civilization. , ,
Illuminating Blake’s significance he says; "I am postulating
that Blake is a major value; and one of peculiar inportance 
2for our time.** Elaborating on this importance he says in 
anoth^ context %
• «• hhat he did achieve justifies us in imputing 
to him astonishing genius. It puts us in a position 
to see and say what, as achievement, it was-^dch is 2 
to realize its bearing on the sicîcness of our world.
It is with Leavis’s recently most acute sense of the
maladies of our o-m cge, however, that we may pass most
conveniently from consideration of the significance of
Collingwood to that of Polanyi. Leavis* s allusions to the
significant ideas of Polanyi have already been partly referred
to, but as Leavis has become very much interested in him recently
it may be viorth while to consider some of Leavis* s quotations
from him in the light of his general philosophy. However, it
is -pertinent to clarify one or two points related to Polanyi* s
significance for Leavis. First Polanyi was originally a
scientist, a professor of physical chemistry at the University of
Manchester and this fact supports Leavis in his struggle to
establish a basically human culture from a non-specialist
standpoint and helps to exonerate hiau from the charge of
1. F.R. Leavis "on Justifying one’s Valuation of Blake" 
The Human World, no.7, May 1972, p. 42
2. F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall Ky Si-?ord, p.l4
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’llterarism*. Furthenaore, Polanyi’s radical theory is that 
the discoveries end advances of science and technology, however 
great and substantial they may be, are in themselves lifeless 
and inanimate; they can be breathed life into only by the 
operative and evaluative activities of man. This theory 
strikes the dominant note in Leavis's recent criticism of 
modem industrial and mechanical civilization. It assert a 
man’s inalienable sovereignty over the machinery of modern 
industrial civilization. If Collingwood asserts that the wrld 
of nature - in itself is not self-sufficient and makes no sense 
without the intervention of the centrally illuminating human 
perception, Polanyi argues that the tools or the machinery of 
modern life are in themselves insignificant unless they are 
indwelt or co-habited by a human being, unless a human touch 
is infused into then* But this seems to be an oversimplification# 
The subject requires a more elaborate treatment.
The main argument in Polanyi* s Personal Knowledge, is that 
our understanding of the outside world depends basically on our 
perception. Ijhat we perceive is bilateral in the s&ise that 
it may take the form either of * focal* or ’ subsidiary’ 
awareness (Polanyi varies the terms and sometimes uses ’distal* 
and * proximal* as equivalents.) To perceive an outside object 
we must shift our attention from subsidiary to focal awareness 
of that object. This shift marks the diversion of our attention 
from the object as an entity to the significance or the meaning 
of that object. This process is termed by Polanyi ’tacit
1, Leavis says "The term* literarism* was in fact coined by the 
late Aldous Euxlqy for use against me". Nor Shall Sword, 
Pt 139
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inference’ or alternatively the shift from the explicit
to the ’tacit’ awareness of that object. To perform
this process we must interiorize the object or dwell in it.
It is through this indwelling that the object is rendered
meaningful and significant. Similarly it is by alienating
the object from us that it becomes devoid of any significance*
Hence arises the radical conception that knowledge is
integrated through a personal participation or endowment on
the part of the knower - "All tacit knowing" - says Polanyi -
"requires the continued participation of the knower, and a
measure of personal participation is intrinsic therefore to 
<1
all knowledge". This conception logically implies belief
that absolute objectivity or utter depersonalization is a
fallacy, if not an absurdity.
An atterfÇ)t to depersonalize our knowledge of 
living beings would result, if strictly pursued, 
in an alienation that would render all observations 
on living things meaningless* Taken to its 
theoretical limits, it i^jould dissolve the very 
conception of lif and make it impossible to 
identify living beings, 2
Corollary to this conception and logically conducive to 
its reinforc^ent is Polanyi’s insistence on the difference 
betiveen inanimate nature and living mechanisms* His argument 
in this connection is based on a hierarchical system to thich 
the various ingredients that build up the machines are subject. 
The functioning of any particle in a machine is conditioned by 
the operation of lower particles; and in turn contributes to 
the functioning of higher ones* This is what Polanyi calls
1, Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being, (ed) Marjorie Grene, 
Rout ledge k Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 1 >2
2* ib id .
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’boundary conditions’# These structural levels are graded
by human efforts and are bound to serve human ends# The
laws of physics and chemistry may help in constructing the
machine, but they fail to exj^ lain the kind of service it can
render us# It is the human factor that determines or rather
dictates this particular service or significance# The
interaction of certain chemical compounds within the framework
of a given machine or the functioning of physical organs in a
living being is in itself immaterial# hhat actually counts
is the existence of an essential human being that constructs
the machine and interprets the value of Its operation. In
view of this fact Polanyi says:
If all men were exterminatecÿ this would not 
affect the laws of inanimate nature, but the 
production of machines would stop, and not 
until men arose again, could machines be 
formed once more. Some animals can produce 
toolsj but only men can construct machines; 
machines are human artifacts, made of 
Inanimate material. 1
The same principleliholda with regard to living organisms.
If the particles that build up the machine are in themselves
inadequate to account for the operation and value of the
machine, the organs of a living being that harmoniously function
in such a way as to preserve the life of this being are equally
insufficient to explain the value of any of these organs in
sustaining the life of this being. This value is primarily
defined by human criteria and not in pathological or
physüogical terms* In the light of this view Polanyi cones
to the conclusion that ’the morphology of living things transcends
the laws of physios and chemistry*.
1, ibid. P.22S
2. ibid. p. 227
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Polanyi, like Collingwood, believes that it is only through
a metaphysical or transcendental apprehension of the natural
and material world that we can comprehend its function and
interpret its purpose • a vieif that is fully endorsed and
applied by Leavis in his critiques# This comprehension takes
the form of consciousness or what Polanyi calls *imag5jiation*
1
or ’intuition* , it is obvious that both Collingwood and
Polanyi are driving at the same end, using more or less the ^
same vocabulary, and Leavis is following suit# The same
procedure applies to mathematical knowledge# Symbols and
nuinbors are in th®iselves nonsensical, unless they are
interpreted by a thinking mind# The discovery end solution
of a problsn is ultimately suggested by man# Hence Polanyi
repudiates explicit knowledge and positive logic#
An exact mathematical theory means nothing unless 
we recognize an inexact non-mathematicaL knowledge 
on which it bears and a person whose judgment 
upholds this bearing# 2
This is the major theme underlying Leavis’s life-long 
campaign for ’the human World’ for the indispensability of 
the human element even in this technologico-Benthamite 
Civilization# Such a civilization would be meaningless 
without the existence of a human mind that could give it value and 
significance# This gives rise to Snow’s erroneous view 
expressed in his ’Two Cultures’ - a lecture that has been the 
subject of attack by both Polanyi and Leavis# To discuss 
polanyi’s reaction to Snow*s*Ttito Cultures ’is to become again 
conscious of certain ideas shared by Polanyi and Leavis#
1# ibid, p# 210 
2# ibid, p# 195
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In 1959 Polanyi published an article in Encounter called 
•The Two Cultures» in reply to G .P. Snow’s own The’TifO Cultures’#
In Snow’s lecture the human cultural tradition is split up into 
scientific and literary.*
I believe the intellectual life of the vdiole of 
Western society is increasingly being ^lit into 
two polar groups# Two polar groups, at one pole 
we have the lierary intellectuals, who incidentally 
while no one was looking took to referring to 
themselves as though there were no others# 1
At the other pole he places the scientists# In the course 3f the
lecture he stigmatizes the men of letters who advocate traditional
humane culture in the face of a growing scientific revolution as
2
’natural luddites’# He maintains that such men are completely 
indifferent to the glorious achieveraents of science and the rosy 
prospects it opens up for the poor. To him, men like Euslcin,, 
William î-krris, Thor eau, Bnerson and Lawrence are trying hard, 
but in vain to stem the tide of an engulfing scientific and 
industrial civilization# Their endeavours amount to no more than
3
I screams of horror ’ # They speak ’as though the scientific edifice 
of the physical world was not in its intellectual depth, complexity 
and articulation, the most beautiful and vjonderful collective work 
of the mind of man’ # ^  The traditional culture they foster is 
on the decline idlereag that of the scientists is on the rise# The
scientists ’have the future in their bones’# Every new
scientist is assured of a rewarding job and a hand seme income
1# G.P# Snow, The Two Cultures And The Scientific Revolution, 
The Rede Lecture, Cambridge University Press, p#4.
2* ibid, p.21
3# ibid, p#24
4# ibid, p#l4
5# ib id , p#11
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whereas the sense of discontent voiced by the men of letters
is due to under-employment and material insecurity. It is
the scientists that provide ’jam* today and secure it for
tomorrow. The complacent, self-assured and blatantly material
tone of Snow is obvious. This complacency is countered by
Polanyi’s astute coxnmendary:
... it would be easy to show that the principles 
of scientific rationalism are strictly speaking 
nonsensical. No human mind can function without . 
accepting authority, custom^ and tradition^  it must 
rely on them for the mere use of language. Empirical 
induction, strictly applied, can yield no knowledge at 
all, and the mechanistic explanation of the universe 
is a meaningless ideal. Not because of the much 
invoked principle of Indeterminacy, which is irrelevant, 
but because the prediction of all atomic positions in the 
universe would not answer any (Question of interest to 
anybody, and as to the naturalistic explanation of 
morality, it must ignore, and so by implication deny 
the very existence of human responsibility. It too 
is absurd, 1
In this quotation Polanyi seems to be foreshadowing, or 
rather forecasting, what in its general outlines, constitutes 
Leavis's leading idea in his retort to Snow’s Two Cultures.
The fact that Polanyi’s essay was published in the sane year as 
Snow’s, that is in 1p59 and that Leavis*s Two Cultures ? The 
Significance of G.P. Snow was published in The Spectator in 
1962, that is three years later may confirm the view that Leavis 
was familiar with, and dependent on it, in his reply* Wiat 
Leavis adds to Polanyi’s argument is a denonstration of the 
egotistic and arrogant tone of Snow* In this connection it 
should be emphasized that Polanyi’s assault on positive logic 
and imperfect scientific criteria permeates all his writings* 
"Scientific obscurantism" says Polanyi, "has pervaded our
1. Michael polanyi, op.cit, pp. 41-U2
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culture and distorts even science itself by iirposing on it false 
ideals of exactitude*"** Again he says: "the disregard of truth
in favour of hard-boiled scientific ideals has spread confusion
2and led eventually to sinister results," In another context 
Folanyl says:
*.* if we decided to examine the universe objectively 
in the sense of paying equal attention to portions of 
equal mass, this would result in a life-long pre­
occupation with interstellar dust, relieved only at 
brief intervals by a survey of incadescent masses of * 
hydrogen - not in a thousand million lifetimes would 
the turn come to give man a second’s notice. It goes 
without saying that no one - scientists included - 
looks at the universe that way, whatever lip-service 
is given to ’objectivity». Nor should this surprise.us 
For as human beings, we must inevitably see the 
universe from a centre lying within ourselves and speak 
about it in terms of a hum,an language shaped by the 
esd-gencies of human intercourse. Any attanpt 
rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from 
our picture of the world must lead to absurdity, 3
These pronouncements show Polanyi suggesting a principle of
relativity favoured by both Collingwood end Leavis* Polanyi’s
repudiation of scientific rationalism forms the cornerstone in
Leavis’s criticism of Sncn^ j largely accounts for his recognition
of Dicliens’s achievement and is seen to be operating at its
highest in his essay on Blake, Polanyi’s disavowal of the
ruthless mechanistic view of the universe is a favourite
procedure in Leavis’s criticism, Kis stress on the significance
of authority, custom and tradition sets us on the right track and
ensures the continuity of the human trddition and by implication
indicates that there is only one tradition, and so one culture;
1, ibid, p.42
2.^  ibid, p.43^  '
3. Personal Knowledge, p.3*
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and this is Leavis*s principal object in his rebuke of Snow,
This continuity manifests itself in a common language that 
binds people to each other. The fact that Polanyi singles 
out language as a manifestation of human community induces 
Leavis to underscore the vitality of language as a ’collaborative 
activity’, whenever he takes up the topic of Culture and 
Education in his recent critical writings, Leavis’s definition 
of language as ’the third realxa* has become a commonplace in his 
writings. His rendering absurd of naturalistic morality (not 
the Rousseauistic spontaneous morality which Leavis favours as 
he. explicitly maintains in his Introduction to The Image of 
Childhood, but the mechanistic Benthamite one) is a radical 
principle effectively at work in both Leavis and CollingX'jood,
The sense of human responsibility that this morality loses 
sight of is drawn upon in Leavis’s criticism of Dickens and 
Plaice, The phrase ’human responsibility’ looms significantly 
large in his Introduction to Nor Shall My Sword, The phrase is 
repeated nine times in tliis introduction; and Leavis acknowledges 
indebtedness to Polanyi when he refers it back to the 
philosopher as a word he uses and emphasizes. It may be
parenthetically observed that both Polanyi and Leavis openly 
indict ’the positive logic of enlightenment* using almost the 
same terms to indicate its failure to cope with vital human issues. 
Unlike Snow, Polanyi belives that scientists and int^lectuals have 
a suprene mission superior to that of ensuring material well-being 
- a mission that can be conceived in human and moral terms
1, F,R, Leavis, Nor Shall Ky Sword., London, Chatto and Windus, 
1972, p.23
2, In Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge, p,li3 and Leavis, Nor Shall 
Py Sword, pp. 12-13
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'Tor we scientists are pledged to values more precious than
material welfare and to service more urgent than that of
1material welfare”* It is this concern with human and moral
values that forms the guiding principle in Leavis* s literary
criticiai. Commenting on Snow* s imperfect understanding that
ideal life can be created in an atmosphere of material
prosperity and technological advance Leavis says ;
The upshot is that if you insist on the need for " 
any other kind of concern, entailing forethought , 
action and provision, about the human future • 
any other kind of misgiving *• than that which 
talks in terms of productivity,, material standards 
of living, hygienic and technological progress, 
you are a Luddite* 2
To Leavis*s mind Snow's apotheosis of science prepares the way
for a computerized age in wMch mental creativity will be
cancelled and human and moral values will be out of place* But
Leavis* s condemnation of mechanical life, of positive logic and
the mathematical calculus has a literary significance added to
it as an indispensable moral and human neW., for it pertains
immediately to the function of the artist. Creativity for the
artist is originality, not repetition, newness and not conformity
to types; and to maintain this creativity the artist has to
resist all kinds of codification and rationalization* ,
To be spontaneous; and in its spontaneity creative, 
is of the essence of life wMch manifests itself in 
nev/ness, that can't be exhaustively reduced to the
determined whatever some biologists may hope* 3
1* Ilichael Polanyi, The Logic of liberty^  London, Routledge and 
hegan Paul, P#o
2* F*R. Leavis, The Two Cultures, p.19
3# F*R, Leavis, her Shall Hy Sword, p*
» 298 -
Leavis interprets this life in Laurentian terms; that is, in
its hidden, so far unexplored depths and not in its superficial
and shallow manifestations* To Leavis the artist is a refined
psychologist exploring the workings of the human psyche* Tiis
penetration into the life of individuals has a human and therefore
a moral value* Thus in vindicating a human and a ^iritual life
against the background of a material, rational and mechanical
civilization, Leavis is simultaneously vindicating the undeniable
claims of the artist. The artist, as Leavis shows in his
interpretation of Blake, is the apostle of human and moral values.
khen Leavis explicates Blake's insight into human nature he seons
to be recasting the original philosophical principles of Polanyi,
which he moulds into a poetic context
... ye see that the education of his powers of expression 
that went with his addiction to Shakespeare^  was 
 ^inseparably^  an education of his power to perceive, to 
recognize and to imagine - and 'imagine' lays the stress
on the heuristic aspect of creative expression; that is .
on the perception; that is, or that becomes y discovery.
imagination and discovery are Polanyi's central clues to human
perception. It is worthwhile noticing that the notion of
discovery, of intuition is the dominant theme in Leavis's justification
of Plaice's poetic achievement, heanwhile Polanyi's insistence on
personal intuition as a key to all knowledge provides Leavis with
a solid base on which to build his justification of the suprme
delineation of Plaice's poetry* The recognition of individual
entities as intrinsically valuable in their concrete existence
is bound to shatter the aggregating rational logic and the objective
method of science*
1* F.R, Leavis, 'Justifying one's Valuation of Blake', 
The human World, no.7, Hay 1972, p*5U
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;
To generalize is to be an idiot# Blake Insists 
on the truth that life is 'there* only in the 
individualXand that lives can't be aggregated, 
generalize, or dealt with qualtitatively in any 
way# It is a disastrous illusion that we can 
attain to the real by an abstracting process or that 
perception is a matter of passive exposure to an 
objective world of which science gives a true report# 
The eye is part of the brain, and the brain is a 
representative of the living whole, an agent of the 
psyche^ , perception is creative# 1
It is tills perception that induces Leavis to assign a high
value to the Romantic movement saying that it has added
something positive to 'the hui,ian heritage',  ^ (the phrase
is near in formulation to Polanyi*s 'cultural heritage*^ )#
It again prospts him to associate Blake with Dickens# Relating
Dickens to the Romantic tradition he describes him as 'having
confirmed the intuitions and affirmations that, present
organically in the structure and significance of Hard Times and
Little Dorrit, make one think of Blalce#* ^ He Identifies
Blalce's bri&en with Dickens's Gradgrind in Hard Times. This
affinity is argued in more detail in the lengthy chspter on
Dickens and Blake wherein Leavis says
The value of Dickens's vindication of the spirit 
lies in its being a great artist's, as Blake's 
is; and that kind of vindication has a peculiar 
importance for us today# 5
This vindication can be taken as embodied in Dickens's
indictment of the rigidly rationalized and scientifically
1# F#R. Leavis, Introduction to Peter Coveney's The Image of 
Childhood, London, Penguin Books, 1966, p#l6
2# F*R, Leavis, Dickens The Novelist, p. 276 and Peter Coveney's 
Image of Childhood, p#19
3# 1-d.chael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p# 137
ij.* Peter Coveney, The Image of Childhood, p.19
F.R# & Q.D# Leavis, Dickens The Novelist, p. 270
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organized society that for Snow is an ultimate ideal, and for
Leavis a thwarting and spiritually depraving phenomenon.
To those troubled by the vanishing of what humanity 
more and more desperately needs, if it i^not ta be 
deprived of all that makes it human, the/society of 
organization, social science, 'welfare', equality 
end statistics is as erpty a nothing as the society 
of manners and exclusiveness. 1
The quotation is extracted from one of Leavis's commentaries on
the inadequacies of the falsely conceived, self-sufficient life
of the Gaw-an-Barnacle world in Little Dorrit.
In his 'English, unrest and Continuity', Leavis recommends
Ilarjorie Grene's The Knower end The KnoTm# as a worthwhile text
for students interested in humanities, end in his essay on Elake ^
he quotes from this book an extract supporting a 'revolution of
life against dead nature and of understanding against the calculi
of logical machines' Karjorie Grene is a student of Fiichael
Polrmyi and she dedicates The Knower and the Eno^ gito him. Moreover
the substance of the book is an elaboration of Polanyi's Personal
Knowledge as she says in her introduction i
My own starting point is the theory of Knowledge 
developed by îüichael Polanyi in Personal Knowledge 
and other writings, or better in my interpretation 
of that theory. §
^plifying on Polanyi's view of 'problem-solving' she points out
that whenever there is a problem requiring solution we are focaUy
1. ibid, p.273
2. F,R. Leavis, Nor Shall ly Sword, p. 126
3. F.R. Leavis, The Human V^ orld, p.62 
h. ibid, p. 62
5» Marjorie Grene, The Knower and The Knom, London, Faber and 
Faber, 1966, p.lU
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aware of that problem; that is, we are wrestling with it in a bid
to find a solution* The clues through which we seek the solution are
related not only to the solution but to ourselves also.
So we live in the tension between what we are and what 
we seek; between the world whose facticity we share and 
ourselves whose shaping makes the world a world - our 
eiqjlicit awareness, the focal core of consciousness is always 
founded in and carried by the tacit acceptance of scmiething 
not e^ qplicit which binds heavily and concretely ourselves to 
and within our world. This means that knowledge is always 
personal. The impersonal aspect of knowledge arises from 
end returns to personal participation in the search for and 
acceptance of the object to be fcnotn. For only the 
e:iplicit, formulable core of knowledge, can be transferred, 
neutrally from person to person. Its implicit base 
(since it is not verbalized and cannot be formulated and 
so impersonalized) must be the groping, the orientation, 
and re-orientation of someone. 1
In another context she says:
The transition from particulars to general laws, still 
more from general laws to explanatory theories necessarily 
entails a leap, an interpretation of clues not inh^ent in 
tiie clues themselves. It is an achievement as much of 
imagination as of intellect. The mark of scientific 
originality is to find significant pattern where others 
could not see it. 2
Marjorie Grene argues that Kant's empirical method, taken on 
its own terras, is inadequate and even unintelligible. It is rendered 
meaningful only through the interpretation, rather the mediation of 
Bertrand Russell; and in the field of pragmatic thought we are not 
simply concerned with mathematical associations, but are making 
appraisals.
Thus empirical proc^ures, whether interpreted 
intellectually or pragmatically, are philosophically 
Inadequate in the sense that they cannot, on their 
own principles account for themselves. 3
This means that the human mind has to contribute something to the
clarification and interpretation of the given object.
1. ibid, pp. 2h-25
2. ibid, p. hh
3. ibid. p. 118
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There Is always involved In the content of the mind 
from perception all the way to mathematical knowledge 
something more than the items which we could count 
up if we really went back to the history of our 
thought as the progressive filling in of a tabular rasa. 
And it is this something more which makes ideas 
meaningful, which makes experience experience and not 
just a blooming-buzz sensation. 1
From this it follows that absolute objectivity is almost
a myth since the evaluative activity, the appraisal is relative
to the person who carries it on. To evaluate an object, in %
linguistic terns we must not only use symbols but dwell in the
language that sets forth that object. To dwell in that
language means to add something personal to it, and in so doing
to enrich it. Thus language is "itself a growing world of
meanings within meanings, which we not only use for practical
ends, but dwell in as the very fabric of our being, idiile at
the same tiiTie changing it by our participation in it, enacting
2the history of language in our history.” One may indicate 
In this context that the style of Grene in this quotation is 
the kind of style that appeals to Leavis. 'Interiorization' 
and 'enactment* are favourite tools in liis criticism. VJhat 
is more significant here is that the underlying identification 
of language with the individuals who use it, develop and change 
it on a basis of personal participation will account for 
Leavis*s insistence that the Romantic movement has enriched the 
•human heritage*. To have a reciprocal intercourse between the 
personal feeling of an individual and the language embodying that
1. Ibid, p. 153
2, Ibid, p. ITij.
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feeling, that is, a sense of spontaneous expression, is of the
essence of Romanticism, In that personal mode the Romantics
were spontaneously engaged in language and simultaneously
enriching it. For Leavis language or literature is a major
manifestation of human tradition.
In her introduction to The Knower and The Kno>m , Marjorie
Grene deplores the fact that she was not able to have access
to Maurice Nat an son's Literature, Philosophy and The Social Sciences,
as it had not yet been published.^  ijatanson*s drift in that book
is phenomenological and impinges directly on the views of both
Polanyi and Grene. The positive contributory part played by
the Icnower in what is sought to be loiown is emphasized all through.
Mhat is mere interesting is that Natan son speaks of this activity
in the sphere of literature and witiiin a framework that reminds
us of both Leavis and Santayana. The point is that in composing
a work of art the artist is driving at a certain intention, but
his readers or audiences may interpret that work in a way different
from the original intention of the artist as they reconstruct for
th ms elves the significance of that ifork.
The intended unity which the artist constitutes 
originally in his art--tjork is taken up by the 
audience, they too must reconstruct for themselves 
the meaning complex at hand, the art-obj ect. Thus 
art commences with the act of intention on the 
part of the artist and depends for its existence 
upon the audience vdiich experiences it. 2
To Natan son perception is possible only tîirough a process of
reduction and reconstruction; that is to say that the reader or
spectator has to assimilate loiowledge, to reduce it to reasonable
and intelligible limits. This is what Natanson calls 'bracketing»,
1. ibid, p,l6
2# Maurice Natanson, Literature, Philosophy and The Social Sciences, 
The Hague, Martinus Nizhoff, 1962, P.8I4.
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In doing Tdilch the reader has personally to shape his fcD.owledge
or experience. The object underlying this 'bracketing* or
compression is to bring the material to a sort of unity or
order. The theory smacks of existentiaiJLsni but what interests
us in it is its relevance to the topic under review; namely the
participation of the individual in any kind of knowledge he is
bound to set forth or in the appreciation of any work of art he
sets out to criticize.
The reduction and reconstruction which are the grounds 
for such unity may be understood as aspects of a 
generalized phenomenology of consciousness in which 
are located the roots of art-creation, art*appreciation 
and the fundamental relationship of the artist to his 
product. 1
In dealing with Collingwood, I did not trace or take into 
account his development as alphilosopher because what pertains 
to this study is only some of the leading ideas in his philosophy 
as a -vdiole « ideas that appealed to Leavis and were consequently 
utilized in the body of his criticism. In connection with 
Polanyi Leavis* s interest in the social, rather human aspects 
of literature becomes much more articulate* Both Colling wood 
and Polanyi assert the supremacy of the illuminatingly huiiian 
imagination and intuition over the computerized elements of 
modern mechanical civilization - and this is a principle of the 
utmost importance to the essaatially 'humane* criticism of Leavis. 
Both affirm the organic, indivisible nature of the human tradition, 
the onmess of the 'human heritage* and this is diametrically 
opposed to the dualism of C.P. Snow. In other words they discredit
1. ibid, p. 89
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the idea of bifurcation and in so doing affirm a 
principle dear to Leavis and also to be found in the 
philosophy of A.H. bhitehead.
Finally, in the extension of Polanyi* s thinking in 
the works of Grene and Natanson, the congruence of those 
ideas in Leavis*s work with which I have been most concerned 
in this thesis with phenomenological philosophy becomes '
overt, revealing the modern aspect of Leavis* s Rcmianticisni 
most cle^ urly and explaining the relation between his work 
and that of his former pupil David Holbrook, whose own concern 
has been largely with phenonouological and existential 
analysis of literature .
1. cf the chapter on Mhitehead.
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